Jones v. Illinois, 464 U.S. 920 (1983). · Go Syfert
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Jones v. Illinois, 464 U.S. 920 (1983). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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cited 2× by 2 distinct cases, last quoted 2004 · …the doctrine of estoppel is for the protection of innocent persons, and only innocent persons may invoke it. ⚠ not in text
69 citation events (11 in the last 25 years) across 29 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Anderson v. the International Union, United Plant Guard Workers of America Upgwa) (ca6, 2004-06-07)
Treatment trajectory · 1983 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1983 2004 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 18 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (quoted) Anderson v. the International Union, United Plant Guard Workers of America Upgwa)
6th Cir. · 2004 · signal: see · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
the doctrine of estoppel is for the protection of innocent persons, and only innocent persons may invoke it.
examined Cited as authority (quoted) Anderson v. International Union, United Plant Guard Workers (2×)
6th Cir. · 2004 · signal: see · quote attribution · 2 verbatim quotes · confidence high
the doctrine of estoppel is for the protection of innocent d. estoppel and ratification persons, and only innocent persons may invoke it.
examined Cited as authority (quoted) Guaranty Service Corporation, Cross-Appellees v. American Employers' Insurance Company, Cross-Appellant
5th Cir. · 1990 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence low
it is well-established that a motion for new trial based upon inflammatory remarks is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge, and his ruling thereon will not be disturbed absent an abuse of that discretion.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Johnson v. Illinois
SCOTUS · 1988 · confidence medium
See Gacy v. Illinois, 470 U. S. 1037, 1038 (1985); Jones v. Illinois, 464 U. S. 920, 920-921 (1983).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Johnson v. Illinois
SCOTUS · 1988 · confidence medium
See Gacy v. Illinois, 470 U. S. 1037, 1038 (1985); Jones v. Illinois, 464 U. S. 920, 920-921 (1983).
cited Cited "see" Rushing v. Yazoo County
5th Cir. · 2021 · signal: see · confidence high
See Meyers v. Moody, 693 F.2d 1196, 1206 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 920 (1983).
discussed Cited "see" Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Authority v. Constructora Lluch, Inc., and Cna Casualty of Puerto Rico, Inc.
1st Cir. · 1999 · signal: see · confidence high
See Meyers v. Moody, 693 F.2d 1196, 1220-21 (5th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 920 , 104 S.Ct. 287 , 78 L.Ed.2d 264 (1983); see also Johnson v. National Sea Prods., Ltd., 35 F.3d 626, 631 (1st Cir.1994).
cited Cited "see" PRASA v. Constructory Lluch
1st Cir. · 1999 · signal: see · confidence high
See Meyers v. Moody, 693 F.2d 1196, 1220-21 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 920 (1983); see also Johnson v. National Sea Prods., Ltd., 35 F.3d 626, 631 (1st Cir. 1994).
discussed Cited "see" Rubinstein v. Collins
5th Cir. · 1994 · signal: see · confidence high
See Meyers v. Moody, 693 F.2d 1196, 1214 (5th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 920 , 104 S.Ct. 287 , 78 L.Ed.2d 264 (1983) (observing that common law fraud claim in Texas contains all of the elements of a Rule 10b-5 claim plus additional ones); see also Trenholm, 646 S.W.2d at 930 -(laying out elements of Texas common law fraud claim); Jackson v. Speer, 974 F.2d 676, 679 (5th Cir.1992) (same). 55 .
cited Cited "see" Clark v. Milam
S.D.W. Va · 1994 · signal: see · confidence high
See Meyers v. Moody, 693 F.2d 1196 (5th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 920 , 104 S.Ct. 287 , 78 L.Ed.2d 264 (1983); Durish v. Uselton, 763 F.Supp. 192 (N.D.Tex.1990).
cited Cited "see" Polycast Technology Corp. v. Uniroyal, Inc.
S.D.N.Y. · 1992 · signal: see · confidence high
See Meyers v. Moody, 693 F.2d 1196, 1220 (5th Cir.1982), reh’g denied, 701 F.2d 173 , cert. denied, 464 U.S. 920 , 104 S.Ct. 287 , 78 L.Ed.2d 264 (1983).
cited Cited "see" James v. Nico Energy Corp.
5th Cir. · 1988 · signal: see · confidence high
See Meyers v. Moody, 693 F.2d 1196, 1214 (5th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 920 , 104 S.Ct. 287 , 78 L.Ed.2d 264 (1983).
cited Cited "see" James v. Nico Energy Corp.
5th Cir. · 1988 · signal: see · confidence high
See Meyers v. Moody, 693 F.2d 1196, 1214 (5th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 920 , 104 S.Ct. 287 , 78 L.Ed.2d 264 (1983).
cited Cited "see" Gacy v. Illinois
SCOTUS · 1985 · signal: see · confidence high
See Jones v. Illinois, 464 U. S. 920 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Golden State TD Investments, LLC v. Andrews Kurth LLP (In re California TD Investments, LLC)
Bankr. C.D. Cal. · 2013 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Meyers v. Moody, 693 F.2d 1196, 1208 (5th Cir.1982) (“A party may not invoke an es-toppel for the purpose of shielding himself from the results of his own fraud, dereliction of duty, or other inequitable conduct.”), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 920 , 104 S.Ct. 287 , 78 L.Ed.2d 264 (1983).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, As Receiver v. O'melveny & Meyers
9th Cir. · 1992 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Meyers v. Moody, 693 F.2d 1196, 1208 (5th Cir.1982) ("A party may not invoke an estoppel for the purpose of shielding himself from the results of his own fraud, dereliction of duty, or other inequitable conduct."), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 920 , 104 S.Ct. 287 , 78 L.Ed.2d 264 (1983). 8 We conclude that ADSB has a corporate identity distinct from that of its wrongdoing officers.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Federal Deposit Insurance ex rel. American Diversified Savings Bank v. O'Melveny & Meyers
9th Cir. · 1992 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Meyers v. Moody, 693 F.2d 1196, 1208 (5th Cir.1982) (“A party may not invoke an estoppel for the purpose of shielding himself from the results of his own fraud, dereliction of duty, or other inequitable conduct.”), cert . denied, 464 U.S. 920 , 104 S.Ct. 287 , 78 L.Ed.2d 264 (1983). 8 We conclude that ADSB has a corporate identity distinct from that of its wrongdoing officers.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Dewey E. Coleman v. Henry Risley, Warden, Montana State Prison, and Michael T. Greely, Attorney General for the State of Montana (2×)
9th Cir. · 1988 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Jones v. Illinois, 464 U.S. 920 , 104 S.Ct. 287 , 78 L.Ed.2d 264 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of cert.) 40 The Fifth and the Eleventh Circuits have decided cases involving claims by defendants that a death penalty statute unconstitutionally placed on them the burden of persuasion on whether the mitigating circumstances outweighed the aggravating ones.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Andre Jones
v.
Illinois
82-6913.
Supreme Court of the United States.
Oct 17, 1983.
464 U.S. 920
Brennan, Marshall.
Cited by 15 opinions  |  Published
3 passages pin-cited by 3 cases
Pinpoint authority: bottom 92%
Citer courts: Sixth Circuit (3) · Fifth Circuit (1)
Reporter's Syllabus — editorial summary, not part of the Court's opinion

On petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Illinois.

The petition for writ of certiorari is denied.

Justice BRENNAN, dissenting.

Adhering to my view that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 227, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 2950, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976), I would vacate the death sentence in this case.

Justice MARSHALL, dissenting from denial of certiorari.

Lead Opinion

Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied.

Dissent

Justice Brennan,

dissenting.

Adhering to my view that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 227 (1976), I would vacate the death sentence in this case.

Dissent

Justice Marshall,

dissenting.

Adhering to my view that the death penalty is under all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, I would vacate the judgment of the Supreme Court of Illinois insofar as it left undisturbed the death sentence imposed in this case. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 231 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting). However, even if I believed that the death penalty could be imposed constitutionally under certain circumstances, I would grant certiorari and vacate the death sentence imposed here.

Given the wording of the Illinois death penalty statute and the trial court’s instructions in this case, I am not convinced that petitioner’s sentencing jury balanced mitigating factors and aggravating circumstances in the manner required by this Court in Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U. S. 586 (1978), and Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U. S. 104 (1982). Under the Illinois statute, once a sentencing jury finds a statutorily defined aggravating factor to exist, the jury proceeds to consider aggravating and mitigating factors. “If the jury determines unanimously that there are no mitigating factors sufficient to preclude the imposition of the death sentence, the court shall sentence the defendant to death.” Ill. Rev. Stat.,[*921] ch. 88, ¶ 9 — 1(g) (Supp. 1982). At the sentencing trial in this case, the trial judge instructed the jury on how to evaluate mitigating evidence: “ ‘[Y]ou go out and determine whether or not this evidence has taken away the [aggravating] factors, mitigated the factors so that you might say no, we don’t want to vote for the death penalty.’” See People v. Jones, 94 Ill. 2d 275, 302, 447 N. E. 2d 161, 174 (1982) (Simon, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Notwithstanding other portions of the trial court’s instructions, this instruction coupled with the Illinois statute’s ambiguous reference to “preclud[ing] the imposition of the death sentence” may well have led the sentencing jury to conduct its deliberation under the assumption that petitioner had the burden of proving that the death penalty was inappropriate in his particular case. Since I do not understand this Court’s precedents to permit the placing of such a burden on a defendant, I would grant the petition.