Nicks v. Alabama, 487 U.S. 1241 (1988). · Go Syfert
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Nicks v. Alabama, 487 U.S. 1241 (1988). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
244 citation events (67 in the last 25 years) across 17 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: McMillan v. State (alacrimapp, 2010-11-05)
Treatment trajectory · 1988 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1988 2007 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 28 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) McMillan v. State
Ala. Crim. App. · 2010 · confidence medium
Such lingering doubts are not over any aspect of petitioner’s “character,” “record,” or a “circumstance of the offense.” This Court’s prior decisions, as we understand them, fail to recognize a constitutional right to have such doubts considered as a mitigating factor.’ “487 U. S. at 174, 108 S.Ct. 2320 .” Smith v. State, [Ms. CR-97-1258, January 16, 2009] — So.3d -, - (Ala.Crim.App.2009).
discussed Cited "see" Jackson v. State (2×)
Ala. Crim. App. · 2008 · signal: see · confidence high
See Nicks v. State, 521 So.2d [1018] at 1025 [(Ala.Crim.App.1987), aff'd, 521 So.2d 1035 (Ala.), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1241 , 108 S.Ct. 2916 , 101 L.Ed.2d 948 (1988)]. `It must ever be borne in mind that the state may prove the accused's commission of another crime if such other crime is relevant for any purpose other than that of showing his guilt through the medium of bad character.' "`C.
cited Cited "see" Alexander v. State
Ala. Crim. App. · 2007 · signal: see · confidence high
See Nicks v. State , 521 So.2d [1018 ] at 1025 [(Ala.Cr.App. 1987), aff'd, 521 So.2d 1035 (Ala.), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1241 , 108 S.Ct. 2916 , 101 L.Ed.2d 948 (1988)].
cited Cited "see" Wimberly v. State
Ala. Crim. App. · 2005 · signal: see · confidence high
See Nicks v. State, 521 So.2d [1018] at 1025 [(Ala.Cr.App.1987), aff'd, 521 So.2d 1035 (Ala.), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1241 , 108 S.Ct. 2916 , 101 L.Ed.2d 948 (1988)].
cited Cited "see" Moody v. State
Ala. Crim. App. · 2003 · signal: see · confidence high
See Nicks v. State, 521 So.2d [1018] at 1025 [(Ala.Cr.App 1987), aff'd, 521 So.2d 1035 (Ala.), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1241 , 108 S.Ct. 2916 , 101 L.Ed.2d 948 (1988)].
cited Cited "see" King v. State
Fla. · 2002 · signal: see · confidence high
See King v. State, 514 So.2d 354, 360 (Fla.1987), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1241 , 108 S.Ct. 2916 , 101 L.Ed.2d 947 (1988).
cited Cited "see" Barrientes v. Johnson
5th Cir. · 2000 · signal: see · confidence high
See Barrientes v. Texas, 487 U.S. 1241 , 108 S.Ct. 2915 , 101 L.Ed.2d 947 (1988).
cited Cited "see" Barrientes v. Johnson
5th Cir. · 2000 · signal: see · confidence high
See Barrientes v. Texas, 487 U.S. 1241 (1988). 24 Barrientes filed a state post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus in August 1988 (the "First State Petition").
discussed Cited "see" Gamble v. State
Ala. Crim. App. · 2000 · signal: see · confidence high
See Nicks v. State, 521 So.2d [1018] at 1025 [(Ala.Cr.App.1987), aff'd, 521 So.2d 1035 *441 (Ala.), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1241 , 108 S.Ct. 2916 , 101 L.Ed.2d 948 (1988)]. `It must ever be borne in mind that the state may prove the accused's commission of another crime if such other crime is relevant for any purpose other than that of showing his guilt through the medium of bad character.' C.
discussed Cited "see" Perkins v. State
Ala. Crim. App. · 1999 · signal: see · confidence high
See Nicks v. State, 521 So.2d [1018] at 1025 [(Ala.Cr.App 1987), aff'd, 521 So.2d 1035 *1084 (Ala.), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1241 , 108 S.Ct. 2916 , 101 L.Ed.2d 948 (1988) ]. `It must ever be borne in mind that the state may prove the accused's commission of another crime if such other crime is relevant for any purpose other than that of showing his guilt through the medium of bad character.' C.
