¹ On the same date, Ellizzette filed a “Motion to Reconsider Order Appointing Administration and Order of Heirship.” The motion to reconsider was substantively identical to the motion to vacate.

² Although the trial court’s April 18, 2018, order references only the denial of Ellizzette’s motion to vacate, we conclude that it also dispensed with the motion to reconsider, which was nearly identical to and raised the same substantive arguments as the motion to vacate.

³ In her November 18, 2019, motion, Ellizzette represented that her father had been declared “ ‘end of life’ Saturday, December 16, 2019.” We presume that Ellizzette meant to state that her father was declared “end of life” on Saturday, November 16, 2019, and not on some future date. - 11 - Ellizzette also represented that she had reconciled the outstanding balance owed to her prior attorneys and requested that they be allowed to reenter an appearance on her behalf. ¶ 61 At a hearing on Ellizzette’s motion for a continuance on November 18, 2019, the trial court, after hearing argument from the parties, denied the motion. The court cited (1) a lack of due diligence on Ellizzette’s part in presenting the motion or obtaining the testimony of Rummerfield and Westacott and (2) Ellizzette’s failure to show that the testimony of the witnesses referenced in her motion would be material to the issues in the case. In response to Ellizzette’s concern regarding her father’s health, the court stated, “If you have another reason for a continuance during the trial, then you’ll bring it up at that point.” The court then asked Ellizzette if she were prepared to proceed. Ellizzette responded that she “would like to proceed with the provision that, God forbid something happens, the court would consider an emergency.” ¶ 62 A litigant does not have an absolute right to a continuance. In re Marriage of LaRocque, 2018 IL App (2d) 160973, ¶ 94. Continuances are within the sound discretion of the trial court. Doe v. Parrillo, 2020 IL App (1st) 191286, ¶ 39; see also 735 ILCS 5/2-1007 (West 2016) (providing that “[o]n good cause shown, in the discretion of the court and on just terms, additional time may be granted for the doing of any act or the taking of any step or proceeding prior to judgment”). A critical factor in the review of such rulings is whether the moving party has exercised due diligence in proceeding with the case. Somers v. Quinn, 373 Ill. App. 3d 87, 96 (2007). Moreover, once a cause has proceeded to trial, a motion for a continuance should show sufficient excuse for the delay, and the movant should present especially grave reasons to support his or her request. Ill. S. Ct. R. 231(f) (eff. Jan. 1, 1970) (“No motion for the continuance of a cause made after the cause has been reached for trial shall be heard, unless a sufficient excuse is shown for the delay.”); Teitelbaum v. Reliable Welding Co., 106 Ill. App. 3d 651, 656 (1982) (“The moving party must give especially grave reasons for continuance once a case has reached the trial stage because of the potential inconvenience to the witnesses, the parties and to the court.”). The decision to grant or deny a trial continuance will not be disturbed on appeal “unless it has resulted in a palpable injustice or constitutes a manifest abuse of discretion.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Doe, 2020 IL App (1st) 191286, ¶ 39. An abuse of discretion occurs where the trial court’s decision is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable or where no reasonable person would agree with the position taken by the trial court. Control Solutions, LLC v. Elecsys, 2014 IL App (2d) 120251, ¶ 38. ¶ 63 Ellizzette argues that the trial court erred when it denied her motion for a continuance, made on the day of trial. In her motion, Ellizzette cited five principal reasons for requesting a continuance. On appeal, however, Ellizzette focuses on just two of those reasons—her father’s illness and her attorneys’ withdrawal. Ellizzette’s failure to argue the three remaining grounds set forth in her motion results in the forfeiture of those bases on appeal. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. May 25, 2018) (providing that points not argued are forfeited and shall not be raised in the reply brief, in oral argument, or on petition for rehearing); BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP v. Mitchell, 2014 IL 116311, ¶ 23 (holding that an appellant’s failure to argue a point in the opening brief results in forfeiture). Moreover, after reviewing the record, we find nothing that would justify a conclusion that the trial court abused its discretion in denying her motion for a continuance on either of the two bases she advances in this appeal. ¶ 64 With respect to her father’s illness, Ellizzette asserted at the hearing on her motion that her father had been hospitalized and declared “end of life” on November 16, 2019, just two days - 12 - earlier. However, this statement is contradicted by an affirmation Ellizzette previously made to the trial court. Notably, at the hearing on November 13, 2019, Ellizzette told the court that three days prior, i.e., November 10, 2019, her father had been declared “end of life” and that he “could die at any day now per the doctors.” Ellizzette could have moved for a continuance at that time but did not. To the contrary, she informed the trial court at the November 13, 2019, hearing that she did not want to waste the court’s time and that she would be present for the trial on November 18, 2019. She then waited until 3:49 a.m. on the day of trial to inform the court that she had changed her mind and wanted to have the trial postponed. Given these circumstances, the trial court could reasonably conclude that Ellizzette did not show due diligence in waiting until the day of trial to file her motion for a continuance. