Brumick v. Morris, 165 So. 351 (Fla. 1935). · Go Syfert
Brumick v. Morris, 165 So. 351 (Fla. 1935). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
18 citation events (11 in the last 25 years) across 3 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Essex Ins. Co. v. Zota (fla, 2008-06-26)
Top citers, strongest first. 2 distinct citers. How cited ↗
examined Cited as authority (rule) Essex Ins. Co. v. Zota (9×) also: Cited "see"
Fla. · 2008 · confidence medium
The policy application stated that the company should incur no liability under it "unless and until (a) it has been received and approved, (b) the policy issued and actually delivered, and (c) the premium has been actually paid to and accepted by the Company, or its authorized agent," all during the lifetime of the insured and while he is in good health. 165 So. at 352 (emphasis supplied).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Florida East Coast Properties, Inc. v. Tifco, Inc.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1989 · confidence medium
Co. v. Lyons, 122 Fla. 346, 349 , 165 So. 351, 353 (1936); see National Premium Budget Plan Corp. v. LaSalle Casualty Co., 81 Ill.App.2d 466 , 225 N.E.2d 400, 402-04 (1967) (agent of insurance company for delivery of policy was the designated agent for the premium finance company in the separate and distinct premium financing transaction).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Iola
v.
Brumick v. Belva E. Morris
Supreme Court of Florida.
Dec 18, 1935.
165 So. 351
James B. Gibson, Jr., for Plaintiff in Error; Hampton, Bull Crom, for Defendant in Error.
Buford, Whitfield, Ellis, Brown, Terrell, Davis.
Cited by 1 opinion  |  Published
Buford, J.

The writ of error brings for review judgment in favor of the petitioner in a statutory proceeding for unlawful detainer of real estate.

The law applicable to such cases is clearly stated in the opinion prepared for this Court by Mr. Justice Ellis in the case of Goffin v. McCall, 91 Fla. 514, 108 Sou. 556.

In this case it was the contention of the petitioner that the respondents, being the owners of and in possession of the premises, conveyed the same by warranty deed to petitioner and thereupon respondents leased the premises for a definite period with option to repurchase during the term of the lease, such lease contract being in writing. That respondents did not exercise the option to repurchase. That after the expiration of the first lease another contract was entered into between the parties on the 23rd day of March, 1934, therein and whereby the respondents were granted an option to repurchase the property with a loan to be procured from Home Owners Loan Corporation. This option was for a period of three months from date thereof and by its terms became null and void if not exercised within that time. That it was not exercised.

The respondents at all times had remained in possession of the property. After expiration of last option petitioner demanded surrender of possession of the property. Re[*238] spondents failed to surrender possession of the property to petitioner and thereupon this statutory summary proceeding was instituted.

Under the principles of law stated in Goffin v. McCall, supra, the remedy invoked is not applicable.

The statutory remedy to be invoked in such cases as this is that provided by Sections 3534 R. G. S., 5398 C. G. L., et seq. We do not hold, however, that the procedure afforded by these statutory provisions excludes the right of proceeding in equity to enforce specified performance of a contract for the delivery of possessions.

For the reasons stated, the judgment should be reversed.

It is so ordered.

Reversed.

Whitfield, C. J., and Ellis and Brown, J. J., concur. Terrell and Davis, J. J., dissent.