green
Positive treatment
Quoted verbatim 2×
11.3 score
G Cite
cited 2× by 2 distinct cases, last quoted 1998 ·
…it is only when a court can say that the publication is not reasonably capable of any defamatory meaning and cannot be reasonably understood in any defamatory sense that it can rule, as a matter of law, that it was not libelous
⚠ not in text
Treatment trajectory · 1995 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1995
2010
2026
Top citers, strongest first. 12 distinct citers.
How cited ↗
examined
Cited as authority (quoted)
Taj Mahal Travel v. Delta Airlines
it is only when a court can say that the publication is not reasonably capable of any defamatory meaning and cannot be reasonably understood in any defamatory sense that it can rule, as a matter of law, that it was not libelous
examined
Cited as authority (quoted)
Taj Mahal Travel, Inc. v. Delta Airlines Inc. Air Canada Airlines Reporting Corporation
(2×)
it is only when a court can say that the publication is not reasonably capable of any defamatory meaning and cannot be reasonably understood in any defamatory sense that it can rule, as a matter of law, that it was not -libelous
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
BORDEN v. NGM INSURANCE COMPANY
(2×)
Ct. 2013) (citing Miller v. Keystone, 636 A.2d 1109, 1113 (Pa. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 875 (1994)). 44 Id. 45 Id. at 929-31. 46 Id. at 930. 10 Much like the insured in Albert, Plaintiff does not allege that NGM deceived him or persuaded him not to assert his UIM rights under the Policy.
discussed
Cited "see"
Mark Ash v. Allstate Insurance Company
See Bright v. QSP, Inc., 20 F.3d 1300, 1306 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 875 (1994) (applying West Virginia law, and stating that, because an “action for unjust enrichment is quasi-contractual in nature[, it] may not be brought in the face of an express contract.”) From the face of petitioner’s complaint, it is clear that his unjust enrichment claim arises from an express contract – his insurance policy with Allstate.
discussed
Cited "see"
Johnson v. United States
See Bright v. QSP, Inc., 20 F.3d 1300, 1305 (4th Cir.1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 875 , 115 S.Ct. 202 , 130 L.Ed.2d 133 (1994); Waterman v. Batton, 294 F.Supp.2d 709 , 715 n. 11 (D.Md.2003), reversed on other grounds by 393 F.3d 471 (4th Cir.2005). .
discussed
Cited "see"
Erica Kaur Ghotra, Minor, by Susan Ghotra Her Guardian Ad Litem Ravinder Singh Ghotra, Minor, by Susan Ghotra, His Guardian Ad Litem Susan Ghotra, an Individual, and as Administratrix of the Estate of Kuldip S. Ghotra Amolak Singh Ghotra and Sarjit Kaur Ghotra v. Bandila Shipping, Inc. \M/v Gracious\"
See Craig v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 19 F.3d 472, 476 (9th Cir.) ("where a federal court has an independent basis of jurisdiction over cases involving admiralty claims, such as diversity of citizenship, both the defendant and plaintiff have a right to demand a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment so long as the suit is one that could traditionally have been brought 'at common law.' "), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 875 , 115 S.Ct. 203 , 130 L.Ed.2d 133 (1994); Wilmington Trust, 934 F.2d at 1029 ("The 'savings-to-suitors' clause establishes the right of a party to choose whether to proceed within th…
discussed
Cited "see"
Ghotra ex rel. Ghotra v. Bandila Shipping, Inc.
See Craig v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 19 F.3d 472, 476 (9th Cir.) (“where a federal court has an independent basis of jurisdiction over cases involving admiralty claims, such as diversity of citizenship, both the defendant and plaintiff have a right to demand a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment so long as the suit is one that could traditionally have been brought ‘at common law.’”), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 875 , 115 S.Ct. 203 , 130 L.Ed.2d 133 (1994); Wilmington Trust, 934 F.2d at 1029 (“The ‘savings-to-suitors’ clause establishes the right of a party to choose whether to proc…
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Mary Johnson v. United States
Laber v. Harvey, 438 F.3d 404, 415 (4th Cir.2006) (en banc); see also Bright v. QSP, Inc., 20 F.3d 1300, 1305 (4th Cir.1994), ce rt. denied, 513 U.S. 875 , 115 S.Ct. 202 , 130 L.Ed.2d 133 (1994) (statements in a party’s pleadings are conclusively binding on that party). 3 .
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
County Commissioners v. J. Roland Dashiell & Sons, Inc.
See also Bright v. QSP, Inc., 20 F.3d 1300, 1306 (4th Cir.) ("[N]o quasi-contractual recovery is possible ‘when the parties have clearly and plainly expressed in writing the actual contract between them'.” (quoting Shanks v. Wilson, 86 F.Supp. 789, 794 (S.D.W.Va.1949))), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 875 , 115 S.Ct. 202 , 130 L.Ed.2d 133 (1994); In re Chateaugay Corp., 10 F.3d 944 , 958 (2d Cir.1993) (" ‘[T]he existence of a valid and enforceable written contract governing a particular subject matter ordinarily precludes recovery in quasi contract for events arising out of the same subject matt…
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Cowan v. Treetop Enterprises, Inc.
As to whether Mr. Shaub is an employer under the FLSA, under 29 U.S.C. § 203 (d), the FLSA defines an “employer” to include “any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee.” In Dole v. Elliott Travel & Tours, Inc., 942 F.2d 962, 965 (6th Cir.1991), this Circuit utilized the “economic reality” test on whether a party is an employer: “a corporate officer with operational control of a corporation’s covered enterprise is an employer along with the corporation, jointly and severally liable under the FLSA for unpaid wages.” Id. (…
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Jewell v. NYP Holdings, Inc.
See, e.g., Moldea v. New York Times Co., 22 F.3d 310, 319 (D.C.Cir.1994) (“Application of the ‘substantial truth’ test when ‘incremental harm’ is not tolerated can be conceptually confusing.”), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 875 , 115 S.Ct. 202 , 130 L.Ed.2d 133 (1994); Haynes v. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 8 F.3d 1222, 1228 (7th Cir.1993) (Posner, J.) (“The rule of substantial truth is based on a recognition that falsehoods which do no incremental damage to the plaintiffs reputation do not injure the only interest that the law of defamation protects.”); Robert D.
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Coffey v. Dobbs International Services, Inc.
See, e.g., Parke-Hayden, Inc. v. Loews Theatre Management Corp., 1993 WL 287815 , at *2 (S.D.N.Y.) (“The court should grant judgment as a matter of law if the charge creates substantial and ineradicable doubt about whether the jury has been properly guided in its deliberations.”) (citing Pierce v. Ramsey Winch Co., 753 F.2d 416, 425 (5th Cir.1985)), aff'd, 22 F.3d 1091 (2d Cir.), cert, denied, 513 U.S. 875 , 115 S.Ct. 203 , 130 L.Ed.2d 133 (1994).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Grove North America, Division of Kidde Industries, Inc.
v.
Lowe
v.
Lowe
No. 94-196.
Supreme Court of the United States.
Oct 3, 1994.
513 U.S. 875
Published
Citer courts: Third Circuit (3)
Sup. Ct. Ala. Certiorari denied.