green
Positive treatment
Quoted verbatim 2×
11.2 score
“the constitutional validity of the section rests on the right and power of the united states to secure the efficient execution of its laws and to prevent interference therewith, due to possible local prejudice...”
Treatment trajectory · 1926 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1926
1976
2026
Top citers, strongest first. 33 distinct citers.
How cited ↗
examined
Cited as authority (quoted)
Mayor of Balt. v. BP P. L.C.
the constitutional validity of the section rests on the right and power of the united states to secure the efficient execution of its laws and to prevent interference therewith, due to possible local prejudice...
examined
Cited as authority (quoted)
New York v. De Vecchio
(3×)
also: Cited "see", Cited "see, e.g."
soper (no. 1)
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Rury v. Gandy
Ed. 55 ; Maryland v. Soper, 46 S. Ct. 185, 192, 194 , 70 L.
discussed
Cited "see"
James Latiolais v. Eagle, Incorporated
(2×)
See Maryland v. Soper, 270 U.S. 9 , 46 S. Ct. 185 (1926); Willingham v. Morgan, 395 U.S. 402 , 89 S. Ct. 1813 (1969); Jefferson County v. Acker, 527 U.S. 423 , 119 S. Ct. 2069 (1999).
discussed
Cited "see"
Lorita Savoie v. Huntington Ingalls, Inc.
See id. (“State-court proceedings may reflect ‘local prejudice’ against unpopular federal laws or federal officials.” (quoting Maryland v. Soper (No. 1), 270 U.S. 9, 32 , 46 S.Ct. 185 , 70 L.Ed. 449 (1926))); Willingham v. Morgan, 395 U.S. 402, 405 , 89 S.Ct. 1813 , 23 L.Ed.2d 396 (1969) (“Obviously, the removal provision was an attempt to protect federal officers from interference by hostile state courts.”).
discussed
Cited "see"
Henry Ruppel v. CBS Corporation
(2×)
also: Cited "see, e.g."
See Maryland v. Soper (No. 1), 270 U.S. 9, 30 , 46 S.Ct. 185 , 70 L.Ed. 449 (1926) (private individual acting as chauffeur for agents entitled to removal, although the Court denied removal for other reasons); Davis v. South Carolina, 107 U.S. 597, 600 , 2 S.Ct. 636 , 27 L.Ed. 574 (1883) (noting “the protection which the law thus furnishes to the marshal and his deputy, also shields all who lawfully assist him in the performance of his official duty”).
cited
Cited "see"
Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation v. Barack Obama
See generally Maryland v. Soper, 270 U.S. 9 , 46 S.Ct. 185 , 70 L.Ed. 449 (1926); Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. 257 , 25 L.Ed. 648 (1879); Seth P. Waxman & Trevor W.
cited
Cited "see"
Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation, Inc. v. Obama
See generally Maryland v. Soper, 270 U.S. 9 , 46 S.Ct. 185 , 70 L.Ed. 449 (1926); Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. 257 , 25 L.Ed. 648 (1879); Seth P. Waxman & Trevor W.
cited
Cited "see"
People v. Clarke
See Maryland v. Soper, (No. 1), 270 U.S. 9, 33 , 46 S. Ct. 185, 189 , 70 L.
discussed
Cited "see"
Isaacson v. Dow Chemical Co.
(2×)
also: Cited "see, e.g."
See Maryland v. Soper (No. 1), 270 U.S. 9, 33 , 46 S.Ct. 185 , 70 L.Ed. 449 (1926).
discussed
Cited "see"
Krangel v. Crown
See California v. Mesa, 813 F.2d 960, 962-63 (9th Cir.1987) (the wresting by an inferior federal court of “the jurisdiction of the courts of a State to try offenses against its own laws and in violation of its own peace and dignity” is a delicate issue (citing Maryland v. Soper (No. 1), 270 U.S. 9, 29 , 46 S.Ct. 185, 189 , 70 L.Ed. 449 (1926))).
discussed
Cited "see"
State of North Carolina v. Lemans L. Ivory
(2×)
See Maryland v. Soper, 270 U.S. 9, 34 , 46 S.Ct. 185, 191 , 70 L.Ed. 449 (1926); People v. Zidek, 691 F.Supp. 1177, 1178 (N.D.Ill.1988).
examined
Cited "see"
People of the State of California v. Kathryn Isabella Mesa, People of the State of California v. Shabbir A. Ebrahim, A/K/A Shabbir Azam
(6×)
See Soper, 270 U.S. at 30 , 46 S.Ct. at 189 .
discussed
Cited "see"
Pennsylvania v. Newcomer
Subsequent statutes were enacted to provide for removal of suits growing out of the enforcement of revenue laws, see, e. g., Judicial Code of 1911, Act of March 3, 1911, § 33, 36 Stat. 1097 ; see generally, Maryland v. Soper, 270 U.S. 9 , 46 S.Ct. 185 , 70 L.Ed. 449 until, in 1948, the language was expanded to cover all federal officers.
