State v. Summers, 642 So. 2d 742 (Fla. 1994). · Go Syfert
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State v. Summers, 642 So. 2d 742 (Fla. 1994). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“pon revocation probation credit must be given for time previously served on probation toward any newly-imposed probationary term for the same offense, when necessary to ensure that the total term of probation does not exceed the statutory maximum for that offense.”
139 citation events (28 in the last 25 years) across 2 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Michael John Triatik v. State of Florida (fladistctapp, 2019-03-28)
Treatment trajectory · 1994 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1994 2010 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 50 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Michael John Triatik v. State of Florida
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2019 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
a probationary period is not a sentence.
examined Cited as authority (verbatim quote) ROBERT COPPINGER v. STATE OF FLORIDA
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2018 · signal: see · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
pon revocation probation credit must be given for time previously served on probation toward any newly-imposed probationary term for the same offense, when necessary to ensure that the total term of probation does not exceed the statutory maximum for that offense.
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Olson v. State (2×) also: Cited "see"
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1995 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
here the total term of probation will not exceed the statutory maximum for a single offense, the court need not give credit for the time already served on probation.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Billy Joe Fowler v. State of Florida
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2017 · confidence medium
We begin our analysis with the general proposition that a probationary period “is not a ‘sentence.’ ” State v. Summers, 642 So.2d 742, 744 (Fla. 1994) (citing Villery v. Fla. Parole & Prob.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Jacoby v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2017 · confidence medium
Young v. State, 697 So.2d 75, 77 (Fla. 1997); State v. Summers, 642 So.2d 742, 744 (Fla. 1994); see also § 948.06(3), Fla. Stat. (2015).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Plamondon v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2011 · confidence medium
Because he was sentenced as a youthful offender, under section 958.14, his maximum sentence was limited to six years. “[U]pon revocation of probation, the time a probationer has already served on probation for a given offense must be credited toward any new term of probation imposed for that offense, when necessary to ensure that the total term of probation does not exceed the statutory maximum for that offense.” State v. Summers, 642 So.2d 742, 743 (Fla. 1994) (emphasis added).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Badger v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2009 · confidence medium
Reluctantly, we conclude that the trial court could not simply disregard the earlier term of community control when measuring the two-year term of probation for the youthful offender sentence, anymore than it could have disregarded the earlier time spent in jail. 4 See State v. Summers, 642 So.2d 742, 743 (Fla.1994) (“[U]pon revocation of probation, the time a probationer has already served on probation for a given offense must be credited toward any new term of probation imposed for that offense, when necessary to ensure that the total term of probation does not exceed the statutory maximum…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Mizelle v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2007 · confidence medium
In State v. Summers, 642 So.2d 742, 744 (Fla.1994), the supreme court held: “[U]pon revocation of probation credit must be given for time previously served on probation toward any newly-imposed probationary term for the same offense, when necessary to ensure that the total term of probation does not exceed the statutory maximum for that offense.” In Bragg v. State, 644 So.2d 586 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994), this court reiterated the supreme court’s holding in Summers .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Perry v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2004 · confidence medium
