Sampson v. Gilmere, 476 U.S. 1124 (1986). · Go Syfert
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Sampson v. Gilmere, 476 U.S. 1124 (1986). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
220 citation events (10 in the last 25 years) across 36 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Walton v. Watts (In re Swift) (ganb, 1995-08-09) · Strongest negative: Forbes v. Rhode Island Brotherhood of Correctional Officers (rid, 1996-04-23)
Treatment trajectory · 1986 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1986 2006 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 22 distinct citers.
discussed Cited "but see" Forbes v. Rhode Island Brotherhood of Correctional Officers (2×)
D.R.I. · 1996 · signal: but see · confidence high
But see Thomas S. v. Morrow, 781 F.2d 367, 377-78 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1124 , 106 S.Ct. 1992 , 90 L.Ed.2d 673 (1986) (guardian does act under color of state law).
discussed Cited "see" Walton v. Watts (In re Swift) (2×)
Bankr. N.D. Ga. · 1995 · signal: see · confidence high
See Bennett v. Parker, 898 F.2d 1530 , 1535 n. 2 (11th Cir.1990) (Tjoflat, J., concurring) (citing Quiller v. Barclays American/Credit, Inc., 727 F.2d 1067, 1069 (11th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1124 , 106 S.Ct. 1992 , 1993, 90 L.Ed.2d 673 (1986)); see also Reeves v. City of Jackson, 532 F.2d 491, 494-95 (5th Cir.1976). .On the defining limits of this absolute immunity doctrine, the Supreme Court has provided the following example: if a probate judge, with jurisdiction over only wills and estates, should try a criminal case, he would be acting in the clear absence of jurisdiction and wo…
discussed Cited "see" Matter of Swift (2×)
Bankr. N.D. Ga. · 1995 · signal: see · confidence high
See Bennett v. Parker, 898 F.2d 1530 , 1535 n. 2 (11th Cir.1990) (Tjoflat, J., concurring) ( citing Quiller v. Barclays American/Credit, Inc., 727 F.2d 1067, 1069 (11th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1124 , 106 S.Ct. 1992 , 1993, 90 L.Ed.2d 673 (1986)); see also Reeves v. City of Jackson, 532 F.2d 491, 494-95 (5th Cir.1976). [6] On the defining limits of this absolute immunity doctrine, the Supreme Court has provided the following example: if a probate judge, with jurisdiction over only wills and estates, should try a criminal case, he would be acting in the clear absence of jurisdiction an…
examined Cited "see" Dismukes v. Hackathorn (3×)
N.D. Miss. · 1992 · signal: see · confidence high
See Gilmere v. Atlanta, 737 F.2d 894 (11th Cir.1984), on rehearing, 774 F.2d 1495 (11th Cir.1985) (en banc), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1124 , 106 S.Ct. 1993 , 90 L.Ed.2d 673 (1986).
examined Cited "see" Tom v. Voida (3×)
7th Cir. · 1992 · signal: see · confidence high
Appellant’s Br. at 36-38; see Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, Georgia, 774 F.2d 1495, 1501-1502 (11th Cir.1985) (when officer improperly beat the suspect-decedent and this improper use of official power created need for use of deadly force, officer could be held liable for shooting even if officer had “a moment of legitimate fear”), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1115 , 106 S.Ct. 1970 , 90 L.Ed.2d 654 , 476 U.S. 1124 , 106 S.Ct. 1993 , 90 L.Ed.2d 673 (1986).
examined Cited "see" Tom v. Voida (3×)
7th Cir. · 1992 · signal: see · confidence high
Appellant's Br. at 36-38; see Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, Georgia, 774 F.2d 1495, 1501-1502 (11th Cir.1985) (when officer improperly beat the suspect-decedent and this improper use of official power created need for use of deadly force, officer could be held liable for shooting even if officer had "a moment of legitimate fear"), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1115 , 106 S.Ct. 1970 , 90 L.Ed.2d 654 , 476 U.S. 1124 , 106 S.Ct. 1993 , 90 L.Ed.2d 673 (1986).
discussed Cited "see" ca11 1991 (2×)
11th Cir. · 1991 · signal: see · confidence high
See Quiller v. Barclays American/Credit, Inc., 727 F.2d 1067, 1069 (11th Cir.1984) (stating that the decision to dismiss on Rule 12(b)(6) must be made on the basis of the allegations made on the face of the complaint), aff'd, 764 F.2d 1400 (11th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1124 , 106 S.Ct. 1992 , 90 L.Ed.2d 673 (1986).
discussed Cited "see" Taffet v. Southern Co. (2×)
