green
Positive treatment
Quoted verbatim 1×
27.8 score
“counsel may properly discuss the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the evidence and its probative effect or lack of probative effect; but such latitude extends only to the facts and issues raised by the evidence admitted under the ruling of the court.”
Treatment trajectory · 1964 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1964
1995
2026
Top citers, strongest first. 50 distinct citers.
How cited ↗
examined
Cited as authority (quoted)
in Re Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. and Viscount Properties II, L.P., D/B/A Hoy Fox toyota/lexus
counsel may properly discuss the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the evidence and its probative effect or lack of probative effect; but such latitude extends only to the facts and issues raised by the evidence admitted under the ruling of the court.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Little Cypress-Mauriceville Consolidated Independent School District v. Pal Environmental Safety Corp.
Co., 381 S.W.2d 48, 48 (Tex. 1964) (per curiam) (explaining that a claim for breach of a contract to buy laboratory equipment does not relate to the administration of school laws and requires exhaustion of remedies to school authorities prior to filing a lawsuit).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Gwendolyn Gabriel v. Merry Outlaw
Texas Sand Co. v. Shield, 381 S.W.2d 48, 55 (Tex. 1964) (citing Eckert v. Wendel, 40 S.W.2d 796 (Tex. 1931)).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
In re BCH Development, LLC
Clark v. Bres, 217 S.W.3d 501, 510 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, pet. denied) (citing Texas Sand Co. v. Shield, 381 S.W.2d 48, 57-58 (Tex. 1964)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Michael McIntyre and Laura McIntyre, Individually and on Behalf of Their Children, K.M., L.M., C.M., M.M., and L.M. v. El Paso Independent School District, Dr. Lorenzo Garcia, and Mark Mendoza
Co., 381 S.W.2d 48, 48 (Tex.1964) (per cu-riam) (holding that a claim for breach of a contract to buy laboratory equipment was not “a matter properly belonging to the administration of school laws”). .
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Robert Hovel and Tania Hovel v. Gal Batzri
The Hovels did not seek relief under any of these statutes. 30 delay, or defraud creditor are fraudulent); Tryco Enters., Inc. v. Robinson, 390 S.W.3d 497, 509 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, pet. dism’d) (piercing corporate veil when owner and directors liquidated assets of corporate defendant and ceased paying franchise tax in attempt to make corporation judgment-proof); Castleberry v. Branscum, 721 S.W.2d 270, 272 (Tex. 1986) (recognizing denuding theory as doctrine for disregarding corporate fiction); Tex. Sand Co. v. Shield, 381 S.W.2d 48, 52 (Tex. 1964) (transfer of assets while…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Robert Hovel and Tania Hovel v. Gal Batzri
Code Ann. § 24.005 (West 2015) (transfers intended to hinder, delay, or defraud creditor are fraudulent); Tryco Enters., Inc. v. Robinson, 390 S.W.3d 497, 509 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, pet. dism’d) (piercing corporate veil when owner and directors liquidated assets of corporate defendant and ceased paying franchise tax in attempt to make corporation judgment-proof); Castleberry v. Branscum, 721 S.W.2d 270, 272 (Tex.1986) (recognizing denuding theory as doctrine for disregarding corporate fiction); Tex. Sand Co. v. Shield, 381 S.W.2d 48, 52 (Tex.1964) (transfer of assets while laws…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
John W. Hankins v. Sarah T. Harris
(2×)
also: Cited "see, e.g."
Texas Sand Co. v. Shield, 381 S.W.2d 48, 54 (Tex. 1964).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
VIA Metropolitan Transit Authority v. Jose Barraza and Ruben Barraza
“Counsel may properly discuss the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the evidence and its probative effect or lack of probative effect; but such latitude extends only to the facts and issues raised by the evidence admitted under the ruling of the Court.” Tex. Sand Co. v. Shield, 381 S.W.2d 48, 58 (Tex. 1964).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Ultra Dimensions
“Thus, a judgment creditor with a lien on the debtor’s property may enforce that lien directly against realty that had been placed in the name of another with intent to defraud the creditor.” Chapman, 756 F.2d at 1240 (citing Texas Sand Company v. Shield, 381 S.W.2d 48, 54-55 (Tex.1964)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Victor M. Zurita, DDS, MS. Individually and D/B/A Heights Medical and Dental Clinic and Ana Zurita v. Fernando Lombana, M.D., and Houston Medical & Dental Center Corp.
