Crosslin Et Vir v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 400 U.S. 1004 (1971). · Go Syfert
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Crosslin Et Vir v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 400 U.S. 1004 (1971). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
55 citation events (2 in the last 25 years) across 20 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Skoglund v. Singer Company (nhd, 1975-11-13)
Treatment trajectory · 1971 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1971 1998 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 5 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Skoglund v. Singer Company
D.N.H. · 1975 · confidence medium
“Forcing an alleged victim of racial discrimination —usually an indigent — first to seek a state remedy prior to vindication of his federal rights when that state remedy is palpably inadequate presents an issue of considerable importance.” 400 U.S. at 1005, 91 S.Ct. at 563. 5 .
discussed Cited "see" Bransford v. Zoning Board of Appeals
Mass. · 2005 · signal: see · confidence high
See Strazzulla v. Building Inspector of Wellesley, 357 Mass. 694, 697 (1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1004 (1971) (considering “eventual elimination of nonconforming uses as an objective underlying zoning regulations”); 4A N. Williams, Jr., American Land Planning Law 283-289 (1986) (noting that term “nonconforming use” is sometimes used genetically to cover all nonconformities).
discussed Cited "see" Barron Chevrolet, Inc. v. Town of Danvers
Mass. · 1995 · signal: see · confidence high
See Strazzulla v. Building Inspector of Wellesley, 357 Mass. 694, 697 (1970), appeal dismissed, cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1004 (1971) (recognizing town’s power to specify conditions for and limitations on changes in nonconforming signs).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Tokuta v. James Madison University
W.D. Va. · 1997 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See e.g., Crosslin v. Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co., 422 F.2d 1028 (9th Cir.1970), vacated, 400 U.S. 1004 , 91 S.Ct. 562 , 27 L.Ed.2d 618 (1971) (holding an agency to be a deferral agency when it has the power to issue cease and desist orders); Hadfield v. Mitre Corp., 562 F.2d 84 (1st Cir.1977) (holding Massachusetts be a deferral state when complainant must exhaust the mediation powers of the agency before filing suit).
cited Cited "see, e.g." Bertrand v. Orkin Exterminating Co., Inc.
N.D. Ill. · 1976 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also, Crosslin et Vir v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel., 400 U.S. 1004 , 91 S.Ct. 562 , 27 L.Ed.2d 618 (1971).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Erlene Crosslin Et Vir.
v.
the Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company
326.
Supreme Court of the United States.
Jan 18, 1971.
400 U.S. 1004
Douglas.
Cited by 11 opinions  |  Published
Reporter's Syllabus — editorial summary, not part of the Court's opinion

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The motion of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People for leave to file a brief, as amicus curiae, is granted. The petition for a writ of certiorari is also granted and the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is vacated. The case is remanded to the United States District Court for the District of Arizona for reconsideration in light of the suggestions contained in the brief of the Solicitor General, as amicus curiae, filed November 19, 1970. By this remand this Court intimates no view as to the merits of the Solicitor General's position.

Mr. Justice DOUGLAS, dissenting.

Lead Opinion

C. A. 9th Cir. Motion, of National Association for Advancement of Colored People for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded to the United States District Court for the. District of Arizona for reconsideration in light of suggestions contained in brief of the Solicitor General as amicus curiae filed November 19, Í970. By this remand this Court intimates no view as to the merits of the Solicitor General’s position.

Dissent

Mr. Justice Douglas,

dissenting.

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 253, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e ét seq., establishes methods of securing relief for individuals complaining of discrimination in employment. An individual may bring court action to enforce his rights under Title VII only after he has filed a timely charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). Section 706 (b), 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5 (b), of the Act provides no charge may be filed with the EEOC until 60 days after the commencement of proceedings (unless they are terminated earlier) before a state ór local agency, if one exists, which has power “to grant or seek relief” or to “institute criminal proceedings” with respect to the complaint. The EEOC has interpreted § 706 (b) as requiring initial submission of the complaint to state agencies only where the agency can provide adequate relief. At present Arizona and six[*1005] other States* have agencies with remedial powers which the EEOC finds inadequate.

This case arose in Arizona. Petitioners brought a complaint of racial discrimination in employment to the EEOC without first going to the Arizona Civil Rights Commission. The EEOC found there was reasonable cause to believe the charge was true and sent a statutory Notice-of-Right-To-Sue-Within-Thirty-Days and the action was timely filed. The Court of-Appeals held that the District Court should have dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction because the Arizona Civil Rights Commission should have been given the initial opportunity to consider the complaint. The court found that a st(ate agency empowered “to grant and seek relief” included an agency that could only attempt to settle the dispute by conciliation and persuasion.

The proper functioning of the various Civil Rights Acts is of critical importance. This Court has recently re-emphasized the importance of deference to an administrative interpretation by the agency charged with the initial interpretation of a new law. United States v. City of Chicago, ante, p. 8; Udall v. Tallman, 380 U. S. 1, 16. The court below rejected the administrative interpretation of § 706 (b). In so doing it requires pursuing a state remedy classified as inadequate by the EEOC.

The various Civil Rights Acts represent a national commitment to achieve an end to racial discrimination. Forcing an alleged victim of racial discrimination — usually an indigent — first to seek a state remedy prior to vindication of his federal rights when that - state remedy is palpably inadequate presents an issue of considerable importance. See Glover v. St. Louis-San Francisco R. Co., 393 U. S. 324. I would grant certiorari to decide the question presented in this case.

Idaho, Maine, Montana, Oklahoma, Tennessee, and Vermont.