11th Cir. · 1991 · signal: see · confidence high
See Quiller v. Barclays American/Credit, Inc., 727 F.2d 1067, 1069 (11th Cir.1984) (stating that the decision to dismiss on Rule 12(b)(6) must be made on the basis of the allegations made on the face of the complaint), aff'd, 764 F.2d 1400 (11th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1124 , 106 S.Ct. 1992 , 90 L.Ed.2d 673 (1986).
discussed Cited "see" William C. Bennett, AKA John A. Richardson v. Garrison A. Parker, Warden, Robert M. Jackson, Officer, Daniel W. Cooper, Officer (2×)
11th Cir. · 1990 · signal: see · confidence high
See Quiller v. Barclays American/Credit, Inc., 727 F.2d 1067, 1069 (11th Cir.1984) ("[A] complaint may be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) when its own allegations reveal the existence of an affirmative defense, so long as the defense clearly appears on the face of the complaint”), cer t. denied, 476 U.S. 1124 , 106 S.Ct. 1992 , 1993, 90 L.Ed.2d 673 (1986); Green v. Maraio, 722 F.2d 1013, 1019 (2d Cir.1983) (affirmative defense of qualified immunity may be asserted in Rule 12(b)(6) motion when “complaint itself establishes ... qualified immunity”); see also 5 C.
discussed Cited "see" Burris v. First Financial Corp. (2×)
E.D. Ark. · 1990 · signal: see · confidence high
See Quiller v. Barclays American/Credit, Inc., 727 F.2d 1067 (11th Cir.1984), rehearing en banc granted, 727 F.2d 1072 (1984), restated en banc, 764 F.2d 1400 (1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1124 , 106 S.Ct. 1992 , 1993, 90 L.Ed.2d 673 (1986); Grant v. General Electric Credit Corp., 764 F.2d 1404 (11th Cir.1985) en banc, cert. denied 476 U.S. 1124 , 106 S.Ct. 1993 , 90 L.Ed.2d 673 (1986); Moyer v. Citicorp Homeowners, Inc., 799 F.2d 1445 (11th Cir.1986).
examined Cited "see" Chester County Intermediate Unit v. Pennsylvania Blue Shield (3×)
3rd Cir. · 1990 · signal: see · confidence high
See Quiller v. Barclays American/Credit, Inc., 727 F.2d 1067 (11th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1124 , 106 S.Ct. 1993 , 90 L.Ed.2d 673 (1986); Amfac Mortgage Corp. v. Arizona Mall, 583 F.2d 426 (9th Cir.1978); Fed.R.Civ.P. 10(c) ("a copy of any written instrument which is an exhibit to a pleading is a part thereof for all purposes."); cf. Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331 , 339-40 n. 3 (3d Cir.1989) (distinguishing between documentary exhibits, such as contracts, which are written instruments for purposes of Rule 10(c), and affidavits, which are not). 6 20 Moreover, plaintiffs have not suggest…
examined Cited "see" Chester County Intermediate Unit v. Pennsylvania Blue Shield (3×)
3rd Cir. · 1990 · signal: see · confidence high
See Quiller v. Barclays American/Credit, Inc., 727 F.2d 1067 (11th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1124 , 106 S.Ct. 1993 , 90 L.Ed.2d 673 (1986); Amfac Mortgage Corp. v. Arizona Mall, 583 F.2d 426 (9th Cir.1978); Fed.R.Civ.P. 10(c) (“a copy of any written instrument which is an exhibit to a pleading is a part thereof for all purposes.”); cf. Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331 , 339-40 n. 3 (3d Cir.1989) (distinguishing between documentary exhibits, such as contracts, which are written instruments for purposes of Rule 10(c), and affidavits, which are not). 6 Moreover, plaintiffs have not sugges…
examined Cited "see" Gutierrez v. City of Hialeah (3×)
S.D. Fla. · 1989 · signal: see · confidence high
See Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, Ga., 774 F.2d 1495 (11th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1115 , 106 S.Ct. 1970 , 90 L.Ed.2d 654 , 476 U.S. 1124 , 106 S.Ct. 1993 , 90 L.Ed.2d 673 (1986) (holding that supervisors were not liable for the shooting death of suspect where Plaintiff failed to establish that supervisors actually exercised control over the officer in connection with the shooting); Young v. City of Killeen, Tex., 775 F.2d 1349 (5th Cir.), reh’g denied, 778 F.2d 790 (1985) (holding that a police chief was not liable for an officer’s fatal shooting of a drug suspect due to the lack …
discussed Cited "see" Diane Dimella v. Gray Lines of Boston, Inc., and Herb Edmunds, United States of America (2×)
1st Cir. · 1988 · signal: see · confidence high
See Quiller v. Barclays American/Credit, Inc., 727 F.2d 1067, 1069 (11th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1124 , 106 S.Ct. 1992 , 90 L.Ed.2d 673 (1986).