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
Id. (citing Tex. Sand Co. v. Shield , 381 S.W.2d 48, 58 (Tex. 1964).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Zurita v. Lombana
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
Id. (citing Tex. Sand Co. v. Shield, 381 S.W.2d 48, 58 (Tex.1964)).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Fort Worth Independent School District v. Service Employment Redevelopment
Co., 381 S.W.2d 48, 48 (Tex.1964) (per curiam).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Clark v. Bres
Tex. Sand Co. v. Shield, 381 S.W.2d 48, 57-58 (Tex.1964).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Columbus Independent School District v. Five Oaks Achievement Center
Co., 381 S.W.2d 48, 48 (Tex.1964) (per curiam).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Service Employment Redevelopment v. Fort Worth Independent School District
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
Co., 381 S.W.2d 48, 48 (Tex.1964).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Columbus Independent School District v. Five Oaks Achievement Center
Co. , 381 S.W.2d 48, 48 (Tex. 1964).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Columbus Independent School District v. Five Oaks Achievement Center
Co., 381 S.W.2d 48, 48 (Tex.1964).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Service Employment Redevelopment v. Fort Worth Independent School District
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
Co. , 381 S.W.2d 48, 48 (Tex. 1964).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Service Employment Redevelopment v. Fort Worth Independent School District
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
Co. , 381 S.W.2d 48, 48 (Tex. 1964).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Coleman Cattle Co., Inc. v. Carpentier
Various facts and circumstances, described as badges of fraud, may be considered in determining fraudulent intent. 3 See, e.g., Texas Sand Co. v. Shield, 381 S.W.2d 48, 52-3 (Tex.1964).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Wooten v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co.
Texas Sand Co. v. Shield, 381 S.W.2d 48, 59 (Tex.1964).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Mazer v. Jones (In Re Jones)
Texas Sand Co. v. Shield, 381 S.W.2d 48, 53 (Tex.1964).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Consumers United Insurance v. Smith
See Tipp v. United Bank of Durango, Colorado, 23 Ark.App. 176 , 745 S.W.2d 141, 143 (1988) (“creditor of the grantor [may] eleet[] to treat a fraudulent conveyance of the debtor’s property as void, and institut[e] legal process to subject the property to his [or her] debt”); Texas Sand Co. v. Shield, 381 S.W.2d 48, 54 (Tex.1964) (“[W]hen the creditor obtains a judgment against the debtor, and properly records and indexes an abstract of such judgment, the creditor acquires a lien upon the land just as though no transfer had been made” if the conveyance is found to be fraudulent).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Shepherd
Such indicia of fraud are known as badges of fraud, i.e., evidence of fraud or a means of establishing fraudulent intent, Texas Sand Co. v. Shield, 381 S.W.2d 48, 53 (Tex.1964), and include: (1) the debtor’s transfer of valuable property without consideration; (2) a close personal relationship between the parties to the conveyance; (3) the debtor’s retention of possession and indicia of ownership of the property; and (4) the debtor’s transfer of all of his property, especially if to different members of his family, leaving him unable to pay his debts.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Circle Y of Yoakum v. Blevins
Litigants are entitled to argue about matters in evidence, Texas Sand Co. v. Shield, 381 S.W.2d 48, 57-58 (Tex.1964); Tex.R.Civ.P. 269(e), and refusal to allow such argument is error.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Russell v. Campbell
Texas Sand Co. v. Shield, 381 S.W.2d 48, 57-58 (Tex.1964).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Castleberry v. Branscum
(2×)
Other doctrines besides disregarding the corporate fiction have been used in cases similar to this: fraudulent conveyance, Texas Sand Co. v. Shield, 381 S.W.2d 48, 52-53 (Tex.1964) and Tex. Bus. & Comm. Code ch. 24 (Vernon Supp. 1986); the trust fund doctrine, Henry 1.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Roberts v. Alta Industries, Inc. (In Re Alta Industries, Inc.)
Texas Sand Co. v. Shield, 381 S.W.2d 48, 54 (Tex.1964).
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Bobby Joe Chapman, A/K/A B.J. Chapman
(3×)
Section 24.02(a) provides, generally, that a transfer of property is void as to a creditor if the transfer was intended to delay, hinder, or defraud any creditor from obtaining “that to which he is, or may become, entitled.” 1 Section 24.-03 provides that a transfer is void with respect “to an existing creditor” if “not made for a fair consideration.” 2 As this court has construed these Texas statutory provisions, a transfer in fraud of creditors is voidable in the general sense that good title may be passed to a transferee who does not have notice of the fraud, Tex.Bus. & Com.Code…
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Stein v. State
Texas Sand Co. v. Shield, 381 S.W.2d 48, 58 (Tex.1964); Martinez v. State, 167 Tex.Cr.R. 97 , 318 S.W.2d 66 , 71 *936 (1958).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Howard v. Faberge, Inc.
