(a)When any bond is forfeited and the period of time specified in Section 1305 has elapsed without the forfeiture having been set aside, the court which has declared the forfeiture shall enter a summary judgment against each bondsman named in the bond in the amount for which the bondsman is bound. The judgment shall be the amount of the bond plus costs, and notwithstanding any other law, no penalty assessments shall be levied or added to the judgment.
(b)If a court grants relief from bail forfeiture, it shall impose a monetary payment as a condition of relief to compensate the people for the costs of returning a defendant to custody pursuant to Section 1305, except for cases where
the court determines that in the best interest of justice no costs should be imposed. The amount imposed shall reflect the actual costs of returning the defendant to custody. Failure to act within the required time to make the payment imposed pursuant to this subdivision shall not be the basis for a summary judgment against any or all of the underlying amount of the bail. A summary judgment entered for failure to make the payment imposed under this subdivision is subject to the provisions of Section 1308, and shall apply only to the amount of the costs owing at the time the summary judgment is entered, plus administrative costs and interest.
(c)If, because of the failure of any court to promptly perform the duties enjoined upon it pursuant to this section, summary judgment is not entered within 90 days after the date upon which it may first be entered, the right to do so expires and the bail is exonerated.
(d)A dismissal of the complaint, indictment, or information after the default of the defendant shall not release or affect the obligation of the bail bond or undertaking.
(e)The district attorney or county counsel shall:
(1)Demand immediate payment of the judgment within 30 days after the summary judgment becomes final.
(2)If the judgment remains unpaid for a period of 20 days after demand has been made, shall forthwith enforce the judgment in the manner provided for enforcement of money judgments generally. If the judgment is appealed by the surety or bondsman, the undertaking required to be given in these cases shall be provided by a surety other than the one filing the appeal. The undertaking shall comply with the enforcement requirements of Section
917.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Notwithstanding Sections 85, 580, 904.1, and 904.2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, jurisdiction of the appeal, and treatment of the appeal as a limited civil case or an unlimited civil case, is governed by Section 1305.5.
(f)The right to enforce a summary judgment entered against a bondsman pursuant to this section shall expire two years after the entry of the judgment.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
52
cases (
4 in the last 5 years), 1959–2025 · leading case:
People v. Am. Sur. Co., 242 Cal. Rptr. 3d 676 (Cal. Ct. App. 5th 2019).
People v. Am. Sur. Co., 242 Cal. Rptr. 3d 676 (Cal. Ct. App. 5th 2019).
· cites it 5× “" 6 ( Pen. Code, § 1306, subd. (e)(2) ; see County of Orange v.”
People v. Am. Contractors Indem. Co., 238 Cal. App. 4th 1041 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015).
· cites it 3× “(Pen. Code, § 1305, subds. (b) & (c)(1).) The court may only enter summary judgment when the appearance period “has elapsed without the forfeiture having been set aside.”
People v. Granite State Ins., 2003 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 11099 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003).
· cites it 2× “Penal Code section 1306 sets a 90-day time limit for the entry of summary judgment on bail forfeitures; if the court does not enter summary judgment within 90 days of its first opportunity to do so, its right to do so expires.”
Cnty. of Los Angeles v. Sur. Ins., 162 Cal. App. 3d 58 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
· cites it 2× “]” Speaking of the same 90-day “timeliness” issue raised by the same defendant corporate surety in the case at bench, the 1973 court went on to say “There can be no doubt the Legislature intended to impose a 90-day time limit in which to enter summary judgments on defaulted bail…”
People v. North River Ins., 200 Cal. App. 4th 712 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011).
· cites it 2× “(Pen. Code, § 1306, subd. (a).) However, if a motion to vacate the forfeiture and exonerate the bond is timely filed, it may be heard within 30 days after the expiration of the appearance period.”
Cnty. of San Bernardino v. Ranger Ins., 95 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 3481 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995).
· cites it 3× “) In turn, Penal Code section 1306, as applicable here, provided that the county counsel as well as the district attorney may be the proper attorney to enforce the forfeiture or oppose a motion for relief.”
People v. Amwest Sur. Ins., 97 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 5915 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997).
“(Pen. Code, § 1306.) 1 The summary judgment was entered after Amwest’s motion to exonerate bond was denied and the bond forfeited because the trial court believed a sufficient excuse may have existed for a previous failure to appear in court of the defendant, Avina M.”
People v. Am. Contractors Indem. Co., 2006 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 1012 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006).
· cites it 2× “(Pen. Code, § 1306, subd. (f).) The bail bond company again moved to set aside the judgment, or alternatively to permanently stay its enforcement.”
People v. United Bonding Ins., 489 P.2d 1385 (Cal. 1971).
“In that case almost five years had elapsed between the time the defendant failed to appear and the order of forfeiture. An action pursuant to section 1306, although commenced by Los Angeles County beyond the applicable limitation period if measured from the time of the…”
People v. Indiana Lumbermens Mut. Ins., 226 Cal. App. 4th 1 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014).
“2 Penal Code section 1306 states in relevant part at subdivision (c): “If, because of the failure of any court to promptly perform the duties enjoined upon it pursuant to this section, summary judgment is not entered within 90 days after the date upon which it may first be…”
People v. Topa Ins., 95 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 1088 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995).
“) 4 “There can be no doubt the Legislature intended to impose a 90-day time limit in which to enter summary judgments on defaulted bail which is jurisdictional, for the statute uses the words ‘[or] the right to do so expires and the bail is exonerated.”
People v. Sur. Ins. Co. of Cal., 82 Cal. App. 3d 229 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978).
“” The provision for notice and hearing requires the party seeking to discharge the forfeiture to give the district attorney or other prosecuting attorney notice and an opportunity to be heard.”
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