(R. 346; State Sentencing Report, State v. Perry, 00-1916-CFA & 99-1277-CFA — VOCC). [8] Here again, there was a plethora of violations to the community control besides case number 00-1916-CFA (R. 346; State Sentencing Report, State v. Perry, 00-1916-CFA & 99-1277-CFA — VOCC). [9] Neither of which is in dispute in this case. [10] Section 775.084(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2000). [11] State v. Summers, 642 So.2d 742, 744 (Fla.1994) (ruling that a probationer must be given credit for time served on probation toward any new term of probation imposed for the same offense, to insure the total term of pro…
cited Cited as authority (rule) Robinson v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2003 · confidence medium
See § 948.06(3), Fla. Stat. (2001); Young v. State, 697 So.2d 75, 76-77 (Fla.1997) (citing State v. Summers, 642 So.2d 742, 744 (Fla.1994); State v. Roundtree, 644 So.2d 1358, 1359 (Fla.1994)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Langley v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2003 · confidence medium
Summers, 642 So.2d at 744 (finding that section 948.06 “speaks only to the situation where a ‘sentence’ is imposed upon revocation of probation or community control.”).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Sainz v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2002 · confidence medium
Francois v. State, 695 So.2d 695, 696-97 (Fla.1997); State v. Summers, 642 So.2d 742, 744 (Fla.1994); Bateh, 110 So.2d at 10 ; Helton, 106 So.2d at 81 ; §§ 948.01(11), 948.06(3), Fla. Stat. (2001).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Sainz v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2001 · confidence medium
Francois v. State, 695 So.2d 695, 696-97 (Fla.1997); State v. Summers, 642 So.2d 742, 744 (Fla.1994); Bateh, 110 So.2d at 10 ; Helton, 106 So.2d at 81 ; §§ 948.01(11), 948.06(3), Fla. Stat. (2001).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Trent v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2000 · confidence medium
"Upon revocation of probation credit must be given for time previously served on probation toward any newly-imposed probationary term for the same offense, when necessary to ensure that the total term of probation does not exceed the statutory maximum for that offense." Francois v. State, 695 So.2d 695, 697 (Fla.1997); State v. Summers, 642 So.2d 742, 744 (Fla.1994).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Landeverde v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2000 · confidence medium
Has a defendant who, at sentencing, received only probation or community control been given a "fixed" sentence such that "no adverse consequences can be visited upon the convicted person by reason of further testimony?" Under Florida law, a probationary period is generally not considered a "sentence." See State v. Summers, 642 So.2d 742, 744 (Fla.1994)(citing Villery v. Florida Parole & Probation Comm'n, 396 So.2d 1107 (Fla.1980) and Committee Note, Fla. R.Crim.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Iglesias v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1997 · confidence medium
The State concedes that “the time a probationer has already served on probation for a given offense must be credited toward any new term of probation imposed for that offense, when necessary to ensure that the total term of probation does not exceed the statutory maximum for that offense.” State v. Summers, 642 So.2d 742, 743 (Fla.1994).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Storey v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1996 · confidence medium
Summers, 642 So.2d at 743 (emphasis ours).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) White v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1995 · confidence medium
Second, in State v. Summers, 642 So.2d 742, 744 (Fla.1994), the supreme court held that when probation is revoked, credit must be given for time previously served on probation toward any newly-imposed probationary term for the same offense, when necessary to ensure that the total term of probation does not exceed the statutory maximum for that offense.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Jackson v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1995 · confidence medium
"Upon revocation of probation, the time a probationer has already served on probation for a given offense must be credited toward any new *236 term of probation imposed for that offense, when necessary to ensure that the total term of probation does not exceed the statutory maximum for that offense." State v. Summers, 642 So.2d 742, 743 (Fla. 1994); accord Roundtree v. State, 637 So.2d 325, 326 (Fla. 4th DCA), approved, 644 So.2d 1358 (Fla. 1994).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Baker v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1995 · confidence medium
