green
Positive treatment
Quoted verbatim 1×
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cited 2× by 1 distinct case, last quoted 2002 ·
…since the entitlement analysis focuses on the degree of official discretion and not on the probability of its favorable exercise, the question of whether an applicant has a property interest will normally be a matter of law for the court.
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Treatment trajectory · 1990 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
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2026
Top citers, strongest first. 30 distinct citers.
How cited ↗
examined
Cited as authority (quoted)
Kiely Construction, L.L.C. v. City of Red Lodge Ex Rel. Red Lodge City Council
(2×)
since the entitlement analysis focuses on the degree of official discretion and not on the probability of its favorable exercise, the question of whether an applicant has a property interest will normally be a matter of law for the court.
discussed
Cited "see"
Matter of Riedman Acquisitions, LLC v. Town Bd. of Town of Mendon
Here, the court erred in granting petitioners' request for attorneys' fees because they did not show that "there is either a 'certainty or a very strong likelihood' that an application for approval would have been granted" ( Bower Assoc. , 2 NY3d at 628 , quoting Harlen Assoc. v Incorporated Vil. of Mineola , 273 F3d 494, 504 [2d Cir 2001]; see RRI Realty Corp. v Incorporated Vil. of Southampton , 870 F2d 911, 918 [2d Cir 1989], cert denied 493 US 893 [1989]).
cited
Cited "see"
D'Amico v. Johnson
See RRI Realty Corp. v. Southampton, 870 F.2d 911 , 918 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 893 , 110 S. Ct. 240 , 107 L.
cited
Cited "see"
Saldin Securities, Inc. v. Snohomish County
See RRI Realty Corp. v. Incorporated Village of Southampton, 870 F.2d 911, 918 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 893 , 110 S.Ct. 240 , 107 L.Ed.2d 191 (1989). [9] 3.
cited
Cited "see"
Saldin Securities, Inc. v. Snohomish County
See RRI Realty Corp. v. Incorporated Village of Southampton, 870 P.2d 911, 918 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 893 , 110 S. Ct. 240 , 107 L.
discussed
Cited "see"
Standard Materials, Inc. v. City of Slidell
See RRI Realty Corporation v. Incorporated Village of Southampton, 870 F.2d 911 , 915 (2d Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 893 , 110 S.Ct. 240 , 107 L.Ed.2d 191 (1989). [17] Bren Bishop testified that the batch plants at the Front Street site had operated "[s]ince probably in the fifties." The Zoning Code was adopted and became effective in 1966. [18] We also note that Standard's expectation that a batch plant would be a permissible use at the Bayou Liberty site is called into doubt by the testimony of its own air pollution expert, Shau-Nong Chang, who admitted that it was at least "debatable…
discussed
Cited "see"
Equus Associates Ltd. v. Town of Southampton
See. e.g., RRI Realty Corp. v. Incorporated Village of Southampton, 870 F.2d 911 (2d Cir.) (analyzing whether applicant possessed property interest in building permit), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 893 , 110 S.Ct. 240 , 107 L.Ed.2d 191 (1989); Sullivan v. Town of Salem, 805 F.2d 81, 84-85 (2d Cir.1986) (analyzing whether applicant possessed property interest in certificate of occupancy); Yale Auto Parts v. Johnson, 758 F.2d 54, 58-60 (2d Cir.1985) (analyzing whether applicant possessed property interest in permit to use property as automobile junkyard).
discussed
Cited "see"
Deepwells Estates Inc. v. Incorporated Village of Head of the Harbor
See RRI Realty Corp. v. Incorporated Village of Southampton, 870 F.2d 911, 918 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 893 , 110 S.Ct. 240 , 107 L.Ed.2d 191 (1989); Yale Auto Parts, Inc. v. Johnson, 758 F.2d 54, 59 (2d Cir.1985).
discussed
Cited "see"
October Twenty-Four, Inc. v. Town of Plainville
To support a finding that a zoning regulation violated a plaintiff's substantive due process rights, the plaintiff must show that (a) he had a protectable "property interest," Brady v. Town of Colchester, 863 F.2d 205, 211-12 (2d Cir.1988); see RRI Realty Corp. v. Incorporated Village of Southampton, 870 F.2d 911, 916 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 893 (1989), and (b) the contested regulation was "clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare," Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926); see …
discussed
Cited "see"
Gerhard Langguth, and His Supporters v. W.J. McCuen as Secretary of State of the State of Arkansas
See Manifold v. Blunt, 863 F.2d 1368, 1374 (8th Cir. 1988) (state has compelling interest in administering election process), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 893 (1989). 6 To survive constitutional scrutiny, the statute's restrictions must be necessary to serve these compelling state interests, and must not go beyond what Arkansas's interests actually require.
examined
Cited "see"
Kelley Property Development, Inc. v. Town of Lebanon
(4×)
also: Cited "see, e.g."