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting this basis for the motion. ¶ 65 Ellizzette also argues that the withdrawal of her attorneys before trial “placed her in a difficult position, which she sought to remedy by obtaining counsel who *** could have refuted the fundamentally flawed legal arguments Shawn presented.” In addressing this issue, Thomas v. Thomas, 23 Ill. App. 3d 936 (1974), is instructive. In that case, the plaintiff’s attorney moved to withdraw from the case, serving notice of his intention on July 5, 1973. The plaintiff appeared at a hearing on July 12, at which the trial court advised her that she should obtain counsel for the trial scheduled for July 17 but that she could file for a continuance if she felt that she would need more time. The plaintiff indicated that she would have counsel for trial, and no continuance was requested. On July 17, for the first time, the plaintiff moved for a continuance because she lacked counsel. The trial court denied the motion. In affirming, the reviewing court observed that the absence of counsel is one factor to consider in deciding a motion to continue but that “it does not entitle a party to a continuance as a matter of right.” Thomas, 23 Ill. App. 3d at 940-41 (citing Adcock v. Adcock, 339 Ill. App. 543, 548 (1950)). The court determined that the lack of counsel “could have been avoided by [the plaintiff’s] own diligence in either securing a lawyer for trial, or requesting a continuance prior to the day of trial.” Thomas, 23 Ill. App. 3d at 940. The court further determined that the 12 days between when counsel served notice of his intent to withdraw and the date of the trial provided the plaintiff with “ample opportunity to extend the time for trial in order to obtain counsel.” Thomas, 23 Ill. App. 3d at 940-41. Accordingly, the court concluded that the trial court properly exercised its judicial discretion in denying the motion for a continuance. Thomas, 23 Ill. App. 3d at 941. ¶ 66 In the present case, Ellizzette had substantially more time to request a continuance to obtain substitute counsel than the plaintiff had in Thomas. In this regard, we note that Ellizzette’s counsel moved to withdraw on September 12, 2019. The motion indicates that Ellizzette was notified by both e-mail and certified mail to her last known addresses. The trial court entered an order on September 18, 2019, granting the motion to withdraw, providing Ellizzette with 21 days to find other counsel and file a substitute appearance, and confirming the scheduled trial date of November 18, 2019. Ellizzette was provided notice of the order granting the withdrawal by certified mail at the same addresses to which the motion to withdraw was sent. The record reflects that Ellizzette did not take any action until October 23, 2019, when she filed an appearance on her own behalf. Further, at no time between October 23 and November 18, 2019, did Ellizzette move the court to retain substitute counsel. In other words, Ellizzette had 68 days between when counsel served notice of their intent to withdraw and the date of the trial to secure substitute counsel or request a continuance. Yet, she did not take any action - 13 - until the day of trial. Given these circumstances, the trial court could reasonably conclude that Ellizzette did not show due diligence in waiting until the day of trial to file her motion for a continuance. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting this basis for the motion. ¶ 67 In short, there was sufficient time for Ellizzette to appear before the court to present a motion for a continuance prior to the date of the trial. Ellizzette, however, waited until the day of trial to move for a continuance. Under these circumstances, the trial court could have reasonably concluded that Ellizzette failed to show due diligence in pursuing her motion for a continuance. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Ellizzette’s motion for a continuance, filed on the day of trial. ¶ 68 C. Judgment on the Pleadings ¶ 69 Next, Ellizzette argues that the trial court erred when it denied her motion for judgment on the pleadings. Section 2-615(e) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-615(e) (West 2016)) provides that “[a]ny party may seasonably move for judgment on the pleadings.” A motion for judgment on the pleadings is like a motion for summary judgment but is limited to the pleadings. Perry v. Fidelity National Title Insurance Co., 2015 IL App (2d) 150168, ¶ 9. Thus, a judgment on the pleadings is proper only when the pleadings disclose no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Gillen v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 215 Ill. 2d 381, 385 (2005); St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. City of Waukegan, 2017 IL App (2d) 160381, ¶ 25. In ruling on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the court considers only those facts apparent from the face of the pleadings, matters subject to judicial notice, and judicial admissions in the record. Gillen, 215 Ill. 2d at 385; St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co., 2017 IL App (2d) 160381, ¶ 25. A party moving for judgment on the pleadings concedes the truth of the well-pled facts in the nonmovant’s pleadings. Allstate Property & Casualty Insurance Co. v. Trujillo, 2014 IL App (1st) 123419, ¶ 16. The court deciding the motion must take all reasonable inferences from those facts as true, disregard all conclusory allegations and surplusage, and construe the evidence strictly against the movant. Parkway Bank & Trust Co. v. Meseljevic, 406 Ill. App. 3d 435, 442 (2010). We review de novo a trial court’s ruling on a motion for judgment on the pleadings. State Bank of Cherry v. CGB Enterprises, Inc., 2013 IL 113836, ¶ 65. ¶ 70 Ellizzette contends that the facts apparent from the face of the pleadings and the