Keenan v. California, 490 U.S. 1012 (1989). · Go Syfert
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Keenan v. California, 490 U.S. 1012 (1989). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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cited 3× by 1 distinct case · “if a client communicates information to his attorney with the understanding that the information will be revealed to others, that information as well as ‘the details underlying the data which was to be published’ will not enjoy the privilege”
147 citation events (23 in the last 25 years) across 39 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: (PC) Falls v. Arredondo (caed, 2022-12-05)
Treatment trajectory · 1989 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1989 2007 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 35 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) (PC) Falls v. Arredondo
E.D. Cal. · 2022 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
prison administrators' indifference to brutal behavior by guards toward inmates 20 sufficient to state an eighth amendment claim
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) (PC) Correa v. Bravdrick
E.D. Cal. · 2022 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
prison administrators' indifference to brutal behavior by guards toward inmates 26 sufficient to state an eighth amendment claim
examined Cited as authority (quoted) First Heights Bank, FSB v. United States
Fed. Cl. · 2000 · signal: see also · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence low
if a client communicates information to his attorney with the understanding that the information will be revealed to others, that information as well as 'the details underlying the data which was to be published' will not enjoy the privilege
discussed Cited as authority (quoted) Madrid v. Gomez (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
N.D. Cal. · 1995 · signal: see also · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence low
prison administrators' indifference to brutal behavior by guards toward inmates sufficient to state an eighth amendment claim
discussed Cited "see" Brasfield & Gorrie LLC v. Hirschfeld Steel Group LP
N.D. Ala. · 2021 · signal: see · confidence high
See Cox v. Administrator U.S. Steel & Carnegie, 17 F.3d 1386, 1422 (11th Cir.), opinion modified on reh'g, 30 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir. 1994) (“[T]he subject-matter waiver doctrine does not extend to materials protected by the opinion work product privilege.”) (citing In re Martin Marietta Corp., 856 F.2d 619 , 625–26 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1011 , 109 S. Ct. 1655 , 104 L.Ed.2d 169 (1989)).
discussed Cited "see" Bank of America, N.A. v. Terra Nova Insurance
S.D.N.Y. · 2002 · signal: see · confidence high
See In re Martin Marietta Corp., 856 F.2d 619, 625-26 (4th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1011 , 109 S.Ct. 1655 , 104 L.Ed.2d 169 (1989); In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 822-23 (D.C.Cir.1982); Bowne v. AmBase Corp., 150 F.R.D. 465, 485-86 (S.D.N.Y.1993).
discussed Cited "see" Blair v. State
Md. Ct. Spec. App. · 2000 · signal: see · confidence high
See generally United States v. Pollard (In re Martin Marietta Corp.), 856 F.2d 619, 624 (4th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1011 , 109 S.Ct. 1655 , 104 L.Ed.2d 169 (1989); Nutramax Lab., Inc. v. Twin Lab.
discussed Cited "see" United States v. Tomison
E.D. Cal. · 1997 · signal: see · confidence high
See Beckford, supra, 964 F.Supp. at 1018 -19 (citing In re Martin Marietta Corp., 856 F.2d 619, 621 (4th Cir.1988), cert. denied sub nom., Martin Marietta Corp. v. Pollard, 490 U.S. 1011 , 109 S.Ct. 1655 , 104 L.Ed.2d 169 (1989)).
discussed Cited "see" Splunge v. Parke (2×)
N.D. Ind. · 1996 · signal: see · confidence high
See Dudley v. Duckworth, 854 F.2d 967 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1011 , 109 S.Ct. 1655 , 104 L.Ed.2d 169 (1989).
cited Cited "see" 96 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 2674, 96 Daily Journal D.A.R. 4438, 96 Daily Journal D.A.R. 5369 Jose Ortiz-Sandoval v. James Gomez, Director of Corrections for the State of California
9th Cir. · 1996 · signal: see · confidence high
See Dudley v. Duckworth, 854 F.2d 967, 970 (7th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1011 , 109 S.Ct. 1655 , 104 L.Ed.2d 169 (1989).
