A. McD. v. State, 422 So. 2d 336 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982). · Go Syfert
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A. McD. v. State, 422 So. 2d 336 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
32 citation events (6 in the last 25 years) across 2 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Rowley v. State (fladistctapp, 2006-10-18)
Treatment trajectory · 1982 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1982 2004 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 16 distinct citers.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Rowley v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2006 · confidence medium
See § 90.104(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (2004); A. McD. v. State, 422 So. 2d 336, 337-38 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) De La Portilla v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2004 · confidence medium
See also Cardenas v. State, 816 So.2d 724 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002); A.McD. v. State, 422 So.2d 336, 338 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)(stating that a trial court's restriction on cross-examination does not constitute fundamental error "where the party fails to make an offer of proof since, as a result of this failure, there is an absence of material in the record to disclose the error.").
discussed Cited as authority (rule) D.L.F. v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2001 · confidence medium
“It is axiomatic that failure to proffer what the excluded evidence would have revealed precludes appellate consideration of the alleged error.” A. McD. v. State, 422 So.2d 336, 337 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); Mosley v. State, 616 So.2d 1129 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Valente v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1998 · confidence medium
Finney v. State, 660 So.2d 674, 684 (Fla.1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1096 , 116 S.Ct. 823 , 133 L.Ed.2d 766 (1996); A. McD. v. State, 422 So.2d 336, 337 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); Ketrow v. State, 414 So.2d 298, 299 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Reed v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1997 · confidence medium
Finney v. State, 660 So.2d 674, 684 (Fla.1995); A. McD. v. State, 422 So.2d 336, 337 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); Ketrow v. State, 414 So.2d 298, 299 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Landry v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1993 · confidence medium
Breedlove at 609 , citing A. McD. v. State, 422 So.2d 336, 338 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Mosley v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1993 · confidence medium
See § 90.104(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (1991); A. McD. v. State, 422 So.2d 336, 337-38 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); see also Lucas v. State, 568 So.2d 18, 22 (Fla. 1990); Wooten v. State, 464 So.2d at 641 n. 1.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Breedlove v. State
Fla. · 1991 · confidence medium
Likewise, in A.McD. v. State, 422 So.2d 336, 338 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982), the court held that, although "a disciplinary investigation, concerning prior incidents of excessive force or arising out of the arrest of this defendant, would be relevant[,]... a prior investigation for something remote in time, or unrelated to excessive force would not be relevant." [7] In Morrell , the case that expanded cross-examination of prosecution witnesses in dicta, the court found an undercover agent's becoming involved in police work to prevent criminal charges against himself two years prior to the case at bar i…
cited Cited "see" Laguan Demetric Ward v. the State of Florida
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2025 · signal: see · confidence high
See McD. v. State, 422 So. 2d 336 , 337–38 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); Lewis v. State, 693 So. 2d 1055, 1058 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997); Williams v. State, 397 So. 3d 1061 , 1062–63 (Fla. 4th DCA 2024). 2
discussed Cited "see" Greenwald v. Eisinger, Brown, Lewis & Frankel, P.A.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2013 · signal: see · confidence high
See A. McD. v. State, 422 So.2d 336, 337 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982) (observing “[i]t is axiomatic that failure to proffer what the excluded evidence would have revealed precludes appellate consideration of the alleged error”).
cited Cited "see" Negron v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1999 · signal: see · confidence high
See A.McD v. State, 422 So.2d 336 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); Barnes v. State, 477 So.2d 6 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985), rev. denied, 484 So.2d 7 (Fla.1986).
discussed Cited "see" Parnell v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1993 · signal: see · confidence high
See A. McD. v. State, 422 So.2d 336 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982) (failure to proffer what excluded evidence would have revealed precludes appellate consideration of alleged error).
cited Cited "see" Fernandez-Carballo v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1991 · signal: see · confidence high
See A. McD. v. State, 422 So.2d 336 , 337 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978); § 90.104(1)(b), Fla.Stat. (1989); cf. Silveira-Hernandez v. State, 495 So.2d 914 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986).
discussed Cited "see" Fernandez v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1990 · signal: see · confidence high
See A.McD., 422 So.2d at 336 . ("The bare question, `Have you ever been subject to any disciplinary investigations?' provides no insight as to its relevancy."); Woodson *439 v. State, 483 So.2d 858, 859 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986) ("The witness' response was not `apparent' from the context of the question.") The absence of proffer in the present case precludes our review of the alleged error.
cited Cited "see" State v. Pettis
Fla. · 1988 · signal: see · confidence high
See A. McD. v. State, 422 So.2d 336 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); Morrell v. State, 297 So.2d 579 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974).
cited Cited "see" Woodson v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1986 · signal: see · confidence high
See McD. v. State, 422 So.2d 336 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1982).
A. McD., a Juvenile, Appellant,
v.
The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
81-2210.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
Nov 9, 1982.
422 So. 2d 336
Hubbart, C.J., and Barkdull and Nesbitt.
Cited by 28 opinions  |  Published

[*337] Bennett H. Brummer, Public Defender, and Elliot Scherker, Asst. Public Defender, for appellant.

