Baker v. State, 78 So. 3d 719 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012). · Go Syfert
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Baker v. State, 78 So. 3d 719 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
9 citation events (9 in the last 25 years) across 1 distinct court.
Strongest positive: Seritage SRC Finance, LLC v. the Town Center at Boca Raton Trust (fladistctapp, 2024-09-18)
Top citers, strongest first. 8 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Seritage SRC Finance, LLC v. the Town Center at Boca Raton Trust
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2024 · confidence medium
However, “intent is a question of fact that should not be decided on a summary judgment.” Olsen v. First Team Ford, Ltd., 359 So. 3d 873 , 878 (Fla. 5th DCA 2023) (quoting Hodge v. Cichon, 78 So. 3d 719, 723 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012)); see also Webb v. Blancett, 473 So. 2d 1376, 1378 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985) (“[I]t is up to the trier of fact to determine whether the words or conduct of a party demonstrates the requisite intent.”).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) AG Beaumont 1, LLC v. LSREF2 Oreo (Direct)
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2013 · confidence medium
LLC, 117 So.3d 486, 488 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013) (“ ‘[I]f material facts are conflicting, i.e., if facts permit different reasonable inferences to be drawn, ... then summary judgment may not be granted.’ ” (quoting Hodge v. Cichon, 78 So.3d 719, 722 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012))).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Reed v. Schutz Litigation LLC
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2013 · confidence medium
Summary judgment is proper only where “the record affirmatively showed that the plaintiff[ ] could not possibly prove [her] case, and not because [she] had simply failed to come forward with evidence doing so.” Hodge v. Cichon, 78 So.3d 719, 722 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012) (citation omitted) (quoting Webster v. MaHin Mem’l Med.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Dennis v. Kline
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2013 · confidence medium
Generally, the intent of a party in creating a document is “ ‘a question of fact that should not be decided on a summary judgment.’ ” Hodge v. Cichon, 78 So.3d 719, 723 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012) (quoting Sanders v. Wausau Underwriters Ins.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Bank of New York Mellon v. P2D2, LLC
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2012 · confidence medium
Hervey v. Alfonso, 650 So.2d 644, 646 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995); Hodge v. Cichon, 78 So.3d 719, 722 (Fla. 5th DCA), review denied, No. SC12-638, 2012 WL 3166723 (Fla. Aug. 3, 2012).
cited Cited "see" JARRETT OLSEN vs FIRST TEAM FORD, LTD D/B/A AUTONATION FORD SANFORD, A FLORIDA LIMTED PARTNERSHIP
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2023 · signal: see · confidence high
See Hodge v. Cichon, 78 So. 3d 719, 723 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012); see also Kuppinger v. JM.
cited Cited "see" Hodge v. Cichon
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2012 · signal: see · confidence high
See Hodge v. Cichon, 78 So.3d 719 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Castle Key Insurance Co. v. Raymond H. Duke Enterprises, Inc.
unknown court · 2014 · signal: see also · confidence medium
Bouton Co., 630 So.2d 1173, 1175 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994) (citation omitted); see also Hodge v. Cichon, 78 So.3d 719, 722 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012) (noting that if material facts are conflicting, i.e., permit different reasonable inferences to be drawn, then summary-judgment may not be granted); Key v. Trattmann, 959 So.2d 339, 341 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) (noting that summary judgment should not be granted unless the facts are so crystallized that nothing remains but questions of law).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Antraveius T. BAKER, Appellant,
v.
STATE of Florida, Appellee
1D10-4348.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
Feb 2, 2012.
78 So. 3d 719
Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and Danielle Jorden, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant., Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Jennifer J. Moore, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
Rowe, Thomas, Van Nortwick.
Published
PER CURIAM.

Antraveius T. Baker challenges his judgment of conviction and sentence for trafficking in more than 200 grams but less than 400 grams of cocaine. We affirm the conviction without comment, but we reverse certain costs imposed by the trial court and remand for a corrected sentencing order.

When the trial court orally announced sentence, it did not impose an assessment for (i) the sheriffs office investigation costs, (ii) the prosecution investigative cost, and (iii) the FDLE operation trust fund. These costs, which were assessed against appellant in the written order of sentence, are therefore improper. See Pullam v. State, 55 So.3d 674 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011). Further, because appellant was not given the opportunity to contest the public defender fee, it too was erroneously assessed. See § 938.29(5), Fla. Stat. (2010). On remand, these costs are to be struck.

AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part and REMANDED.

VAN NORTWICK, THOMAS, and ROWE, JJ., concur.