discussed Cited "see" Presley v. State
Ala. Crim. App. · 1999 · signal: see · confidence high
See Nicks v. State , 521 So.2d [1018] at 1025 [(Ala.Cr.App 1987), aff'd, 521 So.2d 1035 (Ala.), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1241 , 108 S.Ct. 2916 , 101 L.Ed.2d 948 (1988)]. `It must ever be borne in mind that the state may prove the accused's commission of another crime if such other crime is relevant for any purpose other than that of showing his guilt through the medium of bad character.' C.
cited Cited "see" Garza v. State
Tex. App. · 1998 · signal: see · confidence high
See Aranda v. State, 736 S.W.2d 702, 705 (Tex.Crim.App. 1987), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1241 , 108 S.Ct. 2916 , 101 L.Ed.2d 947 (1988).
discussed Cited "see" Rose v. State
Fla. · 1996 · signal: see · confidence high
See King v. State, 514 So.2d 354 (Fla. 1987), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1241 , 108 S.Ct. 2916 , 101 L.Ed.2d 947 (1988); Aldridge v. State, 503 So.2d 1257 (Fla.1987); Burr v. State, 466 So.2d 1051 (Fla.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 879 , 106 S.Ct. 201 , 88 L.Ed.2d 170 (1985). [6] The State suggests that resentencing counsel did not investigate and present mitigating evidence because Rose insisted that counsel put on the "accidental death" theory at the penalty phase, rather than pursue mitigation.
cited Cited "see" Jeffery v. State
Tex. App. · 1995 · signal: see · confidence high
See Rosales v. State, 748 S.W.2d 451, 455 (Tex.Crim.App.1987), ce rt. denied, 487 U.S. 1241 , 108 S.Ct. 2917 , 101 L.Ed.2d 949 (1988). 4 .
discussed Cited "see" Guthrie v. State
Ala. Crim. App. · 1993 · signal: see · confidence high
See Nicks v. State , 521 So.2d 1018 , 1030-31 (Ala.Cr.App. 1987), aff'd, 521 So.2d 1035 (Ala.), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1241 , 108 S.Ct. 2916 , 101 L.Ed.2d 948 (1988) (wherein the court stated that "a trial court will not be placed in error for assigning the wrong reason for a proper ruling, if that ruling is correct for any reason").
discussed Cited "see" Anderson v. Fiedler
E.D. Wis. · 1992 · signal: see · confidence high
See Baker v. Piggott, 833 F.2d 1539, 1540 (11th Cir.1987), ce rt. denied, 487 U.S. 1241 , 108 S.Ct. *549 2918, 101 L.Ed.2d 949 (1988); Harris v. Forsyth, 735 F.2d 1235, 1236 (11th Cir.1984); Hanvey v. Blankenship, 631 F.2d 296, 297 (4th Cir.1980); Sullivan, 609 F.2d at 198 ; Kimble v. Department of Corrections, 411 F.2d 990 (6th Cir.1969).
discussed Cited "see" Gosch v. State (2×)
Tex. Crim. App. · 1991 · signal: see · confidence high
See Jackson v. State, 745 S.W.2d 4, 13 (Tex.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1241 , 108 S.Ct. 2916 , 101 L.Ed.2d 947 (1988); Reed, 744 S.W.2d at 125 ; Mitchell v. State, 650 S.W.2d 801, 807 (Tex.Cr.App. 1983), cert. denied 464 U.S. 1073 , 104 S.Ct. 985 , 79 L.Ed.2d 221 (1984); Pinson v. State, 598 S.W.2d 299, 302 (Tex.Cr.App. 1980); Edwards , 421 S.W.2d at 632. [2] An analysis of the accomplice and non-accomplice testimony is necessary in the case before us to ascertain if there is anything of an incriminating character which tends to connect appellant to the murder of Rebecca Patton other tha…
cited Cited "see" Tafarroji v. State
Tex. App. · 1991 · signal: see · confidence high
See Rosales v. State, 748 S.W.2d 451 (Tex.Crim.App.1987), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1241 , 108 S.Ct. 2917 , 101 L.Ed.2d 949 (1988).
cited Cited "see" Nance v. State
Tex. App. · 1991 · signal: see · confidence high
See Aranda v. State, 736 S.W.2d 702, 706 (Tex.Crim.App.1987), cer t. denied, 487 U.S. 1241 , 108 S.Ct. 2916 , 101 L.Ed.2d 947 (1988).
discussed Cited "see" James Armando Card v. Richard L. Dugger
11th Cir. · 1990 · signal: see · confidence high
