Corey v. Corey, 48 So. 3d 740 (Fla. 2010). · Go Syfert
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Corey v. Corey, 48 So. 3d 740 (Fla. 2010). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“section 775.087(2)(e) makes reference to section 775.082 and states that the mandatory minimum, when it exceeds the statutory maximum, must be imposed.”
127 citation events (127 in the last 25 years) across 4 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: ISLAAM v. STATE OF FLORIDA (fladistctapp, 2024-06-14)
Treatment trajectory · 2010 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
2010 2018 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 50 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) ISLAAM v. STATE OF FLORIDA
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2024 · signal: see · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
questions of statutory interpretation are subject to de novo review.
examined Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Sheppard v. State (3×) also: Cited as authority (rule), Cited "see"
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2013 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
section 775.087(2)(e) makes reference to section 775.082 and states that the mandatory minimum, when it exceeds the statutory maximum, must be imposed.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Dosia Tremain Stewart v. State of Florida
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2026 · confidence medium
See § 775.082(3)(b), Fla. Stat.; Mendenhall v. State, 48 So. 3d 740, 742 (Fla. 2010) (holding that the trial court has the discretion under the 10-20-Life statute to impose a mandatory minimum sentence of twenty-five years to life, even if the mandatory minimum exceeds the statutory maximum provided for in section 775.082).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Kimberly Morrell v. Mark Alsentzer
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2025 · confidence medium
“Questions of statutory interpretation are subject to de novo review.” Mendenhall v. State, 48 So. 3d 740, 747 (Fla. 2010).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Thomas Dexter Lewis v. State of Florida (4×) also: Cited "see", Cited "see, e.g."
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2025 · confidence medium
Although this mandatory-minimum term exceeds the fifteen-year maximum under section 775.082 for second-degree felonies, “the trial court has discretion under section 775.087(2)(a)(3) to impose a mandatory minimum of twenty-five years to life, even if that mandatory minimum exceeds the statutory maximum provided for in section 775.082.” Mendenhall v. State, 48 So. 3d 740, 742 (Fla. 2010).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Kimberly Morrell v. Mark Alsentzer
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2025 · confidence medium
“Questions of statutory 2 interpretation are subject to de novo review.” Mendenhall v. State, 48 So. 3d 740, 747 (Fla. 2010).
cited Cited as authority (rule) A.C., a Juvenile v. the State of Florida
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2025 · confidence medium
Additionally, “[q]uestions of statutory interpretation are subject to de novo review.” Mendenhall v. State, 48 So. 3d 740, 747 (Fla. 2010). 3 III.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Jessie Warren v. Gregory Tony, as Sheriff of Broward County
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2025 · confidence medium
“Questions of statutory interpretation are subject to de novo review.” Mendenhall v. State, 48 So. 3d 740, 747 (Fla. 2010).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Juan F. Perez v. State of Florida
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2025 · confidence medium
Generally speaking, “[s]ection 775.087, Florida Statutes, commonly referred to as the 10-20-Life statute, provides for mandatory minimum sentences for offenders who possess or use a firearm in some manner during the commission of certain crimes.” Mendenhall v. State, 48 So. 3d 740, 746 (Fla. 2010).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Lateef Garnes v. State of Florida
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2024 · confidence medium
The trial court has discretion to “impose a mandatory minimum of twenty-five years to life, even if that mandatory minimum exceeds the statutory maximum.” Mendenhall v. State, 48 So. 3d 740, 742, 750 (Fla. 2010) (finding defendant was “properly sentenced to thirty-five years with a thirty-five-year mandatory minimum, notwithstanding the statutory maximum of thirty years”).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) ACADEMY FOR POSITIVE LEARNING, INC. v. SCHOOL BOARD OF PALM BEACH COUNTY, FLORIDA
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2021 · confidence medium
It is an “elementary principle of statutory construction that significance and effect must be given to every word, phrase, sentence, and part of the statute if possible, and words in a statute should not be construed as mere surplusage.” Mendenhall v. State, 48 So. 3d 740, 749 (Fla. 2010). (emphasis added).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) CHRISTOPHER LAMAR SOLS v. STATE OF FLORIDA (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2021 · confidence medium
The Florida Supreme Court has interpreted this to mean that the trial court has discretion “to impose a mandatory minimum of twenty-five years to life.” Mendenhall v. State, 48 So. 3d 740, 742 (Fla. 2010).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Guzman v. Secretary, Department of Corrections (5×) also: Cited "see"
S.D. Fla. · 2020 · confidence medium
Citing Mendenhall v. State, 48 So. 3d 740, 743 (Fla. 2010), the state post-conviction court concluded “the trial court has discretion, under Florida Statute 775.087(2)(a)(3) to sentence a defendant, who was found guilty of attempted second degree murder with the jury finding of great bodily harm, between twenty- five (25) years to the maximum of life, even though traditionally the statute should have been capped at thirty (30) years state prison.” (State Post-Conviction Order 22).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) ACADEMY FOR POSITIVE LEARNING, INC. v. SCHOOL BOARD OF PALM BEACH COUNTY, FLORIDA
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2020 · confidence medium
It is an “elementary principle of statutory construction that significance and effect must be given to every word, phrase, sentence, and part of the statute if possible, and words in a statute should not be construed as mere surplusage.” Mendenhall v. State, 48 So. 3d 740, 749 (Fla. 2010). (emphasis added).
