State v. Hegstrom, 401 So. 2d 1343 (Fla. 1981). · Go Syfert
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State v. Hegstrom, 401 So. 2d 1343 (Fla. 1981). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
168 citation events (12 in the last 25 years) across 4 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Eddie Slattery v. The State of Florida (fladistctapp, 2024-01-24) · Strongest negative: Juan Fallada v. Richard L. Dugger, Secretary, Department of Corrections, State of Florida (ca11, 1987-06-24)
Treatment trajectory · 1981 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1981 2003 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 26 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Overruled Juan Fallada v. Richard L. Dugger, Secretary, Department of Corrections, State of Florida
11th Cir. · 1987 · confidence high
In State v. Hegstrom, 401 So.2d 1343, 1346 (Fla.1981), overruled by State v. Enmund, 476 So.2d 165 (Fla.1985) the Florida Supreme Court, stating that the underlying felony in a felony-murder is necessarily an offense included within the murder, had held that under Whalen's legislative intent test and this statute, Hegstrom could be convicted of, but not sentenced for, the underlying felony as well as felony murder.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Eddie Slattery v. The State of Florida
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2024 · confidence medium
See Slater v. State, 316 So. 2d 539, 542 (Fla. 1975) (holding double jeopardy principles do not bar convictions for felony murder and underlying felony); State v. Pinder, 375 So. 2d 836, 839 (Fla. 1979) (briefly, for merely two years, concluding such dual convictions and sentences were improper); State v. Hegstrom, 401 So. 2d 1343, 1346 (Fla. 1981) (partially receding from Pinder, finding dual convictions are permissible, but dual sentencing is not); State v. Enmund, 476 So. 2d 165, 168 (Fla. 1985) (confirming there is no double jeopardy bar to dual convictions for felony murder and the underl…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) SHIRLEY COTO v. STATE OF FLORIDA
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2020 · confidence medium
In other words, “[t]he Double Jeopardy Clause ‘presents no substantive limitation on the legislature’s power to prescribe multiple punishments,’ but rather, ‘seeks only to prevent courts either from allowing multiple prosecutions or from imposing multiple punishments for a single, legislatively defined offense.’” Borges v. State, 415 So. 2d 1265, 1267 (Fla. 1982) (quoting State v. Hegstrom, 401 So. 2d 1343, 1345 (Fla. 1981)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Diego Tambriz-Ramirez v. State of Florida
Fla. · 2018 · confidence medium
“The Double Jeopardy Clause ‘presents no substantive limitation on the legislature’s power to prescribe multiple punishments,’ but rather, ‘seeks only to prevent courts either from allowing multiple prosecutions or from imposing multiple punishments for a single, legislatively defined offense.’ ” Borges v. State, 415 So. 2d 1265, 1267 (Fla. 1982) (quoting State v. Hegstrom, 401 So. 2d 1343, 1345 (Fla. 1981)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) McKinney v. State (2×)
Fla. · 2011 · confidence medium
Valdes, 3 So.3d at 1069 (citing Hayes v. State, 803 So.2d 695, 699 (Fla.2001)); Borges v. State, 415 So.2d 1265, 1267 (Fla.1982) (“The Double Jeopardy Clause ‘presents no substantive limitation on the legislature’s power to prescribe multiple punishments,’ but rather, ‘seeks only to prevent courts either from allowing multiple prosecutions or from imposing multiple punishments for a single, legislatively defined offense.’ ”) (quoting State v. Hegstrom, 401 So.2d 1343, 1345 (Fla.1981)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Valdes v. State
Fla. · 2009 · confidence medium
See Hayes v. State, 803 So.2d 695, 699 (Fla.2001) (“As the United States Supreme Court explained in Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. at 161, 165, 97 S.Ct. 2221 , 53 L.Ed.2d 187 (1977), where multiple punishments are imposed at a single trial, ‘the role of the constitutional guarantee against *1070 double jeopardy is limited to assuring that the court does not exceed its legislative authorization by imposing multiple punishments arising from a single criminal act.’ ”); Borges v. State, 415 So.2d 1265, 1267 (Fla.1982) (“The Double Jeopardy Clause ‘presents no substantive limitation on the leg…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Enmund
Fla. · 1985 · confidence medium
After analyzing Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684 , 100 S.Ct. 1432 , 63 L.Ed.2d 715 (1980), and Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333 , 101 S.Ct. 1137 , 67 L.Ed.2d 275 (1981), we held that the fifth amendment presents no substantive limitation on the legislature's power to prescribe multiple punishments, and that double jeopardy seeks only to prevent courts either from allowing multiple prosecutions or from imposing multiple punishments for a single, legislatively defined offense. 401 So.2d at 1345 (footnote omitted).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Bundy v. State
Fla. · 1985 · confidence medium
In State v. Hegstrom, 401 So.2d 1343, 1345 (Fla. 1981), this Court noted that in the absence of a clear contrary legislative intent the Blockburger test must be met before multiple punishments are permissible.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Baker v. State (2×) also: Cited "see"
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1982 · confidence medium
This is an extreme understatement — it is not only not useful, it is solely a negative or confusion factor. [33] But see Stone v. State, 402 So.2d 1222 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981), and cases cited in note 8 therein. [34] Yet, amazingly, in Hegstrom it is said "But we see nothing in Blockburger which bars multiple convictions for lesser included offenses." Hegstrom v. State, 401 So.2d 1343, 1346 (Fla. 1981). [35] But see Chapman v. State, 389 So.2d 1065 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980), holding that the constitutional right against double jeopardy is waived by failure to raise the question by motion to dismiss.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Borges v. State
