Riley v. Illinois, 435 U.S. 1000 (1978). · Go Syfert
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Riley v. Illinois, 435 U.S. 1000 (1978). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
196 citation events (10 in the last 25 years) across 55 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Dewberry v. State (texcrimapp, 1999-10-20) · Strongest negative: State Ex Rel. Juvenile Department v. Gibson (orctapp, 1986-04-30)
Treatment trajectory · 1978 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1978 2002 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 37 distinct citers. How cited ↗
cited Cited "but see" State Ex Rel. Juvenile Department v. Gibson
Or. Ct. App. · 1986 · signal: but see · confidence high
But see People v. Riley, 49 Ill App 3d 304, 7 Ill Dec 145, 364 NE2d 306 (1977), cert den 435 US 1000 , 98 S Ct 1657 , 56 L Ed 2d 91 (1978); State v. Young, 220 Kan 541, 552 P2d 905 (1976).
discussed Cited "see" Dewberry v. State (2×)
Tex. Crim. App. · 1999 · signal: see · confidence high
See Riley v. Illinois, 435 U.S. 1000 , 98 S.Ct. 1657 , 56 L.Ed.2d 91 (1978).
discussed Cited "see" State v. Howard
Del. Super. Ct. · 1998 · signal: see · confidence high
See generally U.S. v. Hearst, 9th Cir., 563 F.2d 1331, 1345-46 (1977), reh’g denied, 9th Cir., 573 F.2d 579 (1978), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1000 , 98 S.Ct. 1656 , 56 L.Ed.2d 90 (1978) (finding that surreptitiously recording conversations between prisoner and visitor does not violate prisoner’s right to privacy when confronted with state's "justifiable purpose of imprisonment or prison security"); State v. Hauss, App., 142 Ariz. 159 , 688 P.2d 1051, 1054-55 (1984) (holding that, in this case where police were concerned that while couple was in an interview room they would pass a weapon, disc…
cited Cited "see" United States v. Kraig Kavanagh, United States of America v. Carl Vincent Bergeman
9th Cir. · 1994 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Hearst, 563 F.2d 1331, 1347 (9th Cir.1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1000 (1978).
cited Cited "see" United States v. William A. Simpson
10th Cir. · 1993 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Hearst, 563 F.2d 1331, 1339 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1000 , 98 S.Ct. 1656 , 56 L.Ed.2d 90 (1978).
discussed Cited "see" City of Seattle v. Heatley
Wash. Ct. App. · 1993 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Hearst, 563 F.2d 1331, 1351 (9th Cir. 1977) (terms "voluntarily rob a bank" and "act under fear of death or grave bodily harm" would be understood by average person in same sense as intended by expert testimony), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1000 (1978).
discussed Cited "see" William A. BROWN, M.D., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SIERRA NEVADA MEMORIAL MINERS HOSPITAL, Et Al., Defendants-Appellees
9th Cir. · 1988 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Hearst, 563 F.2d 1331, 1337 (9th Cir.1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1000 , 98 S.Ct. 1656 , 56 L.Ed.2d 90 (1978) (trial court has discretion to determine the order in which parties should adduce proof at trial).
discussed Cited "see" United States v. Bernard Joseph
9th Cir. · 1987 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Hearst, 563 F.2d 1331, 1347 (9th Cir.1977), cert, denied, 435 U.S. 1000 , 98 S.Ct. 1656 , 56 L.Ed.2d 90 (1978) (interagency exchange of evidence without warrant not violative of Fourth Amendment).
discussed Cited "see" United States v. Walter H. Kupau
9th Cir. · 1986 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Hearst, 563 F.2d 1331, 1349-50 (9th Cir.1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1000 , 98 S.Ct. 1656 , 56 L.Ed.2d 90 (1978) (exclusion of expert linguist’s testimony upheld); see also United States v. Schmidt, 711 F.2d 595, 598-99 (5th Cir.1983), ce rt. denied, 464 U.S. 1041 , 104 S.Ct. 705 , 79 L.Ed.2d 169 (1984) (exclusion of expert linguist’s testimony upheld).
cited Cited "see" Drinkwine v. Federated Publications, Inc.
9th Cir. · 1986 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Hearst, 563 F.2d 1331, 1348-49 (9th Cir.1977) (no abuse when evidence is cumulative), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1000 , 98 S.Ct. 1656 , 56 L.Ed.2d 90 (1978). 34 III.
cited Cited "see" Drinkwine v. Federated Publications, Inc.
9th Cir. · 1985 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Hearst, 563 F.2d 1331, 1348-49 (9th Cir.1977) (no abuse when evidence is cumulative), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1000 , 98 S.Ct. 1656 , 56 L.Ed.2d 90 (1978).
discussed Cited "see" 37 Fair empl.prac.cas. 535, 36 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 35,085, 17 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 978 Belen Torres, (83-1194), (83-1239, 83-1453) v. County of Oakland and Oakland County Community Mental Health Services Board, Jointly and Severally, (83-1194), (83-1239, 83-1453)
6th Cir. · 1985 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Hearst, 563 F.2d 1331, 1351 (9th Cir.1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1000 , 98 S.Ct. 1656 , 56 L.Ed.2d 90 (1978) (testimony is not objectionable as containing a legal conclusion where the "average layman would understand those terms and ascribe to them essentially the same meaning intended").