discussed Cited "see" Mark KOCH, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. James G. RICKETTS, Defendant-Appellee (2×)
9th Cir. · 1996 · signal: see · confidence high
See Vaughan v. Ricketts, 859 F.2d 736 (9th Cir.1988) cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1012 , 109 S.Ct. 1655 , 104 L.Ed.2d 169 (1989) (Vaughan I).
cited Cited "see" Ortiz-Sandoval v. Gomez
9th Cir. · 1996 · signal: see · confidence high
See Dudley v. Duckworth, 854 F.2d 967, 970 (7th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1011 , 109 S.Ct. 1655 , 104 L.Ed.2d 169 (1989).
cited Cited "see" Ring v. Commercial Union Insurance
M.D.N.C. · 1995 · signal: see · confidence high
See generally In re Martin Marietta Corp., 856 F.2d 619 (4th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1011 , 109 S.Ct. 1655 , 104 L.Ed.2d 169 (1989).
discussed Cited "see" Karis v. Vasquez (2×)
E.D. Cal. · 1993 · signal: see · confidence high
See People v. Karis, 46 Cal.3d 612 , 250 Cal.Rptr. 659 , 758 P.2d 1189 (1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1012 , 109 S.Ct. 1658 , 104 L.Ed.2d 172 (1989).
cited Cited "see" Bowne of New York City, Inc. v. AmBase Corp.
S.D.N.Y. · 1993 · signal: see · confidence high
See In re Martin Marietta Corp., 856 F.2d 619, 622-25 (4th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1011 , 109 S.Ct. 1655 , 104 L.Ed.2d 169 (1989).
discussed Cited "see" James Lilly v. Jerry D. Gilmore, Warden
7th Cir. · 1993 · signal: see · confidence high
See Dudley v. Duckworth, 854 F.2d 967 (7th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1011 , 109 S.Ct. 1655 , 104 L.Ed.2d 169 (1989); Cramer v. Fahner, 683 F.2d 1376, 1385 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1016 , 103 S.Ct. 376 , 74 L.Ed.2d 509 (1982); United States ex rel.
discussed Cited "see" Act Up!/Portland v. Bagley (2×)
9th Cir. · 1992 · signal: see · confidence high
See Vaughan v. Ricketts, 859 F.2d 736, 741 (9th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1012 , 109 S.Ct. 1655 , 104 L.Ed.2d 169 (1989).
discussed Cited "see" Act Up!/Portland v. Bagley (2×)
9th Cir. · 1992 · signal: see · confidence high
See Vaughan v. Ricketts, 859 F.2d 736, 741 (9th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1012 , 109 S.Ct. 1655 , 104 L.Ed.2d 169 (1989).
discussed Cited "see" United States v. Victor Arditti, United States of America v. Guillermo Avila (2×)
5th Cir. · 1992 · signal: see · confidence high
Rule 17(c) merely requires that the moving party make a good faith effort to obtain evidence--instead of embarking on "a fishing expedition to see what might turn up." Id. at 678, 679 (holding subpoena's "catch-all provision ... not intended to produce evidentiary materials"); see In re Martin Marietta Corp., 856 F.2d 619, 622 (4th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1011 , 109 S.Ct. 1655 , 104 L.Ed.2d 169 (1989). 94 To this end, a party demanding materials must unfasten three locks to free the 17(c) door.
discussed Cited "see" United States v. Ernest James Perkins (2×)
9th Cir. · 1991 · signal: see · confidence high
See Dudley v. Duckworth, 854 F.2d 967, 972 (7th Cir.1988) (error not harmless where evidence of guilt was "impressive but not overwhelming"), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1011 , 109 S.Ct. 1655 , 104 L.Ed.2d 169 (1989).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Diggs v. State
Md. Ct. Spec. App. · 2013 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
Like other qualified privileges, it may be waived.”); see, e.g., In re Martin Marietta Corp., 856 F.2d 619, 625 (4th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1011 , 109 S.Ct. 1655 , 104 L.Ed.2d 169 (1989) (information voluntarily disclosed constitutes an implied waiver of attorney work product protections).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Adams v. State (2×)
Ind. Ct. App. · 2008 · signal: see also · confidence low
Cox, 422 N.E.2d at 362; see also Dudley v. Duckworth, 854 F.2d 967 (7th Cir.1988) (citing Keyset and Cox in granting petition for writ of habeas corpus based on threat evidence that was unconnected to defendant), teh’g denied, cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1011 , 109 S.Ct. 1655 , 104 L.Ed.2d 169 (1989).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." In Re Commercial Financial Services, Inc.