See Red Maple Properties v. Zoning Commission, 222 Conn. 730, 738-39 , 610 A.2d 1238 (1992), citing RRI Realty Corporation v. Incorporated Village of Southampton, 870 F.2d 911 , 915-18 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 893 , 110 S. Ct. 240 , 107 L.
cited
Cited "see"
Norbert C. Pearson, Also Known as Spike v. City of Grand Blanc, J. Larry Tomlinson
See RRI Realty Corp. v. Incorporated Village of Southampton, 870 F.2d 911, 915-18 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 893 , 110 S.Ct. 240 , 107 L.Ed.2d 191 (1989). 42 .
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Potter v. Incorporated Village of Ocean Beach
See, e.g., RRI Realty Corp. v. Incorporated Village of Southampton, 870 F.2d 911 (2d Cir.) (analyzing whether applicant possessed property interest in building permit), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 893 , 110 S.Ct. 240 , 107 L.Ed.2d 191 (1989); Sullivan v. Town of Salem, 805 F.2d 81 , 84–85 (2d Cir.1986) (analyzing whether applicant possessed property interest in certificate of occupancy); Yale Auto Parts v. Johnson, 758 F.2d 54 , 58–60 (2d Cir.1985) (analyzing whether applicant possessed property interest in permit to use property as automobile junkyard).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Ford v. Skorich (In Re Skorich)
Compare In re Quality Holstein Leasing, 752 F.2d 1009, 1013 (5th Cir.1985), with Belisle v. Plunkett, 877 F.2d 512, 515 (7th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom, 493 U.S. 893 , 110 S.Ct. 241 , 107 L.Ed.2d 191 (1989); see also 11 U.S.C. § 541 (d).
cited
Cited "see, e.g."
Leland v. Moran
See, e.g., RRI Realty Corp. v. Incorporated Village of Southampton, 870 F.2d 911, 918 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 893 , 110 S.Ct. 240 , 107 L.Ed.2d 191 (1989).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
T.S. Haulers, Inc. v. Town of Riverhead
See, e.g., RRI Realty Corp. v. Incorporated Village of Southampton, 870 F.2d 911 (2d Cir.) (analyzing whether applicant possessed property in building permit), ce rt. denied, 493 U.S. 893 , 110 S.Ct. 240 , 107 L.Ed.2d 191 (1989); Sullivan v. Town of Salem, 805 F.2d 81, 84-85 (2d Cir.1986) (analyzing whether applicant possessed property interest in permit to use property as automobile junkyard).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Hampton Bays Connections, Inc. v. Duffy
See, e.g., RRI Realty Corp. v. Incorporated Village of Southampton, 870 F.2d 911 (2d Cir.) (analyzing whether applicant possessed property interest in building permit), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 893 , 110 S.Ct. 240 , 107 L.Ed.2d 191 (1989); Sullivan v. Toum of Salem, 805 F.2d 81, 84-85 (2d Cir.1986) (analyzing whether applicant possessed property interest in certificate of occupancy); Yale Auto Parts v. Johnson, 758 F.2d 54 , 58-60 (2d Cir.1985) (analyzing whether applicant possessed property interest in permit to use property as automobile junkyard).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
East Hampton Airport Property Owners Ass'n v. Town Board
See, e.g., RRI Realty Corp. v. Incorporated Village of Southampton, 870 F.2d 911 (2d Cir.) (analyzing whether applicant possessed property interest in building permit), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 893 , 110 S.Ct. 240 , 107 L.Ed.2d 191 (1989); Sullivan v. Town of Salem, 805 *145 F.2d 81, 84-85 (2d Cir.1986) (analyzing whether applicant possessed property interest in a certificate of occupancy); Yale Auto Parts v. Johnson, 758 F.2d 54 , 58-60 (2d Cir.1985) (analyzing whether applicant possessed property interest in permit to use property as automobile junkyard).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Penlyn Development Corp. v. Incorporated Village of Lloyd Harbor
See, e.g., RRI Realty Corp. v. Incorporated Village of Southampton, 870 F.2d 911 (2d Cir.) (analyzing whether applicant possessed property interest in building permit), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 893 , 110 S.Ct. 240 , 107 L.Ed.2d 191 (1989); Sullivan v. Town of Salem, 805 F.2d 81, 84-85 (2d Cir.1986) (analyzing whether applicant possessed property interest in a certificate of occupancy); Yale Auto Parts v. Johnson, 758 F.2d 54, 58-60 (2d Cir.1985) (analyzing whether applicant possessed property interest in permit to use property as automobile junkyard).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
United States v. Schmitt