discussed Cited "see" Betty J. Archie, as Special Administrator of the Estate of Rena M. Delacy, Deceased v. City of Racine, Ronald W. Chiapete, and George W. Giese (2×)
7th Cir. · 1987 · signal: accord · confidence high
See Wolf-Lillie v. Sonquist, 699 F.2d 864, 871-72 (7th Cir.1983); accord Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, 774 F.2d 1495, 1499-1502 (11th Cir.1985) (en banc), certiorari denied, — U.S. -, 106 S.Ct. 1970 , 90 L.Ed.2d 654 and — U.S. -, 106 S.Ct. 1993 , 90 L.Ed.2d 673 ; cf. Daniels, 106 S.Ct. at 665 (essence of substantive due process claim is that state action should not have been taken no matter the procedures employed). 7 .
discussed Cited "see" McRorie v. Shimoda (2×)
9th Cir. · 1986 · signal: see · confidence high
See Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, 774 F.2d 1495, 1499 (11th Cir.1985) (en banc), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 106 S.Ct. 1970 , 90 L.Ed.2d 654 (1986), and — U.S. —, 106 S.Ct. 1993 , 90 L.Ed.2d 673 (1986).
discussed Cited "see" Mcrorie v. Shimoda (2×)
9th Cir. · 1986 · signal: see · confidence high
See Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, 774 F.2d 1495, 1499 (11th Cir.1985) (en banc), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 106 S.Ct. 1970 , 90 L.Ed.2d 654 (1986), and --- U.S. ----, 106 S.Ct. 1993 , 90 L.Ed.2d 673 (1986).
examined Cited "see, e.g." Wells v. City of Dayton (3×)
S.D. Ohio · 2006 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Sampson v. Gilmere, 476 U.S. 1124, 1125 , 106 S.Ct. 1993 , 90 L.Ed.2d 673 (1986) (Burger, C.J., dissenting from the denial of a certiorari petition) (stating that “an officer’s conduct which makes the need for deadly force more likely does not constitutionally disable the officer from later using deadly force to defend himself.”).
examined Cited "see, e.g." Dickerson ex rel. Stephens v. McClellan (3×)
6th Cir. · 1996 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Sampson v. Gilmere, 476 U.S. 1124, 1125 , 106 S.Ct. 1993, 1994 , 90 L.Ed.2d 673 (1986) (Burger, C.J., dissenting from the denial of a certiorari petition) (stating that “an officer’s conduct which makes- the need for deadly force more likely does not constitutionally disable the officer from later using deadly force to defend himself.”).
examined Cited "see, e.g." Dickerson v. Mcclellan (3×)
6th Cir. · 1996 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Sampson v. Gilmere, 476 U.S. 1124, 1125 , 106 S.Ct. 1993, 1994 , 90 L.Ed.2d 673 (1986) (Burger, C.J., dissenting from the denial of a certiorari petition) (stating that "an officer's conduct which makes the need for deadly force more likely does not constitutionally disable the officer from later using deadly force to defend himself."). 33 Other circuits have applied similar analyses in excessive force cases.
examined Cited "see, e.g." Bernard Beam v. Ipco Corporation, D/B/A Sterling Optical (3×)
7th Cir. · 1988 · signal: see also · confidence low
See, e.g., Coates v. Illinois State Bd. of Educ., 559 F.2d 445, 447 (7th Cir.1977) (court "will take all well-pleaded facts as true, but will not strain to find inferences favorable to plaintiffs”); see also Quiller v. Barclays American Credit, Inc., 727 F.2d 1067, 1069 (11th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1124 , 106 S.Ct. 1993 , 90 L.Ed.2d 673 (1986).
examined Cited "see, e.g." Whildon L. Moyer v. Citicorp Homeowners, Inc. (4×)
11th Cir. · 1986 · signal: see also · confidence low
We held, nonetheless, that a contract containing terms contrary to the DIDMCA does not entitle a creditor to the benefits of federal preemption. 727 F.2d at 1071 ; see also Grant v. General Electric Credit Corp., 764 F.2d 1404, 1406 (11th Cir.1985) (en banc) (creditors entitled to benefits of federal preemption where contract provisions "not clearly contrary" to DIDMCA), cert. denied, --- U.S. ---, 106 S.Ct. 1993 , 90 L.Ed.2d 673 (1986). 25 Although a contract need not include the thirty day foreclosure notice, the contract should not be ambiguous or misleading as to foreclosure notice.
Sampson
v.
Gilmere, Individually and as Administratrix of the Estate of Patillo
No. 85-1186.
Supreme Court of the United States.
May 19, 1986.
476 U.S. 1124
Burger, Connor, Whom.
Cited by 85 opinions  |  Published

