green
Positive treatment
Quoted verbatim 2×
7.7 score
G Cite
cited 2× by 2 distinct cases, last quoted 1978 ·
…there is no question that a breach of a plea bargain by the government, if established, may entitle a defendant who has pleaded guilty in reliance on the bargain to appropriate relief.
⚠ not in text
Treatment trajectory · 1978 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1978
2002
2026
Top citers, strongest first. 6 distinct citers.
How cited ↗
discussed
Cited as authority (quoted)
United States v. Stirling
there is no question that a breach of a plea bargain by the government, if established, may entitle a defendant who has pleaded guilty in reliance on the bargain to appropriate relief.
discussed
Cited as authority (quoted)
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. P 96,308, 2 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1257 United States of America v. David Stirling, Jr., William G. Stirling, Harold M. Yanowitch, Edwin J. Schulz and Rubel L. Phillips
there is no question that a breach of a plea bargain by the government, if established, may entitle a defendant who has pleaded guilty in reliance on the bargain to appropriate relief.
cited
Cited "see"
United States v. Larry Bruce Johnson
See United States v. Scruggs, 549 F.2d 1097, 1103 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 824 , 98 S.Ct. 70 , 54 L.Ed.2d 81 (1977).
discussed
Cited "see"
United States v. Missouri Valley Construction Co.
(2×)
See United States v. Scharf, 551 F.2d 1124, 1129 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 824 , 98 S.Ct. 70 , 54 L.Ed.2d 81 (1977); United States v. Lambros, 544 F.2d 962, 966 (8th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 930 , 97 S.Ct. 1550 , 51 L.Ed.2d 774 (1977).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
United States v. Prince
First, it is well established that the “knowledge prong of the money laundering statute can be proven by direct or circumstantial evidence.” United States v. Johnson, 26 Fed.Appx. 441, 446 (6th Cir.2001), citing United States v. Moss, 9 F.3d 543, 551-52 (6th Cir.1993); see also United States v. Scruggs, 549 F.2d 1097, 1104 (6th Cir.1977) (“Proof of knowledge, like proof of intent, is rarely established by direct evidence ... circumstantial evidence [and] independent facts from which an inference of the ultimate fact may rationally be drawn in light of common experience can be sufficient …
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
United States v. Johnson
United States v. Moss, 9 F.3d 543, 551-52 (6th Cir.1993); see also United States v. Scruggs, 549 F.2d 1097, 1104 (6th Cir.) (“Proof of knowledge, like proof of intent, is rarely established by direct evidence ... circumstantial evidence [and] independent facts from which an inference of the ultimate fact may rationally be drawn in light of common experience can be sufficient to support a jury’s determination”), ce rt. denied. 434 U.S. 824 , 98 S.Ct. 70 , 54 L.Ed.2d 81 (1977).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Fisher
v.
Robinson
v.
Robinson
No. 76-1613.
Supreme Court of the United States.
Oct 3, 1977.
Published
Citer courts: Second Circuit (2)
C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.