Carver v. Florida, 438 U.S. 905 (1978). · Go Syfert
Carver v. Florida, 438 U.S. 905 (1978). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
53 citation events (3 in the last 25 years) across 30 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Urbanizadora Versalles, Inc. v. Miguel A. Rivera Rios (ca1, 1983-03-02)
Treatment trajectory · 1978 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1978 2002 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 4 distinct citers. How cited ↗
cited Cited "see" Urbanizadora Versalles, Inc. v. Miguel A. Rivera Rios
1st Cir. · 1983 · signal: see · confidence high
See generally Donohoe Construction Co. v. Montgomery County Council, 567 F.2d 603, 607, 609 (4th Cir.1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 905 , 98 S.Ct. 3123 , 57 L.Ed.2d 1148 (1978).
discussed Cited "see" Cox v. Planning District I Community Mental Health & Mental Retardation Services Board
4th Cir. · 1982 · signal: see · confidence high
See Donohoe Construction Co. v. Montgomery County Council, 567 F.2d 603 , 607 n.12 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 905 , 98 S.Ct. 3123 , 57 L.Ed.2d 1148 (1978); cf. AFA Distributing Co. v. Pearl Brewing Co., 470 F.2d 1210 (4th Cir. 1973).
discussed Cited "see" Wilma Jean Cox v. Planning District I Community Mental Health And Mental Retardation Services Board
4th Cir. · 1982 · signal: see · confidence high
See Donohoe Construction Co. v. Montgomery County Council, 567 F.2d 603 , 607 n.12 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 905 , 98 S.Ct. 3123 , 57 L.Ed.2d 1148 (1978); cf. AFA Distributing Co. v. Pearl Brewing Co., 470 F.2d 1210 (4th Cir. 1973).
cited Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Gilbert C. Swanson Foundation, Inc.
D. Neb. · 1985 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., United States v. Myslajek, 568 F.2d 55 (8th Cir.1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 905 , 98 S.Ct. 3123 , 57 L.Ed.2d 1147 (1978).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Charles David Carver
v.
State of Florida
77-1146.
Supreme Court of the United States.
Jun 26, 1978.
438 U.S. 905
Brennan, Stewart, Marshall.
Published
Reporter's Syllabus — editorial summary, not part of the Court's opinion

On petition for writ of certiorari to the District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied.

Mr. Justice BRENNAN, with whom Mr. Justice STEWART and Mr. Justice MARSHALL join, dissenting.

On , Sheriff's office seized from petitioner, an employee of a movie theater, a copy of an allegedly obscene movie. Subsequently, petitioner, after reserving his right to appeal from the denial of various pretrial motions, pleaded nolo contendere to the felony of possessing obscene material with the intent to exhibit, defined in Fla.Stat. § 847.011(1)(a) (1977). Section 847.011(1)(a), which is set out in the margin,* has been authoritatively construed by the Florida Supreme Court to contain the standards enunciated by this Court in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 93 S.Ct. 2607, 37 L.Ed.2d 419 (1973), and Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 93 S.Ct. 2628, 37 L.Ed.2d 446 (1973). See Rhodes v. State, 283 So.2d 351, 354-355, 359 (1973). Because I continue to adhere to my view that "at least in the absence of distribution to juveniles or obtrusive exposure to unconsenting adults, the First and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the State and Federal Governments from attempting wholly to suppress sexually oriented materials on the basis of their allegedly 'obscene' contents," Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, supra, 413 U.S. at 113, 93 S.Ct. 2628 (dissenting opinion), I would grant certiorari and summarily reverse petitioner's conviction. See Miller v. California, supra, 413 U.S. at 47, 93 S.Ct. 2627 (BRENNAN, J., dissenting).

Lead Opinion

Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 2d Dist. Certiorari denied.

Dissent

Mr. Justice Brennan, with whom Mr. Justice Stewart and Mr. Justice Marshall join,

dissenting.

On February 12, 1976, members of the Pinellas County, Fla., Sheriff's office seized from petitioner, an employee of a movie theater, a copy of an allegedly obscene movie. Subsequently, petitioner, after reserving his right to appeal from the denial of various pretrial motions, pleaded nolo contendere to the felony of possessing obscene material with the intent to exhibit, defined in Fla. Stat. § 847.011 (1) (a) (1977).[*906] Section 847.011 (l)(a), which is set out in the margin,* has been authoritatively construed by the Florida Supreme Court to contain the standards enunciated by this Court in Miller v. California, 413 U. S. 15 (1973), and Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U. S. 49 (1973). See Rhodes v. State, 283 So. 2d 351, 354-355, 359 (1973). Because I continue to adhere to my view that “at least in the absence of distribution to juveniles or obtrusive exposure to unconsenting adults, the First and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the State and Federal Governments from attempting wholly to suppress sexually oriented materials on the basis of their allegedly 'obscene’ contents,” Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, supra, at 113 (dissenting opinion), I would grant certiorari and summarily reverse petitioner’s conviction. See Miller v. California, supra, at 47 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

“A person who knowingly . . . has in his possession, custody, or control with intent to sell, lend, give away, distribute, transmit, show, transmute, or advertise in any manner, any obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, indecent, sadistic, or masochistic . . . motion-picture film ... is guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree .... A person who, after having been convicted of a violation of this subsection, thereafter violates any of its provisions, is guilty of a felony of the third degree . . .