green
Positive treatment
13.0 score
Treatment trajectory · 1985 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1985
2005
2026
Top citers, strongest first. 35 distinct citers.
How cited ↗
examined
Cited "see"
People v. Surles
(3×)
Defendant's responses to a police officer when the officer resumed the interrogation—which occurred about an hour and a half after the prior questioning ceased—did not negate defendant's prior unequivocal invocation of his right to [*2]remain silent because the police officer failed to reread the Miranda warnings to defendant before resuming the interrogation and therefore failed to scrupulously honor his right to remain silent ( see People v Marrero , 199 AD3d 1471, 1474 [4th Dept 2021], lv denied 38 NY3d 929 [2022]; Brown , 266 AD2d at 838; see generally People v Ferro , 63 NY2d 316, 322…
discussed
Cited "see"
People v. Lipton
"A suspect's right to remain silent, once unequivocally and unqualifiedly invoked, must be 'scrupulously honored' " ( People v Brown , 266 AD2d 838, 838 [4th Dept 1999], lv denied 94 NY2d 860 [1999], quoting Miranda v Arizona , 384 US 436, 479 [1966]; see People v Ferro , 63 NY2d 316, 322 [1984], cert denied 472 US 1007 [1985]; People v Zacher , 97 AD3d 1101 , 1101 [4th Dept 2012], lv denied 20 NY3d 1015 [2013]).
discussed
Cited "see"
People v. Slivienski
"If a person who is subject to police interrogation 'indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he [or she] wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease'" ( People v Colon , 185 AD3d 1510, 1511 [2020], lv denied 35 NY3d 1093 [2020], quoting Miranda v Arizona , 384 US 436, 473-474 [1966]; see People v Ferro , 63 NY2d 316, 322 [1984], cert denied 472 US 1007 [1985]). "[A] defendant's invocation of the right to remain silent must be scrupulously honored once the right is asserted in an unequivocal and unqualified fashion" ( People v Johnson , 106 AD3d 1272,…
discussed
Cited "see"
People v. Marrero
Defendant's responses to the police officers when they resumed the interrogation did not negate his prior unequivocal invocation of his right to remain silent because the police officers failed to reread the Miranda warnings to defendant before resuming the interrogation and therefore failed to scrupulously honor his right to remain silent ( see People v Wisdom , 164 AD3d 928 , 929 [2d Dept 2018], lv denied 32 NY3d 1211 [2019]; Brown , 266 AD2d at 838 ; see generally People v Ferro , 63 NY2d 316, 322 [1984], cert denied 472 US 1007 [1985]).
discussed
Cited "see"
People v. Bowen
We are thus required to determine whether there were "any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should [have known were] reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response" ( Rhode Island v Innis , 446 US 291, 301 [1980]; see People v Ferro , 63 NY2d 316, 322 [1984], cert denied 472 US 1007 [1985]; People v Allnutt , 148 AD2d 993, 994 [4th Dept 1989], lv denied 74 NY2d 736 [1989]).
discussed
Cited "see"
People v. Colon
If a person who is subject to police interrogation "indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he [or she] wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease" ( Miranda v Arizona , 384 US 436, 473-474 [1966]; see People v Ferro , 63 NY2d 316, 322 [1984], cert denied 472 US 1007 [1985]).
discussed
Cited "see"
People v. Czternastek
If a suspect in custody "indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease" ( Miranda v Arizona , 384 US 436, 473-474 [1966]; see People v Ferro , 63 NY2d 316, 322 [1984], cert denied 472 US 1007 [1985]).
discussed
Cited "see"
People v. Clanton
(2×)
For purposes of Miranda , "interrogation" refers to "express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect" ( Rhode Island v Innis , 446 US 291, 301 [footnotes omitted]; see People v Ferro , 63 NY2d 316, 322 , cert denied 472 US 1007 ; see also People v Lightner , 56 AD3d 1274 , 1275, lv dismissed 12 NY3d 760 ).
