Bullock v. Kattner, 502 S.W.2d 828 (Tex. App. 1973). · Go Syfert
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Bullock v. Kattner, 502 S.W.2d 828 (Tex. App. 1973). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
24 citation events (3 in the last 25 years) across 9 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Pebble Beach Property Owners' Ass'n v. Sherer (texapp, 1999-04-28)
Treatment trajectory · 1975 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1975 2000 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 4 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Pebble Beach Property Owners' Ass'n v. Sherer
Tex. App. · 1999 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Lassiter v. Bliss, 559 S.W.2d 353, 356 (Tex.1977) (finding that “trailer” is to be understood in its usual meaning regardless of whether it is referred to or described as “house trailer” or “mobile home”); Gigowski v. Russell, 718 S.W.2d 16, 20-21 (Tex.App.—Tyler 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.)(holding that prohibition of “any kind of mobile home” included double-wide manufactured home which was finished out with foundation, skirt and added porches by concluding difference in nomenclature did not alter intention of framers of restrictive covenants, saying “[t]hat it is …
discussed Cited "see" Gigowski v. Russell
Tex. App. · 1986 · signal: see · confidence high
See Bullock v. Kattner, 502 S.W.2d 828 (Tex.Civ.App.—Austin 1973, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Phillips v. Zmotony, 525 S.W.2d 736 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1975), rev’d on other grounds, 529 S.W.2d 760 (Tex.1975).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Thomas George and Jenifer George v. Cypress Springs Property Owners Association
Tex. App. · 2023 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence medium
See, e.g., Bullock v. Kattner, 502 S.W.2d 828, 829 (Tex. App.—Austin 1973, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (mobile home with wheels removed, placed on blocks, and connected to utilities was a “trailer” within the context of a restrictive covenant prohibiting trailers from being used as a temporary or permanent residence as a matter of law). 15 C.
cited Cited "see, e.g." Smith v. DeVincent
La. Ct. App. · 1975 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Crawford v. Boyd, 453 S.W. 2d 232 , Tex.Civ.App. (1970), and contra, Bullock v. Kattner, 502 S.W.2d 828 , Tex.Civ.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Will D. BULLOCK Et Al., Appellants,
v.
Delbert KATTNER, Appellee
12073.
Court of Appeals of Texas.
Nov 28, 1973.
502 S.W.2d 828
Kirk Kuykendall, Kuykendall & Kuyken-dall, Austin, for appellants., Robert C. (Lou) McCreary, Austin, for appellee.
Phillips.
Cited by 19 opinions  |  Published
PHILLIPS, Chief Justice.

Appellee moved a house trailer onto a lot in Pamela Heights subdivision in Travis County. [1] He removed the wheels, thereby permanently connecting the trailer to the lot by means of water pipes, electricity lines and block foundations.

Appellants brought suit for the purpose of enforcing restrictions applying to lots in the subdivision. Appellee is charged with violating the following restriction:

“3. No trailer, basement, tent, shack, garage, barn or other out buildings erected in this subdivision shall at any time be used as a residence temporarily or permanently, nor shall any structure of a temporary character be used as a residence.” [Emphasis added.]

Appellee, admitting that he had placed a “mobile home” on his lot, contended that a mobile home is not a trailer within the meaning of the restriction.

After trial to the court, a take-nothing judgment was entered.

Appellants contend that the court erred in not holding as a matter of law that ap-pellee’s mobile home was a trailer within the meaning of the restriction. We sustain this point. We therefore reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case to that court so that it may enter an appropriate order compelling appellee to comply with the restriction in question.

This restriction proscribes trailers used as residences temporarily or permanently. The intent of the' restriction is plain. A trailer, sans wheels, placed on blocks and hooked to light and water is still a trailer under this restriction, even though it may also be a mobile home. Temporary or permanent, it is the type of structure that the restriction attempts to exclude.

Appellee cites us to Crawford v. Boyd, 453 S.W.2d 232 (Tex.Civ.App.—Fort Worth 1970, writ ref. n. r. e.); and Hussey v. Ray, 462 S.W.2d 45 (Tex.Civ.App.—Tyler 1970, no writ) for the proposition that the determining factor of whether a structure is a trailer is not what possible use might be made of the structure in the future but what use is actually being made of it at the particular time in question. These cases are distinguishable from the case before us, because the latter restricts the use of trailers parked either temporarily or permanently. Thus, a trailer permanently bound to the earth is also proscribed. Also see Jones v. Beiber, 251 Iowa 969, 103 N.W.2d 364 (1960); Timmerman v. Gabriel, 155 Mont. 294, 470 P. 2d 528 (1970). In Timmerman the court points out that a restrictive convenant, similar to the one in the instant case, is directed to a type of structure such as a[*830] trailer and that the prohibition extends to the use of those types of structures as dwellings; this prohibition is due to their construction rather than their mobility.

Reversed and remanded with instructions.

1

. Trailers have been defined as follows:

“. . . a wide variety of mobile vehicles from boat, U-Hauls, farm, freight trailer to camp, vacation, business office and mobile home trailers.” Hussey v. Ray, Tex.Civ.App., 462 S.W.2d 45, no writ.
“(a) Trailer. Every vehicle ... designed for carrying persons or property and for being drawn by a motor vehicle and so constructed that no part of its weight rests upon the towing vehicle.” Vernon’s Ann.Civ.St. art. 6701d, Sec. 5(a).
“(d) House Trailer. A trailer or semitrailer which is designed, constructed and equipped . . . for use as a conveyance on streets and highways. . . .” Art. 6TOld, Sec. 5(d)(1).