Lead Opinion

C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Dissent

Chief Justice Burger, with whom Justice O’Connor joins,

dissenting.

On New Year’s Day, 1980, Atlanta police responded to a report that Thomas Patillo had threatened the driver of a van with a gun after Patillo had nearly caused an accident with the van. Petitioner Sampson and a fellow police officer, Craig, responded to the call, and arrived at Patillo’s residence. Patillo, who appeared to be inebriated, refused the officers’ order to accompany them to the police car for questioning, and attempted to flee. The police officers then escorted Patillo from his residence by force. Some witnesses reported that at this point the officers began beating Patillo in the head but no evidence of head wounds was discovered. Patillo broke free of the officers’ hold and reached for officer Craig’s revolver. During the struggle that followed, Patillo lunged towards Officer Sampson. Sampson, believing that Patillo had the gun in his hand, shot Patillo twice at close range. Patillo died from these gunshot wounds.

Respondent is Patillo’s sister, who filed this suit under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 on her own behalf and on behalf of Patillo’s estate.[*1125] After a bench trial, the District Court concluded that Patillo’s due process rights had been violated both by the alleged beating and by the shooting, and that Sampson’s belief that his life was in danger was not objectively reasonable, and awarded damages against petitioner. A panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed the award of damages, reasoning that under Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U. S. 527 (1981), the availability of a state-law tort action against the police officers precluded relief under § 1983 for a due process violation. The panel decision was vacated and the case was listed before the Eleventh Circuit for en banc hearing. The en banc court affirmed the award of damages against the police officers. Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, 774 F. 2d 1495 (1985). Reasoning that Parratt barred only purely procedural due process claims for which state remedies are available, the Court of Appeals discerned two substantive constitutional bases for the imposition of § 1983 liability in this case. First, the court determined that Patillo’s shooting deprived him of substantive due process by the excessive use of force. In reaching this conclusion, the Court of Appeals reasoned that any fear that Sampson had for his own life was legally insufficient to justify the use of deadly force because any fear on the officer’s part was the fear of retaliation against his own unjustified physical abuse. Second, as an alternative holding, the Court of Appeals determined that Patillo’s shooting was also an unconstitutional “seizure” in violation of this Court’s holding in Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U. S. 1 (1985), that use of deadly force to arrest a nonviolent suspect violates the Fourth Amendment.

The Court of Appeals’ holding that Patillo’s shooting violates the Fourth Amendment despite Officer Sampson’s fear for his life is plainly at odds with language in Gamer emphasizing that the use of deadly force in effecting an arrest is constitutional when the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat to the officer. Id., at 11-12. The Court of Appeals’ holding conflicts with a holding of the Fifth Circuit that an officer’s conduct which makes the need for deadly force more likely does not constitutionally disable the officer from later using deadly force to defend himself. Young v. City of Killeen, 775 F. 2d 1349 (1985).

Because the Court of Appeals’ decision in this case misreads this Court’s holding in Gamer, and because the decision conflicts with[*1126] the decision of the Fifth Circuit in Young, I would grant certiorari.