Day v. State, 573 So. 2d 1022 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991). · Go Syfert
Day v. State, 573 So. 2d 1022 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
7 citation events across 2 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: State v. Baudy (fladistctapp, 1991-03-20)
Top citers, strongest first. 3 distinct citers. How cited ↗
cited Cited "see" State v. Baudy
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1991 · signal: see · confidence high
See Pope v. State, 561 So.2d 554 (Fla.1990) and Dag v. State, 573 So.2d 1022 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991).
cited Cited "see, e.g." Taylor v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1991 · signal: see also · confidence low
Pope; see also Day v. State, 573 So.2d 1022 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991).
cited Cited "see, e.g." Vara v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1991 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Day v. State, 573 So.2d 1022 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991); Johnson v. State, 566 So.2d 609 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Timothy DAY, Appellant,
v.
STATE of Florida, Appellee.
89-01267.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
Feb 1, 1991.
573 So. 2d 1022
Parker.
Cited by 2 opinions  |  Published

[*1023] James Marion Moorman, Public Defender, Bartow, and Wendy E. Friedberg, Asst. Public Defender, Bartow, for appellant.

Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Brenda S. Taylor, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellee.

PARKER, Judge.

Timothy Day, who was convicted of racketeering and sixteen counts of robbery, appeals guidelines departure sentences of twelve consecutive life terms and two consecutive thirty year terms. We reverse.

This is Day's second appeal to this court in this matter. On February 1, 1989, this court issued a mandate requiring a resentencing hearing on the ground that Day acting by himself did not constitute an "enterprise" as defined by section 895.02(3), Florida Statutes (1985).[1] Upon remand, the trial court imposed the sentences which Day now appeals; those sentences depart from the recommended guidelines range of twenty-two to twenty-seven years' imprisonment.

At the time of resentencing, the trial court provided no contemporaneous written reasons for departure. In Pope v. State, 561 So.2d 554 (Fla. 1990), our supreme court, relying upon its earlier decisions in State v. Jackson, 478 So.2d 1054 (Fla. 1985), receded from on other grounds, Wilkerson v. State, 513 So.2d 664 (Fla. 1987), and Shull v. Dugger, 515 So.2d 748 (Fla. 1987), held that where the trial court fails to provide written reasons for departure, the appellate court must remand for resentencing within the guidelines. Since Day's sentences were imposed before Pope, the state argues that Pope should only be applied prospectively. We disagree and join with the Third District Court which has concluded that Pope should apply retroactively. See Fonseca v. State, 570 So.2d 424 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990).

Reversed and remanded with directions to impose a guidelines sentence.

SCHOONOVER, C.J., and PATTERSON, J., concur.

1 See Day v. State, 541 So.2d 1202 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988), review denied, 545 So.2d 869 (Fla. 1989).