Mobil Oil Corp. v. Shevin, 354 So. 2d 372 (Fla. 1977). · Go Syfert
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Mobil Oil Corp. v. Shevin, 354 So. 2d 372 (Fla. 1977). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“the essential elements of the doctrine are that the parties and issues be identical, and that the particular matter be fully litigated and determined in a contest which results in a final decision of a court of competent jurisdiction.”
138 citation events (40 in the last 25 years) across 16 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Raymond Devindra Bhairo (flmb, 2021-07-15)
Treatment trajectory · 1977 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1977 2001 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 50 distinct citers. How cited ↗
examined Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Raymond Devindra Bhairo
Bankr. M.D. Fla. · 2021 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
the essential elements of the doctrine are that the parties and issues be identical, and that the particular matter be fully litigated and determined in a contest which results in a final decision of a court of competent jurisdiction.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Evans, Evans v. Gulf Landings Association, Inc.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2024 · confidence medium
Servs. v. B.J.M., 656 So. 2d 906, 910 (Fla. 1995) (citing Mobil Oil Corp. v. Shevin, 354 So. 2d 372, 374 (Fla. 1977)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) ITG Brands, LLC v. Reynolds American, Inc.
Del. Ch. · 2022 · confidence medium
“A party may not present a new argument for the first time in a motion for reargument.”21 ITG failed to raise this position in its summary judgment briefs or its supplemental briefs on Florida issue preclusion law.22 For example, ITG’s reply to Reynolds’ supplemental brief focused solely on the adversity element but never argued that ITG and Reynolds Tobacco were adverse in the Florida litigation.23 20 Mobil Oil Corp. v. Shevin, 354 So. 2d 372, 374 (Fla. 1977) (emphasis added) (quoted in Mem.
cited Cited as authority (rule) NITV Federal Services, LLC v. Herring, III
Bankr. E.D. Pa. · 2021 · confidence medium
Fla. 1991); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Shevin, 354 So. 2d 372, 374 (Fla.1977)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Patel v. Kumar (2×)
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
See Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Douglas, 110 So. 3d 419, 432-33 (Fla. 2013) (explaining that res judicata precludes relitigating claims and collateral estoppel precludes relitigating issues); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Shevin, 354 So. 2d 372, 374 (Fla. 1977) (observing that collateral estoppel is a judicial doctrine).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Lucky Nation, LLC and Nina Solonenko v. Hassan Al-Maghazchi
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
Mobil *15 Oil Corp. v. Shevin, 354 So.2d 372, 374 (Fla.1977).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Government Employees Insurance Co. v. Kisha
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2015 · confidence medium
See United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 158 , 104 S.Ct. 568 , 78 L.Ed.2d 379 (1984); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Shevin, 354 So.2d 372, 375 (Fla.1977); Prall v. Prall, 58 Fla. 496 , 50 So. 867 , 870 (1909); see also Cragin v. Ocean & Lake Realty Co., 101 Fla. 1324 , 133 So. 569, 571 (1931).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Dolgencorp, LLC
11th Cir. · 2014 · confidence medium
Mobil Oil Corp. v. Shevin, 354 So. 2d 372, 374 (Fla. 1977); cf. Rufenacht v. Iowa Beef Processors, Inc., 656 F.2d 198, 203 (5th Cir. Sept. 1981) (refusing to apply collateral estoppel due to non-identical issues when “each claim is referable to a separate and distinct cattle transaction”); id. at 204 n.2 (“[E]stoppel applies [when] there is an actual identity of issues . . . as opposed to the cases at bar which involve separate albeit similar sales of cattle.”).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Kane v. Stewart Tilghman Fox & Bianchi, P.A.
S.D. Fla. · 2013 · confidence medium
“Florida’s doctrine of collateral estoppel bars ‘identical parties from relitigating issues that have previously been decided between them.’ ” Madura v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 344 Fed.Appx. 509, 518 (11th Cir.2009) (quoting Mobil Oil Corp. v. Shevin, 354 So.2d 372, 374 (Fla.1977)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Bernice Brown v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.
11th Cir. · 2010 · confidence medium
Co., 945 So. 2d 1216, 1235 (Fla. 2006) (quotation marks omitted); see also Dep’t of Health & Rehabilitative Servs. v. B.J.M., 656 So. 2d 906, 910 (Fla. 1995) (same); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Shevin, 354 So. 2d 372, 374 (Fla. 1977) (same); Holt v. Brown’s Repair Serv., Inc., 780 So. 2d 180, 182 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (“[F]or the doctrine of collateral estoppel to apply, an identical issue must be presented in a prior proceeding; the issue must have been a critical and necessary part of the prior determination; there must have been a full and fair opportunity to litigate that issue; the parties in t…