judicial admissions of Shawn establish that she was entitled to judgment on the pleadings without the need for a trial. Specifically, Ellizzette asserts that, in her petition for letters of administration and affidavit of heirship, she pleaded that she is decedent’s surviving spouse and his sole heir. Ellizzette further asserts that Shawn failed to deny these allegations in his response to her pleadings and that, as a result, the allegations in her pleadings must be taken as true. See 735 ILCS 5/2-610(b) (West 2016) (“Every allegation *** not explicitly denied [in an answer] is admitted ***.”). As additional support for her position, Ellizzette asserts that Shawn, in his verified petition for declaration of invalidity of marriage, admitted that she and decedent “participated in a marriage ceremony” on July 11, 2017, and that he attached thereto a copy of the certification of marriage. Ellizzette acknowledges that Shawn later filed a notice that he was voluntarily withdrawing his petition for declaration of invalidity of marriage but contends that Shawn remained bound thereby, because he did not allege that these “judicial admissions *** were the result [of] mistake or inadvertence.” See In re Marriage of O’Brien, 247 Ill. App. - 14 - 3d 745, 749 (1993). Ellizzette concludes that, because Shawn’s response to her petition for letters of administration and affidavit of heirship “did not set up a defense that would entitle him to a merits hearing,” the trial court erred when it denied her motion for judgment on the pleadings. We disagree. ¶ 71 As noted above, in ruling on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the court considers the facts apparent from the face of the pleadings, matters subject to judicial notice, and judicial admissions in the record. Gillen, 215 Ill. 2d at 385; St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co., 2017 IL App (2d) 160381, ¶ 25. Illinois courts recognize that documents containing readily verifiable facts from sources of indisputable accuracy may be judicially noticed. People v. Davis, 65 Ill. 2d 157, 165 (1976); Centeno v. Illinois Workers’ Compensation Comm’n, 2020 IL App (2d) 180815WC, ¶ 39; City of Centralia v. Garland, 2019 IL App (5th) 180439, ¶ 10. Public documents that are included in the records of courts and administrative tribunals are subject to judicial notice. People v. Ernest, 141 Ill. 2d 412, 428 (1990); Centeno, 2020 IL App (2d) 180815WC, ¶ 39; Palos Bank & Trust Co. v. Illinois Property Tax Appeal Board, 2015 IL App (1st) 143324, ¶ 11 n.2; People v. Rubalcava, 2013 IL App (2d) 120396, ¶ 31; Curtis v. Lofy, 394 Ill. App. 3d 170, 172 (2009); NBD Highland Park Bank, N.A. v. Wien, 251 Ill. App. 3d 512, 520-21 (1993); In re McDonald, 144 Ill. App. 3d 1082, 1085 (1986). ¶ 72 Ellizzette’s position ignores that the trial court was entitled to take judicial notice of its own files and records. See Palos Bank & Trust Co., 2015 IL App (1st) 143324, ¶ 11 n.2. Likewise, this court may take judicial notice of the trial court’s file. People v. Fields, 2020 IL App (1st) 151735, ¶ 58; People v. Alvarez-Garcia, 395 Ill. App. 3d 719, 726-27 (2009). In this case, the trial court’s file demonstrates that in December 2017 Shawn filed a petition for letters of administration and affidavit of heirship. In the affidavit of heirship, Shawn stated as follows. He was appointed the plenary guardian of the person and estate of decedent on May 30, 2017. Decedent was survived by his parents and his three siblings. Decedent had been married “once and only once and then to Debbie Greene McDonald,” with said marriage ending in divorce sometime prior to 2012. Although decedent “participated in a wedding ceremony with Ellizzette Duvall Minnicelli” on July 11, 2017, the marriage was void ab initio because decedent lacked the capacity to consent to the marriage. The trial court’s file further demonstrates that on December 19, 2017, the trial court entered (1) an order appointing Shawn as the independent administrator of decedent’s estate and (2) an order declaring heirship, which designated decedent’s parents and his three siblings as his only heirs. The facts that decedent’s parents and his three siblings were named as his only heirs and that Shawn was appointed as the independent administrator of decedent’s estate were subject to judicial notice, as they were readily verifiable. See In re Linda B., 2017 IL 119392, ¶ 31 n.7 (“Public documents, such as those included in the records of other courts and administrative tribunals, fall within the category of ‘readily verifiable’ facts capable of instant and unquestionable demonstration of which a court may take judicial notice.”); Centeno, 2020 IL App (2d) 180851WC, ¶ 39 (holding that the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Commission properly considered arbitrator decision and transcript from another case, as such information was “readily verifiable and aided in the efficient disposition of the case”). Accordingly, considering the facts apparent from the face of the pleadings, matters subject to judicial notice, and any judicial admissions, the record shows that there remained a genuine issue of material fact as to Ellizzette’s status as decedent’s surviving spouse and sole heir. See In re Estate of Davis, 225 Ill. App. 3d at 1000 (“On a motion for judgment on the pleadings, if the pleadings put in issue one or more material - 15 - facts, evidence must be taken to resolve such issues, and judgment may not be entered on the pleadings.”). In light of the foregoing, we therefore conclude that the trial court did not err in denying Ellizzette’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. ¶ 73 D. Dead Man’s Act ¶ 74 Ellizzette next argues that the trial court committed reversible error in granting Shawn’s motion in limine, which barred her from testifying, under the Dead Man’s Act (735 ILCS 5/8- 201 (West 2016)), as to her marriage and heirship. ¶ 75 As noted above, Shawn filed a motion in limine seeking to bar Ellizzette from testifying or presenting any evidence as to any marital relationship she allegedly had with decedent. Citing Laurence, 164 Ill. 367, In re Estate of Diak, 70 Ill. App. 2d 1, and In re Estate of Enoch, 52 Ill. App. 2d 39, Shawn alleged that such testimony would violate the Dead Man’s Act (735 ILCS 5/8-201 (West 2016)). In her response to Shawn’s motion, Ellizzette argued, inter alia, that the “plain text” of subsection (d) of the Dead Man’s Act provides that “[n]o person shall be barred from testifying as to any fact relating to the heirship of a decedent.” 