Holloway v. Florida, 449 U.S. 905 (1980). · Go Syfert
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Holloway v. Florida, 449 U.S. 905 (1980). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
225 citation events (7 in the last 25 years) across 58 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Spaziano v. Florida (scotus, 1982-01-11)
Treatment trajectory · 1980 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1980 2003 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 25 distinct citers. How cited ↗
examined Cited as authority (rule) Spaziano v. Florida (8×) also: Cited "see"
SCOTUS · 1982 · confidence medium
Whether the trial court properly may enter a judgment of guilt should the jury convict for a lesser included offense seems to me a separate, legal matter with which the factfinder need have no concern.” Id., at 908 (footnote omitted).
cited Cited "see" Sells v. Corely
N.D. Tex. · 2020 · signal: see · confidence high
See In re Beef Industry Antitrust Litigation, 600 F.2d 1148 (Sth Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 905 , 905 (1980); 6 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R.
discussed Cited "see" Nadworny v. Fair (2×)
D. Mass. · 1990 · signal: see · confidence high
See Holloway v. Florida, 362 So.2d 333 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1978), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 905 , 101 S.Ct. 281 , 66 L.Ed.2d 137 (1980); see also Hopper v. Evans, 456 U.S. 605 , 102 S.Ct. 2049 , 72 L.Ed.2d 367 (1982).
cited Cited "see" Ward v. Succession of Freeman
E.D. La. · 1990 · signal: see · confidence high
See, In re Beef Industry Antitrust Litigation, 600 F.2d 1148, 1170 (5th Cir.1979) cert. denied, 449 U.S. 905 , 101 S.Ct. 280 , 66 L.Ed.2d 137 (1980).
discussed Cited "see" State v. Trejo (2×)
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1990 · signal: see · confidence high
See Holloway v. State, 362 So.2d 333 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978), cert. denied, 379 So.2d 953 (Fla.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 905 , 101 S.Ct. 281 , 66 L.Ed.2d 137 (1980).
discussed Cited "see" The State of Texas v. Allan Construction Company, Inc. (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
5th Cir. · 1988 · signal: see · confidence high
See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321, 338 , 91 S.Ct. 795, 806 , 28 L.Ed.2d 77 (1971). 3 .In re Beef Industry Antitrust Litigation, 600 F.2d 1148, 1169 (5th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 905 , 101 S.Ct. 280 , 66 L.Ed.2d 137 (1980). 4 .
discussed Cited "see" State v. McDonald
Ohio · 1987 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Young (1980), 62 Ohio St. 2d 370 , 16 O.O. 3d 416, 406 N.E. 2d 499 , certiorari denied (1980), 449 U.S. 905 , in which we held that Ohio’s organized crime statute, R.C. 2923.04, was unconstitutionally vague.
cited Cited "see" In Re Chicken Antitrust Litigation. Foster Food Products, Claimant-Appellant v. Settlement Administration Committee
11th Cir. · 1987 · signal: see · confidence high
See In re Beef Industry Antitrust Litigation, 600 F.2d 1148 (5th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 905 , 101 S.Ct. 280 , 66 L.Ed.2d 137 (1980).
discussed Cited "see" Vivian L. Walker v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority and Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, U.S. Department of Labor (2×)
D.C. Cir. · 1986 · signal: see · confidence high
See Hastings v. Earth Satellite Corp., 628 F.2d 85, 95-96 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 905 , 101 S.Ct. 281 , 66 L.Ed.2d 137 (1980).
cited Cited "see" Markham v. State
Ind. · 1985 · signal: see · confidence high
See Loyd v. State (1980), 272 Ind. 404 , 398 N.E.2d 1260 , cert. denied, 499 U.S. 881 , 101 S.Ct. 281 , 66 L.Ed.2d 105 .
discussed Cited "see" Walsh v. Ford Motor Co.
D.D.C. · 1984 · signal: accord · confidence high
Further, it is plain that once a governmental investigation commenced “[those] proceedings should have aroused [plaintiffs’] suspicions, and [their] failure to investigate further ... was not the exercise of due diligence required in order to employ the fraudulent concealment doctrine to avoid that bar of the statute of limitations.” Dayco Corp. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 523 F.2d at 394 , quoted in, United Klans of America v. McGovern, 621 F.2d 152, 155 (5th Cir.1980); accord, In Re Beef Industry Antitrust Litigation, 600 F.2d 1148, 1170 (5th Cir.1979), cert denied, 449 U.S. 905 , 1…
discussed Cited "see" United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp.
S.D. Ohio · 1983 · signal: see · confidence high
Civ.P. 56; See, In Re Beef Industry Antitrust Litigation, 600 F.2d 1148, 1170 (5th Cir.1979), cert. denied sub nom., Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Meat Price Investigators Ass’n, 449 U.S. 905 , 101 S.Ct. 280 , 66 L.Ed.2d 137 (1980).
discussed Cited "see" Merican, Inc. And Merican Curtis, Inc. And Merican Curtis, Ltd. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co. Caterpillar Tractor Co. (2×)
3rd Cir. · 1983 · signal: accord · confidence high
Sweeny & Sons, Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., 637 F.2d 105 (3d Cir.1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 911 , 101 S.Ct. 1981 , 68 L.Ed.2d 300 (1981), we held that under Illinois Brick indirect purchasers could not assert claims for damages under sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. 637 F.2d at 122 ; accord In re Beef Industry Antitrust Litigation, 600 F.2d 1148, 1157 (5th Cir.1979) ("Absent exceptional circumstances, Illinois Brick and Hanover Shoe limit the use of passing-on theory in antitrust actions without regard to the parties' characterization of the offense."), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 905 , 101 S.Ct. 2…
discussed Cited "see" In Re Uranium Antitrust Litigation
N.D. Ill. · 1982 · signal: see · confidence high
See In re Beef Industry Antitrust Litigation, 600 F.2d 1148 , 1166 n. 24 (5th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 905 , 101 S.Ct. 280 , 66 L.Ed.2d 137 (1980); In re Bristol Bay, Alaska, Salmon Fisheries Antitrust Litigation, 530 F.Supp. 36 (W.D.Wash.1981); Strax v. Commodity Exchange, Inc., 524 F.Supp. 936, 939-40 (S.D.N.Y.1981); Pollock v. Citrus Associates of the New York Cotton Exchange, 512 F.Supp. 711, 718-19 (S.D.N.Y.1981); Chatham Brass Co. v. Honeywell, Inc., 512 F.Supp. 108, 116 (S.D.N.Y.1981); Illinois v. Ampress Brick Co., 67 F.R.D. 461, 468 (N.D.Ill.1975), rev’d, 536 F.2d 1163 (7th…
