green
Positive treatment
Quoted verbatim 1×
11.1 score
“situations in which a trial judge must find implied bias are strictly limited and must be truly 'exceptional”
Treatment trajectory · 1998 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1998
2012
2026
Top citers, strongest first. 21 distinct citers.
How cited ↗
discussed
Cited as authority (quoted)
Commonwealth v. Mattier
situations in which a trial judge must find implied bias are strictly limited and must be truly 'exceptional
discussed
Cited "see"
United States v. J'son Allbritton
In Fuentes Torres, we held that, if note 14(A) applies, and if the “in connection with” finding is made, “it will rarely be clearly erroneous.” Id.; accord United States v. Regans, 125 F.3d 685, 687 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1065 (1998).
cited
Cited "see"
United States v. Orr
See United States v. Barr, 130 F.3d 711, 712 (5th Cir.1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1065 , 118 S.Ct. 1398 , 140 L.Ed.2d 656 (1998).
discussed
Cited "see"
United States v. Mark Allen Hallam
See United States v. Regans, 125 F.3d 685, 687 (8th Cir.1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1065 , 118 S.Ct. 1398 , 140 L.Ed.2d 656 (1998) (quoting U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 comment. (n. 3)); United States v. Kanatzar, 370 F.3d 810, 815 (8th Cir.2004), vacated on other grounds by — U.S. -, 125 S.Ct. 1010 , 160 L.Ed.2d 1029 (2005).
discussed
Cited "see"
United States v. Mark Allen Hallam
See United States v. Regans, 125 F.3d 685, 687 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1065 (1997) (quoting U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 comment. (n. 3)); United States v. Kanatzar, 370 F.3d 810, 815 (8th Cir. 2004), vacated on other grounds by 125 S. Ct. 1010 (2005).
cited
Cited "see"
United States v. Randy Lee Vanhorn
See id. 6 We disagree with Vanhorn’s assertion that this was merely a case of money spending.
cited
Cited "see"
United States v. Greer
See United States v. Torres, 128 F.3d 38, 43 (2d Cir.1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1065 , 118 S.Ct. 1399 , 140 L.Ed.2d 657 (1998).
discussed
Cited "see"
Seyler v. Burlington Northern Santa Fe Corp.
See United States v. Cerrato-Reyes, 176 F.3d 1253, 1260 (10th Cir.1999) (“issue for implied bias is whether an average person in the position of the juror in controversy would be prejudiced”) (quoting United States v. Torres, 128 F.3d 38, 45 (2d Cir.1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1065 , 118 S.Ct. 1399 , 140 L.Ed.2d 657 (1998)).
cited
Cited "see"
United States v. Greer
See United States v. Torres, 128 F.3d 38, 43 (2d Cir.1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1065 , 118 S.Ct. 1399 , 140 L.Ed.2d 657 (1998).
cited
Cited "see"
United States v. Greer
See United States v. Torres, 128 F.3d 38, 43 (2d Cir.1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1065 , 118 S.Ct. 1399 , 140 L.Ed.2d 657 (1998).
discussed
Cited "see"
United States v. William Greer
(2×)
See United States v. Torres, 128 F.3d 38, 43 (2d Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1065 (1998).
discussed
Cited "see"
United States v. Any and All Radio Station Transmission Equipment, Radio Frequency Power Amplifiers, Radio Frequency Test Equipment and Any Other Equipment Associated With or Used in Connection With the Transmissions Within the Fm Broadcast Band, Located at 9613 Madison Avenue, Cleveland, Ohio, 44102, William Perez, Claimant-Appellant
See United States v. $129, 727.00 U.S. Currency, 129 F.3d 486 , 493 (9th Cir. 1997) (concluding that notice and hearing are not required in an action for the forfeiture of currency under James Daniel Good Real Property, "[b]ecause the Court explicitly did not require any additional due process safeguards for movable personal property such as currency"), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1065 (1998). 22 In this case, the target of the government's forfeiture action was radio transmission equipment, which is movable personable property.
discussed
Cited "see"
United States v. Any & All Radio Station Transmission Equipment
See United States v. $129, 727.00 U.S. Currency, 129 F.3d 486 , 493 (9th Cir.1997) (concluding that notice and hearing are not required in an action for the forfeiture of currency under James Daniel Good Real Property , “[b]eeause the Court explicitly did not require any additional due process safeguards for movable personal property such as currency”), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1065 , 118 S.Ct. 1399 , 140 L.Ed.2d 657 (1998).
cited
Cited "see"
United States v. Stephen Gene Reynolds
See United States v. Williams, 121 F.3d 615, 618 (11th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1065 , 118 S.Ct. 1398 , 140 L.Ed.2d. 656 (1998).
cited
Cited "see"
United States v. Stephen Gene Reynolds
See United States v. Williams, 121 F.3d 615, 618 (11th Cir.1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1065 , 118 S.Ct. 1398 , 140 L.Ed.2d 656 (1998).
discussed
Cited "see"
United States v. James
See United States v. Torres, 128 F.3d 38 , 42 (1st Cir. 1997) (trial judge has the authority and responsibility, either sua sponte or upon counsel's motion, to dismiss prospective jurors for cause), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1065 (1998).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
United States v. Jacob A. Kanatzar
We have said that “[i]n connection with means that the firearm must have some purpose or effect with respect to, and must facilitate, or have the potential of facilitating, another felony offense; its presence or involvement cannot be the result of accident or coincidence.” United States v. Fredrickson, 195 F.3d 438, 439-40 (8th Cir.1999) (per curiam) (internal quotations omitted); see also United States v. Regans, 125 F.3d 685, 686 (8th Cir.1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1065 , 118 S.Ct. 1398 , 140 L.Ed.2d 656 (1998).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
United States v. Jacob Kanatzar
We have said that "[i]n connection with means that the firearm must have some purpose or effect with respect to, and must facilitate, or have the potential of facilitating, another felony offense; its presence or involvement cannot be the result of accident or coincidence." United States v. Fredrickson, 195 F.3d 438 , 439-40 -5- (8th Cir.1999) (per curiam) (internal quotations omitted); see also United States v. Regans, 125 F.3d 685, 686 (8th Cir.1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1065 (1998).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
United States v. Ture Morrow
We have held that under § 2K2.1(b)(5), “[t]he enhancement must be imposed unless it is clearly improbable that [the defendant] possessed the firearm in connection with another felony offense.” Id.; see also United States v. Regans, 125 F.3d 685, 687 (8th Cir.1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1065 , 118 S.Ct. 1398 , 140 L.Ed.2d 656 (1998).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
United States v. Andrew Niccademous Tyler
(2×)
See, e.g., United States v. Regans, 125 F.3d 685, 686 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1065 (1998), and United States v. Fairchild, 122 F.3d 605 , 614 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1131 (1998). 18 We also uphold the district court's ruling that Mr. Tyler did not qualify for a sentence below the mandatory minimum.
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
United States v. Andrew N. Tyler
See, e.g., United States v. Regans, 125 F.3d 685, 686 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1065 (1998), and United States v. Fairchild, 122 F.3d 605 , 614 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1131 (1998).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Karriem
v.
United States
v.
United States
No. 97-8139.
Supreme Court of the United States.
Apr 6, 1998.
Published
Citer courts: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial… (1)
C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.