cited Cited as authority (rule) Andrzej Madura v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.
11th Cir. · 2009 · confidence medium
Florida’s doctrine of collateral estoppel bars “identical parties from relitigating issues that have previously been decided between them.” Mobil Oil Corp. v. Shevin, 354 So. 2d 372, 374 (Fla. 1977).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Andrzej Madura v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.
11th Cir. · 2009 · confidence medium
Florida’s doctrine of collateral estoppel bars “identical parties from relitigating issues that have previously been decided between them.” Mobil Oil Corp. v. She *518 vin, 354 So.2d 372, 374 (Fla.1977).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Zimmerman v. STATE, OFFICE OF INS. REG.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2006 · confidence medium
Servs. v. B.J.M., 656 So.2d 906, 910 (Fla.1995) (citing Mobil Oil Corp. v. Shevin, 354 So.2d 372, 374 (Fla.1977))).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Zimmerman v. State, Office of Insurance Regulation
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2006 · confidence medium
Servs. v. B.J.M., 656 So.2d 906, 910 (Fla.1995) (citing Mobil Oil Corp. v. Shevin, 354 So.2d 372, 374 (Fla.1977))).
cited Cited as authority (rule) GLA and Associates, Inc. v. City of Boca Raton
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2003 · confidence medium
Servs. v. B.J.M., 656 So.2d 906, 910 (Fla.1995) (citing Mobil Oil Corp. v. Shevin, 354 So.2d 372, 374 (Fla.1977)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Mary Quinn v. Monroe County, James L. Roberts, County Administrator, Monroe County, individually and in his official capacity
11th Cir. · 2003 · confidence medium
See Community Bank of Homestead v. Torcise, 162 F.3d 1084, 1086 (11th Cir.1998) (citing Essenson v. Polo Club Assocs., 688 So.2d 981, 983 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1997)); Stogniew v. McQueen, 656 So.2d 917, 920 (Fla.1995); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Shevin, 354 So.2d 372, 374 (Fla.1977).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Goodman v. ALDRICH & RAMSEY ENTERPRISES
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2002 · confidence medium
However, other cases discuss whether the parties are "identical." See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Shevin, 354 So.2d 372, 374 (Fla. 1977); Holt v. Brown's Repair Serv., Inc., 780 So.2d 180, 182 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Far Out Productions, Inc. v. Oskar
9th Cir. · 2001 · confidence medium
“Collateral estoppel, or estoppel by judgment, is a judicial doctrine which in general terms prevents identical parties from relitigating issues that have previously been decided between them.” Mobil Oil Corp. v. Shevin, 354 So.2d 372, 374 (Fla.1977).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Far Out Productions, Inc., a California Corporation v. Lee Oskar Morris Dickerson Bran Aitchison Bruce Solar, Individually and D/B/A Absolute Artists, and Howard Scott, Defendant-Counter-Claimant-Appellant, Harold Brown,plaintiff-Cross-Defendant-Appellant v. Jerry Goldstein
9th Cir. · 2001 · confidence medium
Ed. 2d 274 , 105 S. Ct. 1327 (1985) ("Section 1738 embodies concerns of comity and federalism that allow the States to determine, subject to the requirements of the statute and the Due Process Clause, the preclusive effect of judgments in their own courts."); In re Nourbakhsh, 67 F.3d 798 , 800 (9th Cir. 1995) (applying Florida collateral estoppel doctrine to a default judgment rendered in Florida state court). 30 "Collateral estoppel, or estoppel by judgment, is a judicial doctrine which in general terms prevents identical parties from relitigating issues that have previously been decided bet…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Gentile v. Bauder
Fla. · 1998 · confidence medium
Under Florida law, collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, applies when "the identical issue has been litigated between the same parties or their privies." Stogniew v. McQueen, 656 So.2d 917, 919 (Fla.1995); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Shevin, 354 So.2d 372, 374 (Fla.1977).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Bankr. L. Rep. P 76,650, 95 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 7575, 95 Daily Journal D.A.R. 12,971 in Re Emil Nourbakhsh and Marlene Nourbakhsh, Debtors. John M. Gayden, Jr., and Miriam M. Gayden v. Emil Nourbakhsh
9th Cir. · 1995 · confidence medium
Trucking Employees of North Jersey Welfare Fund, Inc. v. Romano, 450 So.2d 843, 845 (Fla.1984); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Shevin, 354 So.2d 372, 374 (Fla.1977). 10 Nourbakhsh does not dispute that the first two elements are satisfied: the parties are identical and the elements of common law fraud are essentially identical to those required to establish nondischargeability due to fraud under Sec. 523(a)(2)(A).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Gayden v. Nourbakhsh (In re Nourbakhsh)
9th Cir. · 1995 · confidence medium
