Adams v. Dugger, Sec'y, Florida Dep't of Corr., 490 U.S. 1059 (1989). · Go Syfert
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Adams v. Dugger, Sec'y, Florida Dep't of Corr., 490 U.S. 1059 (1989). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
96 citation events (19 in the last 25 years) across 13 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Thomas Nevius v. E.K. McDaniel Warden, Order (ca9, 2000-05-31)
Treatment trajectory · 1989 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1989 2007 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 13 distinct citers. How cited ↗
cited Cited "see" Thomas Nevius v. E.K. McDaniel Warden, Order
9th Cir. · 2000 · signal: see · confidence high
See Nevius v. Sumner, 852 F.2d 463 (9th Cir.1988) (“Nevius I”), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1059 , 109 S.Ct. 1972 , 104 L.Ed.2d 441 (1989).
discussed Cited "see" Carson v. State
Tex. App. · 1998 · signal: see · confidence high
See Purtell v. State, 761 S.W.2d 360, 370 (Tex.Crim.App.1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1059 , 109 S.Ct. 1972 , 104 L.Ed.2d 441 (1989); Tex. Pen.Code Ann. § 9.31 (Vernon 1994, Vernon Supp.1998), § 9.32 (Vernon Supp.1998).
discussed Cited "see" Charles E. McDowell v. Arthur Calderon, Warden of the California State Prison at San Quentin (2×)
9th Cir. · 1997 · signal: see · confidence high
See McDowell v. California, 490 U.S. 1059 , 109 S.Ct. 1972 , 104 L.Ed.2d 441 (1989) (denying petition for certiorari on direct appeal).
cited Cited "see" Fletcher v. State
Tex. App. · 1997 · signal: see · confidence high
See Purtell v. State, 761 S.W.2d 360, 370-71 (Tex.Cr.App.1988), ce rt. denied, 490 U.S. 1059 , 109 S.Ct. 1972 , 104 L.Ed.2d 441 (1989); Jackson v. State, 745 S.W.2d 4, 18 (Tex.Cr.App.1988).
discussed Cited "see" Marion F. Miller, Jr. v. Robert G. Borg
9th Cir. · 1992 · signal: see · confidence high
See Nevius v. Sumner, 852 F.2d 463, 466-67 (9th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1059 (1989); see also Allen v. Hardy, 478 U.S. 255, 257-61 (1986) (per curiam) ( Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) does not apply retroactively to convictions such as Miller's that were already final when Batson was announced). 7 Miller next contends that he was denied a fair trial by the introduction of the following evidence at trial: (1) expert testimony regarding Miller's eye condition by an allegedly unqualified expert, who was a general practitioner and not an opthamologist, (2) blood grouping and hair…
cited Cited "see" Ramos v. State
Tex. App. · 1991 · signal: see · confidence high
See Purtell v. State, 761 S.W.2d 360, 366 (Tex.Crim.App.1988), cer t. denied, 490 U.S. 1059 , 109 S.Ct. 1972 , 104 L.Ed.2d 441 (1989).
discussed Cited "see" Bobby R. Savage v. Wayne Estelle, Warden
9th Cir. · 1991 · signal: see · confidence high
See Nevius v. Sumner, 852 F.2d 463, 466 (9th Cir.1988), ce rt. denied, 490 U.S. 1059 , 109 S.Ct. 1972 , 104 L.Ed.2d 441 (1989). 3 II Criminal defendants have a constitutional right to forgo the assistance of counsel and to represent themselves instead.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Owens v. State
Tex. App. · 1996 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Purtell v. State, 761 S.W.2d 360, 369 (Tex.Crim.App.1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1059 , 109 S.Ct. 1972 , 104 L.Ed.2d 441 (1989) (confession by small-town minister of homosexual conduct); Robinson v. Harkins & Co., 711 S.W.2d 619, 621 (Tex.1986) (statement by husband that he was responsible for an automobile accident whereby his wife became a paraplegic).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Evans v. State
Tex. App. · 1994 · signal: see also · confidence low
See Tex.Penal Code Ann. § 9.31 (Vernon 1974) (self-defense); Hatley v. State, 533 S.W.2d 27, 29 (Tex.Crim.App.1976) (in prosecution for murder, it is not admissible to show victim’s character by isolated acts); see also Purtell v. State, 761 S.W.2d 360 (Tex.Crim.App.1988), ce rt. denied, 490 U.S. 1059 , 109 S.Ct. 1972 , 104 L.Ed.2d 441 (1989) (murder victim’s character was not essential element of capital murder or defense).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." William Andrews v. Gary Deland, Director of Utah Department of Corrections, and M. Eldon Barnes, Warden, Utah State Prison, William Andrews v. M. Eldon Barnes, Warden, Utah State Prison
10th Cir. · 1991 · signal: see also · confidence low
Our reading of Swain, convinces us that in such circumstances a court need not blind itself to the obvious and the court may review the prosecutor's motives to determine whether "the purposes of the peremptory challenge are being perverted." 93 Id. at 1496 (quoting Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. at 224 , 85 S.Ct. at 838 ); see also Nevius v. Sumner, 852 F.2d 463, 467-68 (9th Cir.1988) (following Weathersby), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1059 , 109 S.Ct. 1972 , 104 L.Ed.2d 441 (1989); Garrett v. Morris, 815 F.2d 509, 511 (8th Cir.1987) ("Although the Supreme Court [in Swain ] declined to require an inqui…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Andrews v. Deland
10th Cir. · 1991 · signal: see also · confidence low
Our reading of Swain, convinces us that in such circumstances a court need not blind itself to the obvious and the court may review the prosecutor's motives to determine whether "the purposes of the peremptory challenge are being perverted." Id. at 1496 (quoting Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. at 224 , 85 S.Ct. at 838 ); see also Nevius v. Sumner, 852 F.2d 463, 467-68 (9th Cir.1988) (following Weathersby), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1059 , 109 S.Ct. 1972 , 104 L.Ed.2d 441 (1989); Garrett v. Morris, 815 F.2d 509, 511 (8th Cir.1987) ("Although the Supreme Court [in Swain] declined to require an inquiry i…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Grunsfeld v. State (2×)
Tex. App. · 1991 · signal: see also · confidence low
Goode, supra, § 405.3 at 149-50 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted); see also Purtell v. State, 761 S.W.2d 360, 369 (Tex.Crim.App.1988), cert, denied, 490 U.S. 1059 , 109 S.Ct. 1972 , 104 L.Ed.2d 441 (1989).
cited Cited "see, e.g." Jose Tamayo-Reyes v. J.C. Keeney
9th Cir. · 1991 · signal: see also · confidence low
See Townsend, 372 U.S. at 307 , 83 S.Ct. at 754 ; see also Nevius v. Sumner, 852 F.2d 463, 466 (9th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1059 , 109 S.Ct. 1972 , 104 L.Ed.2d 441 (1989).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Aubrey Dennis Adams, Jr.
v.
Richard L. Dugger, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections
88-7140 (A-875).
Supreme Court of the United States.
May 3, 1989.
490 U.S. 1059
Brennan, Marshall.
Cited by 1 opinion  |  Published
Reporter's Syllabus — editorial summary, not part of the Court's opinion

On petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.

The application for stay of execution of sentence of death presented to Justice KENNEDY and by him referred to the Court is denied. The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied.

Justice BRENNAN, with whom Justice MARSHALL joins, dissenting.

Lead Opinion

C. A. 11th Cir. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Kennedy, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Certiorari denied.

Dissent

Justice Brennan, with whom Justice Marshall joins,

dissenting.

I

Adhering to my view that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth[*1060] and Fourteenth Amendments, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 227 (1976), I would grant the motion for a stay of execution and the petition for a writ of certiorari and vacate the death sentence in this case.

II

Even if I did not take this view, I would grant the petition to consider whether the sentencing procedure in this case violated the Eighth Amendment requirement that a convicted defendant have the opportunity to present any relevant mitigating evidence— not just statutory mitigating factors — at the sentencing hearing. Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U. S. 393 (1987). The Florida Supreme Court declined to find petitioner’s Hitchcock claim procedurally barred and addressed this claim on the merits. Adams v. State, 543 So. 2d 1244, 1247 (1989). Likewise, the District Court addressed the merits, determining that petitioner’s “is not a proper Hitchcock issue.” No. 89-67-Civ-Oc-16, p. 5 (MD Fla., May 3, 1989). Moreover, since Hitchcock was not decided until after petitioner had filed his second federal habeas petition, I detect no abuse of the writ in petitioner raising this claim now for the first time.

At the time petitioner was sentenced, Florida’s “standard jury instructions included a charge which had the effect of limiting the jury’s consideration to the statutory aggravating and mitigating circumstances,” 543 So. 2d, at 1247, reflecting what may have been the general belief in the State, based upon decisions such as Cooper v. State, 336 So. 2d 1133 (Fla. 1976), that mitigating factors not specifically itemized in the statute, Fla. Stat. §921.141 (1975), were not to be taken into account in sentencing. Reasonably believing that state law prohibited a jury or court from considering nonstatutory factors at sentencing, a Florida lawyer might rationally have declined to divert resources from other aspects of case development into the investigation, development, and presentation of evidence of such factors. Indeed, two of petitioner’s counsel have filed affidavits to the effect that, operating on the basis of what they understood to be the law at the time, they did not pursue nonstatutory mitigating evidence because they did not believe it would be admissible. I would grant certiorari in this case to consider whether state-generated disincentives to the pursuit and presentation of mitigating evidence infected petitioner’s sentencing with constitutional error.

[*1061] The trial judge in this case initially denied petitioner’s request for a sentencing instruction to the jury that they might consider nonstatutory mitigating factors. After the prosecutor’s closing argument at sentencing, however, the trial judge announced that he had changed his mind, and that because the prosecutor’s closing had listed statutory mitigating circumstances as the only mitigating factors the jury could consider, he would give the requested instruction that ‘“[t]he aggravating circumstances which you may consider are limited to those upon which I’ve just instructed you. However, there is no such limitation upon the mitigating factors you may consider.’” See 543 So. 2d, at 1247. This change of mind appears to have come too late to allow petitioner’s counsel to develop the mitigating evidence that the court’s prior ruling, and existing Florida law, had reasonably led them to believe would be inadmissible. A belated instruction to consider mitigating evidence cannot cure a defect the effect of which has been to ensure that there is little or no nonstatutory mitigating evidence for the jury or court to consider.