Fla. · 1982 · confidence medium
The Double Jeopardy Clause "presents no substantive limitation on the legislature's power to prescribe multiple punishments," but rather, "seeks only to prevent courts either from allowing multiple prosecutions or from imposing multiple punishments for a single, legislatively defined offense." State v. Hegstrom, 401 So.2d 1343, 1345 (Fla. 1981) (footnote omitted).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Hudgins v. Wainwright
S.D. Fla. · 1981 · confidence medium
Section 775.021(4) Florida Statutes (1979) provides: “Whoever in the course of one criminal transaction or episode, commits an act or acts constituting a violation of two or more criminal statutes, upon conviction and adjudication of guilt, shall be sentenced separately for each criminal offense, excluding lesser included offenses, committed during said criminal epi sode.” State v. Hegstrom, 401 So.2d 1343, 1346 (Fla.1981) (emphasis added).
cited Cited "see" JAMES RAY PARISH v. STATE OF FLORIDA
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2018 · signal: see · confidence high
See Speed v. State, 410 So. 2d 980, 981 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982) (relying on State v. Hegstrom, 401 So. 2d 1343 (Fla. 1981)).
cited Cited "see" Gayman v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1991 · signal: see · confidence high
See, generally, State v. Hegstrom, 401 So.2d 1343 (Fla. 1981).
cited Cited "see" Anderson v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1984 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Hegstrom, 401 So.2d 1343 (Fla. 1981).
discussed Cited "see" State v. Gibson
Fla. · 1984 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Hegstrom, 401 So.2d 1343 (Fla. 1981); State v. Pinder, 375 So.2d 836 (Fla. 1979). [7] In State v. Hegstrom, 401 So.2d 1343 (Fla. 1981), this Court receded from State v. Pinder and held that double jeopardy did not preclude separate prosecutions, in a single-trial setting, of both felony murder and the underlying felony.
cited Cited "see" Johnson v. State
Fla. · 1983 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Hegstrom, 401 So.2d 1343 (Fla. 1981).
cited Cited "see" Ferguson v. State
Fla. · 1982 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Hegstrom, 401 So.2d 1343 (Fla. 1981).
cited Cited "see" Herring v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1982 · signal: see · confidence high
See Hegstrom v. State, 401 So.2d 1343 (Fla. 1981).
cited Cited "see" Gilbert v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1982 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Hegstrom, 401 So.2d 1343 (Fla.1981).
cited Cited "see" Foster v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1982 · signal: see · confidence high
See, State v. Hegstrom, 401 So.2d 1343 (Fla.1981); State v. Monroe, 406 So.2d 1115 (Fla.1981).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Brown v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2000 · signal: see also · confidence medium
Having originally concluded that punishment both for felony murder and for the underlying felony constituted double jeopardy, see State v. Pinder, 375 So.2d 836, 839 (Fla.1979); see also State v. Hegstrom, 401 So.2d 1343, 1346 (Fla.1981), the Florida Supreme Court later decided otherwise, overruling Hegstrom and Pinder in Enmund, 476 So.2d at 167-68 .
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Blankenship v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1987 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., State v. Pinder, 375 So.2d 836 (Fla.1979), receded from on other grounds, State v. Hegstrom, 401 So.2d 1343 (Fla.1981); Duncan v. State, 503 So.2d 443 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987); Henry v. State, 492 So.2d 485 (Fla 5th DCA 1986); Alexander v. State, 470 So.2d 856 (Fla. 1st DCA), review denied, 480 So.2d 1293 (Fla.1985). .
cited Cited "see, e.g." Hall v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1985 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also State v. Hegstrom, 401 So.2d 1343 (Fla. 1981); State v. Pinder, 375 So.2d 836 (Fla. 1979).
cited Cited "see, e.g." Dixon v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1985 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Hegstrom v. State, 401 So.2d 1343 (Fla. 1981).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Lewis
Fla. · 1982 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also King v. State, 390 So.2d 315 (Fla. 1980), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, State v. Hegstrom, 401 So.2d 1343 (Fla.), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 989 , 101 S.Ct. 1529 , 67 L.Ed.2d 825 (1981); Harnum v. State, 384 So.2d 1320 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980); Green v. State, 377 So.2d 193 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979); Smith v. State, 376 So.2d 455 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979), cert. denied, 402 So.2d 613 (Fla. 1981), (all following the Florida Supreme Court's decision in Post-Newsweek ).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Davis v. Wainwright
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1982 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., State v. Hegstrom, 401 So.2d 1343 (Fla. 1981) (defendant may be convicted but not sentenced for both higher offense and lesser-included offense).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
STATE of Florida, Petitioner,
v.
Dennis Andrew HEGSTROM, Respondent.
59893.
Supreme Court of Florida.
Jul 30, 1981.
401 So. 2d 1343
England.
Cited by 126 opinions  |  Published