discussed
Cited "see"
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Newcomer
Subsequent statutes were enacted to provide for removal of suits growing out of the enforcement of revenue laws, see, e. g., Judicial Code of 1911, Act of March 3, 1911, § 33, 36 Stat. 1097 ; see generally, Maryland v. Soper, 270 U.S. 9 , 46 S.Ct. 185 , 70 L.Ed. 449 until, in 1948, the language was expanded to cover all federal officers.
cited
Cited "see"
Kosinski v. Lawlor
Huggins v. Mulvey, 160 Conn. 559, 561 , 280 A.2d 364 (1971); see Maryland v. Soper (No. 1), 270 U.S. 9, 29 , 46 S. Ct. 185 , 70 L.
discussed
Cited "see"
McGlasson v. Barger
See State of Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. 257 , 25 L.Ed. 648 . »**•**« “The history of the origin of this statute with its subsequent amendments, State of Maryland v. Soper, supra [ 270 U.S. 9 , 46 S.Ct. 185 , 70 L.Ed. 449 ], Gay v. Ruff, 292 U.S. 25 , 54 S.Ct. 608 , 78 L.Ed. 1099 , Goldfarb v. Muller, supra, and State of Oklahoma v. Willingham, D.C., 143 F. Supp. 445 , indicates that Congress intended that unless an officer of the United States can justify that which he did by reason of some official connection between the acts complained of and his official duties, the proceeding is no…
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
State of Hawai'i, Ex. Rel. Anne E. Lopez, Attorney General v. CaremarkPCS Health, L.L.C.
Even where the “acting under” requirement of the causal nexus analysis is met, a defendant must also satisfy the causal connection requirement. [T]he “hurdle erected by [the causal-connection] requirement is quite low.” Isaacson, 517 F.3d at 137; see also Maryland v. Soper, 270 U.S. 9, 33 , 46 S. Ct. 185 , 70 L.
cited
Cited "see, e.g."
Jabour v. Hickam Communities, LLC
Co.], 517 F.3d [129,] 137 [(2d Cir. 2008)]; see also Maryland v. Soper, 270 U.S. 9, 33 , 46 S. Ct. 185 , 70 L.
cited
Cited "see, e.g."
Martin v. Island Palm Communities, LLC
Co.], 517 F.3d [129,] 137 [(2d Cir. 2008)]; see also Maryland v. Soper, 270 U.S. 9, 33 , 46 S. Ct. 185 , 70 L.
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
State of Hawai'i, Ex. Rel. Anne E. Lopez, Attorney General v. CaremarkPCS Health, L.L.C.
Id. (citing Durham, 445 F.3d at 1251 ). [T]he “hurdle erected by [the causal-connection] requirement is quite low.” Isaacson, 517 F.3d at 137 ; see also Maryland v. Soper, 270 U.S. 9, 33 , 46 S. Ct. 185 , 70 L.
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Fidelitad, Inc. v. Insitu, Inc.
See id. at 149 , 127 S.Ct. 2301 ; see, e.g. , Maryland v. Soper , 270 U.S. 9 , 30, 46 S.Ct. 185 , 70 L.Ed. 449 (1926) (noting that a private party acting as a federal officers' driver in a distillery raid had "the same right to the benefit of" the removal provision as did the federal agents); Davis v. South Carolina , 107 U.S. 597 , 600, 2 S.Ct. 636 , 27 L.Ed. 574 (1883) (holding that a soldier who killed a distiller during a raid could remove his criminal case because he "lawfully assist[ed]" a revenue officer "in the performance of his official duty").
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Goncalves Ex Rel. Goncalves v. Rady Children's Hospital San Diego
We will start with the second prong first because the “hurdle erected by [the causal-connection] requirement is quite low.” Isaacson, 517 F.3d at 137 ; see also Mary land v. Soper, 270 U.S. 9, 33 , 46 S.Ct. 185 , 70 L.Ed. 449 (1926) (“[T]he statute does not require that the prosecution must be for the very acts which the officer admits to have been done by him under federal authority.
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
MobilizeGreen, Inc. v. Community Foundation for the National Capital Region
See, e.g., Maryland v. Soper (No. 1), 270 U.S. 9, 30 , 46 S.Ct. 185 , 70 L.Ed. 449 (1926) (chauffeur acting under orders of federal prohibition agents in distillery raid “has the same right to the benefit” of the federal officer removal statute as the agents); Winters, 149 F.3d at 389-99 (private defense contractor satisfies “acting under” requirement when it produced Agent Orange, pursuant to strict governmental specifications, control and inspection, to help the government conduct a war); Jacks, 701 F.3d at 1234 (concluding that “[Federal Employees Health Benefits Act] program carr…
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Alsup v. 3-Day Blinds, Inc.