Trucking Employees of North Jersey Welfare Fund, Inc. v. Romano, 450 So.2d 843, 845 (Fla.1984); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Shevin, 354 So.2d 372, 374 (Fla.1977).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Department Hrs v. Bjm
Fla. · 1995 · confidence medium
Mobil Oil Corp. v. Shevin, 354 So.2d 372, 374 (Fla. 1977).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Nourbakhsh v. Gayden (In Re Nourbakhsh) (2×)
9th Cir. BAP · 1994 · confidence medium
Trucking Employees of N. Jersey Welfare Fund, Inc. v. Romano, 450 So.2d 843, 845 (Fla.1984); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Shevin, 354 So.2d 372, 374 (Fla.1977); Daniel Int'l Corp. v. Better Constr., Inc., 593 So.2d 524, 527 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1991), review denied, Better Constr., Inc. v. Daniel Int'l Corp., 602 So.2d 941 (Fla.1992); West Point Constr.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Freund
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1993 · confidence medium
In Mobil Oil Corp. v. Shevin, 354 So.2d 372, 374 (Fla.1977), our supreme court stated: Collateral estoppel, or estoppel by judgment, is a judicial doctrine which in general terms prevents identical parties from relitigating issues that have previously been decided between them.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Vazquez v. Metropolitan Dade County
11th Cir. · 1992 · confidence medium
Although appellant concedes that Dade County has satisfied the first two prongs of this test, he argues that the County has not satisfied the third prong, and that summary judgment was therefore inappropriate. 25 In response, appellee contends that Florida law generally requires only that "the issues [in the respective civil and criminal cases] be identical, and that the particular matter be fully litigated and determined in a contest which results in a final decisions [sic] of a court of competent jurisdiction." Appellee's Brief at 11, citing Mobil Oil Corp. v. Shevin, 354 So.2d 372, 374 (Fla…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Vazquez v. Metropolitan Dade County
11th Cir. · 1992 · confidence medium
In response, appellee contends that Florida law generally requires only that “the issues [in the respective civil and criminal cases] be identical, and that the particular matter be fully litigated and determined in a contest which results in a final decisions [sic] of a court of competent jurisdiction.” Appellee’s Brief at 11, citing Mobil Oil Corp. v. Shevin, 354 So.2d 372, 374 (Fla.1978).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Robbins v. Yusem
Fla. Cir. Ct. · 1991 · confidence medium
Mobil Oil Corp. v Shevin, 354 So.2d 372, 374 (Fla. 1977); West Point Construction Co. v Fidelity and Deposit Company of Maryland, 515 So. 2d 1374, 1376 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Jerry Katzman, M.D. Ophthalmic Associates, P.A. v. Owens (In re Owens)
Bankr. M.D. Fla. · 1991 · confidence medium
In Florida, “... collateral estoppel may be asserted only when the identical issue has been litigated between the same parties or their privies.” Trucking Employees of North Jersey Welfare Fund, Inc. v. Romano, 450 So.2d 843, 845 (Fla.1984), aff'g, 427 So.2d 802 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983), citing, Mobil Oil Corp. v. Shevin, 354 So.2d 372, 374 (Fla.1977).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Matter of Owens
Bankr. M.D. Fla. · 1991 · confidence medium
In Florida, ". . . collateral estoppel may be asserted only when the identical issue has been litigated between the same parties or their privies." Trucking Employees of North Jersey Welfare Fund, Inc. v. Romano, 450 So.2d 843, 845 (Fla.1984), aff'g, 427 So.2d 802 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983), citing, Mobil Oil Corp. v. Shevin, 354 So.2d 372, 374 (Fla. 1977).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Hall v. Hall
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1989 · signal: cf. · confidence medium
Co. v. Race, 508 So.2d 1276, 1278-79 (Fla.3d DCA 1987), approved on other grounds, 542 So.2d 347 (Fla.1989); Krug v. Meros, 468 So.2d 299, 302-03 (Fla.2d DCA), rev. denied, 480 So.2d 1295 (Fla.1985); cf. Mobile Oil Corp. v. Shevin, 354 So.2d 372, 374 (Fla.1977) (when same issue has been fully litigated between the parties, collateral estoppel applies).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Munsey v. GENERAL TELEPHONE CO., FLA.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1989 · confidence medium
Mobil Oil Corp. v. Shevin, 354 So.2d 372, 374 (Fla. 1977).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Race
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1987 · confidence medium
Mobil Oil Corp. v. Shevin, 354 So.2d 372, 374 (Fla. 1977); Husky Indus., Inc. v. Griffith, 422 So.2d 996, 999 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Branca v. Security Benefit Life Insurance
11th Cir. · 1985 · confidence medium
Mobil Oil Corp. v. Shevin, 354 So.2d 372, 374 (Fla.1977); Seaboard Coast Line R.R. v. Cox, 338 So.2d 190 (Fla.1976); Gordon v. Gordon, 59 So.2d 40 (Fla.1952). .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Horan v. Horan
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1985 · confidence medium
