Laws v. Armontrout, Warden, 490 U.S. 1040 (1989). · Go Syfert
Laws v. Armontrout, Warden, 490 U.S. 1040 (1989). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
138 citation events (10 in the last 25 years) across 24 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Wanatee v. Ault (iand, 1999-03-22)
Treatment trajectory · 1989 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1989 2007 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 27 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited "see" Wanatee v. Ault
N.D. Iowa · 1999 · signal: see · confidence high
See McCauley-Bey v. Delo, 97 F.3d 1104, 1105 (8th Cir.1996) (“The claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is a mixed question of law and fact,” citing Laws v. Armontrout, 863 F.2d 1377, 1381 (8th Cir. *1174 1988) (en banc), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1040 , 109 S.Ct. 1944 , 104 L.Ed.2d 415 (1989)); Carter v. Hopkins, 92 F.3d 666, 669 (8th Cir.1996) (“The district court’s determination on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, “both as to the deficient performance and prejudice components”, is a mixed question of law and fact,” citing Sherron v. Norris, 69 F.3d 285, 290 (8th C…
cited Cited "see" State v. Sylvester Smith
Tenn. Crim. App. · 1998 · signal: see · confidence high
See Laws v. Armontrout, 863 F.2d 1377, 1385 (8th Cir. 1988) (en banc), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1040 , 109 S.Ct. 1944 (1989).
discussed Cited "see" Bobby Ray Fretwell v. Larry Norris, Director, Arkansas Department of Corrections
8th Cir. · 1998 · signal: see · confidence high
Counsel’s decision not to “mount an all-out investigation into petitioner’s background in search of mitigating circumstances was supported by reasonable professional judgement.” Burger, 483 U.S. at 794 , 107 S.Ct. at 3125-26 ; see Laws v. Armontrout, 863 F.2d 1377, 1387 (8th Cir.1988) (en banc), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1040 , 109 S.Ct. 1944 , 104 L.Ed.2d 415 (1989).
discussed Cited "see" Bobby Ray Fretwell v. Larry Norris
8th Cir. · 1998 · signal: see · confidence high
Counsel’s decision not to “mount an all-out investigation into petitioner’s background in search of mitigating circumstances was supported by reasonable professional judgement.” Burger, 483 U.S. at 794 ; see Laws v. Armontrout, 863 F.2d 1377, 1387 (8th Cir. 1988) (en banc), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1040 (1989). -12- The district court further concluded that counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance in failing to call Fretwell’s mother, brothers, and sister to testify as to the abuse he suffered as a child.
discussed Cited "see" Eric Adam Schneider v. Paul Delo
8th Cir. · 1996 · signal: see · confidence high
See Laws v. Armontrout, 863 F.2d 1377, 1391 (8th Cir.1988) (en banc) (counsel’s decision not to have the defendant’s family testify because they would not have been effective witnesses was reasonable), ce rt. denied, 490 U.S. 1040 , 109 S.Ct. 1944 , 104 L.Ed.2d 415 (1989).
discussed Cited "see" Eric Schneider v. Paul Delo
8th Cir. · 1996 · signal: see · confidence high
See Laws v. Armontrout, 863 F.2d 1377, 1391 (8th Cir. 1988) (en banc) (counsel's decision not to have the defendant's family testify because they would not have been effective witnesses was reasonable), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1040 (1989).
cited Cited "see" Wilfred W. Nielsen v. Frank X. Hopkins, Warden, Nebraska State Penitentiary
8th Cir. · 1995 · signal: see · confidence high
See Laws v. Armontrout, 863 F.2d 1377, 1384-85 (8th Cir.1988) (en banc), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1040 , 109 S.Ct. 1944 , 104 L.Ed.2d 415 (1989).
discussed Cited "see" Davis v. Executive Director of the Department of Corrections
D. Colo. · 1995 · signal: see · confidence high
See Laws v. Armontrout, 863 F.2d 1377, 1389-91 (8th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1040 , 109 S.Ct. 1944 , 104 L.Ed.2d 415 (1989) (mitigating evidence would have opened doors to damaging information, including war record, drug usage, prison record, and negative feelings of relatives).
discussed Cited "see" Ralph C. Feltrop v. Paul K. Delo (2×)
