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Treatment trajectory · 2002 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
2002
2014
2026
Top citers, strongest first. 50 distinct citers.
How cited ↗
examined
Vacated
Pham v. State
(4×)
also: Cited as authority (rule)
Pham v. State, 36 S.W.3d 199, 205 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2000), vacated by 72 S.W.3d 346 (Tex.Crim.App.2002).
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
Newt Justine Porter v. the State of Texas
(3×)
also: Cited "see", Cited "see, e.g."
On the other hand, the mere failure to obtain a written waiver of a defendant’s jury-trial right, as required by the Code of Criminal Procedure, is categorized as a statutory violation 10 reviewed for harm under Appellate Rule 44.2(b), which provides that if the error “does not affect substantial rights” it “must be disregarded.” Johnson v. State, 72 S.W.3d 346, 348 (Tex. Crim.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Terry Elmo Brewsaugh v. the State of Texas
Id. (first citing Johnson v. State, 72 S.W.3d 346, 349 (Tex. Crim App. 2002); then citing 1 Regarding preservation of error, the court further stated that it would not presume that the defendant entered a plea of “true” to the enhancement allegation when the defendant did not object to the finding—“much like we would not presume that a defendant entered a plea of guilty when he fails to object to a guilty verdict”—because the State has the burden to prove each element of the indictment.
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
Terrance D. McCarter v. the State of Texas
(3×)
also: Cited "see"
P. 44.2(b); Johnson v. State, 72 S.W.3d 346, 348 (Tex. Crim.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Patricia Lynn Swartz v. the State of Texas
Johnson v. State, 72 S.W.3d 346, 349 (Tex. Crim.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Brenda Sanchez v. the State of Texas
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
Johnson, 72 S.W.3d at 349 (finding it significant that the defendant “never alleged that he did not know about his right to a jury trial, nor does the record indicate that he did not”).
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
Matthew Louis Brown v. the State of Texas
(3×)
also: Cited "see"
“Neither the federal nor the state constitution requires that trial by jury be waived in writing.” Munguia v. State, 636 S.W.3d 750 , 757 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2021, pet. ref’d) (citing Johnson v. State, 72 S.W.3d 346, 348 (Tex. Crim.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Clarence Edward Lippert v. the State of Texas
However, the court of criminal appeals has held that this test “is not helpful in evaluating error in non-jury proceedings.” Johnson v. State, 72 S.W.3d 346, 348 (Tex. Crim.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Patrick Oniel Howard v. the State of Texas
While precedential authority provides that a statement in the judgment that an appellant has waived his right to a jury trial is binding in the absence of direct proof of its falsity, see Johnson v. State, 72 S.W.3d 346, 349 (Tex. Crim.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Patrick Oniel Howard v. the State of Texas
(2×)
Johnson v. State, 72 S.W.3d 346, 348 (Tex. Crim.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Monty Durell Bryant v. the State of Texas
Even so, “[n]either the federal nor the state constitution requires that trial by jury be waived in writing.” Munguia, 636 S.W.3d at 757 (citing Johnson v. State, 72 S.W.3d 346, 348 (Tex. Crim.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Josette Richardson v. the State of Texas
App. P. 44.2(b); Johnson v. State, 72 S.W.3d 346, 347-48 (Tex. Crim.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Saul Ranulfo Herrera Rios v. the State of Texas
App. 2002). 6 Id. at 348-49.
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
Saul Ranulfo Herrera Rios v. the State of Texas
(4×)
also: Cited "see"
Id. at 416 (citing Johnson v. State, 72 S.W.3d 346, 348 (Tex. Crim.
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
Rios, Saul Ranulfo Herrera
(4×)
also: Cited "see"
Id. at 416 (citing Johnson v. State, 72 S.W.3d 346, 348 (Tex. Crim.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Johnathan Nightingale Tanner v. the State of Texas
Even so, “[n]either the federal nor the state constitution requires that trial by jury be waived in writing.” Id. (citing Johnson v. State, 72 S.W.3d 346, 348 (Tex. Crim.
