green
Positive treatment
16.6 score
Treatment trajectory · 1931 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1931
1978
2026
Top citers, strongest first. 20 distinct citers.
How cited ↗
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
David James Martin v. State of Florida
Although Martin challenges the court’s denial of certain ineffective assistance of counsel claims, he does not challenge, and has therefore abandoned, his claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately question Juror Smith or to ascertain Smith’s DUI conviction and file a motion for new trial. - 10 - juror, that he would be of that standard of impartiality which is necessary to prevent an impairment of the right to jury trial.” Johnson v. Reynolds, 121 So. 793, 796 (Fla. 1929); see also Dyer v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 970, 973 (9th Cir. 1998) (“The bias or prejudice of e…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Movita Sanchez v. Geico Indemnity Company
In Matarranz v. State, 133 So. 3d 473 (Fla. 2013)[,] the Florida Supreme Court also stated, “if error is to be committed, let it be in favor of the absolute impartiality and purity of the jurors[”]—which is interpreted to mean that the mind of the proposed juror should not contain 9 any element of prejudice for or against either party in a cause to be tried before him.” Matarranz at 484 ; citations omitted. [In Matarranz,] [t]he Florida Supreme Court cited its opinion in Johnson v. Reynolds, 97 Fla. 591 , 121 So. 793, 796 (1929), regarding attempts to rehabilitate a prospective juror w…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Gonzalez v. State
See Busby, 894 So.2d at 95-96 (finding that although equivocal responses do not necessarily disqualify a juror from serving, because the challenged juror equivocated on the most crucial issue — his ability to deliberate in an unbiased manner — he should have been excused for cause); Johnson v. Reynolds, 97 Fla. 591 , 121 So. 793, 796 (1929) (finding that the juror should have been excused for cause where he initially admitted his unfitness and lack of qualifications to serve as a fair and impartial juror but stated he would render a fair and impartial verdict after skillful questioning).
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
Matarranz v. State
(3×)
also: Cited "see"
Johnson v. Reynolds, 97 Fla. 591 , 121 So. 793, 796 (1929) (quoting Temples v. C. of Ga. Ry.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Pelham v. Walker
Johnson v. Reynolds, 97 Fla. 591 , 121 So. 793, 796 (1929).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Darr v. State
By what sort of principle is it to be determined that the last statement of the man is better and more worthy of belief than the former? 538 So.2d at 489 (quoting Johnson v. Reynolds, 97 Fla. 591 , 121 So. 793, 796 (1929)).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Martinez v. State
Johnson v. Reynolds, 97 Fla. 591, 599 , 121 So. 793, 796 (1929).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Coggins v. State
Price, 538 So.2d at 489 (quoting Johnson v. Reynolds, 97 Fla. 591 , 121 So. 793, 796 (1929)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Williams v. State
Commenting on the implications *979 of a juror's equivocation, the supreme court in Johnson v. Reynolds, 97 Fla. 591, 599 , 121 So. 793, 796 (1929) observed: It is difficult, if not impossible, to understand the reasoning which leads to the conclusion that a person stands free of bias or prejudice who having voluntarily and emphatically asserted its existence in his mind, in the next moment under skillful questioning declares his freedom from its influence.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Price v. State
Grappling with similar circumstances, the court in Johnson v. Reynolds, 97 Fla. 591 , 121 So. 793, 796 (1929), observed: It is difficult, if not impossible, to understand the reasoning which leads to the conclusion that a person stands free of bias of prejudice who having voluntarily and emphatically asserted its existence in his mind, in the next moment under skillful questioning declares his freedom from its influence.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Auriemme v. State
In other early cases this Court stated that "jurors should if possible be not only impartial, but beyond even the suspicion of partiality," O'Connor v. State, 9 Fla. 215, 222 (1860), and that "[i]f there is a doubt as to the juror's sense of fairness or his mental integrity, he should be excused." Johnson v. Reynolds, 97 Fla. 591, 598 , 121 So. 793, 796 (1929).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Hill v. State
In other early cases this Court stated that "jurors should if possible be not only impartial, but beyond even the suspicion of partiality," O'Connor v. State, 9 Fla. 215, 222 , (1860), and that "[i]f there is a doubt as to the juror's sense of fairness or his mental integrity, he should be excused." Johnson v. Reynolds, 97 Fla. 591, 598 , 121 So. 793, 796 (1929).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Jackson
The Florida Supreme Court noted that if there is question as to the juror’s “sense of fairness or Ms mental integrity,” he should be excused and that “[i]f error is to be committed, let it be in favor of the absolute impartiality and purity of the jurors” (121 So., at p. 796).
cited
Cited "see"
Scott v. State
See Johnson v. Reynolds, 97 Fla. 591 , 121 So. 793 , 796 (1929); Martinez v. State, 795 So.2d 279, 283 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001).