8th Cir. · 1995 · signal: see · confidence high
Feltrop has failed to “overcome a strong presumption that his counsel’s actions constituted reasonable trial strategy.” Sanders v. Trickey, 875 F.2d 205, 207 (8th Cir.) (quotation omitted), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 898 , 110 S.Ct. 252 , 107 L.Ed.2d 201 (1989); see Laws v. Armontrout, 863 F.2d 1377, 1389 (8th Cir.1988) (en banc), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1040 , 109 S.Ct. 1944 , 104 L.Ed.2d 415 (1989).
discussed Cited "see" David Lee Starr v. A.L. Lockhart, Director, Arkansas Department of Corrections (2×)
8th Cir. · 1994 · signal: see · confidence high
See Laws v. Armontrout, 863 F.2d 1377, 1381 (8th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1040 , 109 S.Ct. 1944 , 104 L.Ed.2d 415 (1989).
discussed Cited "see" Emmitt Foster v. Paul Delo (2×)
8th Cir. · 1994 · signal: see · confidence high
See Laws v. Armontrout, 863 F.2d 1377, 1392 (8th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1040 , 109 S.Ct. 1944 , 104 L.Ed.2d 415 (1989).
cited Cited "see" United States v. Darius Koshnevis, AKA James Frederick Koshnevis
9th Cir. · 1992 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Baron, 860 F.2d 911, 917 (9th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1040 , 109 S.Ct. 1944 , 104 L.Ed.2d 414 (1989); United States v. Smith, 790 F.2d 789, 792 (9th Cir.1986).
discussed Cited "see" Grace Petroleum Corp. v. Corporation Commission
Okla. Civ. App. · 1992 · signal: see · confidence high
See additionally, Inexco Oil Co. v. Oklahoma Corporation Commission, 767 P.2d 404 (Okl.1988), certiorari denied, 490 U.S. 1040 , 109 S.Ct. 1948 , 104 L.Ed.2d 414 (1989) and Amoco Production Company v. Corporation Commission of Oklahoma, 752 P.2d 835 (Okl.App.1987) (approved for publication by the Supreme Court, March 21, 1988).
discussed Cited "see" Whitmore v. Lockhart
E.D. Ark. · 1992 · signal: see · confidence high
See Laws v. Armontrout, 863 F.2d 1377, 1382-83 (8th Cir.1988) (en banc) (counsel not ineffective during the penalty phase of capital murder prosecution for failure to contact and interview relatives and failure to offer psychiatric evidence), ce rt. denied, 490 U.S. 1040 , 109 S.Ct. 1944 , 104 L.Ed.2d 415 (1989).
discussed Cited "see" Harold R. Wilson v. Bill Armontrout
8th Cir. · 1992 · signal: see · confidence high
See Laws v. Armontrout, 834 F.2d 1401, 1415 (8th Cir.1987) (petitioner must show “adequate cause to excuse his failure to raise the claim in state court”), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1040 , 109 S.Ct. 1944 , 104 L.Ed.2d 415 (1989).
discussed Cited "see" Edward v. Lawrence v. Bill Armontrout
8th Cir. · 1992 · signal: see · confidence high
See Laws v. Armontrout, 863 F.2d 1377, 1382 (8th Cir.1988), ce rt. denied, 490 U.S. 1040 , 109 S.Ct. 1944 , 104 L.Ed.2d 415 (1989) (district court reversed for use of erroneous legal test that departed from Strickland standard).
discussed Cited "see" United States v. Gerald Caperell
9th Cir. · 1991 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Baron, 860 F.2d 911, 920 (9th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1040 , 109 S.Ct. 1944 , 104 L.Ed.2d 414 (1989) (case remanded for resentencing where court’s findings were ambiguous and prosecutor was permitted to argue the challenged facts at length).
cited Cited "see" State v. Joly
Conn. · 1991 · signal: see · confidence high
See People v. Caro, 46 Cal. 3d 1035, 1048-49 , 761 P.2d 680 , 251 Cal. Rptr. 757 (1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1040 , 109 S. Ct. 1944 , 104 L.
cited Cited "see" Jimmie L. Weekley v. Jimmy Jones
8th Cir. · 1991 · signal: see · confidence high
See Couch v. Trickey, 892 F.2d 1338 (8th Cir.1989) (citing Laws v. Armontrout, 863 F.2d 1377 (8th Cir.1988) (en banc), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1040 , 109 S.Ct. 1944 , 104 L.Ed.2d 415 (1989)).
cited Cited "see, e.g." Phillip Brown v. Paul Caspari, Superintendent
8th Cir. · 1999 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Laws v. Armontrout, 863 F.2d 1377, 1381 (8th Cir.1988) (en banc), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1040 , 109 S.Ct. 1944 , 104 L.Ed.2d 415 (1989).
cited Cited "see, e.g." Phillip Brown v. Paul Caspari