Bankr. N.D. Okla · 2000 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Cox v. Administrator United States Steel & Carnegie, 17 F.3d 1386, 1422-23 (11th Cir.1994) and United States v. Pollard (In re Martin Marietta Corp.), 856 F.2d 619, 625-26 (4th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1011 , 109 S.Ct. 1655 , 104 L.Ed.2d 169 (1989).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Armendariz v. Penman (2×)
9th Cir. · 1996 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
Id. at 1409; see, e.g., Vaughan v. Ricketts, 859 F.2d 736, 738 (9th Cir.1988) (prison warden violated prisoners’ substantive due process rights by conducting rectal searches for malicious purposes), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1012 , 109 S.Ct. 1655 , 104 L.Ed.2d 169 (1989); Rutherford v. Berkeley, 780 F.2d 1444, 1446 (9th Cir.1986) (excessive force against arrestees violated substantive due process).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." 96 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 839, 96 Daily Journal D.A.R. 1369 Tomas Armendariz Rosa C. Armendariz Harry Julian Brown, Jr. Lance A. Bukouskis v. James F. Penman W.R. Holcomb David M. Stachowski Cecil Dillard Kenneth J. Henderson, Tomas Armendariz Rosa C. Armendariz Harry Julian Brown, Jr. Lance A. Bukouskis v. James F. Penman W.R. Holcomb David M. Stachowski Cecil Dillard Kenneth J. Henderson, and Al Boughey Larry Reed, Tomas Armendariz Rosa C. Armendariz v. James F. Penman (2×)
9th Cir. · 1996 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
Id. at 1409; see, e.g., Vaughan v. Ricketts, 859 F.2d 736, 738 (9th Cir.1988) (prison warden violated prisoners' substantive due process rights by conducting rectal searches for malicious purposes), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1012 , 109 S.Ct. 1655 , 104 L.Ed.2d 169 (1989); Rutherford v. Berkeley, 780 F.2d 1444, 1446 (9th Cir.1986) (excessive force against arrestees violated substantive due process).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Arnie Gonzales v. James Gomez, Director, Charles D. Marshall, Warden C. Gollihar Johns, Dr.
9th Cir. · 1994 · signal: see also · confidence low
This contention lacks merit. 12 In Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312 (1986), the Supreme Court provided the standard for determining the constitutional requirements imposed on the actions of the prison officials during riot circumstances: 13 Where a prison security measure is undertaken to resolve a disturbance ... that indisputably poses significant risks to the safety of inmates and prison staff, ... the question whether the measure taken inflicted unnecessary and wanton pain and suffering ultimately turns on "whether force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline o…
cited Cited "see, e.g." National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pa. v. Murray Sheet Metal Company, Incorporated, and Arkwright Mutual Insurance Company
4th Cir. · 1992 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., United States v. Pollard (In re Martin Marietta Corp.), 856 F.2d 619 (4th Cir.1988), cert, denied, 490 U.S. 1011 , 109 S.Ct. 1655 , 104 L.Ed.2d 169 (1989). 5 .
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Matthews v. Murphy
9th Cir. · 1992 · signal: see also · confidence low
The District Court Properly Granted Summary Judgment To The Prison Officials On Matthews' Claims He Was Subjected To Cruel And Unusual Punishment And Was Deprived Of Due Process During The Prison Riot. 19 In counts one through three of his complaint, Matthews alleged constitutional deprivations in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments by prison officials during the course of the riots. 20 In Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312 (1986), the Supreme Court laid out the standard for determining the constitutional requirements imposed on the actions of prison officials during riot circumstan…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Dennis R. Cookish v. Commissioner Ronald Powell (2×)
1st Cir. · 1991 · signal: see also · confidence low
Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. at 641 , 107 S.Ct. at 3039 ; see also Vaughan v. Ricketts, 859 F.2d 736, 739 (9th Cir.1988) (a defendant is entitled to summary judgment granting him qualified immunity if he can establish that “ ‘a reasonable officer could have believed that the search comported with [the Constitution] even though it actually did not’ ” (quoting Anderson, supra)), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1012 , 109 S.Ct. 1655 , 104 L.Ed.2d 169 (1989).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Meyer v. Fidelity Savings (2×)
