Dow Jones & Co., Inc. v. Stanley Simon, 488 U.S. 946 (1988). · Go Syfert
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Dow Jones & Co., Inc. v. Stanley Simon, 488 U.S. 946 (1988). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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cited 3× by 3 distinct cases, last quoted 1991 · 2 courts · …when the exercise of free press rights actually tramples upon sixth amendment rights, the former must nonetheless yield to the latter. ⚠ not in text Topic ↗
142 citation events (17 in the last 25 years) across 40 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: The News-Journal Corporation, a Florida Corporation v. Honorable S. James Foxman, Circuit Judge, Seventh Judicial Circuit, State of Florida (ca7, 1991-08-30)
Treatment trajectory · 1988 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1988 2007 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 20 distinct citers. How cited ↗
examined Cited as authority (quoted) The News-Journal Corporation, a Florida Corporation v. Honorable S. James Foxman, Circuit Judge, Seventh Judicial Circuit, State of Florida (3×) also: Cited as authority (rule), Cited "see, e.g."
7th Cir. · 1991 · signal: see · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
when the exercise of free press rights actually tramples upon sixth amendment rights, the former must nonetheless yield to the latter.
discussed Cited as authority (quoted) In Re United States
11th Cir. · 1990 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence low
when the exercise of free press rights actually tramples upon sixth amendment rights, the former must nonetheless yield to the latter.
discussed Cited as authority (quoted) United States v. Noriega
11th Cir. · 1990 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence low
when the exercise of free press rights actually tramples upon sixth amendment rights, the former must nonetheless yield to the latter.
discussed Cited "see" Sioux Falls Argus Leader v. Miller
S.D. · 2000 · signal: see · confidence high
See News-Journal Corp. v. Foxman, 939 F.2d 1499, 1512 (11th Cir.1991) (“The Supreme Court has suggested a restrictive order limiting extrajudicial commentary of trial participants as an alternative to a prior restraint oh the media.” (citing Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 361 , 86 S.Ct. at 1521 , 16 L.Ed.2d 600 )). [¶ 17.] Dow Jones, 842 F.2d at 609 , cert denied, 488 U.S. 946 , 109 S.Ct. 377 , 102 L.Ed.2d 365 , represents the majority rule among the federal circuit courts having addressed the question.
cited Cited "see" Larkin v. Michigan Department of Social Services
6th Cir. · 1996 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Starrett City Associates, 840 F.2d 1096, 1102-03 (2nd Cir.1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 946 , 109 S.Ct. 376 , 102 L.Ed.2d 365 (1988); Horizon House, 804 F.Supp. at 695 .
cited Cited "see" Larkin v. State Of Michigan Department Of Social Services
6th Cir. · 1996 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Starrett City Associates, 840 F.2d 1096, 1102-03 (2nd Cir.1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 946 , 109 S.Ct. 376 , 102 L.Ed.2d 365 (1988); Horizon House, 804 F.Supp. at 695 .
discussed Cited "see" United States v. Olawale Akere
4th Cir. · 1996 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Rogers, 853 F.2d 249, 251-52 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 946 (1988) (harmless error where defendant absent for trial testimony in light of curative measures taken by district court); United States v. Arriagada, 451 F.2d 487, 489 (4th Cir.1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1018 (1972) (harmless error where court responded to jury query about instructions with a written response--without advising counsel or defendant in advance--that conformed to prior instructions).
discussed Cited "see" United States v. Akere
4th Cir. · 1996 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Rogers, 853 F.2d 249, 251-52 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 946 (1988) (harmless error where defendant absent for trial testimony in light of curative measures taken by district court); United States v. Arriagada, 451 F.2d 487, 489 (4th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1018 (1972) (harmless error where court responded to jury query about instructions with a written response -- without advising counsel or defendant in advance-- that conformed to prior instructions).
cited Cited "see" In re Austin
Bankr. N.D. Ohio · 1994 · signal: see · confidence high
See Loudermill v. Cleveland Board of Education, 844 F.2d 304 (6th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 946 , 109 S.Ct. 377 , 102 L.Ed.2d 365 (1988).
discussed Cited "see" United States v. Mark K. Cross
6th Cir. · 1994 · signal: see · confidence high
See U.S. v. Wolak, 923 F.2d 1193, 1199 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 2824 (1991), and U.S. v. Brewer, 853 F.2d 1319, 1322 (6th Cir.1988), cert. denied 488 U.S. 946 (1988) and 489 U.S. 1021 (1989). 16 Because there is no plausible argument that the defendant did not receive actual notice of the government's intent to seek enhanced punishment in this case, we need not address that question in this opinion.