[*1344] Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., and Paul Mendelson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Miami, for petitioner.

Bennett H. Brummer, Public Defender, and Peter Raben, Asst. Public Defender, Miami, for respondent.

ENGLAND, Justice.

In State v. Pinder, 375 So.2d 836 (Fla. 1979), we held that the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment to the Constitution prohibits multiple convictions and punishments in the same trial for both first-degree murder and the underlying felony from which the murder results. Following our directive, the Third District Court of Appeal vacated Dennis Hegstrom's conviction and sentence for the underlying felony of robbery in a felony murder case.[1]. The state asks that we reconcile differing applications of Pinder,[2] and that we reconsider it in light of two subsequent double jeopardy decisions of the United States Supreme Court. Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 100 S.Ct. 1432, 63 L.Ed.2d 715 (1980); Albernaz v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 101 S.Ct. 1137, 67 L.Ed.2d 275 (U.S. 1981).

Preliminarily, we dispose of the state's suggestion that the district court should be reversed inasmuch as Hegstrom's conviction can be sustained on the basis of premeditated, rather than felony, murder.[3] Were we do so, of course, the double jeopardy issue raised by Pinder would not be reached, let alone resolved. We categorically decline to accept the case for review on one basis and then reweigh the evidence, once reviewed by the district court, in order to avoid a ruling on the legal issue which provoked our jurisdiction. As the 1980 constitutional amendment to our jurisdiction made clear, we will not provide a second record review of cases already resolved by the district courts of appeal.[4] We take this case as we find it with respect to factual determinations, and the Third District Court of Appeal found no evidence of premeditation.