“Collateral estop-pel, or estoppel by judgment, is a judicial doctrine which in general terms prevents identical parties from relitigating issues that have previously been decided between them.” Mobile Oil Corp. v. Shevin, 354 So.2d 372, 374 (Fla.1977).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Bates v. Cook, Inc. (2×) also: Cited "see"
M.D. Fla. · 1984 · confidence medium
Id. at 374 (footnotes omitted).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Nell v. INTERN. UNION OF OPERATING ENGINEERS
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1983 · confidence medium
The essential elements of the doctrine are that the parties and issues be identical, and that the particular matter be fully litigated and determined in a contest which results in a final decision of a court of competent jurisdiction. 354 So.2d at 374 (footnotes omitted). [2] Boshnack v. World Wide Rent-A-Car, Inc., 195 So.2d 216 (Fla. 1967).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Gonzalez v. Gonzalez
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1982 · confidence medium
Mobil Oil Corp. v. Shevin, 354 So.2d 372, 374 (Fla.1977); Zurich Ins.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Fuller v. General Motors Corp.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1981 · confidence medium
The final judgment under review, which was entered in favor of the defendant General Motors Corporation based on a jury verdict after trial below, is affirmed upon a holding that: (a) “[collateral estoppel, or estoppel by judgment, is a judicial doctrine which in general terms prevents identical parties from relitigating issues that have previously been decided between them,” and has, as one of its essential elements, the requirement that “[t]he parties ... be identical.” Mobil Oil Corp. v. Shevin, 354 So.2d 372, 374 (Fla.1978); (b) the judicial doctrine of collateral estoppel or estop…
cited Cited as authority (rule) S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Robinson
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1980 · confidence medium
Mobil Oil Corp. v. Shevin, 354 So.2d 372, 374 (Fla. 1977); Zurich Ins.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Pressley v. Wainwright
Fla. · 1979 · confidence medium
Nothing indicates when the public defender received his request or promised to file for him, and the filing itself, of course, was out of time. [6] The Fifth Circuit did not directly rule that Pressley had been denied due process or equal protection, but apparently adopted the federal district court's conclusion to that effect. 540 F.2d at 821 n. 11. [7] See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Shevin, 354 So.2d 372, 374 (Fla. 1977). [8] Crawford v. Wainwright, 222 So.2d 188 (Fla. 1969).
cited Cited "see" UNITED AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY v. MILLENNIUM RADIOLOGY, LLC, D/B/A MILLENNIUM OPEN MRI, A/A/O SORAYA CASTANEDA ARANGO
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2022 · signal: see · confidence high
See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Shevin, 354 So. 2d 372, 374 (Fla. 1977).
cited Cited "see" Traci K. Stevenson v. Corporation of Lloyd's
11th Cir. · 2016 · signal: see · confidence high
See Mobil Oil Corp. v, Shevin, 354 So.2d 372, 374 (Fla. 1977).
examined Cited "see" Rice-Lamar v. City of Fort Lauderdale (3×)
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2003 · signal: see · confidence high
See Dep't of Health and Rehabilitative Servs. v. B.J.M., 656 So.2d 906, 910 (Fla.1995)(citing Mobil Oil Corp. v. Shevin, 354 So.2d 372, 374 (Fla.1977)).
cited Cited "see" Burshan v. NATIONAL UNION FIRE INS. COMPANY OF PITTSBURGH, PA.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2001 · signal: see · confidence high
See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Shevin, 354 So.2d 372 , 374 (Fla.1977); Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc. v. Seymour, 356 So.2d 834 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).
discussed Cited "see" Ned L. Siegel, Georgette Sosa Douglas v. Theresa Lepore, Charles E. Burton (2×)
11th Cir. · 2000 · signal: see · confidence high
See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Shevin, 354 So.2d 372, 374 (Fla.1977).
cited Cited "see" Ned L. Siegel v. Theresa Lepore
11th Cir. · 2000 · signal: see · confidence high
See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Shevin, 354 So.2d 372, 374 (Fla. 1977).
cited Cited "see" E.C. v. Katz
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1998 · signal: see · confidence high
See id. at 374 .
cited Cited "see" State Dept. of Revenue v. Ferguson
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1996 · signal: see · confidence high
See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Shevin, 354 So.2d 372 (Fla.1977).
cited Cited "see" Kosow v. Kosow
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1993 · signal: see · confidence high
See and compare Mobil Oil Corp. v. Shevin, 354 So.2d 372 (Fla.1977); R.D.J.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
MOBIL OIL CORPORATION, Shell Oil Company, Marathon Oil Company, Continental Oil Company, Phillips Petroleum Company, Atlantic Richfield Company and Cities Service Company, Appellants,
v.
Robert L. SHEVIN, Attorney General, State of Florida, Appellee.
51287.
Supreme Court of Florida.
Dec 8, 1977.
354 So. 2d 372
England.
Cited by 101 opinions  |  Published