See Foster v. Dugger, 828 F.2d 402 , 407 (11th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1241 , 108 S.Ct. 2915 , 101 L.Ed.2d 946 (1988) (decision to rely on lay testimony and to avoid the excessive use of medical evidence was reasonable); Daugherty v. Dugger, 839 F.2d 1426 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 871 , 109 S.Ct. 187 , 102 L.Ed.2d 156 (1988) (same).
cited Cited "see" Giddens v. State
Ala. Crim. App. · 1990 · signal: see · confidence high
See Nicks v. State, 521 So.2d 1018 (Ala.Cr.App.1987), aff'd, 521 So.2d 1035 (1988), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1241 , 108 S.Ct. 2916 , 101 L.Ed.2d 948 (1988).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Small v. State (2×)
Tex. App. · 1998 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Jackson v. State, 745 S.W.2d 4, 10 (Tex.Crim.App.), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1241 , 108 S.Ct. 2916 , 101 L.Ed.2d 947 (1988).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Clemons v. State
Ala. Crim. App. · 1996 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also 2 Wigmore on Evidence (Chadbourn rev. 1979), § 304. "`"Evidence of the accused's commission of another crime is admissible if such evidence, considered with other evidence in the case, warrants a finding that both the now-charged crime and such other crime were committed in keeping with or pursuant to a single plan, design, scheme, or system, whether narrow or broad in scope." Nicks v. State , 521 So.2d 1018 , 1027 (Ala.Cr.App. 1987), affirmed, 521 So.2d 1035 (Ala. 1988), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1241 , 108 S.Ct. 2916 , 101 L.Ed.2d 948 (1988), citing C.
cited Cited "see, e.g." Lane v. State
Tex. Crim. App. · 1996 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Barrientes v. State, 752 S.W.2d 524, 526-527 (Tex.Crim.App.1987), cer t. denied, 487 U.S. 1241 , 108 S.Ct. 2915 , 101 L.Ed.2d 947 (1988).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Brimage v. State
Tex. Crim. App. · 1996 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Aranda v. State, 736 S.W.2d 702 (Tex.Cr.App.1987), cer t. denied 487 U.S. 1241 , 108 S.Ct. 2916 , 101 L.Ed.2d 947 (1988), where we held the trial court, in a case also involving massive pretrial publicity, did not abuse its discretion ordering, after a hearing, a transfer of venue on its own motion.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Curry v. State
Tex. Crim. App. · 1995 · signal: see also · confidence low
See Selvage v. Collins, 816 S.W.2d 390, 392 (Tex.Cr.App.1991); see also Jackson v. State, 745 S.W.2d 4 , 5 at n. 2 (Tex.Cr.App.1988), cert, denied, 487 U.S. 1241 , 108 S.Ct. 2916 , 101 L.Ed.2d 947 (1988).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Garcia v. State
Tex. Crim. App. · 1994 · signal: see also · confidence low
See Selvage v. Collins, 816 S.W.2d 390, 392 (Tex.Cr.App.1991); see also Jackson v. State, 745 S.W.2d 4 , 5 at n. 2 (Tex.Cr.App.1988), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1241 , 108 S.Ct. 2916 , 101 L.Ed.2d 947 (1988).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Howell v. State
Ala. Crim. App. · 1993 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also 2 Wigmore on Evidence (Chadbourn rev. 1979), § 304. " 'Evidence of the accused's commission of another crime is admissible if such evidence, considered with other evidence in the case, warrants a finding that both the now-charged crime and such other crime were committed in keeping with or pursuant to a single plan, design, scheme, or system, whether narrow or broad in scope.' Nicks v. State , 521 So.2d 1018 , 1027 (Ala.Cr.App. 1987), affirmed, 521 So.2d 1035 (Ala. 1988), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1241 , 108 S.Ct. 2916 , 101 L.Ed.2d 948 (1988), citing C.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Harry Nicks
v.
Alabama
87-6977.
Supreme Court of the United States.
Sep 15, 1988.
487 U.S. 1241
Marshall, Brennan.
Cited by 2 opinions  |  Published
Reporter's Syllabus — editorial summary, not part of the Court's opinion