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
Jose Werner Munguia v. the State of Texas
(6×)
also: Cited "see"
Johnson v. State, 72 S.W.3d 346, 348 (Tex. Crim.
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
Sean Patrick Bunker v. the State of Texas
(3×)
also: Cited "see"
Cf. Johnson v. State, 72 S.W.3d 346, 349 (Tex. Crim.
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
Jose Werner Munguia v. the State of Texas
(6×)
also: Cited "see"
Johnson v. State, 72 S.W.3d 346, 348 (Tex. Crim.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Sanchez, Jose Cesar
Sanchez, 2020 WL 2837023 , at *2 (citing Johnson v. State, 72 S.W.3d 346, 348 (Tex. Crim.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Jose Cesar Sanchez v. the State of Texas
Sanchez, 2020 WL 2837023 , at *2 (citing Johnson v. State, 72 S.W.3d 346, 348 (Tex. Crim.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Gerald Sherard v. the State of Texas
Harm analysis requires that “we consider whether a party had a right to that which the error denied.” Johnson v. State, 72 S.W.3d 346, 348 (Tex. Crim.
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
David Martin Ruiz v. State
(3×)
also: Cited "see"
Article 1.13 provides in part that the defendant “shall have the right, upon entering a plea, to waive the right of trial by jury, conditioned, however, that . . . the waiver must be made in person by the defendant in writing in open court with the consent and approval of the court, and the attorney representing the state.” Id.; Johnson v. State, 72 S.W.3d 346, 347 (Tex. Crim.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Johnny Eugene Ray, Jr. v. State
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
App. 2003) (range of punishment); Johnson v. State, 72 S.W.3d 346, 348 (Tex. Crim.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Teodora Hinojosa v. State
Johnson v. State, 72 S.W.3d 346, 348 (Tex. Crim.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Mark Hoff v. State
(2×)
In contexts such as this, not involving a jury proceeding, to determine whether an error affected substantial rights, the Court of Criminal Appeals has considered “whether a party had a right to that which the error denied.” Johnson v. State, 72 S.W.3d 346, 348 (Tex. Crim.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Gary Carson v. State
(2×)
First, “[t]o determine whether an error ‘affect[ed] substantial rights,’ we consider whether a party had a right to that which the error denied.” Johnson v. State, 72 S.W.3d 346, 348 (Tex. Crim.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Jacob Lee Roper v. State
Johnson v. State, 72 S.W.3d 346, 349 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Jacob Lee Roper v. State
Johnson v. State, 72 S.W.3d 346, 349 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Jacob Lee Roper v. State
Johnson v. State, 72 S.W.3d 346, 349 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002).
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
Michael Wayne Jackson v. State
(4×)
also: Cited "see"
When applying the presumption of regularity to the waiver of a jury trial, a recitation in the judgment that the defendant “waived trial by jury” “is ‘binding in the absence of direct proof of [its] falsity.’” Johnson v. State, 72 S.W.3d 346, 349 (Tex. Crim.
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
Michael Wayne Jackson v. State
(4×)
also: Cited "see"
When applying the presumption of regularity to the waiver of a jury trial, a recitation in the judgment that the defendant “waived trial by jury” “is ‘binding in the absence of direct proof of [its] falsity.’” Johnson v. State, 72 S.W.3d 346, 349 (Tex. Crim.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Jose Albert Aguilar v. State
Johnson v. State, 72 S.W.3d 346, 349 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Julio Ortiz Chavarria v. State
App. 1998); cf. Johnson v. State, 72 S.W.3d 346, 348 (Tex. Crim.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Justin Sanders v. State
Troy Daniels testified that he smelled 126 Morales, 32 S.W.3d at 867; Johnson v. State, 72 S.W.3d 346, 348 (Tex. Crim.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Robert Mitchell Dean Jr. v. State
Johnson v. State, 72 S.W.3d 346, 349 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Melvin Jetson v. State
Johnson v. State, 72 S.W.3d 346, 349 (Tex. Crim.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
in the Matter of R.A.J., a Child
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
Johnson v. State, 72 S.W.3d 346, 349 (Tex. Crim.