735 ILCS 5/8- 201(d) (West 2016). Ellizzette contended that, because her testimony would “relate to facts surrounding the heirship of [decedent], this testimony falls precisely within the exception carved out within the Dead Man’s Act itself.” Therefore, Ellizzette urged the trial court to deny Shawn’s motion. Following the parties’ argument on the motion, the trial court granted Shawn’s motion. The court reasoned that “Illinois law says that the spouse cannot testify as to heirship, and there’s cases cited, and they weren’t responded to.” Thereafter, the trial court entered a written order in accordance with its oral finding, barring Ellizzette from “testifying regarding her putative marriage to the decedent or regarding the decedent’s heirship.” ¶ 76 On appeal, Ellizzette, relying principally on In re Estate of Bailey, 97 Ill. App. 3d 781 (1981), argues that the legislature expressly enacted subsection (d) of the Dead Man’s Act (735 ILCS 5/8-201(d) (West 2016)) to overrule the authority Shawn cited in his motion in limine. She therefore contends that the trial court committed reversible error in barring her from testifying about her marriage and heirship. Shawn responds that the trial court’s decision to grant his motion in limine was proper because it relied on Illinois Supreme Court precedent, Laurence, 164 Ill. 367, which he claims remains good law and prohibits a spouse from testifying in an heirship proceeding. Further, Shawn maintains that, even if it was improper for the trial court to bar Ellizzette from testifying, she failed to preserve the issue for review by making an offer of proof as to her testimony. We review evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion but interpretations of statutes de novo. See Gunn v. Sobucki, 216 Ill. 2d 602, 609 (2005). Additionally, a trial court’s ruling on an issue involving the Dead Man’s Act will not be reversed unless the error was substantially prejudicial and affected the outcome of the trial. People v. $5,608 United States Currency, 359 Ill. App. 3d 891, 895 (2005). ¶ 77 We begin our analysis with a review of Laurence, 164 Ill. 367. In that case, the decedent died intestate. The plaintiff, the decedent’s putative wife, petitioned the court for half of the decedent’s estate. The trial court allowed the plaintiff to testify at trial as to her alleged marriage to the decedent. After considering the evidence presented at the trial, the court concluded that the plaintiff was the lawful widow of the decedent and was therefore entitled to share in his estate. On appeal, the defendants argued that the trial court erred in permitting the plaintiff to testify on her own behalf. In support of their position, the defendants relied on section 2 of the Evidence and Depositions Act (Ill. Ann. Stat., ch. 51, ¶ 2 (Starr & Curtis - 16 - 1896)), commonly referred to as the Dead Man’s Act (see Adrienne D. Whitehead, New Life to the Dead Man’s Act in Illinois, 5 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 428 (1974)). At the time of the Laurence decision, the statute provided: “ ‘[N]o party to any civil action, suit or proceeding, or person directly interested in the event thereof, should be allowed to testify therein of his own motion or in his own behalf, by virtue of the foregoing section, when any adverse party sues or defends as the *** heir *** of any deceased person, *** unless when called as a witness by such adverse party so suing or defending.’ ” Laurence, 164 Ill. at 372 (quoting Ill. Ann. Stat., ch. 51, ¶ 2 (Starr & Curtis 1896)). The supreme court reversed and remanded the matter, holding that the plaintiff’s testimony should have been excluded. Laurence, 164 Ill. at 373. The court explained that the plaintiff “was not an heir until she established the marriage which she alleged and which was denied by the heirs, and until such marriage was established by proof or conceded she was a stranger to the estate and incompetent to testify, and the court erred in permitting her to do so.” Laurence, 164 Ill. at 373. ¶ 78 In 1973, the Dead Man’s Act as it then existed was repealed and replaced. In re Estate of Babcock, 105 Ill. 2d 267, 272 (1985); Whitehead, supra, at 428. In its current form, the Dead Man’s Act reads in pertinent part as follows: “In the trial of any action in which any party sues or defends as the representative of a deceased person or person under a legal disability, no adverse party or person directly interested in the action shall be allowed to testify on his or her own behalf to any conversation with the deceased or person under legal disability or to any event which took place in the presence of the deceased or person under legal disability, except in the following instances: *** (d) No person shall be barred from testifying as to any fact relating to the heirship of a decedent.” 735 ILCS 5/8-201 (West 2016). As the Babcock court noted, the successor version of the Dead Man’s Act is less restrictive than the prior version of the statute. In re Estate of Babcock, 105 Ill. 2d at 272. The Babcock court explained: “The successor act *** no longer bars all testimony by interested persons. Unlike the previous statute, the Act now disqualifies the testimony by interested persons only to the extent that the testimony would be to a ‘conversation with the deceased [or person under legal disability]’ or an ‘event which took place in the presence of the deceased [or person with a legal disability].’ ” In re Estate of Babcock, 105 Ill. 2d at 273 (quoting Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 110, ¶ 8-201). We also observe that the successor statute provides several exceptions to its applicability, including subsection (d) (735 ILCS 5/8-201(d) (West 2016)), which is at issue in this case. ¶ 79 In In re Estate of Bailey, 97 Ill. App. 3d 781, the court had an opportunity to consider the effect of subsection (d). In that case, the petitioner, the putative wife of the decedent, brought an action to vacate the respondent’s appointment as the administrator of the decedent’s estate. At the trial on the matter, the respondent objected to the petitioner testifying about her marriage to the decedent. The respondent asserted that such testimony was barred by the Dead Man’s Act since the petitioner’s testimony was adverse to the admitted heirs. The trial court sustained - 17 - the objection, ruling that heirship must be proved by disinterested witnesses. On appeal, the petitioner argued that the trial court erred in barring her testimony. The reviewing court agreed. In re Estate of Bailey, 97 Ill. App. 3d at 783-84. In so holding, the court stated that the enactment by the legislature of subsection (d) in 1973 was “intended to change the rule of Laurence,” which the court termed “harsh.” In re Estate of Bailey, 97 Ill. App. 3d at 783-84. The court elaborated: “The language of the amendment is reasonably clear, and no other purpose can be discerned in enacting the amendment. Respondent’s interpretation would read the general rule, that interested parties may not testify as to transactions which took place in the presence of decedent, into the exception contained in [subsection (d)]. Such an interpretation would render [subsection (d)] a nullity.” In re Estate of Bailey, 97 Ill. App. 3d at 784. ¶ 80 Further, the Bailey court “question[ed] whether a proceeding to establish the proper administrator of an estate is within the scope of the [Dead Man’s] Act.” In re Estate of Bailey, 97 Ill. App. 3d at 784. The court explained: “Such a proceeding does not directly reduce or impair the decedent’s estate. Application of the testimonial bar of the [Dead Man’s] Act to situations such as this leads to a race to the court house to be appointed or nominate an administrator. Once the appointment is made, any party wrongfully omitted from the selection must shoulder the onerous burden of proving heirship without the benefit of his own testimony.” In re Estate of Bailey, 97 Ill. App. 3d at 784. As such, the reviewing court held that the petitioner should have been allowed to testify as to her marriage to the decedent. In re Estate of Bailey, 97 Ill. App. 3d at 783-84. ¶ 81 Three years after Bailey was decided, the court in In re Estate of Hutchins, 120 Ill. App. 3d 1084 (1984), also had occasion to consider the effect of subsection (d). At issue in Hutchins was whether certain purported heirs of the decedent were competent under the Dead Man’s Act to testify to their heirship of the decedent. The plaintiff argued that the trial court erred in allowing testimony from the purported illegitimate children of the decedent on the issue of the heirship of the decedent. Citing Laurence, the plaintiff asserted that, under the Dead Man’s Act, an heir is competent to testify in a proceeding to establish the heirship of his or her ancestor only where the proceedings are not contested and the establishment of the heirship is routine. The reviewing court disagreed. In re Estate of Hutchins, 120 Ill. App. 3d at 1086. Relying on the reasoning in Bailey, the court held that the trial court properly admitted the purported heirs’ testimony on the issue of the heirship of the decedent, pursuant to subsection (d) of the Dead Man’s Act. In re Estate of Hutchins, 120 Ill. App. 3d at 1087. ¶ 82 Turning to the facts in this case, we agree with the rationale set forth in Bailey and hold that the trial court abused its discretion in granting Shawn’s motion in limine, which sought to bar Ellizzette from testifying or presenting any evidence as to any marital relationship she had with decedent. Quite simply, pursuant to the plain language of subsection (d) (735 ILCS 5/8- 201(d) (West 2016)), the Dead Man’s Act no longer prohibits interested parties from testifying “as to any fact relating to the heirship of a decedent.” See Spencer v. Strenger Wayne, 2017 IL App (2d) 160801, ¶ 16 (noting that the fundamental objective of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature, the best indicator of which is the plain language of the statute itself). Thus, the trial court should have permitted Ellizzette to testify as to her marriage to decedent, as it directly relates to heirship. In so holding, we observe that - 18 - the court’s rationale for its finding, i.e., that Ellizzette did not respond to the authority cited by Shawn, is not supported by the record. While it is true that Ellizzette did not cite any case law in her response to the motion in limine or at the hearing on the same, she clearly referenced subsection (d) in her response and asserted that the statute allowed her to testify as to her relationship with decedent. However, the trial court never addressed the impact of subsection (d) in ruling on Shawn’s motion in limine. ¶ 83 Additionally, we reject Shawn’s claim that Laurence, 164 Ill. 367, remains good law. Shawn claims that Laurence is still valid precedent because the Illinois Supreme Court “never overruled or modified [the] decision *** in the twelve plus decades following its opinion.” Shawn’s position completely ignores the fact that the legislature altered the version of the Dead Man’s Act interpreted in Laurence to provide that “[n]o person shall be barred from testifying as to any fact relating to the heirship of a decedent.” 