Irving v. Mississippi, 441 U.S. 913 (1979). · Go Syfert
Search
Irving v. Mississippi, 441 U.S. 913 (1979). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
259 citation events (19 in the last 25 years) across 67 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Jimmy Lee Gray v. Eddie Lucas, Warden (ca5, 1982-06-10) · Strongest negative: Pisa v. Commonwealth (mass, 1979-08-09)
Treatment trajectory · 1979 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1979 2002 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 39 distinct citers.
cited Cited "but see" Pisa v. Commonwealth
Mass. · 1979 · signal: but see · confidence high
But see Irving v. State, 361 So. 2d 1360, 1363-1365 (Miss. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 913 (1979).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Jimmy Lee Gray v. Eddie Lucas, Warden
5th Cir. · 1982 · confidence medium
Gray also claims that this factor has been inconsistently applied and contrasts Irving v. State, 361 So.2d 1360 (Miss.1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 913 , 99 S.Ct. 2014 , 60 L.Ed.2d 386 (1979), with Voyles v. State, 362 So.2d 1236 (Miss.1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. at 956, 99 S.Ct. 2184 , 60 L.Ed.2d 1059 (1979) .
cited Cited "see" Scott v. Kelly
E.D. Va. · 2000 · signal: see · confidence high
See Hudspeth v. Figgins, 584 F.2d 1345, 1347 (4th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 913 , 99 S.Ct. 2013 , 60 L.Ed.2d 386 (1979).
cited Cited "see" Jacobi v. Blocker
E.D. Va. · 1994 · signal: see · confidence high
See Hudspeth v. Figgins, 584 F.2d 1345 (4th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 913 , 99 S.Ct. 2013 , 60 L.Ed.2d 386 (1979); Islam v. Jackson, 782 F.Supp. 1111 (E.D.Va.1992).
discussed Cited "see" Allain Delont Norman v. Otis Taylor, Deputy Sergeant (2×)
4th Cir. · 1994 · signal: see · confidence high
See Hudspeth v. Figgins, 584 F.2d 1345 (4th Cir.1978) (noting that an Eighth Amendment claim may be stated by an inmate who alleged that two prison guards threatened his life), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 913 , 99 S.Ct. 2013 , 60 L.Ed.2d 386 (1979); see also Hudson, 503 U.S., at ----, 112 S.Ct. at 1004 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (" 'Pain' in its ordinary meaning surely includes a notion of psychological harm") and Northington v. Jackson, 973 F.2d 1518 (10th Cir.1992) (holding that inmate stated an Eighth Amendment excessive-force claim by alleging that a prison official put a gun to his head and th…
discussed Cited "see" Brown v. United States
D.C. · 1991 · signal: see · confidence high
See id. at 1140 (there is “often a tendency on the part of the executive branch to exercise its discretion to grant or deny immunity in ways that make it more likely that defendants will be convicted, [and] [i]n such a situation, this court has suggested that the trial judge seek a commitment from the appropriate prosecuting authority not to bring charges against the witness.” (citing United States v. Herman, 589 F.2d 1191, 1203 (3d Cir.1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 913 , 99 S.Ct. 2014 , 60 L.Ed.2d 386 (1979), and Davis, supra, 482 A.2d at 785)).
cited Cited "see" Darwin Rusty Siers v. Stephen Greiner, Sheriff Shayne Yearego, Co James Asbury, Co Co Joy Co McMullen
4th Cir. · 1990 · signal: see · confidence high
See Hudspeth v. Figgins, 584 F.2d 1345, 1347-48 (4th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 913 (1979); Russell v. Oliver, 552 F.2d 115, 116 (4th Cir.1977).
discussed Cited "see" Parker v. Asher
D. Nev. · 1988 · signal: see · confidence high
See Hudspeth v. Figgins, 584 F.2d 1345, 1348 (4th Cir.1978) (holding that an eighth amendment claim existed where an inmate alleged that a guard had threatened to shoot the inmate for no reason and then gestured towards his holstered firearm), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 913 , 99 S.Ct. 2013 , 60 L.Ed.2d 386 (1979).