Texas Sand Company v. Shield, 381 S.W.2d 48, 58 (Tex.1964); Magic Chef v. Sibley, 546 S.W.2d 851, 857 (Tex.Civ.App.— San Antonio 1977, writ ref’d n.r.e.).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
In Re Mortgageamerica Corporation, Debtor. The American National Bank of Austin v. Mortgageamerica Corporation
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
Under the Texas Act, a transfer in fraud of creditors is voidable in the general sense that good title may be passed to a transferee who does not have notice of the fraud, Tex.Bus. & Com.Code Ann. § 24.-02(b), and void in the very limited sense that creditors may otherwise treat the transferred property as though the transfer *1273 had never taken place, see Texas Sand Co. v. Shield, 381 S.W.2d 48, 55 (Tex.1964).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Adams v. Wilhite
Texas Sand Co. v. Shield, 381 S.W.2d 48, 52 (Tex.1964).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Harrison v. Harrison
Rule 434, T.R.C.P.; Texas Sand Company v. Shield, 381 S.W.2d 48, 58 (Tex.1964); Aultman v. Dallas Railway and Terminal Co., supra at 599; Benevides v. Peche, supra at 212.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Fulmer v. Thompson
Texas Sand Co. v. Shield, 381 S.W.2d 48, 58 (Tex.1964); Aultman v. Dallas Railway & Terminal Co., 152 Tex. 509 , 260 S.W.2d 596, 600 (1953); Carter v. City of Tyler, 454 S.W.2d 771, 775 (Tex.Civ.App.—Tyler 1970, writ ref’d n. r. e.).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
First Southern Properties, Inc. v. Gregory
Texas Sand Co. v. Shield, 381 S.W.2d 48, 53 (Tex.1964).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Seeley v. Eaton
Texas Sand Company v. Shield, 381 S.W.2d 48, 58 (Tex.Sup.1964).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
JC Penney Company v. Duran
Texas Sand Co. v. Shield, 381 S.W.2d 48, 58 (Tex.1964); Aultman v. Dallas Railway & Terminal Co., 152 Tex. 509 , 260 S.W.2d 596 (1953); Williams v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., supra. After careful consideration of the entire record before us, we hold that the record does not establish any reversible error of the trial court pertaining to the matter of argument of counsel.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Reese v. Security National Insurance Co.
Texas Sand Company v. Shield, 381 S.W.2d 48, 58 (Tex.Sup.1964).
cited
Cited "see"
In Re: The Commitment of Jeffrey Parkinson v. the State of Texas
P. 269(e); see Tex. Sand Co. v. Shield, 381 S.W.2d 48 , 57–58 (Tex. 1964).
cited
Cited "see"
in Re: The Commitment of Justin Shelton
Id. at (e); see Texas Sand Co. v. Shield, 381 S.W.2d 48, 58 (Tex. 1964).
cited
Cited "see"
in Re: The Commitment of Justin Shelton
Id. at (e); see Texas Sand Co. v. Shield, 381 S.W.2d 48, 58 (Tex. 1964).
discussed
Cited "see"
in Re Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. and Viscount Properties II, L.P., D/B/A Hoy Fox toyota/lexus
See Tex. Sand Co. v. Shield, 381 S.W.2d 48, 57-58 (Tex.1964) (“Counsel may properly discuss the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the evidence and its probative effect or lack of probative effect; but such latitude extends only to the facts and issues raised by the evidence admitted under the ruling of the Court.”).
discussed
Cited "see"
Wilhoite, Sandra Lynn v. Sims, Linda Diane
See Tex. Sand Co. v. Shield, 381 S.W.2d 48, 55 (Tex.1964). “ ‘Adverse possession’ means an actual and visible appropriation of real property, commenced and continued under a claim of right that is inconsistent with and is hostile to the claim of another person.” Civ.
discussed
Cited "see"
Calsaro 10000 Old Katy, Ltd. v. State
See Clark v. Bres , 217 S.W.3d 501, 510 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, pet. denied) (“A litigant is entitled to have his counsel argue the facts of the case to the jury.”) (citing Tex. Sand Co. v. Shield , 381 S.W.2d 48 , 57 – 58 (Tex. 1964)).
cited
Cited "see"
In the Interest of C.J.B.
See Texas Sand Co. v. Shield, 381 S.W.2d 48, 58 (Tex.1964).
cited
Cited "see"
Jackson Law Office, P.C. v. Chappell
See Texas Sand Co. v. Shield, 381 S.W.2d 48, 53 (Tex.1964).
cited
Cited "see"
Roquemore v. Kellogg
Rutherford v. Carr, 99 Tex. 101 , 87 S.W. 815, 816 (1905); see Texas Sand Co. v. Shield, 381 S.W.2d 48, 54-55 (Tex.1964).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
SPRING BRANCH INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, Petitioner,
v.
METALAB EQUIPMENT COMPANY, a Corporation, Respondent
v.
METALAB EQUIPMENT COMPANY, a Corporation, Respondent
Ernest A. Knipp, Houston, for petitioner., William W. Byrd, Houston, for respondent.
Per Curiam.
Cited by 10 opinions | Published
Citer courts: Texas Supreme Court (1)
PER CURIAM.
This is a suit for the breach of a contract to buy laboratory equipment. The trial court sustained a plea in abatement by •the defendant-petitioner, Spring Branch Independent School District, on the grounds that the plaintiff-respondent had not alleged or otherwise shown that it had exhausted the remedy of appeal to the proper school authorities. The Court of Civil Appeals reversed and remanded. 378 S.W.2d 347. In our opinion this action does not embrace a complaint relating “to a matter properly belonging to the administration of school laws.” The action is one for a debt allegedly owing by the petitioner for equipment furnished the school district under contract. The application for writ of error is refused, no reversible error. Warren v. Sanger Independent School District, 116 Tex. 183, 288 S.W. 159, (1926); Cook v. Neill, 163 Tex. 49, 352 S.W.2d 258 (1961); McIntyre v. Hoblinski, Tex.Civ.App., 333 S.W.2d 697 wr. ref. (1960).