9th Cir. · 1991 · signal: see also · confidence low
An error of instruction will not be reversed "if it is more probably than not harmless." Benigni, 879 F.2d at 479 ; see also Kisor v. Johns-Mansville Corp., 783 F.2d 1337 , 1340 (9th Cir.1986) ("We must consider whether the instruction ... [is] to the prejudice of the objecting party"). 67 We conclude that the error in this case was non-prejudicial based on our finding that, as a matter of law, " 'the facts alleged ... [do not] support a claim of violation of clearly established law.' " Vaughan v. Ricketts, 859 F.2d 736, 739 (9th Cir.1988) (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 , 528 n. 9,…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Federal Deposit Insurance v. Marine Midland Realty Credit Corp.
E.D. Va. · 1991 · signal: see also · confidence low
It is settled that loss of the attorney-client privilege extends “ ‘to the substance of a communication’ ... and requires the attorney to disclose ‘the details underlying the data which was to be published.” In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 727 F.2d at 1356 (quoting United States v. Cote, 456 F.2d 142, 145 (8th Cir.1972)); see also In re Martin Marietta Corp., 856 F.2d 619, 623-24 (4th Cir.1988) (same), cert. denied Martin Marietta Corp. v. Pollard, 490 U.S. 1011 , 109 S.Ct. 1655 , 104 L.Ed.2d 169 (1989); In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 809 (D.C.Cir. 1982) (waiver extends “to all oth…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Berry v. City of Muskogee
10th Cir. · 1990 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Vaughan v. Ricketts, 859 F.2d 736, 741-42 (9th Cir.1988) (digital body cavity searches, “while involving a threat to security, did not constitute an ongoing prison disturbance,” and “the officers were not confronted with an instantaneous decision whether to conduct the searches in the manner described”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 1655 , 104 L.Ed.2d 169 (1989); Stubbs v. Dudley, 849 F.2d 83, 86 (2d Cir.1988) (“ Whitley does not require that every case involving a guard’s failure to protect a prisoner threatened by other prisoners be decided under a heightened st…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Berry v. City Of Muskogee
10th Cir. · 1990 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Vaughan v. Ricketts, 859 F.2d 736, 741-42 (9th Cir.1988) (digital body cavity searches, "while involving a threat to security, did not constitute an ongoing prison disturbance," and "the officers were not confronted with an instantaneous decision whether to conduct the searches in the manner described"), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 109 S.Ct. 1655 , 104 L.Ed.2d 169 (1989); Stubbs v. Dudley, 849 F.2d 83, 86 (2d Cir.1988) ("Whitley does not require that every case involving a guard's failure to protect a prisoner threatened by other prisoners be decided under a heightened standard app…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Lesko v. Owens
3rd Cir. · 1989 · signal: compare · confidence low
Compare Bisaccia, 623 F.2d at 312 -13 and Dudley v. Duckworth, 854 F.2d 967 (7th Cir.1988), with (Panzavecchia v. Wainwright, 658 F.2d 337, 341-42 (5th Cir.1981)), cert. denied --- U.S. ----, 109 S.Ct. 1655 , 104 L.Ed.2d 169 (1989) 8 At oral argument it was also suggested that the "abuse of discretion" standard--the standard accorded a district court's balancing of prejudice and relevance pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 403--might be applicable here.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Lesko v. Owens
3rd Cir. · 1989 · signal: compare · confidence low
Compare Bisaccia, 623 F.2d at 312 -13 and Dudley v. Duckworth, 854 F.2d 967 (7th Cir.1988), with (Panzavecchia v. Wainwright, 658 F.2d 337, 341-42 (5th Cir.1981)), cert. denied — U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 1655 , 104 L.Ed.2d 169 (1989). .
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Maurice J. Keenan
v.
California
88-6438.
Supreme Court of the United States.
Apr 3, 1989.
490 U.S. 1012
Brennan, Marshall.
Cited by 85 opinions  |  Published
2 passages pin-cited by 2 cases
Pinpoint authority: bottom 74%
Citer courts: N.D. California (1) · Federal Claims (1)
Reporter's Syllabus — editorial summary, not part of the Court's opinion

On petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of California.

The petition for writ of certiorari is denied.

Justice BRENNAN, dissenting.

Adhering to my view that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 227, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 2950, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976), I would grant certiorari and vacate the death sentence in this case.

Justice MARSHALL, dissenting from denial of certiorari.

Lead Opinion

Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied.

Dissent

Justice Brennan,

dissenting.

Adhering to my view that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 227 (1976), I would grant certiorari and vacate the death sentence in this case.

Dissent

Justice Marshall,

dissenting.

Adhering to my view that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 231 (1976) (Marshall J., dissenting), I would grant the petition for certiorari and vacate the death sentence in this case. But[*1013] even if I did not hold this view, I would still grant the petition. The record in this case strongly suggests that, in the words of the dissenting judge below, “certain remarks by the court during the penalty phase, superimposed upon an emotional episode that had already occurred in the jury room, had an improperly coercive effect upon the jury’s deliberations and improperly influenced the verdict.” 46 Cal. 3d 478, 545, 758 P. 2d 1081, 1124 (1988) (Kaufman, J., dissenting in part). I would therefore grant certiorari, both to ascertain whether petitioner was denied his right to an uncoerced verdict, and to clarify our standards for determining jury coercion, a subject discussed most recently in Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U. S. 231 (1988).

The penalty phase in question was described at length in the majority and partially dissenting opinions below, 46 Cal. 3d, at 527-544, 758 P. 2d, at 1112-1124 (majority opinion); id., at 545-550, 758 P. 2d, at 1124-1129 (Kaufman, J., dissenting in part), and so only a brief account is necessary here. During jury deliberations, only one juror held out: an elderly woman who refused to vote to impose the death penalty. After a day of deliberations, another juror rose out of his chair and verbally attacked her in a tirade that apparently included a death threat. Id., at 545, 758 P. 2d, at 1125. Crying and shaking, she left the jury room and went to a bathroom, where she vomited. In response, the foreman sent the judge notes indicating that there was one holdout against imposing the death penalty. Ibid.

The judge then recalled the jury. He told the jury that the court was required to investigate the jury’s “problem” by questioning the foreman and, perhaps, “‘the one or more jurors who may be having difficulty in reaching a verdict.’” Id., at 546, 758 P. 2d, at 1125. He added that, if necessary, he would determine whether or not “one or more of the jurors are refusing to adhere to the law and the evidence,” ibid, (emphasis omitted); he added that he had expected that the jury would have delivered a verdict by then. Id., at 546, 758 P. 2d, at 1126. The judge told the jurors that he was sending them home for the weekend so that they could search their consciences. He then recognized the foreman, who stated that the weekend release would be a “fine gesture,” and that “we should have a verdict come Monday.” Ibid. The judge responded: “Good. Well, I’m glad to hear you say that. I appreciate that.” Ibid. After only one hour of delib[*1014] erations Monday morning, the jurors voted unanimously to impose the death penalty.

In Lowenfield, the Court observed that “[a]ny criminal defendant, and especially any capital defendant, being tried by a jury is entitled to the uncoerced verdict of that body.” 484 U. S., at 241. To determine if coercion has occurred, courts must “consider the supplemental charge given by the trial court ‘in its context and under all the circumstances.’” Id., at 237 (citation omitted). We held that the particular supplemental charges and jury polling at issue had not resulted in coercion, but that other instructions and comments might require a different conclusion. Id., at 241.

In my view, this case presents a far more compelling circumstance for finding jury coercion than did Lowenfield. As the dissenting judge below observed, the holdout juror, given her emotional condition, the verbal attack upon her, and the judge’s indication that he would have to investigate one or more jurors

“may well have interpreted these statements as meaning the court expected a verdict on Monday and that it wanted her personally to resolve any lingering doubts she may have had about the appropriateness of imposing the death penalty. It is also highly likely [she] believed that, by agreeing to the death verdict on Monday, she could avoid the threatened investigation by the court and the attorneys of the jury room incident and of her reluctance to vote for death.” 46 Cal. 3d, at 547-548, 758 P. 2d, at 1127.

The petitioner here was entitled to have the decision whether he “deserve[d] to live or die . . . made on scales that are not deliberately tipped toward death.” Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U. S. 510, 521-522, n. 20 (1968). Because the actions of the trial judge in this case raise serious doubts about whether the context and circumstances of the death sentence in this case were coercive, and thus whether the scales of justice were in equipoise when the time for that decision came, I would grant the petition for review. I dissent.