cited Cited "see" In Re Beef Industry Antitrust Litigation
N.D. Tex. · 1982 · signal: see · confidence high
See In re Beef Antitrust Litigation, 600 F.2d 1148 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 905 , 101 S.Ct. 280 , 66 L.Ed.2d 137 (1980).
discussed Cited "see" Lower Brule Sioux Tribe v. Southn Dakota
D.S.D. · 1982 · signal: see · confidence high
See, Red Lake Bank of Chippewa Indians v. Minnesota, 614 F.2d 1161 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 905 , 101 S.Ct. 279 , 66 L.Ed.2d 136 (1980); State v. Hero, supra. Thus, it may be that this language on the face of the acts constitutes sufficient indicia of congressional intent to extinguish treaty hunting and fishing rights of the Tribe within the taken area.
cited Cited "see" Robert Hastings v. Earth Satellite Corporation
D.C. Cir. · 1980 · signal: see · confidence high
See 101 S.Ct. 281 .
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Jesse Joseph Trujillo v. George E. Sullivan (2×)
10th Cir. · 1987 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Holloway v. Florida, 362 So.2d 333 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1978), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 905 , 101 S.Ct. 281 , 66 L.Ed.2d 137 (1980) (Blackmun, Brennan, and Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Donahue v. Pendleton Woolen Mills, Inc.
S.D.N.Y. · 1986 · signal: see also · confidence low
Berkson v. Del Monte Corp., 743 F.2d 53, 55 (1st Cir.1984), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 105 S.Ct. 1765 , 84 L.Ed.2d 826 (1985) (upholding finding on summary judgment of no fraudulent concealment); Dayco Corp. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 523 F.2d 389, 394 (6th Cir. 1975); see also In re Beef Industry Antitrust Litigation, 600 F.2d 1148, 1169 (5th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 905 , 101 S.Ct. 280 , 66 L.Ed.2d 137 (1980); Charlotte Telecasters Inc. v. Jefferson-Pilot Corp., 546 F.2d 570, 574 (4th Cir.1976).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Clemmie M. Henry, Widow of Wilson R. Henry v. George Hyman Construction Company and Maryland Casualty Company (2×)
D.C. Cir. · 1984 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Hastings v. Earth Satellite Corp., 628 F.2d 85 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 905 , 101 S.Ct. 281 , 66 L.Ed.2d 137 (1980) (allowing concurrent awards for an unscheduled disability and permanent total disability). 34 .
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Herbert D. Berkson v. Del Monte Corporation
1st Cir. · 1984 · signal: see also · confidence low
To invoke the doctrine of fraudulent concealment, a plaintiff must plead and prove three elements: “(1) wrongful concealment of their actions by the defendants; (2) failure of the plaintiff to discover the operative facts that are the basis of his cause of action within the limitations period; and (3) plaintiff’s due diligence until discovery of the facts.” Dayco Corp. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 523 F.2d 389, 394 (6th Cir.1975); see also In re Beef Industry Antitrust Litigation, 600 F.2d 1148, 1169 (5th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 905 , 101 S.Ct. 280 , 66 L.Ed.2d 137 (1980); Ch…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." State of Arizona v. Shamrock Foods Company, an Arizona Corporation and Beatrice Foods Company, an Illinois Corporation, Darryll J. Alton v. Shamrock Foods Company, an Arizona Corporation, and Beatrice Foods Company, an Illinois Corporation
9th Cir. · 1984 · signal: see also · confidence low
Second, the Court sought to avoid increasing the cost and burden of antitrust actions with complicated damage theories necessitating massive evidence to determine how the overcharge was apportioned throughout the distribution chain. 431 U.S. at 731-32, 745 , 97 S.Ct. at 2067, 2074 . 13 The Court in Illinois Brick expressly noted, however, that the newly announced rule barring damage suits by indirect purchasers was not absolute. 2 Whether allegations of a retail price-fixing conspiracy such as the one alleged by the consumers would avoid the bar of Illinois Brick was expressly reserved by this…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Arizona v. Shamrock Foods Co.
9th Cir. · 1984 · signal: see also · confidence low
The Court in Illinois Brick expressly noted, however, that the newly announced rule barring damage suits by indirect purchasers was not absolute. 2 Whether allegations of a retail price-fixing conspiracy such as the one alleged by the consumers would avoid the bar of Illinois Brick was expressly reserved by this circuit in In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Products Antitrust Litigation, 691 F.2d 1335 , 1341 n. 9 (9th Cir.1982); see also In re Beef Industry Antitrust Litigation, 600 F.2d 1148, 1161-63 (5th Cir.1979) (also reserving issue), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 905 , 101 S.Ct…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Harris v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co.
Md. Ct. Spec. App. · 1983 · signal: compare · confidence low
Compare American Stevedores, Inc. v. Salzano, 538 F.2d 933 (2d Cir. 1976), and Hastings v. Earth Satellite Corp., 628 F.2d 85 (4th Cir.), cert. den. 449 U.S. 905 (1980), approving the retrospective application of the 1972 amendments. 3 Accordingly, we think that the trial court erred to the extent that its order excused appellee from paying the difference between the benefits payable under the Maryland award and the amount payable for the same disability under the D.
examined Cited "see, e.g." Tucker v. State (4×)
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1982 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Holloway v. Florida, 449 U.S. 905 , 101 S.Ct. 281 , 66 L.Ed.2d 137 (1980), Justice Blackmun dissenting to denial of petition for writ of certiorari.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Eugene Holloway
v.
State of Florida
79-6512.
Supreme Court of the United States.
Oct 14, 1980.
449 U.S. 905
Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall.
Cited by 9 opinions  |  Published
Reporter's Syllabus — editorial summary, not part of the Court's opinion