discussed Cited "see" Torres v. County of Oakland
6th Cir. · 1985 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Hearst, 563 F.2d 1331, 1351 (9th Cir.1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1000 , 98 S.Ct. 1656 , 56 L.Ed.2d 90 (1978) (testimony is not objectionable as containing a legal conclusion where the “average layman would understand those terms and ascribe to them essentially the same meaning intended”).
discussed Cited "see" Donaldson v. Superior Court (2×)
Cal. · 1983 · signal: see · confidence high
Fed. 816 ], cert. den. 446 U.S. 941 ; see United States v. Hearst (9th Cir. 1977) 563 F.2d 1331, 1345 , cert. den. 435 U.S. 1000 , and cases there cited; Christman v. Skinner (2d Cir. 1972) 468 F.2d 723, 726 .) There are signs that the federal courts may move away from Lanza’s total rejection of privacy in a jail or police station, and may ultimately adopt the De Lancie position limiting evesdropping to that required for institutional security.
discussed Cited "see" Nakao v. Rushen
N.D. Cal. · 1982 · signal: accord · confidence high
Accord, *1093 United States v. Hearst, 563 F.2d 1331, 1344-45 (9th Cir. 1977), cert, denied, 435 U.S. 1000 , 98 S.Ct. 1656 , 56 L.Ed.2d 90 (1978); United States v. Vallez, 653 F.2d 403, 406 (9th Cir. 1981), cert, denied, 454 U.S. 904 , 102 S.Ct. 412 , 70 L.Ed.2d 223 (1982).
discussed Cited "see" United States v. John Stanley Campbell, United States of America v. Riley Ray Fultz (2×)
6th Cir. · 1982 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Hearst, 563 F.2d 1331 , 1336 n. 2 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1000 , 98 S.Ct. 1656 , 56 L.Ed.2d 90 (1978); United States v. Johnson, 516 F.2d 209, 212-13 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 859 , 96 S.Ct. 112 , 46 L.Ed.2d 85 (1975).
discussed Cited "see" United States v. James W. Melanson (2×)
1st Cir. · 1981 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Hearst, 563 F.2d 1331, 1347-48 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1000 , 98 S.Ct. 1656 , 56 L.Ed.2d 90 (1978); United States v. Aloisio, 440 F.2d 705, 710 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 824 , 92 S.Ct. 49 , 30 L.Ed.2d 51 (1971); United States ex rel.
examined Cited "see" United States v. Henry (8×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
SCOTUS · 1980 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Hearst, 563 F. 2d 1331, 1347-1348 (CA9 1977), cert. denied, 435 U. S. 1000 (1978).
cited Cited "see" City of Indianapolis v. Ervin
Ind. Ct. App. · 1980 · signal: see · confidence high
Foster v. United States (5th Cir.1961) 296 F.2d 65 ; see May v. State (1977), Ind.App., 364 N.E.2d 172 , cert. den. 435 U.S. 1000 , 98 S.Ct. 1657 , 56 L.Ed.2d 91 .
cited Cited "see" United States v. John D. Clardy
9th Cir. · 1980 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Hearst, 563 F.2d 1331, 1336 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1000 , 98 S.Ct. 1656 , 56 L.Ed.2d 90 .
discussed Cited "see" United States v. Susan Paul (79-5061), and Arnold Chester Pierce (79-5082) (2×)
6th Cir. · 1980 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Hearst, 563 F.2d 1331, 1344-46 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1000 , 98 S.Ct. 1656 , 56 L.Ed.2d 90 (1978).
discussed Cited "see" United States v. John Stanley Campbell, United States of America v. Riley Ray Fultz
8th Cir. · 1979 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Hearst, 563 F.2d 1331 , 1336 n. 2 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1000 , 98 S.Ct. 1656 , 56 L.Ed.2d 90 (1978); United States v. Johnson, 516 F.2d 209, 212-13 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 859 , 96 S.Ct. 112 , 46 L.Ed.2d 85 (1975).
discussed Cited "see" United States v. Harold Glickman AKA Hal Glickman, United States of America v. James Rowe
9th Cir. · 1979 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Hearst, 563 F.2d 1331 , 1336 n.2 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1000 , 98 S.Ct. 1656 , 56 L.Ed.2d 90 (1978); United States v. Monroe, 552 F.2d 860, 863 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 972 , 97 S.Ct. 2936 , 53 L.Ed.2d 1009 (1977).
discussed Cited "see" Billy Gale Henry v. United States (2×)
4th Cir. · 1978 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Hearst, 563 F.2d 1331 (9 Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1000 , 98 S.Ct. 1656 , 56 L.Ed.2d 90 (1978), in which the Ninth Circuit held that such interception did not violate the sixth amendment under Massiah.
discussed Cited "see" United States v. Hearst (2×)
N.D. Cal. · 1978 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Hearst, 563 F.2d 1331 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1000 , 98 S.Ct. 1656 , 56 L.Ed.2d 90 (1978); United States v. Hearst, 435 F.Supp. 29 (N.D.Cal.1977); United States v. Hearst, 424 F.Supp. 307 (N.D.Cal. 1976). 11 .
discussed Cited "see" United States v. James A. Saettele (2×)