735 ILCS 5/8-201(d) (West 2016). This action by the legislature effectively overruled the holdings in Laurence and its progeny. In re Estate of Bailey, 97 Ill. App. 3d at 784 (“[W]e believe that by enacting [subsection (d)] the legislature intended to change the rule of Laurence which applied the [Dead Man’s] Act to proceedings to establish heirship.”); see also In re Estate of Hutchins, 120 Ill. App. 3d at 1087 (agreeing with the Bailey court that the language of subsection (d) was clearly intended by the legislature to change the holding in Laurence); Whitehead, supra, at 437 (opining that the addition of subsection (d) “will undoubtedly be a boon to [putative spouses] who invariably failed under the old statute to establish heirship” and referring to Laurence). When the legislature changes the law in response to a ruling by the supreme court, that precedent is overruled when the statute is enacted. See Roth v. Yackley, 77 Ill. 2d 423, 429 (1979) (recognizing that the General Assembly has the authority to draft legislation and to amend statutes prospectively if it believes that a judicial interpretation was at odds with its intent). This is exactly what occurred here. Shawn does not even discuss subsection (d) in his brief. ¶ 84 Shawn also maintains that Ellizzette forfeited this issue by failing to make an offer of proof. “An offer of proof informs the trial court, opposing counsel, and the reviewing court of the nature and substance of the evidence sought to be introduced.” Colella v. JMS Trucking Co. of Illinois, 403 Ill. App. 3d 82, 93 (2010). “When a motion in limine is granted, the key to saving for review an error in the exclusion of evidence is an adequate offer of proof in the trial court.” Snelson v. Kamm, 204 Ill. 2d 1, 23 (2003). “However, an offer of proof is not required where it is apparent that the trial court clearly understood the nature and character of the evidence sought to be introduced.” Dillon v. Evanston Hospital, 199 Ill. 2d 483, 495 (2002); see also La Salle Bank, N.A. v. C/HCA Development Corp., 384 Ill. App. 3d 806, 823-24 (2008). ¶ 85 Here, Shawn’s motion in limine specifically stated that he “expected that *** Ellizzette *** will attempt to testify that she is the surviving spouse of [decedent].” More significantly, the trial court, in ruling on the motion, stated, “to the extent that the spouse is going to testify as to the purported marriage *** I would have to grant the motion in limine based on the law that [Ellizzette] can’t testify.” The court later told Ellizzette: “[H]aving ruled as to your ability to testify, that makes it difficult for you to prove the validity of the marriage. The marriage may have happened. It may have been valid in your eyes, but we’re proceeding under statutes, law, cases, precedent, and rulings on those laws as applied to the facts. So I’m not saying you didn’t have a ceremony, but I may—that may be the effect as it pertains to heirship. It depends what you are able to prove without testifying.” - 19 - Given this record, we conclude that an offer of proof was not required because the trial court understood that Ellizzette would testify as to her purported marriage to decedent. See Dillon, 199 Ill. 2d at 495 (holding that an offer of proof was not required because the trial court understood that the witness would testify as to the medical standard of care); La Salle Bank, N.A., 384 Ill. App. 3d at 824 (holding that an offer of proof was not required because the trial court knew both the identity of the proposed witness and the subject matter of his proposed testimony); First National Bank of Mount Prospect v. Village of Mount Prospect, 197 Ill. App. 3d 855, 864-65 (1990) (holding that an offer of proof was not necessary where expert’s opinion testimony was obvious). ¶ 86 In short, based upon the 1973 amendment to the Dead Man’s Act, we are compelled to conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in granting Shawn’s motion in limine and barring Ellizzette from testifying or presenting any evidence as to any marital relationship she had with decedent. As the trial court’s erroneous ruling precluded Ellizzette from presenting her case-in-chief, it substantially prejudiced her. See $5,608 United States Currency, 359 Ill. App. 3d at 896. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s decision to grant a directed finding in Shawn’s favor on this basis, and we remand the matter for a new trial. However, because additional issues related to the reasons the trial court cited in support of its grant of a directed finding in Shawn’s favor might arise on remand, we address those issues now. ¶ 87 E. Directed Finding ¶ 88 Ellizzette challenges the grounds the trial court cited in support of its decision to direct a finding in Shawn’s favor at the close of her case-in-chief. Section 2-1110 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-1110 (West 2016)) permits a defendant to move for a directed finding at the close of the plaintiff’s case in a bench trial. In ruling on such a motion, the trial court engages in a two- step analysis. Minch v. George, 395 Ill. App. 3d 390, 398 (2009). Initially, the court must determine whether the plaintiff presented a prima facie case as a matter of law. Edward Atkins, M.D., S.C. v. Robbins, Salomon & Patt, Ltd., 2018 IL App (1st) 161961, ¶ 53. If the court finds that the plaintiff presented a prima facie case, it proceeds to the second step and weighs the evidence to determine whether the prima facie case survives. Minch, 395 Ill. App. 3d at 398. Where, as here, the trial court did not proceed beyond the first stage, we review de novo its determination. In re Petition to Disconnect Certain Territory Commonly Known as Foxfield Subdivision, 396 Ill. App. 3d 989, 992 (2009) (In re Foxfield Subdivision). ¶ 89 To establish a prima facie case, a plaintiff must proffer at least some evidence on every essential element of the cause of action. In re Foxfield Subdivision, 396 Ill. App. 3d at 992. To legally marry in Illinois, a couple must fulfill the requirements and formalities set out in the Marriage Act (750 ILCS 5/101 et seq. (West 2016)). Section 201 of the Marriage Act (750 ILCS 5/201 (West 2016)) provides that “[a] marriage between 2 persons licensed, solemnized and registered as provided in this Act is valid in this State.” Thus, the parties must apply for a marriage license from the county clerk’s office of the county in which they intend to marry. 