Hasper v. Dept. of Labor & Emp. Sec., 459 So. 2d 400 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). · Go Syfert
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Hasper v. Dept. of Labor & Emp. Sec., 459 So. 2d 400 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
7 citation events (1 in the last 25 years) across 2 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Fla. Soc. of Ophthalmology v. State, Bd. of Optometry (fladistctapp, 1988-10-06)
Top citers, strongest first. 3 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Fla. Soc. of Ophthalmology v. State, Bd. of Optometry
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1988 · confidence medium
This decision, therefore, is limited to the question of standing in each individual certification proceeding. [5] Notwithstanding these allegations we do not consider the propriety or the right of these persons to have standing to maintain an administrative "class action" under chapter 120 to represent similarly situated persons other than in the limited sense hereinafter discussed. [6] The propriety of that ruling is before this court in case number 88-142, so we intimate no view thereon in this opinion. [7] See, e.g., §§ 120.53(5), 120.54(4)(a), 120.56(1), 120.565, 120.57(1), Fla. Stat. (1…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Park v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services
Fla. Div. Admin. Hr'g · 1985 · confidence medium
In Hasper v. Department of Administration, 459 So.2d 398 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984), and Hasper v. Department of Labor and Employment Security, 459 So.2d 400 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984), it was held that state employees in Senior Management Service positions have a substantial interest in their positions so as to entitle them, upon termination, to a “fair and impartial hearing conducted by a Hearing Officer provided by the Division of Administrative Hearings of the Department of Administration, pursuant to Section 120.57(1).” Hasper v. Department of Labor and Employment Security, 459 So.2d at 402.
cited Cited "see, e.g." Publix Supermarkets, Inc. v. FLA. COM'N ON H. REL.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1985 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See also Hasper v. Department of Labor & Employment Security, 459 So.2d 400, 402 (Fla 1st DCA 1984).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Pacharee K. HASPER, Appellant,
v.
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR & EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, DIVISION OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, Appellee.
AW-183.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
Nov 9, 1984.
459 So. 2d 400
Mills.
Published

[*401] Ben R. Patterson of Patterson & Traynham, Tallahassee, for appellant.

Sonja P. Mathews, Tallahassee, for appellee.

MILLS, Judge.

Pacharee K. Hasper appeals a final order of the Department of Labor and Employment Security denying her a formal hearing pursuant to Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes. We reverse.

In December of 1982, Hasper, who was employed by the Department of Labor and Employment Security (DLES), requested and was granted maternity leave for the period 14 March 1983 through 15 July 1983. She was granted the requested leave by her then Division Director, Katie Tucker. By letter dated 28 February 1983, Ronald Villella, the new Division Director, confirmed to Hasper that her request for maternity leave was granted and advised her that:

We will search for a suitable position to which you can be appointed upon completion of the leave period. If successful, you can be returned from leave of absence to the new assignment. If a suitable position cannot be located, you will be returned from leave of absence for one workday and then separated from the Senior Management. Rule 22SM-1.12.

When Hasper returned to work from her maternity leave on Monday, 18 July 1983, she was terminated. Hasper had achieved an "outstanding" performance evaluation while serving in her Senior Management Service Position.

The issue before the court is whether one who is a Senior Management Service appointee is entitled to a formal hearing under Section 120.57(1) upon termination without cause.

Section 120.57(1) provides that a formal hearing be afforded whenever the "substantial interests of a party are determined by an agency." DLES contends that Hasper's substantial interests, within the meaning of the statute, were not affected by her termination.

DLES equates substantial interests under the statute with the due process rights of life, liberty, and property which arise under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. DLES argues that when one asserts a substantial interest under 120.57(1), one must also assert a loss of life, liberty, or property. We disagree.

There is no definition of substantial interest in the statute. Nor has this Court or any Florida District Court of Appeal attempted a comprehensive definition. We decline to do so now.

[*402] However, we do believe that the legislature intended by the passage of Section 120.57(1) to create a broad avenue of redress for many persons variously situated, and specifically that "substantial interests" contemplates rights not more restrictive but more expansive than those afforded by the predecessor statute which provided redress for "legal rights, duties, privileges or immunities," Section 120.22, Florida Statutes (1973).

We have no doubt that Hasper's substantial interests were affected by her termination from the Senior Management Service.

DLES argues that Hasper has no substantial interest to protect because under Rule 22SM-1.12, Florida Administrative Code, and Section 110.403(1)(c), Florida Statutes, she has no property interest in her Senior Management Service position. See Hasper v. Department of Administration, et al., 459 So.2d 398 (1984).

Because the class of rights encompassed by substantial interests affected is more expansive than the class of rights encompassed by the due process clause, we need not reach the issue in order to decide the case. We expressly do not determine whether Rule 22SM-1.12 and Section 110.403(1)(c) establish for Hasper property rights in her Senior Management Service position.

Notwithstanding that, Hasper is entitled to a fair and impartial hearing conducted by a hearing officer provided by the Division of Administrative Hearings of the Department of Administration pursuant to Section 120.57(1).

We reverse and remand.

ERVIN, C.J., and ZEHMER, J., concur.