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
Sylverio Carrizales v. State
(5×)
also: Cited "see"
ANN. art. 1.13 (West, Westlaw through 2013 3d C.S.); Johnson v. State, 72 S.W.3d 346, 348 (Tex. Crim.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Margaret Carolyn Snider v. State
Johnson v. State, 72 S.W.3d 346, 349 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Lewis Ramirez v. State
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
Johnson v. State, 72 S.W.3d 346, 349 (Tex. Crim.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Michael Anthony Jimenez v. State
Although neither the federal nor Texas Constitutions require that a jury be waived in writing, Johnson v. State, 72 S.W.3d 346, 348 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002), article 1.13 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure provides that waiver of a jury "must be made in person by the defendant in writing in open court . . . ." Tex. Code Crim.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Michael Anthony Jimenez v. State
Although neither the federal nor Texas Constitutions require that a jury be waived in writing, Johnson v. State, 72 S.W.3d 346, 348 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002), article 1.13 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure provides that waiver of a jury "must be made in person by the defendant in writing in open court . . . ." Tex. Code Crim.
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
Guadalupe Pedraza v. State
(3×)
also: Cited "see"
Id. at 348; see also Tex. R.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Timothy Evan Kennedy v. State
Johnson v. State , 72 S.W.3d 346, 347 (Tex. Crim.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Horacio Gonzales v. State
We therefore analyze harm under Appellate Rule 44.2(b).‖ Johnson v. State, 72 S.W.3d 346, 348 (Tex. Crim.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Leon Brewer v. State
Johnson v. State, 72 S.W.3d 346, 348 (Tex. Crim.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Nicholas Ryan Kucera v. State
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
Johnson v. State, 72 S.W.3d 346, 348 (Tex. Crim.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Hobbs v. State
Cf. Johnson v. State, 72 S.W.3d 346, 348 (Tex.Crim.App.2002) (where defendant alleges merely that there was no written jury waiver, and does not allege that there was no jury waiver at all, he alleges statutory error subject to harm analysis under Tex.R.App.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
John Tuy PHAM, Appellant,
v.
the STATE of Texas
v.
the STATE of Texas
198-01.
Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
Apr 10, 2002.
G. Allen Goodling, Houston, for appellant., Jeffrey L. Van Horn, First Assist. St. Att., Matthew Paul, State’s Attorney, Austin, for state.
Per Curiam.
Cited by 13 opinions | Published
OPINION
The opinion of the Court was delivered
PER CURIAM.A jury found Appellant guilty of murder and assessed punishment at confinement for life. The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction based on its conclusion that the trial court erred to admit Appellant’s confession. Pham v. State, 36 S.W.3d 199 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2000). The Court of Appeals held the confession was inadmissible because of the State’s violation of V.T.C.A. Family Code, § 52.02(b), which requires that a juvenile’s parent or guardian be promptly notified that the juvenile has been taken into custody. The Court of Appeals concluded the trial court reversibly erred to admit Appellant’s confession. See Article 38.23, V.A.C.C.P.; Tex.R.App.P. 44.2(b).
The State has filed a petition for discretionary review contending the Court of Appeals erred to conclude that any statement given by the juvenile must be suppressed because of the failure to notify the juvenile’s parent, guardian, or custodian that the juvenile had been taken into custody. The State also argues that no causal connection exists between the failure to notify and any statement subsequently made by the juvenile.
Recently, in Gonzales v. State, 67 S.W.3d 910 (Tex.Crim.App.2002), we addressed the same issue. We concluded that before a juvenile’s written statement can be excluded, there must be a causal connection between the Family Code violation and the making of the statement. Id. at 912. The Court of Appeals in the instant case did not have the benefit of our opinion in Gonzales. Accordingly, we grant grounds one and two of the State’s petition for discretionary review, vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and remand this case to the Court of Appeals in light of our opinion in Gonzales.