Pac. Express Co. v. Dunn, 16 S.W. 792 (Tex. 1891). · Go Syfert
Pac. Express Co. v. Dunn, 16 S.W. 792 (Tex. 1891). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
107 citation events (30 in the last 25 years) across 6 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Steve Huynh, Individually Yvonne Huynh, Individually Huynh Poultry Farm, LLC D/B/A Steve Thi Huynh Poultry Farm D/B/A Huynh Poultry Farm T & N Poultry Farm, LLC Thinh Bao Nguyen, Individually Timmy Huynh Poultry Farm Timmy Huynh, Individually And Sanderson Farms, Inc. v. Frank Blanchard, Angelia Snow, Tanya Berry, Kimberly Riley, John Miller, Amy Miller, Chad Martinez, Emily Martinez, Mersini Blanchard, Malakoff Properties, LLC, and Ronny Snow (tex, 2024-06-07)
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discussed Cited as authority (rule) Steve Huynh, Individually Yvonne Huynh, Individually Huynh Poultry Farm, LLC D/B/A Steve Thi Huynh Poultry Farm D/B/A Huynh Poultry Farm T & N Poultry Farm, LLC Thinh Bao Nguyen, Individually Timmy Huynh Poultry Farm Timmy Huynh, Individually And Sanderson Farms, Inc. v. Frank Blanchard, Angelia Snow, Tanya Berry, Kimberly Riley, John Miller, Amy Miller, Chad Martinez, Emily Martinez, Mersini Blanchard, Malakoff Properties, LLC, and Ronny Snow
Tex. · 2024 · confidence medium
Ass’n, 16 S.W. 792, 793 (Tex. 1891)). 25 Cf. Wales Trucking Co. v. Stallcup, 474 S.W.2d 184, 186 (Tex. 1971) (noting jury finding that “the plaintiffs lost temporary use of their house”); Town of Jacksonville v. McCracken, 232 S.W. 294, 295 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1921, judgm’t adopted) (“If the injury to the land is only temporary, and the nuisance also temporary and capable of being abated,” then “the measure of damages to be applied is such depreciation in its rental value or use as had occurred up to the time of the trial of the action.”); Bowie Sewerage Co. v. Chandler, 138 S.…
cited Cited as authority (rule) Jason Ritenour v. Centrecourt Homeowners Association, Inc. Associa Hill Country, Inc. Rebecca Travelstead Gary E. Doucha And Jennifer Lucinda Raman
Tex. App. · 2022 · confidence medium
Express Co. v. Lasker Real-Estate Ass’n, 16 S.W. 792, 793 (1891)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Velma San Miguel and Alexis Rendon v. PlainsCapital Bank, Trustee of the Guerra Mineral Trust
Tex. App. · 2019 · confidence medium
Co. v. Dunn, 16 S.W. 792, 792 (Tex. 1891)); accord House v. Reavis, 35 S.W. 1063, 1064 (Tex. 1896) (determining -2- Dissenting Opinion 04-18-00450-CV that the plaintiffs’ “possession of the land in controversy under a claim of title . . . [was] prima facie evidence of title in [the plaintiffs]”).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) ExxonMobil Corp. v. Lazy R Ranch, LP
Tex. · 2017 · confidence medium
Express Co. v. Lasker Real-Estate Ass’n, 81 Tex. 81 , 16 S.W. 792, 793 (1891) (holding that if plaintiff owned both the damaged house and the land on which it stood, and if the property's value—due to age or new railroad lines— was only a fraction of the cost of repairing or rebuilding the house, the measure of damages should be "the difference between the value of the land immediately before and after a house on it is injured or destroyed, with interest”), and Coastal Transp.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Enbridge Pipelines (East Texas) L.P. v. Gilbert Wheeler, Inc.
Tex. App. · 2015 · confidence medium
Two of those ex- damages should be “the difference between the ceptions are at issue in this case. value of the land immediately before and after a house on it is injured or destroyed.” Id. at 794.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Don C. and Wynette M. Russell v. Robert B. Coward and Coward Land, LP, a Texas Limited Partnership
Tex. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
Express Co. v. Lasker Real-Estate Ass’n, 81 Tex. 81 , 16 S.W. 792, 793 (1891).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Enbridge Pipelines (East Texas) L.P. v. Gilbert Wheeler, Inc. (2×)
Tex. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
Express Co. v. Lasker Real-Estate Ass 'n, 16 S.W. 792, 793 (Tex. 1891).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Gilbert Wheeler, Inc. v. Enbridge Pipelines (East Texas), L.P. (5×)
Tex. · 2014 · confidence medium
Express Co. v. Lasker Real-Estate Ass’n, 81 Tex. 81 , 16 S.W. 792, 793 (1891).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Crown Central Petroleum Corp. v. Coastal Transport Co. (4×)
Tex. App. · 2001 · confidence medium
The supreme court reversed, concluding that “the measure of compensation applied in this case would be manifestly unjust.” Id. at 794.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Coastal Transport Co. v. Crown Central Petroleum Corp.
Tex. · 2004 · signal: see also · confidence medium
We hold that Crown Central was therefore entitled to recover only the amount of money necessary to rebuild its facility and to compensate for its loss of use during the interim, as this amount was sufficient to place Crown Central “in the same position [it] occupied prior to the injury.” Kraft v. Langford, 565 S.W.2d 223, 227 (Tex.1978); see also Pacific Express Co. v. Lasker Real Estate Ass’n, 81 Tex. 81 , 16 S.W. 792, 793-94 (1891).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Pacific Express Company
v.
William M. Dunn.
No. 7039..
Texas Supreme Court.
May 15, 1891.
16 S.W. 792
Ball Burney and McCormick Spence, for appellant. — In order for proof of possession alone to entitle plaintiff to recover for damage to real estate, the possession proved must constitute some species of title or be coupled with facts showing the right to the possession. The surviving widow may have the right to possession without having title to the fee, or possession alone may by lapse of time have ripened into title, but these facts must be shown. Railway v. Timmerman, 61 Tex. 660 ; Reed v. Railway, 37 N.W. Rep., 758; Bascom v. Dempsey, 9 N.E. Rep., 744. Martin Jennings and J.M. Moon, for appellee. — Appellee testified that he was the owner of the house described in the petition and of the lot on which it was situated; was in possession of said property and had been prior to the destruction thereof, which occurred June 17, 1886. At the time of the fire was living at the Renderbrook Hotel, just across the street from the house burned and opposite to it; was renting two rooms in said house to other parties; two rooms were vacant, and one of the rooms was used and occupied by him as an office. The house was built in the spring of 1882. Abbott's Trial Ev., secs. 1, 2, p. 634; 2 Whart. Ev., secs. 1331, 1332.
Stayton.
Cited by 29 opinions  |  Published
STAYTON, Chief Justice.