discussed Cited "see" United States v. Echeverri, Elkin A.
3rd Cir. · 1988 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Herman, 589 F.2d 1191, 1198 (3d Cir.), cert. denied 441 U.S. 913 , 99 S.Ct. 2014 , 60 L.Ed.2d 386 (1979) (other crimes evidence inadmissible to show common scheme where modus operandi not particularly unusual or distinctive); see also 2 J.
cited Cited "see" United States v. William R. Hooks
7th Cir. · 1988 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Herman, 589 F.2d 1191, 1203-04 (3d Cir.1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 913 , 99 S.Ct. 2014 , 60 L.Ed.2d 386 (1979).
discussed Cited "see" State v. Cito
N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. · 1986 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Summers, 197 N.J.Super. 510 (Law Div. 1984), which looks for its genesis to Government of Virgin Islands v. Smith, 615 F. 2d 964 (3rd Cir.1980), drawn from an earlier Third Circuit opinion, United States v. Herman, 589 F. 2d 1191 (3rd Cir.1978), cert. den. 441 U.S. 913 , 99 S.Ct. 2014 , 60 L.Ed.2d 386 (1979).
cited Cited "see" Beltran v. State of Cal.
S.D. Cal. · 1985 · signal: see · confidence high
See Bittaker v. Enomoto, 587 F.2d 400 , 402 n. 1 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 913 , 99 S.Ct. 2013 , 60 L.Ed.2d 386 (1979).
discussed Cited "see" United States v. Henry Daniel Stull, Sr., Henry Daniel Stull, Jr., and Patricia Mooradian
6th Cir. · 1984 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Frick, 588 F.2d 531, 536 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 913 , 99 S.Ct. 2013 , 60 L.Ed.2d 385 (1979); Amrep Corp., supra, 560 F.2d at 543 ; Irwin v. United States, 338 F.2d 770, 774 (9th Cir.1964), ce rt. denied, 381 U.S. 911 , 85 S.Ct. 1530 , 14 L.Ed.2d 433 (1965).
cited Cited "see" United States v. Howard Taylor
7th Cir. · 1984 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Herman, 589 F.2d 1191, 1204 (3d Cir.1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 913 , 99 S.Ct. 2014 , 60 L.Ed.2d 386 (1979).
discussed Cited "see" United States v. Harry Ronald Frans, United States of America v. James J. Arrajj, Jr.
7th Cir. · 1983 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Herman, 589 F.2d 1191, 1202-03 (3d Cir.1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 913 , 99 S.Ct. 2014 , 60 L.Ed.2d 386 (1979) (federal court has no power to review prosecutorial decision not to immunize defense witness).
discussed Cited "see" People v. Gomez
Ill. App. Ct. · 1982 · signal: accord · confidence high
In addition, even if there is no evidence of such prosecutorial misconduct, when it is found that a potential defense witness can offer testimony which is clearly exculpatory and essential to the defense case and when the government has no strong interest in withholding use immunity, the court should grant judicial immunity to the witness in order to vindicate the defendant’s constitutional right to a fair trial.” ( 615 F.2d 964, 974 ; accord United States v. Herman (3d Cir. 1978), 589 F.2d 1191 , cert. denied (1979), 441 U.S. 913 , 60 L.
discussed Cited "see" Loren v. Jackson (2×)
N.C. Ct. App. · 1982 · signal: see · confidence high
See Hudspeth v. Figgins, 584 F.2d 1345 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied 441 U.S. 913 , 99 S.Ct. 2013 , 60 L.Ed.2d 386 (1979).
cited Cited "see" United States v. Frederick C. Sturm, III
3rd Cir. · 1982 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Herman, 589 F.2d 1191, 1196 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 913 , 99 S.Ct. 2014 , 60 L.Ed.2d 386 (1979).
discussed Cited "see" ca9 1981
9th Cir. · 1981 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Herman, 589 F.2d 1191, 1197-98 (3 Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 913 , 99 S.Ct. 2014 , 60 L.Ed.2d 386 (1979). 20 The record here, unlike that in Sangrey, does not disclose that the district judge balanced the probative value and prejudicial effect of the challenged evidence.