750 ILCS 5/202, 203, 207 (West 2016); In re Estate of Crockett, 312 Ill. App. 3d 1167, 1171 (2000). Both parties must be present before the county clerk or one of his deputies, pay the required fee, and sign the license application. 750 ILCS 5/203 (West 2016); In re Estate of Crockett, 312 Ill. App. 3d at 1171. The parties must then appear before a duly authorized officiant and, after consenting to marry, must file the marriage certificate with the county clerk’s office within 10 days of the ceremony. 750 ILCS 5/209 (West 2016); In re Estate of - 20 - Crockett, 312 Ill. App. 3d at 1171. We observe, however, that Illinois courts have conferred “spouse” status upon individuals even when one of the directory requirements of the Marriage Act has not been satisfied. See, e.g., Haderaski v. Haderaski, 415 Ill. 118, 119-22 (1953) (concluding that the lack of a license in an otherwise lawful marriage did not invalidate the marriage, as the statute requiring a license was directory rather than mandatory); In re Estate of Bailey, 97 Ill. App. 3d at 786 (noting that, with the exception of the lack of a marriage license, the evidence established that the couple was legally married). ¶ 90 In this case, the trial court ruled that Ellizzette did not present a prima facie case of a valid marriage as a matter of law. The court ruled that, to present a prima facie case on the validity of her marriage to decedent, Ellizzette had to present a valid application for a marriage license and a ceremony performed in Edgar County witnessed by two individuals. The court found, as a matter of law, that Ellizzette “did not present a prima facie case of a valid marriage ceremony under the circumstances such as would be sufficient to meet her burden of proof on all of the elements.” The court stated that “[i]t would have been simple to present the evidence of a marriage license and certificate and application and have some witness testify about that, but that was not done.” In ruling, the court further stated: “And while it is not as clear as [Shawn’s counsel] presents as to the case law precedents—and in that I’m referring to the arguments that [Ellizzette] had when she was represented by counsel during motion practice on a motion for judgment on the pleadings—it is clear that there was an order finding and adjudicating Decedent as a disabled person and in immediate need of a plenary guardianship and that there was no best-interest hearing held; that the punitive [sic] marriage was not known to the Administrator until November 2017; and that the marriage was not properly witnessed or licensed or subject to a best-interest determination by the probate court.” Thus, in concluding that Ellizzette did not establish a prima facie case of a valid marriage, the trial court determined that there was no evidence that the purported marriage was properly licensed, there was no evidence of a valid marriage ceremony in Edgar County, there was no evidence of two witnesses to the marriage, and there was no best-interest hearing to determine decedent’s competency to marry. Applying de novo review, we conclude that the trial court erred in granting Shawn’s motion for a directed finding on the four grounds cited in its ruling. ¶ 91 1. License ¶ 92 First, the trial court erred in ruling that there was no evidence that the purported marriage was properly licensed. As noted above, in ruling that Ellizzette failed to present a prima facie case of a valid marriage, the trial court stated, “[i]t would have been simple to present the evidence of a marriage license and certificate and application and have some witness testify about that, but that was not done.” But this finding by the trial court ignores the fact that on November 30, 2018, almost a year before the trial, the court granted Shawn’s motion requesting that it take judicial notice of these very documents. The purpose of judicial notice is to dispense with the normal method of producing evidence. See State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Grebner, 132 Ill. App. 2d 234, 237 (1971); see also Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (defining “judicial notice” as “[a] court’s acceptance, for purposes of convenience and without requiring a party’s proof, of a well-known and indisputable fact”); City of Centralia, 2019 IL App (5th) 180439, ¶ 10 (noting that a court may take judicial notice of “matters that are readily verifiable from sources of indisputable accuracy, such as public - 21 - records”). “The theory and effective application of judicial notice of adjudicative facts not only renders the formal introduction of evidence before the trier of fact unnecessary, Secrist v. Petty, 109 Ill. 188 (1883); People v. One 1999 Lexus, 367 Ill. App. 3d 687, *** but also precludes the introduction of evidence of contrary tenor ***.” Michael H. Graham, Cleary and Graham’s Handbook of Illinois Evidence § 202.3 (9th ed. 2009). Hence, by order of the court, evidence of a marriage application, license, and certificate were before the court pursuant to its ruling on Shawn’s motion. Since