Appellee brought this action to recover damages for the destruction of a house and property therein by fire, which he alleges resulted from the negligence of an employe of appellant while engaged in the course of his employment in its business. In the course of the trial appellee was permitted to prove his ownership of the house by his own testimony, and it is urged that such evidence was not admissible for that purpose.

[*86] His evidence was to the effect that he owned the house and lot on which it stood, and was in possession of it at the time and before it was destroyed; that he built the house some four years before it was burned, on another lot, from which he moved it to the lot on which it stood about three years before it was destroyed; that two rooms in the house were occupied by his tenants, two vacant, and another occupied by himself as an office. It was contended that appellee could not thus show his ownership, and that it was incumbent on him to show title by written muniment, or to show that he held the exclusive possession. The possession shown was certainly exclusive within the meaning of the law, for the possession of his tenants was his possession, and no part of the premises was occupied by any person other than himself and his tenants.

We do not understand that in actions of this character it is incumbent on a plaintiff to deraign title through writings from the sovereignty of the soil, or in some of the other methods in which title is acquired, but understand that an exclusive and peaceable possession of land furnishes prima facie evidence of ownership, which, if not rebutted, is sufficient to maintain such an action as this or even ejectment or trespass to try title against a trespasser or mere intruder.. Linard v. Crossland, 10 Texas, 462; Lea v. Hernandez, 10 Texas, 137; Wilson v. Palmer, 18 Texas, 595; Yates v. Yates, 76 N. C., 142; Smith v. Lorilard, 10 Johns., 339; Bledsoe v. Sims, 53 Mo., 305; Keith v. Keith, 104 Ill., 397; Barger v. Hobbs, 67 Ill., 592; Sedg. & Wait’s Trespass to Try Title, 717, and cases cited.

The question which brought out the evidence as to possession may have been leading, and the broad assertion of ownership may have been but the assertion of an opinion, but these matters furnish no reason for reversal in view of the evidence of right furnished by the possession proved.

There is no other question in the case, and the judgment must be affirmed. It is so ordered.

Affirmed.

Delivered May 15, 1891.