New York Times Co. Et Al. v. New Jersey Et Al., 439 U.S. 886 (1978). · Go Syfert
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New York Times Co. Et Al. v. New Jersey Et Al., 439 U.S. 886 (1978). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
42 citation events (2 in the last 25 years) across 28 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: United States v. South Carolina Recycling and Disposal, Inc. (scd, 1986-08-14)
Treatment trajectory · 1978 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1978 2002 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 4 distinct citers.
discussed Cited "see" United States v. South Carolina Recycling and Disposal, Inc.
D.S.C. · 1986 · signal: see · confidence high
See Allied Structural Steel Company v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 257 , 98 S.Ct. 2716, 2728 , 57 L.Ed.2d 727 (1978), reh. den. 439 U.S. 886 , 99 S.Ct. 233 , 58 L.Ed.2d 201 ; Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v.. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 589 , 55 S.Ct. 854, 863 , 79 L.Ed. 1593 (1935), reh. den., 296 U.S. 661 , 56 S.Ct. 82 , 80 L.Ed. 471 ; Hanover National Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181, 188 , 22 S.Ct. 857, 860 , 46 L.Ed. 1113 (1902).
discussed Cited "see" Green v. United States
7th Cir. · 1983 · signal: accord · confidence high
Schneider Enterprises, 41 Wis.2d 45, 50 , 163 N.W.2d 190, 193 (1968) (quoting same); accord Dellums v. Powell, 184 U.S.App.D.C. 324, 329 , 566 F.2d 216, 221 (D.C.Cir.1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 916 , 98 S.Ct. 3147 , 57 L.Ed.2d 1161 , reh’g denied, 439 U.S. 886 , 99 S.Ct. 234 , 58 L.Ed.2d 201 (1978); Doman v. United States, 460 F.2d 425, 428 (9th Cir.1972).
discussed Cited "see" ca3 1983
3rd Cir. · 1983 · signal: accord · confidence high
Schneider Enterprises, 41 Wis.2d 45, 50 , 163 N.W.2d 190, 193 (1968) (quoting same); accord Dellums v. Powell, 184 U.S.App.D.C. 324, 329 , 566 F.2d 216, 221 (D.C.Cir.1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 916 , 98 S.Ct. 3147 , 57 L.Ed.2d 1161 , reh'g denied, 439 U.S. 886 , 99 S.Ct. 234 , 58 L.Ed.2d 201 (1978); Dornan v. United States, 460 F.2d 425, 428 (9th Cir.1972).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Chappy v. Labor & Industry Review Commission
Wis. · 1987 · signal: see also · confidence low
No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, nor any law impairing the obligation of contracts, shall ever be passed.” 9 There is some indication that, where only a minimal alteration is present, "the inquiry ends as no constitutional violation has occurred.” In Re LaFortune, 652 F.2d 842, 846 (9th Cir. 1981); See also Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 245 (1978), reh’g. denied, 439 U.S. 886 (minimal alteration of contractual obligations may end the inquiry at its first stage). 10 See supra n. 6. 11 The need for such a legislative enactment is highlighted by the facts of…
New York Times Company and Myron Farber
v.
New Jersey and Mario E. Jascalevich
A-284 (78-540).
Supreme Court of the United States.
Oct 6, 1978.
439 U.S. 886
Marshall, Brennan.
Published
Reporter's Syllabus — editorial summary, not part of the Court's opinion

Motion to vacate stay granted, and it is ordered that the order of Mr. Justice STEWART dated September 26, 1978, is hereby, vacated.

Mr. Justice MARSHALL, dissenting.

I dissent from the decision of the Court to vacate the stay entered by Mr. Justice STEWART on September 26, 1978.

The motion to vacate provides a third occasion for me to consider the merits of the contentions raised by the New York Times and Farber in their petition for certiorari. On the first occasion, I denied their reapplication for a stay because of the premature stage of the state court proceedings. 439 U.S. 1304, 98 S.Ct. 3060, 58 L.Ed.2d 12 (1978). Upon petitioners' reapplication for a stay after they had been held in contempt, I expressed my opinion that:

"Given the likelihood that forced disclosure even for in camera review will inhibit the reporter's and newspaper's exercise of First Amendment rights, I believe that some threshold showing of materiality, relevance, and necessity should be required. . . . Examination of the record submitted with this application discloses that the Superior Court did not make any independent determinations of materiality, relevance, or necessity prior to ordering the applicants to submit the subpoenaed materials for in camera review." 439 U.S. 1331, 1335, 99 S.Ct. 11, 58 L.Ed.2d 38 (1978).

I was compelled to deny that reapplication for a stay, however, because I could not conclude in good faith that four members of this Court would vote to grant a writ of certiorari, a criterion that must be satisfied before a single Justice can grant an application for a stay. Now that the matter is presented to the entire Court for decision, I am no longer so constrained.

Lead Opinion

Sup. Ct. N. J. Motion to vacate stay granted, and it is ordered that the order of Mr. Justice Stewart, dated September 26, 1978, is hereby vacated.

Mr. Justice Brennan took no part in the consideration or decision of this motion.

Dissent

Mr. Justice Marshall,

dissenting.

I dissent from the decision of the Court to vacate the stay entered by Mr. Justice Stewart on September 26, 1978.

The motion to vacate provides a third occasion for me to consider the merits of the contentions raised by the New York Times and Myron Farber in their petition for certiorari. On the first occasion, I denied their reapplication for a stay because of the premature stage of the state-court proceedings. New York Times Co. v. Jascalevich, post, p. 1304. Upon petitioners’ reapplication for a stay after they had been held in contempt, I expressed my opinion that:

“Given the likelihood that forced disclosure even for in camera review will inhibit the reporter’s and newspaper’s exercise of First Amendment rights, I believe that some threshold showing of materiality, relevance, and ne[*887] cessity should be required. . . . Examination of the record submitted with this application discloses that the Superior Court did not make any independent determinations of materiality, relevance, or necessity prior to ordering the applicants to submit the subpoenaed materials for in camera review.” New York Times Co. v. Jascalevich, post, at 1335.

I was compelled to deny that reapplication for a stay, however, because I could not conclude in good faith that four Members of this Court would vote to grant a writ of cer-tiorari, a criterion that must be satisfied before a single Justice can grant an application for a stay. Now that the matter is presented to the entire Court for decision, I am no longer so constrained.

I adhere to my view, notwithstanding the intervening decision by the Supreme Court of New Jersey, that petitioners have raised substantial claims under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Under the circumstances, I believe that both the criminal and civil contempt penalties should be stayed until this Court disposes of the petition for certiorari.