State v. Summers, 642 So.2d 742, 743 (Fla. 1994).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) King v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1994 · confidence medium
Most recently, however, our supreme court has espoused the more traditional view that a "probationary period is not a `sentence.'" State v. Summers, 642 So.2d 742, 744 (Fla. 1994). [7] In Anderson v. State, 637 So.2d 971 , 972 n. 1 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994), language interpreting Snead , while it supports the majority's position, fails to take into account that Snead had never begun service of a guidelines sentence. [8] Citing Scott v. State, 326 So.2d 165 (Fla.) (holding sentence imposed upon revocation of probation after trial on remand may exceed sentence imposed after first trial), cert. denied,…
cited Cited as authority (rule) King v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1994 · confidence medium
Most recently, however, our supreme court has espoused the more traditional view that a “probationary period is not a 'sentence.' ” State v. Summers, 642 So.2d 742, 744 (Fla.1994). .
discussed Cited "see" Patrick Michael Craig v. State of Florida
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2026 · signal: see · confidence high
See Campbell v. State, 380 So. 3d 1292 , 1293 (Fla. 6th DCA 2024) (citing Ashley v. State, 850 So. 2d 1265, 1268 (Fla. 2003) (“[W]hen conflict arises between the written sentence and the oral pronouncement, the oral pronouncement prevails.”)); Grissinger v. State, 905 So. 2d 982, 984 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) (holding that trial court must award credit for time served in jail awaiting trial against probation term so that combined time does not 2 exceed statutory maximum) (citing Baldwin v. State, 558 So. 2d 173, 174 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990)); see generally State v. Summers, 642 So. 2d 742, 744 (Fla. …
cited Cited "see" Barry K. Gordon v. State of Florida
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2019 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Summer, 642 So. 2d 742, 744 (Fla. 1994).
discussed Cited "see" Thompson v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2013 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Summers, 642 So.2d 742, 744 (Fla.1994) (“[Ujpon revocation of probation credit must be given for time previously served on probation toward any newly-imposed probationary term for the same offense, when necessary to ensure that the total term of probation does not exceed the statutory maximum for that offense.”).
discussed Cited "see" Smith v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2006 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Summers, 642 So.2d 742 (Fla. 1994); Waters v. State, 662 So.2d 332 (Fla. 1995) (holding that upon revocation of probation, a court must grant credit for time served on probation and community control towards any newly imposed term of imprisonment and probation so that the total period of control, probation, and imprisonment does not exceed the statutory maximum); Bragg v. State, 644 So.2d 586 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994) ("[i]f the trial court includes probation as part of a sentence upon revocation of probation, the trial court must give credit for any time previously served on probation …
cited Cited "see" Grissinger v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2005 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Summers, 642 So.2d 742 (Fla.1994).
examined Cited "see" Hernandez v. State (3×)
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2004 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Summers, 642 So.2d 742 (Fla.1994); Storey v. State, 684 So.2d 888, 890 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996).
cited Cited "see" Reynolds v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2001 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Summers, 642 So.2d 742 (Fla.1994).
cited Cited "see" Schwartz v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2000 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Summers, 642 So.2d 742 (Fla.1994); Straughan v. State, 636 So.2d 845 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994); Ogden v. State, 605 So.2d 155 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992).
cited Cited "see" Maier v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2000 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Summers, 642 So.2d 742 (Fla.1994).
cited Cited "see" Fernandez v. State of Florida
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1998 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Summers, 642 So.2d 742, 743 (Fla.1994).