8th Cir. · 1978 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Hearst, 563 F.2d 1331 , 1335 n.1 (9th Cir. 1977), Cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1000 , 98 S.Ct. 1656 , 56 L.Ed.2d 90 (1978); United States v. Michelson, 559 F.2d 567, 569 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Patrick, 542 F.2d 381, 386 (7th Cir. 1976), Cert. denied, 430 U.S. 931 , 97 S.Ct. 1551 , 51 L.Ed.2d 775 (1977). 13 Assuming arguendo that the evidence presented was sufficient to establish a reasonable apprehension of injury, nothing in the record suggests that Saettele made any attempt to escape or avoid the threatened danger or was prevented from doing so at any time.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Marco Wayne Hall v. Lasalle Corrections West LLC, et al.
D. Ariz. · 2026 · signal: see also · confidence low
Further, the information requested in the subpoena 22 could reasonably lead to admissible evidence on Plaintiff’s cognitive impairment claim. 23 See Surfvivor Media, Inc., 406 F.3d at 635 . 24 Additionally, the Ninth Circuit has held that “[e]ven if [a prisoner] believed that 25 his calls were private, no prisoner should reasonably expect privacy in his outbound 26 telephone calls.” United States v. Van Poyck, 77 F.3d 285, 290-91 (9th Cir. 1996). 27 Although prisoners do not forfeit all their privacy rights at the jailhouse steps, Franklin v. 28 Oregon, 662 F.2d 1337, 1347 (9th Cir.1981)…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Belmer v. Commonwealth (2×)
Va. Ct. App. · 2001 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., United States v. Hearst, 563 F.2d 1331, 1345-46 (9th Cir.1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1000 , 98 S.Ct. 1656 , 56 L.Ed.2d 90 (1978).
cited Cited "see, e.g." State v. Strohl
Neb. · 1999 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., United States v. Hearst, 563 F.2d 1331 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied 435 U.S. 1000 , 98 S. Ct. 1656 , 56 L.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." State v. Gibson
Or. Ct. App. · 1996 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also United States v. Hearst, 563 F2d 1331, 1336, cert den 435 US 1000 (9th Cir 1977) (holding that evidence of subsequent acts of uncharged misconduct was relevant to prove intent where defendant claimed that she was acting under duress during the charged act.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Ariel Escobedo, A/K/A Ariel Joquin, A/K/A Ignacio Hernandez
9th Cir. · 1994 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also United States v. Hearst, 563 F.2d 1331, 1340-41 (9th Cir.1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1000 (1978) (Hearst's testimony that she acted involuntarily "placed in issue her behavior during the entire period from abduction to arrest").
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Simmons v. State
Md. · 1988 · signal: compare · confidence low
Compare United States v. Hearst, 563 F.2d 1331, 1350-52 (9th Cir.1977), ce rt. denied, 435 U.S. 1000 , 98 S.Ct. 1656 , 56 L.Ed.2d 90 (1978) (psychiatrists testifying on behalf of the government were permitted to express their opinions that the defendant did not take part in a bank robbery because she was in fear of her life, but rather, engaged in the illegal activity voluntarily).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Larry Eugene McCollum (2×)
9th Cir. · 1984 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., United States v. Hearst, 563 F.2d 1331, 1348-49 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1000 , 98 S.Ct. 1656 , 56 L.Ed.2d 90 (1978).
cited Cited "see, e.g." Robert J. Neely v. Thomas Israel
7th Cir. · 1983 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also United States v. Hearst, 563 F.2d 1331, 1342 (9th Cir.1977), cert, denied, 435 U.S. 1000 , 98 S.Ct. 1656 , 56 L.Ed.2d 90 (1978).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Stephen Gonsalves
9th Cir. · 1982 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., United States v. Hearst, 563 F.2d 1331 , 1336 & n.2 (9th Cir. 1977) (duress), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1000 , 98 S.Ct. 1656 , 56 L.Ed.2d 90 (1978); United States v. Hermosillo-Nanez, 545 F.2d 1230, 1232 (9th Cir. 1976) (entrapment), ce rt. denied, 429 U.S. 1050 , 97 S.Ct. 763 , 50 L.Ed.2d 767 (1977).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Matter of Vinson (2×)
N.C. · 1979 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also, Riley v. Illinois, 435 U.S. 1000 , 98 S.Ct. 1657 , 56 L.Ed.2d 91 (1978) (mem.). [3] We note that the statute neither authorizes nor forbids the use of the breathalyzer test or polygraph, Cf. North Carolina Juvenile Code Revision Committee, 1979 Report 185 (1979) (Citing rationale for this silence). [4] Study done by Diane Porter of the Division of Youth Services, reported in the minutes of the Juvenile Code Revision Committee, 31 March 1978.
cited Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Larry Joe Dooley
5th Cir. · 1979 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also United States v. Hearst, 9 Cir., 1977, 563 F.2d 1331, 1338-44 , cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1000 , 98 S.Ct. 1656 , 56 L.Ed.2d 90 (1978).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Thomas Riley
v.
State of Illinois
77-5953.
Supreme Court of the United States.
Jun 5, 1978.
435 U.S. 1000
Marshall, Brennan.
Cited by 7 opinions  |  Published
Reporter's Syllabus — editorial summary, not part of the Court's opinion