discussed
Cited "see"
People v. Henry
I can’t do that for myself.” Inasmuch as “a defendant’s invocation of the right to remain silent must be scrupulously honored once the right is asserted in an unequivocal and unqualified fashion,” and defendant made what can only be viewed as such an assertion, the interrogation should have stopped at that point (People v Johnson, 106 AD3d at 1275 [internal quotation marks, brackets and citations omitted]; see People v Ferro, 63 NY2d 316, 322 [1984], cert denied 472 US 1007 [1985]).
discussed
Cited "see"
People v. Henry
I can’t do that for myself.” Inasmuch as “a defendant’s invocation of the right to remain silent must be scrupulously honored once the right is asserted in an unequivocal and unqualified fashion,” and defendant made what can only be viewed as such an assertion, the interrogation should have stopped at that point (People v Johnson, 106 AD3d at 1275 [internal quotation marks, brackets and citations omitted]; see People v Ferro, 63 NY2d 316, 322 [1984], cert denied 472 US 1007 [1985]).
discussed
Cited "see"
People v. Walker
It is undisputed that defendant was in custody when he was handcuffed by the first officer and then escorted by the second officer to be placed in the police car (see People v Evans, 294 AD2d 918, 919 [2002], lv dismissed 98 NY2d 768 [2002]; People v Sanchez, 280 AD2d 891, 891 [2001], lv denied 96 NY2d 806 [2001]; see generally People v Yukl, 25 NY2d 585, 589 [1969], cert denied 400 US 851 [1980]), and that defendant was subjected to pr e-Miranda interrogation because his initial admission was made in response to a question by the second officer regarding ownership of the gun that was “ ‘r…
discussed
Cited "see"
People v. Walker
It is undisputed that defendant was in custody when he was handcuffed by the first officer and then escorted by the second officer to be placed in the police car (see People v Evans, 294 AD2d 918, 919 [2002], lv dismissed 98 NY2d 768 [2002]; People v Sanchez, 280 AD2d 891, 891 [2001], lv denied 96 NY2d 806 [2001]; see generally People v Yukl, 25 NY2d 585, 589 [1969], cert denied 400 US 851 [1980]), and that defendant was subjected to pr e-Miranda interrogation because his initial admission was made in response to a question by the second officer regarding ownership of the gun that was “ ‘r…
discussed
Cited "see"
WALKER, KENNEDY D., PEOPLE v
It is undisputed that defendant was in custody when he was handcuffed by the first officer and then escorted by the second officer to be placed in the police car (see People v Evans, 294 AD2d 918, 919 , lv dismissed 98 NY2d 768 ; People v Sanchez, 280 AD2d 891, 891 , lv denied 96 NY2d 806 ; see generally People v Yukl, 25 NY2d 585, 589 , cert denied 400 US 851 ), and that defendant was subjected to pre-Miranda interrogation because his initial admission was made in response to a question by the second officer regarding ownership of the gun that was “ ‘reasonably likely to elicit an incrimi…
discussed
Cited "see"
People v. George
The operative question is whether, in context, “the officer should have known that his statement was ‘reasonably likely to evoke an incriminating response from the suspect’ ” (People v Huffman, 61 NY2d 795, 797 [1984], quoting Rhode Island v Innis, 446 US at 301 ; see People v Ferro, 63 NY2d 316, 322-323 [1984], cert denied 472 US 1007 [1985]).
discussed
Cited "see"
People v. Roberts
The evidence at the hearings establishes that the statements were not caused by “words or actions on the part of police officers that they should have known were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response” (Rhode Island v Innis, 446 US 291, 302 [1980]; see People v Ferro, 63 NY2d 316, 322-323 [1984], cert denied 472 US 1007 [1985]).