8th Cir. · 1999 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Laws v. Armontrout, 863 F.2d 1377, 1381 (8th Cir. 1988) (en banc), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1040 (1989).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Robert A. Brecheen v. Dan Reynolds, Warden of the Oklahoma State Penitentiary (2×)
10th Cir. · 1994 · signal: see also · confidence low
If counsel had "a reasonable basis for his strategic decision that an explanation of petitioner's history would not have minimized the risk of the death penalty," Burger, 483 U.S. at 795 , 107 S.Ct. at 3126 , quoted in Devier, 3 F.3d at 1453 , then that decision must be given "a strong presumption of correctness" and "the inquiry is generally at an end." Porter, 14 F.3d at 557 ; see also Laws v. Armontrout, 863 F.2d 1377, 1385 (8th Cir.1988) (en banc), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1040 , 109 S.Ct. 1944 , 104 L.Ed.2d 415 (1989).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Darrel Wayne Hill, Appellee/cross-Appellant v. A.L. Lockhart, Director, Arkansas Department of Correction, Appellant/cross-Appellee
8th Cir. · 1994 · signal: compare · confidence low
Compare Whitmore v. Lockhart, 8 F.3d 614, 617 (8th Cir.1993), petition for cert. filed (May 11, 1994), and Laws v. Armontrout, 863 F.2d 1377, 1390 (8th Cir.1988) (en banc), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1040 , 109 S.Ct. 1944 , 104 L.Ed.2d 415 (1989).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." State v. Tyler (2×)
Utah · 1993 · signal: see also · confidence low
Trial was originally set for October 18 and, upon Tyler's waiver of a "speedy" trial, was reset for November 28, 1990. [7] See State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 185 (Utah 1990); State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116 , 118 n. 1 (Utah 1989); State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239 , 1247 n. 5 (Utah 1988). [8] 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). [9] Id. at 698 , 104 S.Ct. at 2070 . [10] Templin, 805 P.2d at 186 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 698 , 104 S.Ct. at 2070 ). [11] Id.; see also Laws v. Armontrout, 863 F.2d 1377, 1381 (8th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1040 , 109 S.Ct. 1944 , 104 L.…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Cherry Yolanda Wheatley
9th Cir. · 1992 · signal: see also · confidence low
"In order to find probable cause based on association with persons engaging in criminal activity, some additional circumstances from which it is reasonable to infer participation in the criminal enterprise must be shown." United States v. Hillison, 733 F.2d 692, 697 (9th Cir.1984); see also United States v. Baron, 860 F.2d 911, 916-17 (9th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1040 (1989). 7 Nervous conduct, lack of eye contact, and speaking in hushed tones are insufficient bases upon which to find probable cause.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." State v. Leonard (2×)
Utah Ct. App. · 1991 · signal: compare · confidence low
Compare United States v. Baron, 860 F.2d 911, 914 (9th Cir.1988) (police exceeded scope of investigative stop by ordering defendant not to touch anything or say anything, and thirty-five minutes later confined her to a small room for questioning), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1040 , 109 S.Ct. 1944 , 104 L.Ed.2d 414 (1989). [11] Although none of the officers testified they actually conducted a search of defendant's vehicle to locate these items, the record does indicate the officers obtained the Intertech invoice from the vehicle at some point.
cited Cited "see, e.g." Bennion v. ANR Production Co.
Utah · 1991 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Inexco Oil Co. v. Oklahoma Corp. Comm’n, 767 P.2d 404, 405 (Okla.1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1040 , 109 S.Ct. 1943 , 104 L.Ed.2d 414 (1989); Amoco Prod.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Leonard Marvin Laws
v.
William Armontrout, Warden
88-6848.
Supreme Court of the United States.
Jun 12, 1989.
490 U.S. 1040
Marshall, Brennan.
Published
Reporter's Syllabus — editorial summary, not part of the Court's opinion