cited Cited "see" In Re Cieslak
Bankr. N.D. Ohio · 1994 · signal: see · confidence high
See Loudermill v. Cleveland Board of Education, 844 F.2d 304 (6th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 946 , 109 S.Ct. 377 , 102 L.Ed.2d 365 (1988).
cited Cited "see" United States v. Ray Anthony Merryman
6th Cir. · 1994 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Brewer, 853 F.2d 1319 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 946 (1988).
cited Cited "see" Horizon House Developmental Services, Inc. v. Township of Upper Southampton
E.D. Pa. · 1992 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Starrett City Associates, 840 F.2d 1096 (2d Cir.1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 946 , 109 S.Ct. 376 , 102 L.Ed.2d 365 (1988). 26.
cited Cited "see" United States v. Cephus McNeil A/K/A Twin, United States of America v. Cephus McNeil A/K/A Twin
4th Cir. · 1992 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Rogers, 853 F.2d 249, 252 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 946 (1988).
discussed Cited "see" United States v. George W. Lowry, III
6th Cir. · 1992 · signal: see · confidence high
See Whitney v. Brown, 882 F.2d 1068, 1071 (6th Cir.1989), and Loudermill v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 844 F.2d 304 , 308 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 941 and 488 U.S. 946 (1988). 31 In United States v. Martin, 920 F.2d 393 (6th Cir.1991), the defendant argued that the agent-affiant "never told the magistrate that his principal informant ... was a person whose veracity was open to serious question." Id. at 398 .
discussed Cited "see, e.g." State v. Carruthers (2×)
Tenn. · 2000 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., In re Dow Jones & Co., Inc., 842 F.2d 603, 609 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 946 , 109 S.Ct. 377 , 102 L.Ed.2d 365 (1988); United States v. Ford, 830 F.2d 596, 600 (6th Cir.1987).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Focus v. Allegheny County Court Of Common Pleas
3rd Cir. · 1996 · signal: see also · confidence low
"We have routinely found, as have other courts, that third parties have standing to challenge protective orders and confidentiality orders in an effort to obtain access to information or judicial proceedings." Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 777 (3d Cir.1994) (footnote omitted); see also In re Dow Jones & Co., 842 F.2d 603, 607 (2d Cir.) (noting the rights of potential recipients of speech to challenge the abridgment of that speech), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 946 , 109 S.Ct. 377 , 102 L.Ed.2d 365 (1988). 17 That putative recipients of speech usually have standing to challenge orders…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Focus v. Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas
3rd Cir. · 1996 · signal: see also · confidence low
The standing issue arises in this ease because the gag orders merely constrain the speech of the parties and the attorneys to the Baby Byron case; the plaintiffs do not complain that the orders affirmatively constrain their speech in any way. 2 Of course, that alone does not mean the plaintiffs’ case fails for lack of standing. ‘We have routinely found, as have other courts, that third parties have standing to challenge protective orders and confidentiality orders in an effort to obtain access to information or judicial proceedings.” Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 777 (3d …
cited Cited "see, e.g." Del Fierro v. Pepsico International
E.D.N.Y · 1995 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also, In re Application of Dow Jones & Co., 842 F.2d 603 , 606 (2d Cir.1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 946 , 109 S.Ct. 377 , 102 L.Ed.2d 365 (1988).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." State v. Hudson
N.J. · 1990 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., United States v. Rogers, 853 F.2d 249 (4th Cir.) (finding an abuse of discretion when court proceeded without further investigation, but concluding that error was harmless), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 946 , 109 S.Ct. 375 , 102 L.Ed.2d 364 (1988); United States v. Sanchez, supra, 790 F.2d at 251 (noting broad discretion afforded trial courts “in determining whether to proceed with a trial in absentia, [ ] to adjourn, or to sever”); United States v. Muzevsky, 760 F.2d 83 (4th Cir.1985) (finding no per se rule that single-defendant trials cannot proceed without the defendant); United S…
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Dow Jones & Co., Inc., Et Al.
v.
Simon Et Al.
88-229.
Supreme Court of the United States.
Nov 7, 1988.
488 U.S. 946
White, Stevens, Brennan, Marshall.
Cited by 12 opinions  |  Published
1 passages pin-cited by 3 cases
Pinpoint authority: bottom 75%
Citer courts: Eleventh Circuit (4) · Seventh Circuit (2)
Reporter's Syllabus — editorial summary, not part of the Court's opinion

On petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.

The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied.

Justice WHITE, with whom Justice BRENNAN and Justice MARSHALL join, dissenting.

Lead Opinion

C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice Stevens took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.

Dissent

Justice White,

with whom

Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall join, dissenting.

In Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, 427 U. S. 539 (1976), we held that an order restraining the news media from reporting or[*947] commenting on public judicial proceedings was a prior restraint on speech and that the State had not in that case overcome the high barriers to the use of a prior restraint. Id., at 570. The restraining order in this case is directed against the participants in the trial, not against the media, but it is likewise challenged by various news agencies as an unconstitutional prior restraint.

This case arises out of the trial of several criminal defendants, including Representative Mario Biaggi and former Bronx Borough President Stanley Simon, on federal racketeering charges based on their involvement with Wedtech, a South Bronx military contractor. On April 23, 1987, at the request of the defendants, the District Court entered an order restraining the prosecutors, defendants, and defense counsel from making extrajudicial statements to the press. The Government initially concurred in the order but eventually joined with petitioners, the news agencies, in seeking to have the order vacated. On July 10, 1987, the District Court modified its order to allow the parties to state, without elaboration, matters of public record and to explain, without characterization, the substance of any motion or step in the proceedings. Otherwise, however, the court continued the order in force.

Petitioners appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which affirmed the July 10 order. After finding that petitioners had standing to complain, the court stated that “there is a fundamental difference between a gag order challenged by the individual gagged and one challenged by a third party; an order objected to by the former is properly characterized as a prior restraint, one opposed solely by the latter is not.” In re Application of Dow Jones & Co., 842 F. 2d 603, 609 (1988). Because only the news agencies opposed the restraining order, the court concluded that a prior restraint had not been imposed. The court then held that the restraining order was justified because there was a “reasonable likelihood” that pretrial publicity would otherwise have prejudiced the defendants' rights to a fair trial. Id., at 610.

By so holding, the Second Circuit joined the Ninth Circuit, which had previously refused to treat as a prior restraint a restraining order directed against the parties and challenged only by the media. Compare Radio & Television News Assn. v. United States District Court, 781 F. 2d 1443, 1446 (CA9 1986) (order challenged by media), with Levine v. United States District Court, 764[*948] F. 2d 590, 595 (CA9 1985) (order challenged by trial participants), cert. denied, 476 U. S. 1158 (1986). That approach conflicts directly with the approach taken by the Sixth Circuit, which held in CBS Inc. v. Young, 522 F. 2d 234, 239 (1975), that “the conclusion is inevitable that [such a restraining order] constitutes a prior direct restraint upon freedom of expression.” Moreover, the Second Circuit’s adoption of a “reasonable likelihood” standard conflicts with the Sixth Circuit’s “clear and present danger” standard. Id., at 238. Because of the importance of this issue and the conflicting resolutions given it by the Courts of Appeals, I would grant the petition for certiorari.