discussed Cited "see" Woodall v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1998 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Summers, 642 So.2d 742 (Fla.1994); see also Davis v. State, 661 So.2d 1193, 1196 (Fla.1995) ("[A]n illegal sentence is one that exceeds the maximum period set forth by law for a particular offense without regard to the guidelines").
cited Cited "see" Sinks v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1997 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Summers, 642 So.2d 742, 743 (Fla.1994); Meader, 665 So.2d at 345 .
cited Cited "see" Madrigal v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1996 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Holmes, 360 So.2d 380, 383 (Fla. 1978), holding limited on other grounds by State v. Summers, 642 So.2d 742 (Fla.1994).
cited Cited "see" Young v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1996 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Holmes, 360 So.2d 380, 383 (Fla.1978), holding limited by, State v. Summers, 642 So.2d 742 (Fla.1994).
discussed Cited "see" Russell v. State (2×)
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1996 · signal: see · confidence high
See Summers v. State, 625 So.2d 876 , 880 n. 6 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993) (en banc), approved, State v. Summers, 642 So.2d at 744 .
cited Cited "see" Featherston v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1996 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Summers, 642 So.2d 742 (Fla.1994).
cited Cited "see" Moody v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1996 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Summers, 642 So.2d 742 (Fla.1994).
cited Cited "see" Bennett v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1995 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Summers, 642 So.2d 742 (Fla. 1994).
cited Cited "see" Hall v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1995 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Summers, 642 So.2d 742 (Fla.1994).
discussed Cited "see" Marchessault v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1995 · signal: see · confidence high
We reverse appellant's newly-imposed sentence and remand for correction of the order to reflect the appropriate amount of credit for time served on community control from August 25, 1993, the date of imposition of community control, through June 3, 1994, the date of entry of the valid order of revocation. § 948.06(2), Fla. Stat. (1993); see State v. Summers, 642 So.2d 742, 744 (Fla. 1994); accord Roundtree v. State, 637 So.2d 325 (Fla. 4th DCA), approved, 644 So.2d 1358 (Fla. 1994); Gordon v. State, 649 So.2d 326 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995).
cited Cited "see" Griffin v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1995 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Summers, 642 So.2d 742 (Fla.1994).
cited Cited "see" Cavaretta v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1995 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Summers, 642 So.2d 742 (Fla.1994).
cited Cited "see" Burkey v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1995 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Summers, 642 So.2d 742 (Fla.1994).
cited Cited "see, e.g." Kirin v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2001 · signal: see also · confidence low
See §§ 370.021, 775.082(4)(b), Fla. Stat. (2000); see also State v. Summers, 642 So.2d 742 (Fla.1994) (stating that probation terms are subject to a statutory maximum).
cited Cited "see, e.g." Terry v. State
Fla. · 2000 · signal: see also · confidence low
See § 775.082(3)(d), Fla. Stat. (1997); see also State v. Summers, 642 So.2d 742 (Fla.1994) (stating that probationary terms are subject to a statutory maximum).
cited Cited "see, e.g." Wise v. State
Fla. · 2000 · signal: see also · confidence low
See §§ 322.34(2)(a), 775.082(4)(b), Fla. Stat. (1997); see also State v. Summers, 642 So.2d 742 (Fla.1994) (stating that probationary terms are subject to a statutory maximum).
cited Cited "see, e.g." Young v. State
Fla. · 1997 · signal: see also · confidence low
Holmes, 360 So.2d at 383 ; see also State v. Summers, 642 So.2d 742 , 743 (Fla.1994).
cited Cited "see, e.g." Francois v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1996 · signal: see also · confidence low
See State v. Holmes, 360 So.2d 380, 383 (Fla. 1978); see also State v. Summers, 642 So.2d at 743 .
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
STATE of Florida, Petitioner,
v.
Christopher Gene SUMMERS, Respondent.
82632.
Supreme Court of Florida.
Sep 22, 1994.
642 So. 2d 742
Kogan.
Cited by 81 opinions  |  Published