cited Cited "see" United States v. Green
9th Cir. · 1981 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Herman, 589 F.2d 1191, 1197-98 (3 Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 913 , 99 S.Ct. 2014 , 60 L.Ed.2d 386 (1979).
discussed Cited "see" United States v. William Curtis, III (2×)
3rd Cir. · 1981 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Herman, 589 F.2d 1191, 1197 (3d Cir. 1978) cert. denied, 441 U.S. 913 , 99 S.Ct. 2014 , 60 L.Ed.2d 386 (1979).
cited Cited "see" United States v. Rick De La Torre and Ben Garcia
5th Cir. · 1981 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Frick, 588 F.2d 531, 537 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 913 , 99 S.Ct. 2013 , 60 L.Ed.2d 385 (1979).
discussed Cited "see" United States v. Donald Phillip Lenz
6th Cir. · 1980 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Herman, 589 F.2d 1191, 1200 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 913 , 99 S.Ct. 2014 , 60 L.Ed.2d 386 (1979); United States v. Rocco, 587 F.2d 144 , 147 & n.10 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. *963 denied sub nom.
discussed Cited "see" Reginald Carter v. Lowell D. Hewitt, Superintendent John Fuiek, C.O. Duane D. Pyles, C.O. And Gilbert Levi, C.O.
3rd Cir. · 1980 · signal: see · confidence high
See 527 F.2d at 145 11 The dissent implies that there is some inconsistency between our disposition of the rule 608(b) claim here and the disposition of the 608(b) claim in United States v. Herman, 589 F.2d 1191 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 913 , 99 S.Ct. 2014 , 60 L.Ed.2d 386 (1979).
cited Cited "see" United States v. James Terrell Knight and A. C. Brown, A/K/A Cadillac
5th Cir. · 1980 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Frick, 588 F.2d 531, 537 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 913 , 99 S.Ct. 2013 , 60 L.Ed.2d 385 (1979).
cited Cited "see" United States v. Gerald N. Klauber
4th Cir. · 1979 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Herman, 589 F.2d 1191, 1204 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 913 , 99 S.Ct. 2014 , 60 L.Ed.2d 386 (1979).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." State v. Faust (2×)
Neb. · 2003 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., United States v. Herman, 589 F.2d 1191 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied 441 U.S. 913 , 99 S. Ct. 2014 , 60 L.
cited Cited "see, e.g." Nicholson on Behalf of Gollott v. State
Miss. · 1996 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Irving v. State, 361 So.2d 1360, 1371 (Miss. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 913 , 99 S.Ct. 2014 , 60 L.Ed.2d 386 (1979).
cited Cited "see, e.g." Gail D. Nicholson v. State of Mississippi
Miss. · 1991 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Irving v. State, 361 So. 2d 1360, 1371 (Miss. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 913 , 99 S. Ct. 2014 , 60 L.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Babst v. Morgan Keegan & Co.
E.D. La. · 1988 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also United States v. Frick, 588 F.2d 531, 536 (5th Cir.) cert. denied, 441 U.S. 913 , 99 S.Ct. 2013 , 60 L.Ed.2d 385 (1979) (reckless indifference for the truth suffices for conviction under the mail fraud statute); Louisiana Power & Light v. United Gas Pipe Line, 642 F.Supp. 781, 803 (E.D.La.1986) (“‘knowing intent to defraud’ may be found when a defendant deliberately proceeds with reckless indifference for the truth, making representations that are baseless, and shutting his eyes to their probable falsity”).
cited Cited "see, e.g." Douglas v. Marino
D.N.J. · 1988 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Hudspeth v. Figgins, 584 F.2d 1345, 1348 (4th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 913 , 99 S.Ct. 2013 , 60 L.Ed.2d 386 (1979).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." People v. Burnett