discussed
Cited "see"
Overton v. State
See generally Price v. State, 538 So.2d 486 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989) (quoting Johnson v. Reynolds, 97 Fla. 591 , 121 So. 793, 796 (1929) ("It is difficult, if not impossible, to understand the reasoning which leads to the conclusion that a person stands free of bias of prejudice who having voluntarily and emphatically asserted its existence in his mind, in the next moment under skillful questioning declares his freedom from its influence.
cited
Cited "see"
Alford v. Barnett National Bank
See Johnson v. Reynolds, 97 Fla. 591 , 121 So. 793 ; Williams v. Bailey, 69 Fla. 225 , 67 So. 877 .
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Randall T. Deviney v. State of Florida
See, e.g., Overton v. State, 801 So. 2d 877, 892 (Fla. 2001) (“It is difficult, if not impossible, to understand the reasoning which leads to the conclusion that a person stands free of bias [or] prejudice who having voluntarily and emphatically asserted its existence in his mind, in the next moment under skillful - 31 - questioning declares his freedom from its influence.” (quoting Johnson v. Reynolds, 121 So. 793, 796 (Fla. 1929))).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
State v. Jonas
See, e.g., Johnson v. Reynolds, 97 Fla. 591 , 121 So. 793, 796 (1929) (en banc) (“It is difficult, if not impossible, to understand the reasoning which leads to the conclusion that a person stands free of bias or prejudice who having voluntarily and emphatically asserted its existence in his mind, in the next moment under skillful questioning declares his freedom free from its influence.”); Gosling v. Commonwealth, 7 Va.App. 642 , 376 S.E.2d 541, 544 (1989) (holding-juror who expresses positive, unequivocal bias should be disqualified notwithstanding subsequent generalized statements regar…
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Longshore v. Fronrath Chevrolet, Inc.
See also Johnson v. Reynolds, 97 Fla. 591 , 121 So. 793 (1929) (denial of challenge for cause of juror who had *925 friendly relationship with plaintiffs' counsel held reversible error); Club West, Inc. v. Tropigas of Florida, Inc., 514 So.2d at 426 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987) (denial of challenge for cause of juror who owned stock in defendant corporation held reversible error); Sikes v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 487 So.2d 1118 (Fla. 1st DCA) (denial of challenge for cause of juror who had friendly relationship with counsel held reversible error), rev. denied, 497 So.2d 1218 (Fla. 1986); Boca Teeca Co…
cited
Cited "see, e.g."
Club West v. Tropigas of Florida, Inc.
See, e.g., Johnson v. Reynolds, 97 Fla. 591, 599 , 121 So. 793, 796 (1929); Singer, 109 So.2d at 24 .
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
L. S. Brannon, Plaintiff in Error,
v.
State of Florida, Defendant in Error
v.
State of Florida, Defendant in Error
James N. Daniel and T. E. Buntin, for Plaintiff in Error;
Fred H. Davis, Attorney General, and Roy Campbell, Assistant, for the State.
Ellis, Terrell, Brown, Whitfield, Buford.
Published
Ellis, J.
L. S. Bannon was indicted for the crime of embezzlement in the sum of more than $500.00 which was. alleged to be the property of Robert R. Carpenter. Upon a plea of not guilty the accused was convicted and sentenced.
The facts out of which the charge of embezzlement grew were briefly as follows: Brannon was a fire insurance agent at Marianna, Fla. He represented two or more fire insurance companies. Carpenter was an agent or solicitor for Brannon at Sneads, Fla. His services -were under an agreement with Brannon to be paid for by the latter. The commission which the insurance companies allowed to Brannon upon the premiums received on policies of insurance were to be equally divided between Brannon and Carpenter on business secured by the latter.
[*489] Many policies of insurance which Carpenter procured to be issued at Sneads and the premiums on which were sent by him to Brannon were cancelled at different times and Carpenter procured other insurance to be issued in such cases and paid the premiums thereon and demanded of Brannon the return of the unearned premium upon the policies which had been cancelled.
Brannon failed to return it all but held back some of it on account of claims which he had against Carpenter arising upon other transactions, one of which was where Brannon had to pay a fire loss of $800.00 upon a policy of insurance which had been cancelled and in which Carpenter had neglected to notify the insured of such cancellation. Brannon held that Carpenter owed him that sum because the fault was Carpenter’s and the sum which Brannon had to pay for Carpenter’s fault was greater than Brannon owed to Carpenter on the other transaction.
We are of the opinion that the foregoing facts do not constitute embezzlement on the part of Brannon.
The judgment is reversed.
Terrell, C. J., and Brown, J., concur. Whitfield, P. J., and Buford, J., concur in the opinion and judgment.