See 436 U.S. 951, 98 S.Ct. 2861.

On petition for writ of certiorari to the Appellate Court of Illinois, First District.

The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied.

Mr. Justice MARSHALL, with whom Mr. Justice BRENNAN joins, dissenting.

Lead Opinion

App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied.

Dissent

Mr. Justice Marshall, with whom Mr. Justice Brennan joins,

dissenting.

I dissent from the denial of certiorari. Petitioner was 16 years old at the time of his arrest in connection with three homicides.[1] After being held for an hour and a half in a police car at the cemetery where the bodies were found, petitioner was taken to the police station, where his shoes, trousers, and shirt were removed[2] and he was given a blanket and placed in a cell. An hour or two later, after being advised[*1001] of his constitutional rights to remain silent and consult with an attorney, petitioner asked to speak to his father, who had come to the police station when he learned of his son’s arrest;[3] this request was ignored by the police. Petitioner then confessed to the crimes, and later that evening repeated the confession to a prosecuting attorney, without having consulted. with the parent whom he had asked to see or with any other friendly adult. The confession was introduced over objection at petitioner’s trial, which led to his conviction for murder and to sentences of 75 to 225 years.[4]

The Illinois courts considered and rejected petitioner’s argument, made initially in support of his motion to suppress the confession, that “the request of a juvenile defendant to see a parent is tantamount to an adult’s request for an attorney” and should terminate police interrogation. 49 Ill. App. 3d 304, 308, 364 N. E. 2d 306, 309 (1977).[5] It is this argument that petitioner presses here.

I have recently expressed my view that this Court should decide whether a juvenile’s waiver of rights is valid in the absence of “competent advice from an adult who does not have significant conflicts of interest.” Little v. Arkansas, ante,p. 957 (dissenting from denial of certiorari). The instant case presents a related but less difficult issue, for we need not consider here whether the Constitution requires that[*1002] a juvenile always receive adult advice before making a confession. Compare ante, at 958-959, and nn. 5-6. Nor need we decide whether adult advice tainted by conflict of interest is nevertheless sufficient for constitutional purposes. See ante, at 959-960. The narrow question presented here is simply whether an accused child’s request to see a parent must be honored by the police before they continue interrogation, at least when the parent is available at the police station and interested in speaking to his child.