At issue here is the constitutionality of multiple punishments in a single trial setting for discrete crimes arising out of the same offense. In the felony-murder setting of Pinder, we held that the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment barred the imposition of cumulative convictions and punishments for both felony murder and the underlying felony in a single criminal proceeding. We based this decision on our interpretation of Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 97 S.Ct. 2221, 53 L.Ed.2d 187 (1977), and Harris v. Oklahoma, 433 U.S. 682, 97[*1345] S.Ct. 2912, 53 L.Ed.2d 1054 (1977), two cases forbidding the imposition of cumulative punishments for the same offense in successive prosecutions. An extension of Brown and Harris to a single trial setting seemed natural in light of those and other Supreme Court decisions.[5] Many other states reached the same conclusion.[6] We now have the benefit of a more refined analysis of double jeopardy by the Supreme Court.

In Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 100 S.Ct. 1432, 63 L.Ed.2d 715 (1980), the Supreme Court reiterated earlier pronouncements that double jeopardy protects "not only against a second trial for the same offense, but also `against multiple punishments for the same offense.'" Id. at 688, 100 S.Ct. at 1436 (quoting North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 2076, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969)). Whalen emphasized, however, that Congress defines offenses and determines the proper punishment for multiple offenses arising from a single criminal episode. Applying the double jeopardy test first announced in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932), the Court concluded that Congress did not intend cumulative punishments for rape and murder committed during the course of rape because the conviction of the felony murder offense could not be had without proving the lesser included offense of rape. In the absence of a clear contrary legislative intent, the Blockburger test must be met before multiple punishments are permissible. Under Blockburger, the same act violates two statutes only if "each [statutory] provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not." Id. at 304, 52 S.Ct. at 182.

In Albernaz v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 101 S.Ct. 1137, 67 L.Ed.2d 275 (U.S. 1981), the Court ruled that double jeopardy did not bar the imposition of cumulative sentences for conspiracy to import marijuana and conspiracy to distribute marijuana even though one transaction gave rise to both offenses. Relying on Whalen, the dispositive question was whether the legislature intended to authorize separate punishments for the differing offenses. Thus, under Whalen and Albernaz, it is now clear that the fifth amendment presents no substantive limitation on the legislature's power to prescribe multiple punishments, and that double jeopardy seeks only to prevent courts either from allowing multiple prosecutions or from imposing multiple punishments for a single, legislatively defined offense.[7] To hold that the legislature might violate the Constitution by authorizing too many punishments for a single act "demands more of the Double Jeopardy Clause than it is capable of supplying."[8]

In light of Whalen and Albernaz, we have reconsidered our Pinder decision and now believe our reliance on successive prosecution cases was misplaced.[9] At least three members of the Supreme Court have specifically declared that Harris does not apply to multiple punishment, single trial problems.[10]

[*1346] Our sole inquiry now is to determine what punishment our legislature authorized for a single criminal transaction involving two or more separate, statutory offenses. Section 775.021(4), Florida Statutes (1979), supplies the answer. It states:

Whoever, in the course of one criminal transaction or episode, commits an act or acts constituting a violation of two or more criminal statutes, upon conviction and adjudication of guilt, shall be sentenced separately for each criminal offense, excluding lesser included offenses, committed during said criminal episode... .

Because the crime of first-degree murder committed during the course of a robbery requires, by definition, proof of the predicate robbery, the latter is necessarily an offense included within the former. Under Whalen's legislative intent test[11] and our statute, it would follow that Hegstrom could not be sentenced both for felony murder and for the underlying felony. But we see nothing in Blockburger which bars multiple convictions for lesser included offenses.

As a last ditch effort to sustain multiple punishments here, the state argues on the basis of an hypothecated legislative intent that felony murder episodes were to be excluded from the operation of section 775.021(4). The state reasons that the statute was enacted subsequent to Slater v. State, 316 So.2d 539 (Fla. 1975),[12] in which we held that robbery and murder committed during the course of the felony were two separate offenses allowing the imposition of two separate sentences. From this chronology the state infers that the legislature "intended" to preserve our decision and to exclude from what it wrote double sentences for felony murder and the underlying felony.[13]

We reject the state's contention. Judicial decisions before an enactment do not stand as independent beacons of legislative intent to explain an otherwise unambiguous statute. Section 775.021(4) is specific, and the lesser included offenses are exempt from multiple sentencing.