See, e.g., RRI Realty Corp. v. Incorporated Village of Southampton, 870 F.2d 911 (2d Cir.1989) (analyzing whether applicant possessed property interest in building permit), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 893 , 110 S.Ct. 240 , 107 L.Ed.2d 191 . (1989); Sullivan v. Town of Salem. 805 F.2d 81, 84-85 (2d Cir.1986) (analyzing whether applicant possessed property interest in certificate of occupancy); Yale Auto Parts v. Johnson, 758 F.2d 54 , 58-60 (2d Cir.1985) (analyzing whether applicant possessed property interest in permit to use property as automobile junkyard).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Reed's of Armonk Building Supply, Inc. v. Curry
To state a claim pursuant to 42 USC § 1983 in the case before us, the plaintiff had to first establish that it had a valid property interest in a benefit that was entitled to constitutional protection at the time the plaintiff was deprived of that benefit (see, Zahra v Town of Southold, 48 F3d 674 ; Gagliardi v Village of Pawling, 18 F3d 188 ; see also, RRI Realty Corp. v Incorporated Vil. of Southampton, 870 F2d 911, 918, cert denied 493 US 893 ).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
A.B.C. Home Furnishings, Inc. v. Town of East Hampton
See, e.g., RRI Realty Corp. v. Incorporated Village of Southampton, 870 F.2d 911 (2d Cir.) (analyzing whether applicant possessed property interest in building permit), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 893 , 110 S.Ct. 240 , 107 L.Ed.2d 191 (1989); Sullivan v. Town of Salem, 805 F.2d 81, 84-85 (2d Cir.1986) (analyzing whether applicant possessed property interest in certificate of occupancy); Yale Auto Parts v. Johnson, 758 F.2d 54 , 58-60 (2d Cir.1985) (analyzing whether applicant possessed property interest in permit to use property as automobile junkyard).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Washington Legal Clinic for the Homeless, Inc. v. Barry
The test was presented by the Second Circuit as “whether, absent the alleged denial of due process, there is either a certainty or a very strong likelihood, that the application would have been granted.” Yale Auto Parts, Inc. v. Johnson, 758 F.2d 54, 59 (2d Cir.1985); see also Ressler v. Pierce, 692 F.2d 1212 (9th Cir.1982). “[A]pplication of the test must focus primarily on the degree of discretion enjoyed by the [government], not the estimated probability that the [government] will act favorably in a particular case.” RRI Realty Corp. v. Southampton, 870 F.2d 911 , 918 (2d Cir.), cer…
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Walz v. Town Of Smithtown
See, e.g., RRI Realty Corp. v. Incorporated Village of Southampton, 870 F.2d 911 (2d Cir.) (analyzing whether applicant possessed property interest in building permit), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 893 , 110 S.Ct. 240 , 107 L.Ed.2d 191 (1989); Sullivan v. Town of Salem, 805 F.2d 81, 84-85 (2d Cir.1986) (analyzing whether applicant possessed property interest in certificate of occupancy); Yale Auto Parts v. Johnson, 758 F.2d 54 , 58-60 (2d Cir.1985) (analyzing whether applicant possessed property interest in permit to use property as automobile junkyard). 16 In Yale Auto Parts, 758 F.2d at 59, we sta…
cited
Cited "see, e.g."
Gagliardi v. Village Of Pawling
See, e.g., RRI Realty Corp. v. Incorporated Village of Southampton, 870 F.2d 911, 918 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 893 , 110 S.Ct. 240 , 107 L.Ed.2d 191 (1989).
cited
Cited "see, e.g."
Gagliardi v. Village of Pawling
See, e.g., RRI Realty Corp. v. Incorporated Village of Southampton, 870 F.2d 911, 918 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 893 , 110 S.Ct. 240 , 107 L.Ed.2d 191 (1989).
cited
Cited "see, e.g."
Carr v. Town of Bridgewater
See, e.g., RRI Realty Corporation v. Incorporated Village of Southampton, 870 F.2d 911 , 918-19 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 893 , 110 S. Ct. 240 , 107 L.
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Fulani v. Krivanek
Compare Manifold v. Blunt, 863 F.2d 1368 , 1373 & n. 9 (8th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 893 , 110 S.Ct. 242 , 107 L.Ed.2d 192 (1989) (applying strict scrutiny and rejecting Anderson test); Dixon v. Maryland St.
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Fulani v. Krivanek
Compare Manifold v. Blunt, 863 F.2d 1368 , 1373 & n. 9 (8th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 893 , 110 S.Ct. 242 , 107 L.Ed.2d 192 (1989) (applying strict scrutiny and rejecting Anderson test); Dixon v. Maryland St.
cited
Cited "see, e.g."
Karan v. Adams
See e.g., RRI Realty Corp. v. Southampton, 870 F.2d 911 , 917 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 893 , 110 S.Ct. 240 , 107 L.Ed.2d 191 (1989) (discussing cases).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Marker et ux.
v.
Rieschel
v.
Rieschel
No. 89-254.
Supreme Court of the United States.
Oct 10, 1989.
Published
Citer courts: Montana Supreme Court (2)
C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.