There is a conflict of authority on this question that indicates a need for this Court to exercise its certiorari jurisdiction. See Sup. Ct. Rule 19. The Supreme Court of California has held:

“[WJhen ... a minor is taken into custody and is subjected to interrogation, without the presence of an attorney, his request to see one of his parents . . . must ... be construed to indicate that the minor suspect desires to invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege. The police must cease custodial interrogation immediately upon exercise of the privilege.” People v. Burton, 6 Cal. 3d 375, 383-384, 491 P. 2d 793, 798 (1971).

Other state courts have gone further, requiring that a juvenile always receive adult advice before the police may accept his confession, regardless of whether he asks to speak to an adult. See, e. g., Lewis v. State, 259 Ind. 431, 436-440, 288 N. E. 2d 138, 141-143 (1972); In re K. W. B., 500 S. W. 2d 275, 279-283 (Mo. App. 1973); Commonwealth v. Webster, 466 Pa. 314, 320-328, 353 A. 2d 372, 375-379 (1975); Commonwealth v. McCutchen, 463 Pa. 90, 343 A. 2d 669 (1975). On the other hand, at least two courts in addition to the court below have upheld the admission of confessions obtained after juveniles’ requests to see parents had been ignored by the police. Chaney v. Wainwright, 561 F. 2d 1129 (CA5 1977) (2-1 decision); State v. Young, 220 Kan. 541, 555, 552 P. 2d 905, 916 (1976) (noting that honoring juvenile’s request to see[*1003] parent would be the “better police practice,” although not constitutionally required) .[6]

In In re Gault, 387 U. S. 1 (1967), this Court emphasized that “the greatest care must be taken to assure that [a juvenile’s] admission was voluntary . . . [and] that it was not the product of ignorance of rights or of adolescent fantasy, fright or despair.” Id., at 55. In light of this admonition, there is an obvious incongruity in requiring the police to honor an adult’s request for an attorney while allowing them to ignore a juvenile’s request to speak to a parent:

“[T]he state readily concedes that the police would have been required to accede to a request for an attorney. The accused who requests his mother rather than his ever-available attorney is the less knowledgeable, more easily coerced person most in need of protection from police overreaching. It makes no sense to protect the knowledgeable accused from stationhouse coercion while abandoning the young person who knows no more than to ask for the one person he trusts, his mother.” Chaney v. Wainwright, supra, at 1134 (Goldberg, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).

These considerations, at the very least, indicate that the issue presented here is a substantial one. For this reason, and because of the conflict among state and federal courts on the question, I would grant the petition for certiorari.

1

All facts are taken from the opinion of the Illinois Appellate Court. 49 Ill. App. 3d 304, 364 N. E. 2d 306 (1977). It appears that petitioner first told the police that he was 17 years old, but it is here undisputed that petitioner was 16 at the time of the events in question. See id., at 306, 310, 364 N. E. 2d, at 307-308, 310; Brief in Opposition 2.

2

This clothing was apparently removed for evidentiary purposes. See 49 Ill. App. 3d, at 306, 364 N. E. 2d, at 307.

3

Police testimony conflicted with both petitioner’s claim that he had asked to see his father and the father’s claim that he had asked repeatedly to see his son. There is no dispute, however, about the father’s presence at the police station that evening, and the trial court assumed, in ruling on petitioner’s suppression motion, that petitioner had made the request to see his father. Id., at 306-307, 310, 364 N. E. 2d, at 308, 310.

4

Petitioner was convicted of two counts of murder, for which he received concurrent sentences of 75 to 225 years. He was also convicted of one count of involuntary manslaughter, for which he received a sentence of 3 to 10 years.

5

The Illinois Supreme Court denied leave to appeal. App. B to Pet. for Cert.

6

The Illinois court in the instant case similarly indicated that “ ‘it would be preferable to make sure, whenever possible, that a parent or guardian is present when a juvenile waives his rights,'” 49 Ill. App. 3d, at 311, 364 N. E. 2d, at 311, quoting In re Stiff, 32 Ill. App. 3d 971, 978, 336 N. E. 2d 619, 625 (1975).