See 490 U.S. 1117, 109 S.Ct. 3179.

On petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.

The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied.

Justice MARSHALL, with whom Justice BRENNAN joins, dissenting.

Adhering to my view that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 231, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 2950, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting), I would grant the petition for certiorari and vacate the death sentence in this case.

Even if I did not hold this view, I would still grant the petition and vacate petitioner's death sentence, so that we might address petitioner's claim that he was denied effective assistance of counsel at the penalty phase of his trial. After an extended hearing, the District Court granted petitioner's writ of habeas corpus, ruling that petitioner had not received effective assistance of counsel, and a panel of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed. The panel's judgment, however, was overturned by the Court of Appeals sitting en banc, over a strong dissenting opinion which three judges joined. 863 F.2d 1377, 1394 (1988) (McMillian, J., dissenting, joined by Lay, C.J., and Heaney and Arnold, JJ.).

Lead Opinion

C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Dissent

Justice Marshall, with whom Justice Brennan joins,

dissenting.

Adhering to my view that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 231 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting), I would grant the petition for certiorari and vacate the death sentence in this case.

Even if I did not hold this view, I would still grant the petition and vacate petitioner’s death sentence, so that we might address petitioner’s claim that he was denied effective assistance of counsel at the penalty phase of his trial. After an extended hearing, the District Court granted petitioner’s writ of habeas corpus, ruling that petitioner had not received effective assistance of counsel, and a panel of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed. The panel’s judgment, however, was overturned[*1041] by the Court of Appeals sitting en banc, over a strong dissenting opinion which three judges joined. 868 F. 2d 1377, 1394 (1988) (McMillian, J., dissenting, joined by Lay, C. J., and Heaney and Arnold, JJ.).

In my view, the behavior of petitioner’s attorney at the penalty phase was plainly deficient, depriving his client of “the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668, 687 (1984). The attorney offered literally no evidence in mitigation. This inaction cannot be explained by a dearth of potentially mitigating evidence. On the contrary, the attorney knew of, but failed to investigate, a number of facts about petitioner on which quite credible arguments in mitigation could have been made. Petitioner told his attorney, for example, that he had fought for this country in Vietnam and received an honorable discharge from the Army. 863 F. 2d, at 1396 (dissenting opinion). The attorney, however, failed to pursue this claim. Had he done so, he would have learned that petitioner had earned the National Defense Service Medal, the Vietnam Service Medal, the Vietnam Campaign Medal, and the Good Conduct Medal. Id., at 1397.

The attorney also knew that many of the soldiers who served in the Vietnam conflict suffered severe emotional trauma afterwards, encountering problems of socialization and readjustment. In some cases, they have suffered from posttraumatic stress disorder so severe as to induce violent criminality, a fact recognized by Congress when it passed the Veterans Health Care Amendments of 1979, 38 U. S. C. §612 et seq. 863 F. 2d, at 1396-1397. The attorney failed, too, to explore this potential source of mitigating evidence, deciding after a sketchy telephone conversation with petitioner’s stepmother and after a brief conversation with his brother not to interview the family. Id., at 1395-1396. Had he done so, he would have learned that after his experience in Vietnam, petitioner “changed from a church-going young man who had never had any trouble with the law to a nervous and withdrawn loner constantly in trouble, in and out of prison.” Id., at 1397. The attorney also failed to explore petitioner’s postdischarge psychiatric records, documents which would have provided “even more evidence of [petitioner’s] personality change after his military service in Vietnam.” Ibid.

[*1042] It is questionable, to say the least, whether under these facts counsel’s performance was indeed reasonable so as to satisfy the first prong of the two-pronged test for ineffective assistance set forth in Strickland. This conclusion is especially doubtful given that this is a capital case, posing the heaviest professional responsibility on counsel. Yet that is precisely what the en banc Court of Appeals held in this case. 868 F. 2d, at 1394. In my view, the decision below calls into question whether the Strickland test is to have any vitality at all. To establish that there are minimal thresholds below which counsel cannot go, I would grant the petition for certiorari.