cited Cited as authority (rule) L. C. v. STATE OF FLORIDA
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2019 · confidence medium
Mendenhall v. State, 48 So. 3d 740, 747 (Fla. 2010).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) WYLIE BILLUPS v. STATE OF FLORIDA
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2018 · confidence medium
In construing a sentencing statute, a court must “give effect to legislative intent.” Mendenhall v. State, 48 So. 3d 740, 747 (Fla. 2010). -3- The legislature has been crystal clear in stating the intent behind section 775.087—“that offenders who actually possess, carry, display, use, threaten to use, or attempt to use firearms or destructive devices be punished to the fullest extent of the law.” § 775.087(2)(d), Fla. Stat. (2017) (emphasis supplied).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Tyrone Williams v. State of Florida (3×) also: Cited "see"
Fla. · 2017 · confidence medium
Mendenhall, 48 So. 3d at 751-55 (Pariente, J., dissenting).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Darriue Montgomery v. State (3×)
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2017 · confidence medium
Mendenhall v. State, 48 So. 3d 740, 742 (Fla. 2010).
examined Cited as authority (rule) STATE OF FLORIDA v. PETER PERAZA (3×) also: Cited "see"
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2017 · confidence medium
In Mendenhall v. State, 48 So.3d 740, 748 (Fla. 2010), the Florida Supreme Court identified that [i]t is a well settled rule of statutory construction ... that a special statute covering a particular subject matter is controlling over a general statutory provision covering the same and other subjects in general terms.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) TASHEEM T. DAVIS v. STATE OF FLORIDA
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2017 · confidence medium
“Section 775.087, Florida Statutes, commonly referred to as the 10-20-Life statute, provides for mandatory minimum sentences for offenders who possess or use a firearm in some manner during the commission of certain crimes.” Mendenhall v. State, 48 So.3d 740, 746 (Fla. 2010).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Baxter v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
Mendenhall v. State, 48 So.3d 740, 750 (Fla. 2010) (concluding that the trial court has discretion to impose a mandatory minimum term within the range of twenty-five years to life under the 10-20-Life statute, regardless of whether the sentence imposed exceeds the crime’s statutory maximum).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Pitts v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
Stated another way, “under section 775.087(2)(a)(3), the trial court has discretion to impose a mandatory minimum within the range of twenty-five years to life.” Mendenhall v. State, 48 So.3d 740, 750 (Fla.2010).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Duclos-Lasnier v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
We do not agree. *1239 “Questions of statutory interpretation are subject to de'novo review.” Mendenhall v. State, 48 So.3d 740, 747 (Fla.2010).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Tyrone Williams v. State of Florida
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
I concur fully, noting that the Fifth District’s decision in Wilkerson v. State, 143 So. 3d 461 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014), cannot stand unless our supreme court revisits and changes course from its decision in Mendenhall v. State, 48 So. 3d 740, 750 (Fla. 2010), whose holding our court applied to validate the trial court’s discretionary imposition of a “minimum mandatory life term” in Flowers v. State, 69 So. 3d 1042, 1044 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Duclos-Lasnier v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
"Questions of statutory interpretation are subject to de novo review." Mendenhall v. State, 48 So. 3d 740, 747 (Fla. 2010).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Brock v. Garner Window & Door Sales, Inc. (3×)
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
When interpreting a statute, courts must begin with the “actual language used in the statute.” Mendenhall v. State, 48 So.3d 740, 747 (Fla.2010) (quoting Heart of Adoptions, Inc. v. J.A., 963 So,2d 189, 198 (Fla.2007)) (citations and internal quotations omitted).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Taylor Morrison Services, Inc. v. Ecos
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2015 · confidence medium
Proper statutory analysis begins with the plain language of the statute, Koile v. State, 934 So.2d 1226, 1230 (Fla.2006), which is to be considered in context, Variety Children’s Hosp., Inc. v. Perkins, 382 So.2d 331, 337 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980), and not construed in a way that renders any portion of the statute meaningless, Mendenhall v. State, 48 So.3d 740, 749 (Fla.2010).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Antoine v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