On petition for writ of certiorari to the District Court of Appeal of Florida for the Third District.

The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied.

Justice BLACKMUN, with whom Justice BRENNAN and Justice MARSHALL join, dissenting.

Lead Opinion

Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 3d Dist. Certiorari denied.

Dissent

Justice Blackmun, with whom Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall join,

dissenting.

The Court in this case denies certiorari to review what I believe is an important due process question requiring interpretation of our decisions in Keeble v. United. States, 412 U. S. 205 (1973), and Beck v. Alabama, 447 U. S. 625 (1980).

[*906] The facts, taken from the state-court opinion and the undisputed allegations of the petition, may be summarized briefly. On November 7, 1972, a man was killed in Dade County, Fla. Five days later, petitioner voluntarily turned himself over to the Miami police in connection with the killing. After issuing Miranda warnings, the police took two separate statements from petitioner concerning the victim’s death. Petitioner was then released. On November 29, he communicated with one of the police detectives and furnished a third statement.

About three and one-half years later, on June 23, 1976, petitioner and a codefendant were indicted for the capital felony of first-degree murder based on the 1972 killing. Following presentation of all the evidence, the trial court decided over petitioner’s objection that it would not instruct the jury on the lesser included state offenses of second-degree murder, third-degree murder, and manslaughter, on the ground that the Florida statute of limitations had run on these lesser offenses.[1] The jury was instructed solely as to first-degree murder. Petitioner was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment.

On appeal, the Florida District Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction. 362 So. 2d 333 (1978). The appellate court concluded that a defendant has no state or federal constitutional right to have a court instruct on lesser offenses where “any conviction returned as to such offense would be a nullity.” Id., at 335. After accepting jurisdiction and hearing argument, the Supreme Court of Florida, with one dissent, denied certiorari. 379 So. 2d 953 (1980).