Jim Smith, Atty. Gen. and Calianne P. Lantz, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

Before HUBBART, C.J., and BARKDULL and NESBITT, JJ.

NESBITT, Judge.

The defendant appeals an adjudication of delinquency upon two counts of battery on a police officer and one count of resisting arrest with violence. The defendant entered a plea of not guilty, contending at trial that the police officers had in fact assaulted the defendant.

The defendant first contends that the trial court improperly sustained the state's objection when, on cross-examination, defense counsel asked one of the arresting officers, "Have you ever been subject to any disciplinary investigations?" The defendant in a criminal case is accorded wide latitude in the cross-examination of prosecutorial witnesses. Mendez v. State, 412 So.2d 965 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982); Porter v. State, 386 So.2d 1209 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980); Lutherman v. State, 348 So.2d 624 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977). All witnesses are subject to cross-examination for the purpose of discrediting them by showing bias, prejudice, or interest. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974); D.C. v. State, 400 So.2d 825 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981). The defendant cites several cases[1] for the proposition that inquiry into prior or pending disciplinary action is proper cross-examination. While we are in agreement with those decisions, under the facts of the present case, we find no error.

It is axiomatic that failure to proffer what the excluded evidence would have revealed precludes appellate consideration of the alleged error. Cason v. Smith, 365 So.2d 1042 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978); Seaboard Air Line Railroad Co. v. Ellis, 143 So.2d 550 (Fla. 3d DCA 1962). The Florida Evidence Code, Section 90.104, Florida Statutes (1979) provides:

(1) A court may predicate error, set aside or reverse a judgment, or grant a new trial on the basis of admitted or excluded evidence when a substantial right of the party is adversely affected and:
... .
(b) When the ruling is one excluding evidence, the substance of the evidence was made known to the court by offer of proof or was apparent from the context within which the questions were asked.

In the present case, no offer of proof was made to indicate the testimony to be elicited from the police officer. The bare question, "Have you ever been subject to any disciplinary investigations?" provides[*338] no insight as to its relevancy.[2] Thus, while it is clear that a disciplinary investigation, concerning prior incidents of excessive force or arising out of the arrest of this defendant, would be relevant; it is equally apparent that a prior investigation for something remote in time, or unrelated to excessive force would not be relevant. See Morrell v. State, 297 So.2d 579 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974) (fact that two years earlier undercover agent became involved in police work in order to prevent criminal charges from being prosecuted against him for his own arrest in a narcotics case, and charges had been dropped six months earlier, was not relevant to show bias). It is in this crucial respect that the instant case is distinguishable from those cited by the defendant. In each of those decisions, the relevancy was apparent from the question being asked or from the proffer that was made.[3] We therefore find that the absence of such a proffer in the present case precludes our review of the alleged error.

The appellant, in apparent reliance upon Section 90.104(3), Florida Statutes (1979)[4] and Davis v. Alaska, supra, argues that the restriction of cross-examination constitutes fundamental error for which this court must reverse. We disagree. This section can hardly be applied where the party fails to make an offer of proof since, as a result of this failure, there is an absence of material in the record to disclose the error. See Law Revision Council Note to § 90.104(3), Fla. Stat. Ann. (1976).

We next consider the defendant's contention that the trial court improperly refused to allow inquiry into the substance of conversations which the three arresting officers had with the state attorney in the presence of each other. In Duncomb v. State, 237 So.2d 86 (Fla. 3d DCA 1970), this court held that curtailment of cross-examination on this issue is not improper since

[t]he only value or materiality to the defendants of disclosing that the said state witnesses were interviewed in the presence of each other prior to trial, was that the credibility of those witnesses could be considered by the jury to have been lessened through the possibility that one may have been influenced (beyond his personal observation or recollection) by information supplied by another, during such joint interrogation.

237 So.2d at 87. Once the fact became known, the trier of fact was in a position to consider the credibility of the witnesses.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.

1 Mendez v. State, supra; D.C. v. State, supra; Lutherman v. State, supra; Webb v. State, 336 So.2d 416 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976).
2 We can only conclude by the absence of a proffer that the attorney was engaging in a fishing expedition during trial. To propound such a question, without knowing what the answer would be, can only serve to taint the minds of the jurors. An attorney who employs such tactics deserves a rebuke from the trial judge.
3 Mendez v. State, supra, (proffer of police officer's prior suspensions without pay for excessive use of force, as well as pending investigation for pulling a revolver on a traffic violator); D.C. v. State, supra, (evidence that the defendant's sister had filed a complaint against police officers who arrested defendant); Lutherman v. State, supra, (cross-examination of police officer for police brutality in making the defendant's arrest); Webb v. State, supra, (proffer that defendant was being framed by the police department because of a pending civil suit for false arrest).
4 Section 90.104(3):

Nothing in this section shall preclude a court from taking notice of fundamental errors affecting substantial rights, even though such errors were not brought to the attention of the trial judge.