In Mendenhall v. State, 48 So.3d 740, 742 (Fla.2010), the Florida Supreme Court construed this provision to provide trial courts with discretion “to impose a mandatory minimum of twenty-five years to life, even if that mandatory minimum exceeds the statutory maximum provided for in section 775.082.” However, the decision failed to address whether a trial court may impose a sentence in excess of both the mandatory minimum and maximum sentence otherwise provided by law once a mandatory minimum has been set.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Cricket Properties, LLC v. Nassau Pointe at Heritage Isles Homeowners Ass'n
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2013 · confidence medium
Mendenhall v. State, 48 So.3d 740, 748 (Fla.2010).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Delgado-George v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2013 · confidence medium
Mendenhall v. State, 48 So.3d 740, 747 (Fla.2010).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Board of Trustees v. Parker
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2013 · confidence medium
See Fla. Dep’t of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Hernandez, 74 So.3d 1070, 1074 (Fla.2011) (stating that legislative intent is guided by statutory analysis); Mendenhall v. State, 48 So.3d 740, 748 (Fla.2010) (“ ‘[A] special statute covering a particular subject matter is controlling over a general statutory provision covering the same and other subjects in general terms.’ ” (quoting McDonald v. State, 957 So.2d 605, 610 (Fla.2007))).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Wiley v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2013 · confidence medium
Under this statute, regardless of whether the underlying crime is a first, second, or third degree felony, once a defendant falls within the purview of the statute, “the trial court has discretion ... to impose a mandatory minimum of twenty-five years to life, even if that mandatory minimum exceeds the statutory maximum provided for in section 775.082.” Mendenhall v. State, 48 So.3d 740, 742 (Fla.2010).
examined Cited as authority (rule) State v. Caamano (3×) also: Cited "see"
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2012 · confidence medium
In Mendenhall v. State, 48 So.3d 740, 748 (Fla.2010), the Florida Supreme Court identified that [i]t is a well settled rule of statutory-construction ... that a special statute covering a particular subject matter is controlling over a general statutory provision covering the same and other subjects in general terms.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Gracia v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2012 · confidence medium
Mendenhall v. State, 48 So.3d 740, 747 (Fla.2010).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Allen v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2012 · confidence medium
“Questions of statutory interpretation are subject to de novo review.” Mendenhall v. State, 48 So.3d 740, 747 (Fla.2010). “[L]egislative intent is the polestar that guides a court’s statutory construction analysis.” Knowles v. Beverly Enters.-Fla., 898 So.2d 1, 5 (Fla.2004).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Parker v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2011 · confidence medium
L.A.P. v. State, 62 So.3d 693, 694 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011) (citing Mendenhall v. State, 48 So.3d 740, 747 (Fla.2010)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Raulerson v. Wright
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2011 · confidence medium
Mendenhall v. State, 48 So.3d 740, 748 (Fla.2010) (quoting Velez v. Miami-Dade Cnty.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Shannon (2×)
11th Cir. · 2011 · confidence medium
By disregarding the statute’s use of the disjunctive, the government’s argument runs afoul of Florida’s “elementary principle of statutory construction that significance and effect must be given to every word, phrase, sentence, and part of the statute if possible, and words in a statute should not be construed as mere surplus-age.” Mendenhall v. State, 48 So.3d 740, 749 (Fla.2010) (citations omitted).
discussed Cited "see" AMIL LAMONT BARNES v. STATE OF FLORIDA
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2019 · signal: see · confidence high
See Mendenhall v. State, 48 So. 3d 740 (Fla. 2010); State v. Maxwell, 682 So. 2d 83 (Fla. 1996); Lewis v. State, 177 So. 3d 64 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015); McKenzie v. State, 31 So. 3d 275 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010); Johnson v. State, 149 So. 3d 727 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014).
cited Cited "see" ERIC L. WILEY v. STATE OF FLORIDA
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2019 · signal: see · confidence high
See Hatten, 203 So. 3d at 145-46 (discussing Mendenhall v. State, 48 So. 3d 740 (Fla. 2010)).