This Court’s decision in Keeble v. United States, supra, casts doubt on the validity of the state court’s analysis. In Keeble, the Court held that an Indian charged with a federal[*907] crime under the Major Crimes Act was entitled to an instruction on a lesser included offense even though the Act did not confer federal jurisdiction over the defendant for the lesser crime. The Court explained the value of such a safeguard:

“[I]f the prosecution has not established beyond a reasonable doubt every element of the offense charged, and if no lesser offense instruction is offered, the jury must, as a theoretical matter, return a verdict of acquittal. But a defendant is entitled to a lesser offense instruction — in this context or any other — precisely because he should not be exposed to the substantial risk that the jury’s practice will diverge from theory. Where one of the elements of the offense charged remains in doubt, but the defendant is plainly guilty of some offense, the jury is likely to resolve its doubts in favor of conviction.” (Emphasis in original). 412 U. S., at 212-213.

More recently, in Beck v. Alabama, supra, the Court held that the death sentence may not constitutionally be imposed after a jury verdict of guilt of a capital offense if the jury has not been permitted to consider an alternative verdict of guilt of a lesser included offense. In reaffirming the Court’s commitment to the lesser-offense doctrine, the Court observed that “the nearly universal acceptance of the rule in both state and federal courts establishes the value to the defendant of this procedural safeguard.” 447 U. S., at 637.

Thus the Court more than once has expressed the understanding that a lesser-included-offense option minimizes the risk of undermining the reasonable-doubt standard. Florida, whose laws here apply, apparently has reached the same understanding, and requires that any person indicted for a “degree crime” such as first-degree murder[2] is entitled to[*908] have the jury instructed on all degrees of the offense.[3] It is not disputed that, absent the running of the statute of limitations, petitioner would have been so entitled in this case.

On the record presented, it appears that the State’s own delay in bringing an indictment against petitioner may have caused the statute of limitations to run. Serious due process concerns are raised if the State through prosecutorial inaction can avoid its own mandate to instruct on lesser degrees of an offense. Assuming that petitioner’s uncontested version of the facts is accurate, I believe such conduct merits plenary review.

Even if we were to find, upon a fuller development of the record, that the State bears no onus for the delay in securing an indictment, I am inclined to the view that petitioner retains his right to a lesser-offense instruction. The Court’s decisions in both Keeble and Beck imply that affording jurors a less drastic alternative may be constitutionally necessary to enhance or preserve their essential factfinding function.[4] Whether the trial court properly may enter a judgment of guilt should the jury convict for a lesser included offense seems to me a separate, legal matter with which the fact-finder need have no concern.[5] Because I believe that a trial[*909] court’s asserted lack of jurisdiction may not be dispositive of the due process concerns here invoked, I would grant the petition for certiorari.

1

At the time of the killing, the statute of limitations for each of the lesser offenses was two years. Fla. Stat. § 932.465 (1972). There was no period of limitations for the crime of first-degree murder. Ibid.

2

See Fla. Stat. § 782.04 (1976 and Supp. 1980) (defining murder as a degree crime).

3

Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.490 reads as follows:

“Determination of Degree of Offense If the indictment or information charges an offense which is divided into degrees, without specifying the degree, the jurors may find the defendant guilty of any degree of the offense charged; if the indictment or information charges a particular degree the jurors may find the defendant guilty of the degree charged or of any lesser degree. The court shall in all such cases charge the jury as to the degrees of the offense.”
4

Both Keeble and Beck stop short of explicitly holding that a defendant is entitled to a lesser-included-offense instruction as a matter of due process. In the circumstances of those cases, however, such a holding was not necessary in order to prescribe the lesser-offense instruction.

5

The legal question may be determined by whether the defendant himself chooses to invoke a statute of limitations defense. At least two Cir[*909] cuits have held that a defendant can effectively waive this defense. United States v. Wild, 179 U. S. App. D. C. 232, 236-238, 551 F. 2d 418, 422-424, cert. denied, 431 U. S. 916 (1977); United States v. Doyle, 348 F. 2d 715, 718-719, and n. 3 (CA2), cert. denied, 382 U. S. 843 (1965) (waiver by guilty plea); United States v. Parrino, 212 F. 2d 919, 922 (CA2), cert. denied, 348 U. S. 840 (1954) (same). The court in Wild, in concluding that the statute of limitations constitutes an affirmative defense to be raised by the defendant rather than a jurisdictional bar to prosecution, relied heavily on this Court’s prior statement to that effect in United States v. Cook, 17 Wall. 168, 179 (1872). See also Biddinger v. Commissioner of Police, 245 U. S. 128, 135 (1917). There is no indication in the record before us as to how petitioner acted in this regard, or even whether he was presented with a choice.