See also Maryland v. Soper, 270 U.S. 9, 32 , 46 S.Ct. 185 , 70 L.Ed. 449 (1926) (“The constitutional validity of the section rests on the right and power of the United States to secure the efficient execution of its laws and to prevent interference therewith, due to possible local prejudice, by state prosecutions instituted against federal officers in enforcing such laws, by removal of the prosecutions to a federal court to avoid the effect of such prejudice.”).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Arness v. Boeing North American, Inc.
Second, the defendant must establish that it acted under the direction of a federal officer by demonstrating “a causal nexus between plaintiffs’ claims and acts it performed under color of federal of fice.” Fung v. Abex Carp., 816 F.Supp. 569, 571-72 (N.D.Cal.1992); see also Maryland, v. Soper (No. 1), 270 U.S. 9, 33 , 46 S.Ct. 185, 190 , 70 L.Ed. 449 (1926); Ryan v. Dow Chemical Co., 781 F.Supp. 934, 939 (E.D.N.Y.1992).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
New York v. Fried
See, e.g., Ryan, 781 F.Supp. at 939 (citing Maryland v. Soper (No. 1), 270 U.S. 9 , 46 S.Ct. 185 , 70 L.Ed. 449 (1926); Florida v. Cohen, 887 F.2d 1451, 1453-54 (11th Cir.1989)) (discussing elements for proper removal under § 1442(a)(1)).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Roofing & Sheet Metal Services, Inc. v. La Quinta Motor Inns, Inc.
See McGraw-Edison Co. v. Van Pelt, 8 Cir. 1965, 350 F.2d 361, 364 (Van Oosterhout, J., concurring); In re Josephson, 1 Cir. 1954, 218 F.2d 174 , 181 & n*; see also Maryland v. Soper, 1926, 270 U.S. 9, 19 , 46 S.Ct. 185 , 70 L.Ed. 449, 456 ; D’Ippolito v. American Oil Co., 2 Cir. 1968, 401 F.2d 764 , 765 (per curiam).
cited
Cited "see, e.g."
Sanchez v. Sanchez
See, e. g., Maryland v. Soper, 270 U.S. 9, 35 , 46 S.Ct. 185 , 70 L.Ed. 449 (1926).
cited
Cited "see, e.g."
Snypp v. State of Ohio
Compare Maryland v. Soper, 270 U. S. 9 , 46 S. Ct. 185 , 70 L.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Mandelbaum
v.
United States
v.
United States
139.
Supreme Court of the United States.
Jan 25, 1926.
Mr. Howard L. Bump, with whom Mr. James C. Hume was on the brief, for appellant., Assistant Attorney General Letts, with whom Solicitor General Mitchell and Mr. Harvey B. Cox, Special Assistant to the Attorney General, were on the brief, for the United States.
Holmes.
Cited by 2 opinions | Published
Citer courts: E.D. New York (1)
Mr. Justice Holmes
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is' a suit brought in the District Court under its jurisdiction concurrent with the Court of Claims (Judicial Code, § 24, Twentieth; Act of March 3, 1911, c. 231; 36 Stat. 1087,) to recover on War Saving Certificates with stamps attached, issued under the Acts of September 24, 1917, c. 56, § 6; 40 Stat. 288, 291; and of September 24, 1918, c. 176, § 2, 40 Stat. 965, 966. The certificates fell due on January 1, 1923, but were stolen in the preceding year. They bore the name of the plaintiff or of different members of his family who had transferred their claim to him, but they were not registered. The plaintiff offers to give a sufficient bond of indemnity. The bill was dismissed by the District Court and the decree was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals on the ground that the right to recover was excluded by the certificates on their face. 298 Fed. Rep. 295.
The certificates were sheets with blanks for the affixing of stamps issued by the Government for the purpose, face value five dollars each. They were not valid without one stamp affixed, and there were blanks for twenty in all, which could be added from time to time if and when desired. The certificate declared that, subject to the conditions thereon, the Owner named on the back would be entitled on January 1, 1923, to receive the amount indicated by the stamps. Among the-conditions are provisions for registration and notice that unless registered the United States will not be liable for payment to one not the owner; that upon payment the certificate must be surrendered and a receipt signed by the[*9] owner; and that upon satisfactory evidence of the loss of a registered certificate the owner shall be entitled to payment of the registered amount. We agree with the Circuit Court of Appeals that these conditions very plainly imported what on January 21, 1918, was embodied by the Secretary of the Treasury in an authorized regulation, that unregistered certificates would not be paid if lost. There was good reason for the condition. The stamps are un-distinguishable one from another. Therefore they could be detached and put upon another certificate,' and it would be impossible for the Government to know whether the stolen stamps that gave the value to the certificate had been paid or not. The offer of indemnity was illusory, and the case is not like that of a lost bond. The condition limited the obligation of the Government to pay and until it is complied with the plaintiff must put up with his loss.
Decree affirmed.