[*373] Andrew J. Kilcarr and Maureen O'Bryon of Donovan, Leisure, Newton & Irvine, Washington, D.C., Thomas R. Trowbridge, III, Charles F. Rice, New York City, and John A. Madigan, Jr. and Jack M. Skelding, Jr., of Madigan, Parker, Gatlin, Swedmark and Skelding, Tallahassee, for appellants.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and William C. Sherrill, Jr., Chief Trial Counsel and Charles R. Ranson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for appellee.

[*374] ENGLAND, Justice.

This case is brought to us on direct appeal from an order of the Leon County Circuit Court holding that the Attorney General of the State of Florida had autonomous authority to initiate a federal antitrust lawsuit in federal court on behalf of the state and its agencies, or alternatively that such authority was retroactively conferred by a resolution of the Florida Cabinet.[1] The trial court action was instituted by Mobil Oil Corporation and six other oil companies (collectively "Mobil") for declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent the Attorney General from continuing his prosecution of an ongoing federal antitrust suit against them, in which the identical question as to his authority had been decided adversely to them by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.[2]

The threshold question for our determination is raised on a cross-assignment of error by the Attorney General, who contends that his motion to dismiss this action in the circuit court should have been granted on the ground of collateral estoppel. We agree. Collateral estoppel, or estoppel by judgment, is a judicial doctrine which in general terms prevents identical parties from relitigating issues that have previously been decided between them.[3] The essential elements of the doctrine are that the parties and issues be identical,[4] and that the particular matter be fully litigated and determined in a contest which results in a final decision of a court of competent jurisdiction.[5] All of these elements are present here.