For the reasons expressed, we recede from Pinder, but affirm that part of the district court's judgment vacating Hegstrom's separate sentence for robbery. Hegstrom's multiple convictions, however, present another matter. Although our opinions have not been entirely consistent on whether double jeopardy forbids double convictions as well as double sentencing,[14] the absence of double jeopardy and Blockburger constraints in this situation returns our attention to an analysis of legislative intent. Section 775.021(4), of course, expressly bars only multiple sentences. An implication exists that the legislature did not intend to prohibit multiple convictions, one which is bolstered by the designation of robbery and of felony murder as separate and discrete criminal acts. Accordingly, we reverse the district court's decision vacating Hegstrom's conviction. We remand this case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this decision.

It is so ordered.

SUNDBERG, C.J., and ADKINS, BOYD, OVERTON, ALDERMAN and McDONALD, JJ., concur.

1 Hegstrom v. State, 388 So.2d 1308 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980).
2 King v. State, 390 So.2d 315 (Fla. 1980), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 101 S.Ct. 1529, 67 L.Ed.2d 825 (1981); Wright v. State, 380 So.2d 550 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980). Our jurisdiction is predicated on article V, section 3(b)(3), Florida Constitution.
3 Hegstrom was charged with first-degree murder, committed either with premeditation or in the perpetration of a robbery. The district court found "no evidence of premeditated design to support the jury's verdict of first-degree murder on [the theory of premeditated murder.]" 388 So.2d at 1309.
4 England, Hunter & Williams, Constitutional Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Florida: 1980 Reform, 32 U.Fla.L.Rev. 147 (1980).
5 See, e.g., Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 95 S.Ct. 1284, 43 L.Ed.2d 616 (1975). See generally Westen & Drubel, Toward A General Theory Of Double Jeopardy, 1978 Sup.Ct.Rev. 81.
6 See Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 699 n. 3, 100 S.Ct. 1432, 1442 n. 3, 63 L.Ed.2d 715 (1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (citing authorities from other states).
7 See generally Note, Twice In Jeopardy, 75 Yale L.J. 262, 266-67 (1975).
8 See Westen & Drubel, supra note 5, at 113.
9 Contra, Sours v. State, 603 S.W.2d 592 (Mo. 1980), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 101 S.Ct. 953, 67 L.Ed.2d 118 (1981), in which the Missouri Supreme Court reconsidered its decision regarding multiple punishments in light of Whalen. The majority found that the legislature clearly intended to impose cumulative punishments for separate degrees of robbery and armed criminal action under a criminal action statute. On this basis, it distinguished Sours from Whalen and applied a double jeopardy bar to multiple punishments in a single trial setting.
10 Justice Blackmun in his concurrence in Whalen points to Pinder as one of several decisions which erroneously applied Harris to double punishment cases for felony murder and its predicate felony. 445 U.S. at 699 n. 3, 100 S.Ct. at 1442 n. 3 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Rehnquist, joined by Chief Justice Burger, also concluded in his dissent that reliance upon Harris was improper. Id. at 700-01, 100 S.Ct. at 1442-43 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
12 Subsection four was added to section 775.021 in 1976. Ch. 76-66, § 1, Laws of Fla.
13 The state relies upon the general rule that the legislature is presumed to know existing judicial constructions of the law when enacting a statute. Williams v. Jones, 326 So.2d 425 (Fla. 1975), appeal dismissed, 429 U.S. 803, 97 S.Ct. 34, 50 L.Ed.2d 63 (1976).
14 Compare Mahaun v. State, 377 So.2d 1158 (Fla. 1979) (sentence and conviction vacated) with King v. State, 390 So.2d 315 (Fla. 1980) (sentence vacated but conviction preserved), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 101 S.Ct. 1529, 67 L.Ed.2d 825 (1981).