discussed
Cited "see"
ROBERTS, ROOSEVELT, PEOPLE v
The evidence at the hearings establishes that the statements were not caused by “words or actions on the part of police officers that they should have known were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response” (Rhode Island v Innis, 446 US 291, 302 ; see People v Ferro, 63 NY2d 316, 322-323 , cert denied 472 US 1007 ).
discussed
Cited "see"
People v. Roberts
The evidence at the hearings establishes that the statements were not caused by “words or actions on the part of police officers that they should have known were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response” (Rhode Island v Innis, 446 US 291, 302 [1980]; see People v Ferro, 63 NY2d 316, 322-323 [1984], cert denied 472 US 1007 [1985]).
discussed
Cited "see"
People v. Jackson
“If [an] individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he [or she] wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease” (Miranda v Arizona, 384 US at 473-474 ; see People v Ferro, 63 NY2d 316, 322 [1984], cert denied 472 US 1007 [1985]).
discussed
Cited "see"
People v. Jackson
“If [an] individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he [or she] wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease” (Miranda v Arizona, 384 US at 473-474 ; see People v Ferro, 63 NY2d 316, 322 [1984], cert denied 472 US 1007 [1985]).
discussed
Cited "see"
People v. Tavares-Nunez
Further, the Supreme Court erred in concluding that the inculpatory statement was admissible because it was spontaneous, and not the result of interrogation or its functional equivalent. “[T]he special procedural safeguards outlined in Miranda are required not where a suspect is simply taken into custody, but rather where a suspect in custody is subjected to interrogation” (Rhode Island v Innis, 446 US 291, 300 [1980]). “[T]he term ‘interrogation’ under Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normall…
discussed
Cited "see"
People v. Rodriguez
“If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease” (id. at 473-474; see People v Ferro, 63 NY2d 316, 322 [1984], cert denied 472 US 1007 [1985]).
discussed
Cited "see"
People v. Latimer
Here, contrary to the defendant’s contention in his supplemental pro se brief, the County Court properly denied that branch of the defendant’s motion which was to suppress his initial statement to Detective Fernandez, as that statement was spontaneous and not the product of inducement by the police (see People v Roper, 208 AD2d 571 [1994]; People v Hylton, 198 AD2d 301 [1993]; see generally People v Ferro, 63 NY2d 316, 322 [1984], cert denied 472 US 1007 [1985], citing Rhode Island v Innis, 446 US 291, 301 [1980]).
discussed
Cited "see"
People v. Fuller
Contrary to defendant’s contention, the spontaneous statement did not result from “ ‘words or actions on the part of police officers that they should have known were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response’ ” (Rhode Island v Innis, 446 US 291, 302 [1980]; see People v Ferro, 63 NY2d 316, 322-323 [1984], cert denied 472 US 1007 [1985]).
discussed
Cited "see"
People v. Smith
Moreover, those statements were not the product of "interrogation,” i.e., either express questioning or "words or actions on the part of the police * * * that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response” (Rhode Island v Innis, 446 US 291, 301 ; see, People v Ferro, 63 NY2d 316, 322, cert denied 472 US 1007 ). ”[N]ot every comment made by a police officer in response to an inquiry by the defendant can be said to constitute interrogation, merely because it is followed by an incriminating statement from the defendant” (People v Rivers, 56 NY2d 476, 479…
cited
Cited "see"
Restrepo v. United States
See United States v. Mourad, 729 F.2d 195, 202 (2d Cir.1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1007 , 105 S.Ct. 2700 , 86 L.Ed.2d 717 (1985).