Mobil does not contend that the parties or issues are different in this proceeding from the parties and issues in the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. Rather, it argues that collateral estoppel is inapplicable because the federal court decision was not "final". For this proposition, Mobil relies on a statement in the majority opinion of the Fifth Circuit suggesting that the court's evaluation of the Attorney General's authority was merely tentative because "only the Florida Supreme Court can decide this state law question in a manner that is, by definition, correct."[6]

The position Mobil asserts is untenable. Notwithstanding any acknowledgment of this Court's preeminence on questions of Florida law, there is nothing tentative about the Fifth Circuit's decision that, as between these parties, the Attorney General of Florida had standing to initiate and prosecute this federal antitrust suit. Of controlling significance is the legal effect of that court's determination, not what was incidentally said. Mobil does not deny that the issue of the Attorney General's authority was fully and effectively litigated in a proceeding which culminated in a written opinion of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, nor that certiorari was sought to review that decision in the United States Supreme Court and denied. It necessarily follows, then, that as between these parties in this lawsuit, that issue is conclusively determined.[7]

Mobil does not suggest that the same issue could be relitigated in any other federal court, or in the courts of any other jurisdiction. It contends, however, that the[*375] issue can be relitigated in Florida because the Florida Supreme Court has the ultimate authority to decide the standing of the Attorney General of Florida to initiate lawsuits, and for that reason the Florida Supreme Court should be given an opportunity to speak to that issue. We find no fault with the first part of Mobil's contention, and if the matter came to us in a proper case there is no doubt that our decision on our Constitution's grant of authority to the Attorney General of Florida would be binding precedent not only in Florida but in any other jurisdiction where the question might later be litigated.[8] That fact, however, does not substantiate Mobil's conclusion that we should now address the issue. The Fifth Circuit's determination that the Attorney General had standing to initiate this federal anti-trust litigation does not bind this Court to a like determination in any other proceeding.[9] Consequently, that decision neither presents a reason for us to pass on the issue nor poses a threat to our jurisprudence if we do not.

Our action in this cause follows well-established doctrine. As a matter of comity, courts of competent jurisdiction have routinely applied the law of other jurisdictions when required to do so for the purpose of their own litigation.[10] Collateral estoppel has traditionally operated to preclude litigants from relitigating the same issue not only in the same, but as well in a different forum.[11] Clearly, then, the Fifth Circuit's decision is the law of this case.[12]

Some years ago, the State of Florida initiated the process of "certification", by which federal appellate courts may certify to this Court questions of Florida law that are "determinative of [the] cause" and for which there are "no clear controlling precedents" in the decisions of this Court.[13] Before that jurisprudential innovation, it was common for federal courts to resolve issues of Florida state law in proceedings which required such determinations. There was, of course, the doctrine of abstention, by which the federal courts voluntarily declined to pass on unsettled questions of state law and directed the parties to file a declaratory proceeding in the state court system for a definitive resolution of the issue.[14] The certification process was initiated to eliminate both the expense and delay of abstention, by permitting the federal litigation[*376] to be abated while the doubtful question of state law was referred directly to the highest state court for resolution.[15] As a tool of federal-state comity, the certification process has been well-received, and is now used generously in the federal system where permitted by state law.[16]

