State v. Lane, 669 S.E.2d 321 (N.C. 2008). · Go Syfert
State v. Lane, 669 S.E.2d 321 (N.C. 2008). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“e conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding plaintiff attorneys fees based on defendant alvis' unreasonable refusal to resolve the dispute out of court.”
54 citation events (54 in the last 25 years) across 5 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: SMS Constr., Inc. v. Wittels (ncctapp, 2018-02-06)
Treatment trajectory · 2008 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
2008 2017 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 6 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (quoted) SMS Constr., Inc. v. Wittels
N.C. Ct. App. · 2018 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence low
e conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding plaintiff attorneys fees based on defendant alvis' unreasonable refusal to resolve the dispute out of court.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Cureton
N.C. Ct. App. · 2012 · confidence medium
Ed. 2d 824 (1960) (per curiam)] but who still suffer from severe mental illness to the point where they are not competent to conduct trial proceedings by themselves’[.]” State v. Lane, 362 N.C. 667, 668 , 669 S.E.2d 321, 322 (2008) (quoting Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 178 , 171 L.
cited Cited as authority (rule) State v. Lane
N.C. · 2011 · confidence medium
State v. Lane, 362 N.C. 667, 668 , 669 S.E.2d 321, 322 (2008) (per curiam).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Re Watson
N.C. Ct. App. · 2011 · confidence medium
Stat. § 15A-1242 “is mandatory and failure to conduct such an inquiry is prejudicial error.” Pruitt, 322 N.C. at 603 , 369 S.E.2d at 592 . “[T]he United States Constitution permits judges to preclude self-representation for defendants adjudged to be ‘borderline-competent’ based on a ‘realistic account of the particular defendant’s mental capacities ....’” State v. Lane, 362 N.C. 667, 668 , 669 S.E.2d 321, 322 (2008) (quoting Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164 , -, 128 S. Ct. 2379, 2387-88 , 171 L.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Jason
Iowa Ct. App. · 2009 · confidence medium
See Ferguson, 560 F.3d at 1070 ; Connor, 973 A.2d at 658-59 ; State v. Lane, 362 N.C. 667 , 669 S.E.2d 321, 322 (2008); cf. State v. Klessig, 211 Wis.2d 194 , 564 N.W.2d 716, 724-25 (1997) (pre-Edwards, but remanding for hearing on defendant’s competence to proceed pro se).
discussed Cited "see" State v. Lane (2×)
N.C. · 2018 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Lane , 362 N.C. 667 , 668, 669 S.E.2d 321 , 322 (2008) (per curiam), clarified by --- N.C. ----, 706 S.E.2d 775 (2009) (order) (instructing the trial judge to determine whether defendant fell within the category of "borderline-competent" or "gray-area" defendants who are "competent enough to stand trial ... but who still suffer from severe mental illness to the point where they are not competent to conduct trial proceedings by themselves").
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
State of North Carolina
v.
Eric Glenn Lane
606A05.
Supreme Court of North Carolina.
Dec 12, 2008.
669 S.E.2d 321
Roy Cooper; Attorney General, by Robert C. Montgomery, Special Deputy Attorney General, and, Derrick C. Mertz, Assistant Attorney General, for the State. , Ann B. Petersen for defendant-appellant.
Per Curiam.
Cited by 11 opinions  |  Published
1 passage pin-cited by 1 case
Pinpoint authority: bottom 64%
Citer courts: Court of Appeals of North Caro… (1)
PER CURIAM.

The trial court entered judgment imposing the jury’s capital sentence' in this case on 11 July 2005. The Supreme Court of the United States decided Indiana v. Edwards on 19 June 2008.-U.S.-, 128 S. Ct. 2379, 171 L. Ed. 2d 345 (2008). Based on Edwards, defendant argues on appeal that he is entitled to a new trial because the trial court was unaware of its discretion to deny defendant’s request for self-representation, and that if it had been aware of its discretion, the trial court would have required counsel for defendant. In light of Edwards, this case is remanded to the Superior Court, Wayne County, for further hearing by the presiding trial judge to determine the following issues:

(1) At the time defendant sought to represent himself in this matter, did he come within the category of “borderline-competent” (or “gray-area”) defendants, id. at-, 128 S. Ct. at 2384-85, 171 L. Ed. 2d at 353-55, defined by the Supreme Court of the United States as parties “competent enough to stand trial under Dusky [v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 80 S. Ct. 788, 4 L. Ed. 2d 824 (1960) (per curiam)] but who still suffer from severe mental illness to the point where they are not competent to conduct trial proceedings by themselves”? Edwards,-U.S. at-, 128 S. Ct. at 2388, 171 L. Ed. 2d at 357.

Only if the first inquiry is answered in the affirmative should the trial court proceed to this second issue:

(2) Given that the United States Constitution permits judges to preclude self-representation for defendants adjudged to be “borderline-competent” based on a “realistic account of the particular defendant’s mental capacities,” id. at-, 128 S. Ct. at 2387-88, 171 L. Ed. 2d at 357, the court shall consider whether the court in its discretion would have precluded self-representation for defendant and appointed counsel for him pursuant to Indiana v. Edwards, and if so, whether in this case defendant was prejudiced by his period of self-representation.

[*669] The trial court is directed to hold this hearing, make findings of fact and conclusions of law, and certify its opinion to this Court within 120 days of the filing date of this opinion.

REMANDED.