discussed
Cited "see"
People v. Allnutt
A statement is not spontaneous, of course, if it results from direct questioning, or its functional equivalent, which is defined as "words or actions on the part of police officers that they should have known were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response” (Rhode Is. v Innis, 446 US 291, 302 ; see, People v Ferro, 63 NY2d 316, 322-323 , cert denied 472 US 1007 ).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
People v. Aviando (Elijah)
The record also demonstrates that the statement that the handcuffed defendant made to the officer, after the officer heard complainant's accusation against defendant, was the result of the functional equivalent of interrogation and should have been suppressed ( see People v Torres , 172 AD3d 758 , 761 [2019]; People v Perry , 97 AD3d at 448 ; see also People v Ferro , 63 NY2d 316, 322 [1984] , cert denied 472 US 1007 [1985]).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
People v. Dunbar
Whether or not the preamble was the functional equivalent of interrogation — i.e., designed to evoke an incriminating response (see id.; see also People v Ferro, 63 NY2d 316, 322-323 [1984], cert denied 472 US 1007 [1985]) — is not essential to our analysis.
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
People v. Dunbar
Whether or not the preamble was the functional equivalent of interrogation — i.e., designed to evoke an incriminating response (see id.; see also People v Ferro, 63 NY2d 316, 322-323 [1984], cert denied 472 US 1007 [1985]) — is not essential to our analysis.
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
People v. Lawrence
The police conduct consisted of normal conversation at the scene of an arrest and it was neither intended nor reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating statement (see People v Arriaga, 309 AD2d 544 [2003], lv denied 1 NY3d 624 [2004]; People v Smith, 298 AD2d 182 [2002], lv denied 99 NY2d 585 [2003]; compare People v Ferro, 63 NY2d 316, 322 [1984], cert denied 472 US 1007 [1985]).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
People v. Sprague
Thus, we perceive no basis upon which to disturb County Court’s conclusions that it was indeed spontaneous and admissible (see, People v Damiano, 87 NY2d 477, 486-487; People v Romano, 176 AD2d 595 , lv denied 79 NY2d 863 ; see also, People v Ferro, 63 NY2d 316, 319 , cert denied 472 US 1007 ; People v Rivers, 56 NY2d 476, 479 ; People v Lanahan, 55 NY2d 711 ; People v Stoesser, 53 NY2d 648 ; People v Grimaldi, 52 NY2d 611 ; People v Felton, 238 AD2d 288 , lv denied 90 NY2d 904 ; People v Richardson, 235 AD2d 502 , lv denied 89 NY2d 1014 ).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
People v. McMickel
Under the circumstances, the officers “had no reason to expect that their conduct was reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response” (People v Barbarisi, 243 AD2d 259 , lv denied 91 NY2d 868 ; compare, People v Ferro, 63 NY2d 316, 319 , cert denied 472 US 1007 ).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
People v. Butts
(People v Lanahan, 55 NY2d 711, 713 ; see also, Rhode Is. v Innis, 446 US 291, 301 .) In Innis (supra), the Court defined this functional equivalency as “words or actions on the part of police * * * that [they] should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response”. ( 446 US, at 301 .) In People v Ferro ( 63 NY2d 316, 319 , cert denied 472 US 1007 ), the Court of Appeals set forth this definition: “What constitutes ‘interrogation’ of a suspect * * * is determined not by the subjective intent of the police, but by whether an objective observer with the same knowledge c…
cited
Cited "see, e.g."
People v. Suressi
A suspect’s exercise of the right to remain silent must be " 'scrupulously honored’ ” (Michigan v Mosley, 423 US 96, 104 ; see also, People v Ferro, 63 NY2d 316, 322 , cert denied 472 US 1007 ).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
People v. Ondrizek
The record establishes that the defendant’s initial outburst to the detective upon his arrest that he was “glad it was all over” was a spontaneous statement and was not elicited by interrogation or by “police conduct which should reasonably have been anticipated to evoke a declaration from the defendant” (People v Lynes, 49 NY2d 286, 295 ; see also, People v Ferro, 63 NY2d 316 , cert denied 472 US 1007 ; People v Suarez, 140 AD2d 558 ).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Mourad
v.
United States
v.
United States
No. 83-2067.
Supreme Court of the United States.
Jun 10, 1985.
Published
C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.