The opportunity to certify to us the question of the Attorney General's legal authority to institute a federal anti-trust suit was presented to the Fifth Circuit by Mobil.[17] The court expressly declined the invitation, stating among other reasons that the point of law to be resolved on the basis of existing Florida law "does not seem ... an extremely close one."[18] Mobil does not suggest that the Fifth Circuit's decision not to certify a question is reviewable — plainly it is not[19] — yet this lawsuit in state court is tantamount to a collateral attack on the Fifth Circuit's exercise of its certification discretion. To permit that attack would invite serious problems of comity.[20]

At the present time there are at least three initiatives available to a federal litigant faced with an unsettled question of state law. The litigant can, of course, have the matter resolved in the federal proceeding and be bound by the result in that lawsuit. Alternatively, the litigant can request the federal appellate court to use the certification process (where it is available) to obtain a definitive resolution from the highest state court. The federal appellate court may, but need not, choose to certify the particular issue; but if it does, the state court's answer resolves the issue not only for that lawsuit but for all future litigants, state and federal. There is, as well, a third alternative for litigants. The litigants can request the federal trial court to stay its proceeding while a declaration of state law is obtained from the state courts. Since certification is not available from federal trial courts (at least in Florida)[21] and no final judgment will have been entered at this early stage of the proceeding, the litigant would then be free to seek a binding resolution of the question in the state court system.[22]

The third alternative was available to Mobil. The federal trial court in fact entered a stay, ostensibly to allow the Attorney General to pursue a declaratory action in the state court system on the question of his authority. He declined, and instead filed an abortive appeal in the federal appellate court.[23] The opportunity was open to Mobil during that stay to have commenced the state declaratory action which it later initiated and now brings here. Apparently[*377] choosing to risk a federal court resolution of the question, Mobil is and should be bound both by its own tactical decision and by the federal court's ruling.

The doctrine of collateral estoppel bars our present consideration of whether the Attorney General possessed autonomous authority to initiate an antitrust lawsuit in federal court. The trial judge erred in denying the Attorney General's motion to dismiss the state court proceeding, and this case is remanded to that court for the purpose of entering an order dismissing with prejudice the declaratory action brought by Mobil Oil Corporation and the other appellants.

It is so ordered.

OVERTON, C.J., BOYD, SUNDBERG and HATCHETT, JJ., and DREW (Retired), J., concur.

KARL, J., dissents.