discussed Cited "see" AKHNATEN CASEY v. STATE OF FLORIDA
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2019 · signal: see · confidence high
See Mendenhall v. State, 48 So. 3d 740 (Fla. 2010); Bizzell v. State, 912 So. 2d 386 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005); Flowers v. State, 69 So. 3d 1042 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011); Coke v. State, 955 So. 2d 1216 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007); Lykins v. State, 894 So. 2d 302 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005); Thomas v. State, 778 So. 2d 429 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001).
cited Cited "see" Edward A. Crapo, as Alachua County etc. and John Power, as Alachua County Tax Collector v. Gainesville Area Chamber of Commerce, Inc. etc.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2019 · signal: see · confidence high
See Mendenhall v. State, 48 So. 3d 740 (Fla. 2010) (holding courts should not construct an unambiguous statute).
discussed Cited "see" Butler v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2019 · signal: see · confidence high
See Mendenhall v. State , 48 So.3d 740 , 742 (Fla. 2010) (holding that under section 775.087, Florida Statutes, "the trial court has discretion ... to impose a mandatory minimum ... even if that mandatory minimum exceeds the statutory maximum.").
discussed Cited "see" Butler v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2019 · signal: see · confidence high
See Mendenhall v. State , 48 So.3d 740 , 742 (Fla. 2010) (holding that under section 775.087, Florida Statutes, "the trial court has discretion ... to impose a mandatory minimum ... even if that mandatory minimum exceeds the statutory maximum.").
cited Cited "see" State v. Espinoza
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2019 · signal: see · confidence high
See Mendenhall v. State , 48 So.3d 740 , 747 (Fla. 2010).
cited Cited "see" State v. Espinoza
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2019 · signal: see · confidence high
See Mendenhall v. State , 48 So.3d 740 , 747 (Fla. 2010).
cited Cited "see" Davon White v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2017 · signal: see · confidence high
See Mendenhall v. State, 48 So.3d 740, 742 (Fla. 2010).
discussed Cited "see" Blair Nurseries, Inc. v. Baker County, Florida, A Political etc. (2×)
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2016 · signal: see · confidence high
See, for example, Mendenhall v. State, 48 So.3d 740 (Fla.2010).
cited Cited "see" Cortez Hatten v. State of Florida
Fla. · 2016 · signal: see · confidence high
See Mendenhall v. State, 48 So.3d 740, 747 (Fla.2010).
cited Cited "see" Anthony Laverne Hill v. State of Florida
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2015 · signal: see · confidence high
See Mendenhall v. State, 48 So. 3d 740, 748 (Fla. 2010).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Erica Lynn COREY, Petitioner,
v.
Michael James COREY, Respondent
SC10-164.
Supreme Court of Florida.
Oct 21, 2010.
48 So. 3d 740
Roger J. Schindler and Anthony V. Fal-zon of Simon, Schindler and Sandberg, LLP, Miami, FL, for Petitioner., Kathy M. Klock, June G. Hoffman, and Greg A. Lewen of Fowler White Burnett, P.A., West Palm Beach, FL, for Respondent.
Canady, Pariente, Lewis, Quince, Polston, Labarga, Perry.
Published
PER CURIAM.

We initially accepted jurisdiction to review the decision of the Third District Court of Appeal in Corey v. Corey, 29 So.3d 315 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009), based on express and direct conflict with decisions of other district courts of appeal. The conflict issue under review is whether the Legislature’s enactment of section 61.121, Florida Statutes, abrogated the judicial presumption against rotating custody. [1] After further consideration of the issue involved, and in light of the Legislature’s repeal of section 61.121 and substantial revision to section 61.13, Florida Statutes, effective October 1, 2008, [2] we have determined that we should exercise our discretion and discharge jurisdiction. Accordingly, this review proceeding is dismissed.

It is so ordered.

CANADY, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, POLSTON, LABARGA, and PERRY, JJ., concur.
1

. Section 61.121 was enacted on July 1, 1997, and provided that a court "may order rotating custody if the court finds that rotating custody will be in the best interest of the child.” See ch. 97-242, § 2, Laws of Fla.

2

. See ch. 2008-61, §§ 6, 8, Laws of Fla. In 2009, the Legislature further revised section 61.13(2)(c)(l) to provide that there is "no presumption for or against the father or mother of the child or for or against any specific time-sharing schedule when creating or modifying the parenting plan of the child.” Ch. 2009-180, § 3, Laws of Fla.