[*743] Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen. and Dale E. Tarpley, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for petitioner.

James Marion Moorman, Public Defender and Deborah K. Brueckheimer, Asst. Public Defender, Bartow, for respondent.

KOGAN, Justice.

We have for review Summers v. State, 625 So.2d 876 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993). We accepted jurisdiction to answer the following question which was certified to be of great public importance:[1]

MUST A TRIAL COURT, UPON REVOCATION OF PROBATION, CREDIT PREVIOUS TIME SERVED ON PROBATION TOWARD ANY NEWLY-IMPOSED TERM OF PROBATION SO THAT THE TOTAL PROBATIONARY TERM IS SUBJECT TO THE STATUTORY MAXIMUM FOR A SINGLE OFFENSE?

625 So.2d at 880.

Upon revocation of Summers' probation and imposition of a new term of probation, the trial court in this case refused to give Summers credit for previous time served on probation for the same offense. Summers appealed, arguing that the new term of probation exceeded the statutory maximum when added to the time he had already served on probation. The Second District Court of Appeal agreed that Summers was entitled to credit for time already served on probation for the same offense. Thus, the court reversed and remanded with directions that Summers be given credit for the time already served toward the most recently imposed probationary term for the same offense. The district court then certified the above question for our review. Id. at 880.

We agree with the district court below that, upon revocation of probation, the time a probationer has already served on probation for a given offense must be credited toward any new term of probation imposed for that offense, when necessary to ensure that the total term of probation does not exceed the statutory maximum for that offense. The district court is correct that our decision in State v. Holmes, 360 So.2d 380 (Fla. 1978), does not mandate a contrary holding. As noted by the district court, Holmes did not deal with a new probationary term imposed after revocation of probation. Rather, that decision dealt with the initial imposition of a probationary split sentence. In that context, this Court held that the combined terms of incarceration and probation may not exceed the statutory maximum. 360 So.2d at 383. We went on to explain that if the probationary portion of the split sentence is subsequently revoked, a trial court may impose any sentence it might have originally imposed minus jail time already served as part of the same sentence but that no credit may be given for the time spent on probation. 360 So.2d at 383. The district court is correct that Holmes should be read to mean "only that the time already spent on probation may not be credited toward the new sentence, i.e., the term of incarceration imposed." 625 So.2d at 878. It should not be read to hold that time previously served on probation may not be credited toward a new probationary term after revocation of probation.

Likewise, section 948.06, Florida Statutes (1987),[2] cannot be read to preclude the crediting of time already served on probation in this case. Section 948.06 provides in pertinent part:

(1) ... If such probation or community control is revoked, the court shall adjudge the probationer or offender guilty of the offense charged and proven or admitted, unless he has previously been adjudged guilty, and impose any sentence which it might have originally imposed before placing the probationer or offender on probation or into community control.
(2) No part of the time that the defendant is on probation or in community control shall be considered as any part of the time that he shall be sentenced to serve.

[*744] Like our decision in Holmes, section 948.06(2) does not address the question presented here. It speaks only to the situation where a "sentence" is imposed upon revocation of probation or community control. A probationary period is not a "sentence." See Villery v. Florida Parole & Probation Comm'n, 396 So.2d 1107 (Fla. 1980); see also Committee Note, Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.790. As noted by the court below, to treat a term of probation like a "sentence" or term of incarceration in this context could result in probation being extended ad infinitum beyond the statutory maximum each time probation is revoked. 625 So.2d at 879 (citing Ogden v. State, 605 So.2d 155, 158 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992)). We agree that the legislature did not intend to allow such "ad infinitum" extensions of a probationary term that is otherwise subject to a statutory maximum. See Holmes, 360 So.2d at 383 (combined terms of incarceration and probation may not exceed the statutory maximum); Schertz v. State, 387 So.2d 477 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980) (statutory maximum must be observed when modifying or extending probation); Watts v. State, 328 So.2d 223 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976) (original term of probation may not exceed statutory maximum).

Accordingly, we approve the decision below, and hold that upon revocation of probation credit must be given for time previously served on probation toward any newly-imposed probationary term for the same offense, when necessary to ensure that the total term of probation does not exceed the statutory maximum for that offense. We note, however, that where the total term of probation will not exceed the statutory maximum for a single offense, the court need not give credit for the time already served on probation. For example, when a defendant who had been given two years' probation for a third-degree felony violates probation after serving one year, the judge can impose up to three additional years of probation without giving credit for the one year already served because the total term of probation would not exceed the five year statutory maximum.[3]

It is so ordered.

GRIMES, C.J., OVERTON, SHAW, HARDING and WELLS, JJ., and McDONALD, Senior Justice, concur.

1 We have jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(4) of the Florida Constitution.
2 The 1987 version of the statute applies in this case because Summers was originally placed on probation in 1988.
3 We decline to address the issues raised in Summers' cross-petition.