1 Jurisdiction here is predicated on the trial court's construction of provisions of the Florida Constitution. Art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.
2 State of Florida ex rel. Shevin v. Exxon Corp., 526 F.2d 266 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 829, 97 S.Ct. 88, 50 L.Ed.2d 92 (1976). Ten of the seventeen oil companies which are parties to the federal court action are not participating in this collateral litigation.
3 Gordon v. Gordon, 59 So.2d 40 (Fla.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 878, 73 S.Ct. 165, 97 L.Ed. 680 (1952).
4 See, e.g., Seaboard Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Cox, 338 So.2d 190 (Fla. 1976).
5 See, e.g., Gray v. Gray, 91 Fla. 103, 107 So. 261 (1926), where the doctrine of estoppel by judgment is distinguished from the doctrine of res judicata.
7 In re Sanford Fork and Tool Co., 160 U.S. 247, 16 S.Ct. 291, 40 L.Ed. 414 (1895). See also IB Moore's Federal Practice para. 0.404[10] at 571 (2d ed. 1974).
8 U.S.Const., art. IV, § 1. See, e.g., Newton v. Newton, 245 So.2d 45 (Fla. 1971).
9 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938); Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 28 S.Ct. 40, 52 L.Ed. 151 (1907); State v. Dwyer, 332 So.2d 333 (Fla. 1976); Miles Laboratories, Inc. v. Eckerd, 73 So.2d 680 (Fla. 1954); Wright, The Federal Courts and the Nature and Quality of State Law, 13 Wayne L.Rev. 317, 323 (1967). We recognize, of course, that state courts are bound by federal court determinations of federal law questions. See, e.g., Ratner v. Arrington, 111 So.2d 82 (Fla.3d DCA 1959).
10 See, e.g., Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. City of Thomasville, 100 Fla. 748, 130 So. 7 (1930). See also the definition of "comity", Black's Law Dictionary 334 (rev. 4th ed. 1968), and Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 2, Comment a(3) (1971).
11 See United States Gypsum Co. v. Columbia Cas. Co., 124 Fla. 633, 169 So. 532 (1936).
12 Id. See also note 7 above.
13 Fla.App.R. 4.61. Certification was initiated by statute which authorized Supreme Court implementation by rule. Ch. 23098, § 1, Laws of Florida (1945), subsequently reenacted in its present form as § 25.031, Fla. Stat. (1975), by Ch. 57-274, Laws of Florida. Our rule was adopted in In re Florida Appellate Rules, 127 So.2d 444 (Fla. 1961). The certification procedure was thoroughly discussed, and its constitutionality upheld, in Sun Ins. Office, Ltd. v. Clay, 133 So.2d 735 (Fla. 1961).
14 First utilized in Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 61 S.Ct. 643, 85 L.Ed. 971 (1941), this "well-established procedure" has been the focal point of much attention both in the opinions of the United States Supreme Court, see, e.g., Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 88 S.Ct. 391, 19 L.Ed.2d 444 (1967); Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167, 79 S.Ct. 1025, 3 L.Ed.2d 1152 (1959); Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 64 S.Ct. 7, 88 L.Ed. 9 (1943); and in the literature of the profession. See, e.g., Kurland, Toward a Co-operative Judicial Federalism: The Federal Court Abstention Doctrine, 24 F.R.D. 481 (1960); Wright, The Abstention Doctrine Reconsidered, 37 Tex. L.Rev. 815 (1959); Note, Abstention: An Exercise in Federalism, 108 U.Pa.L.Rev. 226 (1959).
15 See Note, Florida's Interjurisdictional Certification: A Reexamination to Promote Expanded National Use, 22 U.Fla.L.Rev. 21 (1969).
16 See Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 390 & nn. 5-7, 94 S.Ct. 1741, 40 L.Ed.2d 215 (1974), resulting in a certification of the legal issues ultimately resolved in Schein v. Chasen, 313 So.2d 739 (Fla. 1975).
19 Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 392-95, 94 S.Ct. 1741, 40 L.Ed.2d 215 (1974) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
20 At oral argument, Mobil's counsel conceded some uncertainty as to how a favorable determination from this Court would be of any practical benefit to its position in the federal litigation.
21 Both the rule (Fla.App.R. 4.61) and the statute (§ 25.031, Fla. Stat. (1975)) limit availability of certification to federal appellate courts. A concise treatment of the purposes underlying this limitation may be found in Note, Inter-Jurisdictional Certification: Beyond Abstention Toward Cooperative Judicial Federalism, 111 U.Pa.L.Rev. 344, 360-61 (1963).
22 There are two additional alternatives available to the federal appellate courts but not the litigants. There are, of course, one or more forms of abstention. Also, as in Lee v. Bickell, 292 U.S. 415, 426, 54 S.Ct. 727, 78 L.Ed. 1337 (1934), and in Glenn v. Field Packing Co., 290 U.S. 177, 179, 54 S.Ct. 138, 78 L.Ed. 252 (1933), the appellate court could expressly leave open the possibility of modifying its decision if a later state court determination is made to the contrary. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in this case neither abstained nor authorized a re-opening of its decision.
23 This appeal was dismissed without opinion by the Fifth Circuit for lack of a final order. 526 F.2d at 267-68.