Cal. Ct. App. · 1987 · signal: see also · confidence low
Moreover, error of this sort “simply does not lend itself to review by any standard short of per se reversal.” (People v. Tyner (1977) 76 Cal.App.3d 352, 356 [ 143 Cal.Rptr. 52 ]; People v. Freeman *1323 (1977) 76 Cal.App.3d 302, 308-310 [ 142 Cal.Rptr. 806 ]; see also, Bittaker v. Enomoto (9th Cir. 1978) 587 F.2d 400 , cert. den. 441 U.S. 913 [ 60 L.Ed.2d 386 , 995 S.Ct. 2013 ].) II.
cited Cited "see, e.g." Waller v. Butkovich
M.D.N.C. · 1985 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Hudspeth v. Figgins, 584 F.2d 1345, 1347 (4th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 913 , 99 S.Ct. 2013 , 60 L.Ed.2d 386 .
discussed Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Martinez
usarmymilrev · 1984 · signal: see also · confidence low
See United States v. Villines, 13 M.J. 46, 56 (C.M.A.1982) (Cook, J., concurring in the result); see also United States v. Herman, 589 F.2d 1191 (3d Cir.1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 913 , 99 S.Ct. 2014 , 60 L.Ed.2d 386 (1979) ; United States v. Rocco, 587 F.2d 144 (3d Cir.1978).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Georgia Waste Systems, Inc. And Raymond E. Dinkle
11th Cir. · 1984 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See e.g., United States v. Herman, 589 F.2d 1191, 1199 (3d Cir.1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 913 , 99 S.Ct. 2014 , 60 L.Ed.2d 386 (1979); United States v. Beasley, 550 F.2d 261, 268 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 938 , 98 S.Ct. 427 , 54 L.Ed.2d 297 (1977).
cited Cited "see, e.g." People v. Harding
Colo. Ct. App. · 1983 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also United States v. Herman, 589 F.2d 1191 (3d Cir.1976), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 913 , 99 S.Ct. 2014 , 60 L.Ed.2d 386 (1979).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Lee Stoller Enterprises, Inc., Lee Stoller, John M. Cooper, and John Maeras (2×)
7th Cir. · 1981 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also, United States v. Herman, 589 F.2d 1191 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 913 , 99 S.Ct. 2014 , 60 L.Ed.2d 386 (1979) (applied RICO to Pittsburgh magistrates without discussion); and United States v. Vignola, 464 F.Supp. 1091, 1095-96 (E.D.Pa.1979), aff'd mem., 605 F.2d 1199 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1072 , 100 S.Ct. 1015 , 62 L.Ed.2d 753 (1980) (Philadelphia Traffic Court) Fourth Circuit: United States v. Altomare, 625 F.2d 5, 7 (4th Cir. 1980) (County Prosecuting Attorney); United States v. Karas, 624 F.2d 500, 504 (4th Cir. 1980) (County Prosecuting Attorney); Uni…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." People v. Shapiro
NY · 1980 · signal: see also · confidence low
Nor do there exist in this case any aggravating circumstances, such as "prosecutorial misconduct”, which would bring into play defendant’s due process rights and thereby take the case out of the general rule (see United States v Rocco, 587 F2d 144, 147, n 10, cert den 440 US 972 ; United States v Saettele, 585 F2d 307, 310-313 [Bright, J., dissenting], cert den 440 US 910 ; see, also, United States v Herman, 589 F2d 1191, cert den 441 US 913 ). 6 Although the majority goes out of its way to characterize the District Attorney’s position as "threatening” and "menacing”, such characteri…
cited Cited "see, e.g." Bruce Leonardo v. John Moran
1st Cir. · 1979 · signal: compare · confidence low
Compare Hudspeth v. Figgins, 584 F.2d 1345, 1347 (4th Cir. 1978) , cert. denied, 441 U.S. 913 , 99 S.Ct. 2013 , 60 L.Ed.2d 386 (1979) (communication of threat pleaded).
John Buford Irving, III
v.
State of Mississippi
78-5873.
Supreme Court of the United States.
Apr 16, 1979.
441 U.S. 913
Marshall, Brennan.
Cited by 2 opinions  |  Published
Reporter's Syllabus — editorial summary, not part of the Court's opinion

On petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Mississippi.

The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied.

Mr. Justice MARSHALL, with whom Mr. Justice BRENNAN joins, dissenting.

Lead Opinion

Sup. Ct. Miss. Cer-tiorari denied.

Dissent

Mr. Justice Marshall, with whom Mr. Justice Brennan joins,

dissenting.

I adhere to my view that the death penalty is unconstitutional under all circumstances. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U. S.[*914] 238, 314 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 231 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting). I would therefore grant certiorari and vacate the death sentence on this basis alone. However, because the Mississippi Supreme Court's ruling on an issue of joint representation appears inconsistent with this Court’s prior decisions, I believe certiorari should be granted on that ground as well.

Petitioner John Irving was indicted in Pontotoc County, Miss., on July 7, 1976, for capital murder. Both petitioner and a separately indicted accomplice, Keith Givhan, retained the same counsel. On November 8, 1976, the day before petitioner’s trial, his attorney filed a motion to withdraw because of a conflict of interest. Counsel did, however, express his willingness to continue representing Givhan, whose trial was scheduled for the following week. After a hearing, the Circuit Court denied the motion and petitioner’s case proceeded to trial. A jury found petitioner guilty as charged and sentenced him to death. The Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed. 361 So. 2d. 1360 (1978).

In the affidavit supporting his motion to withdraw, petitioner’s counsel identified several potential sources of conflict. Each defendant had given an inculpatory statement implicating the other. Also, during the period of pretrial incarceration, each had developed inconsistent theories of defense. Finally, plea negotiations with the local district and county attorneys had raised the possibility of a bargain in one case but not the other. Under those circumstances, counsel averred that he could not, based on his “reading of Glasser [v. United States, 315 U. S. 60 (1942),] advise either defendant ... as to what posture [he] should assume.” Record 53.

In Glasser, this Court stated: “[T]he 'assistance of counsel’ guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment contemplates that such assistance be untrammeled and unimpaired by a court order requiring that one lawyer shall simultaneously represent conflicting interests.” 315 U. S., at 70. Just last Term, in[*915] Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U. S. 475 (1978), we reaffirmed that principle and noted:

“[S]ince the decision in Glasser, most courts have held that an attorney’s request for the appointment of separate counsel, based on his representations as an officer of the court regarding a conflict of interests, should be granted. . . . An ‘attorney representing two defendants in a criminal matter is in the best position professionally and ethically to determine when a conflict of interest exists or will probably develop in the course of a trial.’ State v. Davis, [110 Ariz. 29, 31, 514 P. 2d 1025, 1027 (1973)]. . . . [Attorneys are officers of the court, and ‘ “when they address the judge solemnly upon a matter before the court, their declarations are virtually made under oath.” ’ State v. Brazile, [226 La. 254, 266, 75 So. 2d 856, 860-861 (1954)]. (Emphasis deleted.) We find these considerations persuasive.” Id., at 485-486 (footnotes omitted).

Particularly where, as here, a defendant is on trial for his life, an attorney’s judgment as to potential conflicts should carry special force.

Notwithstanding Holloway’s clear directive and the nature of the sentence imposed, the Mississippi Supreme Court sustained the refusal to permit counsel’s withdrawal. In so ruling, the court relied on petitioner and Givhan’s failure to testify, and on the absence of any clear indication that counsel “would have defended any differently or would have approached the defense of the case on another basis had he not been representing Givhan.” 361 So. 2d, at 1365. Because the record did not “reflect any prejudice or harm resulting to [petitioner] on account of the alleged conflict of interest,” ibid., the court below found no constitutional infirmity.

Yet it was precisely this form of analysis that we rejected in Glasser and again in Holloway. Glasser unequivocally held that “[t]he right to have the assistance of counsel is too[*916] fundamental and absolute to allow courts to indulge in nice calculations as to the amount of prejudice arising from its denial.” 315 U. S., at 76. After quoting this passage with approval, the Holloway Court made clear that where joint representation occurs over a defendant's express objection, “prejudice is presumed regardless of whether it [is] independently shown.” 435 U. S., at 489. For the danger presented by a conflict of interest arises not simply from what an advocate does, which may be evident from the record, but from what he “finds himself compelled to refrain from doing,” which may not be so readily apparent. Id., at 490. To assess the effect of incompatible interests on all of an attorney's strategies at trial and in plea negotiations would, as we concluded in Holloway, be “virtually impossible.” Id., at 491.

Here, however, the Mississippi Supreme Court professed itself able to accomplish what Holloway explicitly recognized as beyond the competence of a reviewing tribunal. On this record, I cannot share the court's confidence that counsel would have approached the defense no differently had he represented only petitioner. More to the point, I believe that such speculation is inappropriate under Holloway and unsupportable in a capital case. Surely where a defendant’s life is at stake, he is entitled to assistance from an attorney whose loyalty is beyond question.

I therefore dissent from the denial of certiorari.