See 487 U.S. 1263, 109 S.Ct. 27.

On petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Alabama.

The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied.

Justice MARSHALL, with whom Justice BRENNAN joins, dissenting.

Lead Opinion

Sup. Ct. Ala. Certiorari denied.

Dissent

Justice Marshall, with whom Justice Brennan joins,

dissenting.

I continue to believe that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, see Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 231-241 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting). But even if I did not hold this view, I would grant the petition for writ of certiorari and vacate the death sentence in this case, because the sentence was secured in flagrant violation of our decision in Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U. S. 320 (1985).

In Caldwell we vacated a sentence of death because the prosecutor “sought to minimize the jury’s sense of the importance of its role” by stressing to the jury that its verdict would be subject to appellate review. Id., at 325. The prosecutor told the jury during the sentencing phase that “your decision is not the final de-[*1242] cisión. . . . Your job is reviewable.” Ibid. We held that “it is constitutionally impermissible to rest a death sentence on a determination made by a sentencer who has been led to believe that the responsibility for determining the appropriateness of the defendant’s death rests elsewhere.” Id., at 328-329.

Petitioner’s sentence of death cannot be squared with our decision in Caldwell. The prosecutor in this case made the following argument to the jury at the penalty phase of petitioner’s trial:

“The opinion, which you will come to a conclusion when you go back and deliberate — Let me say this, it will be only an advisory opinion. The law provides for you to present this to the Court for their consideration. The ultimate decisions [sic] rests with Judge Reynolds. He will be the one to take whatever ruling that you send out and decide whether it will be life without parole or death by electrocution in the electric chair.” Pet. for Cert. 3.

This argument, perhaps even more baldly than the statements in Caldwell, sought to minimize the jury’s sense of its awesome responsibility to determine whether petitioner would live or die by encouraging the jury to view its verdict as merely “advisory.” This shifting of the jury’s sense of responsibility to another decisionmaker, as we explained at length in Caldwell, undermines the reliability of the jury’s decision and conditions the jury to return the death penalty. See 472 U. S., at 330-333.

That the prosecutor in this case told the jury that the trial judge would make the ultimate decision, whereas the prosecutor in Caldwell identified the appellate court as the ultimate decisionmaker, is a distinction without a difference. Caldwell makes plain that a death penalty cannot stand where the jury is led to believe that the defendant’s life rests in some other hands. The constitutional infirmity here is thus no different from that in Caldwell, and the sentence of death no less intolerable. I therefore would grant the petition and reverse the judgment of the Supreme Court of Alabama to the extent it sustains the imposition of the death penalty.