State v. Allen, 651 So. 2d 1343 (La. 1995). · Go Syfert
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State v. Allen, 651 So. 2d 1343 (La. 1995). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
9 citation events (1 in the last 25 years) across 1 distinct court.
Strongest positive: State v. Branch (lactapp, 1998-07-06)
Top citers, strongest first. 1 distinct citer.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." State v. Branch
La. Ct. App. · 1998 · signal: see also · confidence low
State v. Solomon, 93,1199 (La.App. 3d Cir. 3/2/94), 634 So.2d 1330 citing State v. Wade, 390 So.2d 1309 (La.1980), cert. denied 451 U.S. 989 , 101 S.Ct. 2326 , 68 L.Ed.2d 848 (1981); see also State v. Allen, 93,838 (La.App. 5th Cir. 5/31/94), 638 So.2d 394 , writ recalled 94-1754 (La.3/16/95), 651 So.2d 1343 .
STATE of Louisiana
v.
Russell J. ALLEN
No. 94-K-1754.
Supreme Court of Louisiana.
Mar 16, 1995.
651 So. 2d 1343
Michael Riehlamann, Dorothy G. daPonte, for applicant., Richard P. Ieyoub, Atty. Gen., Harry J. Morel, Jr., Dist. Atty., Gerald A. Rome, Emile R. St. Pierre, for respondent.
Ilemmon, Liper.
Cited by 2 opinions  |  Published

Lead Opinion

liPER CURIAM *.

This court granted certiorari to review the issue of the trial court’s requiring the parties to alternate in their exercise of peremptory challenges.[1] 646 So.2d 390. Upon reviewing the record, the court has determined that defendant did not object to the peremptory challenge procedure. Accordingly, the court recalls the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted.

Judge Charles R. Lindsay, Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, has been assigned as Justice Pro Tempore, in place of Justice James L. Dennis.

Victory, J., not on panel.

1

See La.Code Crim.Proc. art. 788, which requires that a prospective juror be tendered first to the state unless the court rules provide for a system of simultaneous exercise of challenges.

Concurrence

| iLEMMON, Justice,

concurring.

I concur in denying certiorari. However, the court of appeal erred in ruling that the officer only needed “reasonable suspicion” to tackle defendant and pin him to the ground. This conduct by the officer, which the court of appeal recognized as constituting a seizure of defendant, was only valid if based on probable cause to seize and search defendant.

Nevertheless, in my view there was probable cause to seize defendant. After the car in which he was a passenger had been properly stopped for a traffic violation in a high crime area, defendant bolted from the car, ran through a ditch partially filled with water, and headed toward a wooded area while holding his hands in his groin area. Under the totality of the circumstances, there was a “fair probability” that a seizure and search of defendant would yield contraband or evidence of a crime, and the officer therefore had probable cause to believe that defendant was committing or had committed a crime. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 and 246, 108 S.Ct. 2317, 2332 and 2336, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983).