the court had already taken judicial notice of these documents for purposes of the trial, there was no need for Ellizzette to reintroduce them. ¶ 93 Shawn argues that the purpose behind his motion was “to highlight every falsehood [Ellizzette] promoted on the Edgar County Clerk, as well as [decedent], a disabled person in need of protection from neglect, exploitation and abuse.” However, this purpose is not set forth in his motion or in the record. In this regard, we observe that the body of Shawn’s motion consisted of one page. In the motion, Shawn simply asked the trial court to take judicial notice, “[p]ursuant to the terms of *** trial,” of the “Certified Copy of Edgar County, Illinois[,] Marriage Application and Record of John Wood McDonald, III and Ellizzette Duvall Minicelli [sic].” Attached to the motion were certified copies of (1) a “Marriage Application and Record” of “John Wood McDonald III” and “Ellizzette Duvall Minnicelli,” (2) a Marriage License of “John Wood McDonald III” and “Ellizzette Duvall Minnicelli” issued by the Edgar County Clerk, signed by Bement as the officiant and indicating that the marriage ceremony occurred in Paris, Illinois on July 11, 2017, and (3) a “Certification of Marriage” of “John Wood McDonald, III” and “Ellizzette Duvall Minnicelli.” No court reporter was present for the argument on this motion, and no basis for or limitations on the trial court’s order appears in the record. The order granting Shawn’s motion simply states that “The Motion for Judicial Notice is granted and the Court hereby takes judicial notice of the exhibits attached thereto.” Since there was no limitation on the purpose for which the exhibits were admitted at trial, we find that Shawn’s position lacks merit. ¶ 94 2. Ceremony ¶ 95 Second, the trial court erred when it ruled that Ellizzette did not present some evidence of “a ceremony performed in Edgar County.” Bement testified that he performed a marriage ceremony between Ellizzette and decedent on July 11, 2017, in the parties’ home in Paris, Edgar County, Illinois. The “Certification of Marriage” issued by the clerk of Edgar County, of which the trial court took judicial notice, lists the wedding ceremony as taking place on July 11, 2017, in Paris, Illinois, with Bement as the officiant. In addition, we may take judicial notice that Paris is the county seat of Edgar County (see About, Edgar County, https://edgar countyillinois.com/about/ (last visited Jan. 25, 2021) [https://perma.cc/JB2C-9YQ4]). See People v. Mata, 217 Ill. 2d 535, 539-40 (2005) (noting that a reviewing court can take judicial notice “of matters that are readily verifiable from sources of indisputable accuracy”); Trannel v. Prairie Ridge Media, Inc., 2013 IL App (2d) 120725, ¶ 20 (taking judicial notice of the population of a county); People v. Clark, 406 Ill. App. 3d 622, 632 (2010) (taking judicial notice of park’s location). Indeed, Shawn’s counsel admitted in arguing the motion for a directed finding that a marriage ceremony was performed, stating, “there’s no evidence that there is a valid marriage other than what Mr. Bement said, and Mr. Bement said he conducted a ceremony.” The trial court’s ruling that Ellizzette failed to present some evidence of a - 22 - ceremony performed in Edgar County is simply not supported by the record. ¶ 96 3. Witnesses ¶ 97 Third, the trial court erred when it ruled that Ellizzette did not present a prima facie case, because she failed to introduce evidence of two witnesses to the marriage ceremony. Neither Shawn nor the trial court cited any statutory provision requiring the presence of two witnesses for a marriage to be valid in Illinois. Indeed, our research reveals that, while many states have a witness requirement, Illinois is not one of them. See, e.g., Alaska Stat. Ann. § 25.05.301 (West 2016) (“In the solemnization of marriage no particular form is required except that the parties shall assent or declare in the presence of each other and the person solemnizing the marriage and in the presence of at least two competent witnesses that they take each other to be husband and wife.”); Cal. Family Code § 359(d) (West 2016) (“The person solemnizing the marriage shall complete the solemnization sections on the marriage license, and shall cause to be entered on the marriage license the printed name, signature, and mailing address of at least one, and no more than two, witnesses to the marriage ceremony.”); Del. Code Ann. tit. 13, § 106(a)(4) (West 2016) (“Marriages shall be solemnized in the presence of at least 2 reputable witnesses who are at least 18 years of age and who shall sign the certificate of marriage ***.”); La. Stat. Ann. § 9:244 (2016) (requiring marriage ceremony to be “performed in the presence of two competent witnesses of full age”); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 23-2504(a) (West 2016) (providing that a marriage may be validly solemnized “[b]y the mutual declarations of the two parties to be joined in marriage, made before an authorized officiating person and in the presence of at least two competent witnesses over 18 years of age, other than the officiating person, that they take each other as husband and wife”); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 551.9 (West 2016) (“In the solemnization of marriage *** there shall be at least 2 witnesses, besides the person solemnizing the marriage, present at the ceremony.”); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 517.09 (West 2016) (“No particular form is required to solemnize a civil marriage, except: the parties shall declare in the presence of a person authorized to solemnize civil marriages and two attending witnesses that each takes the other as husband, wife, or spouse ***.”); Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 42-109 (West 2016) (requiring “at least two witnesses, besides the minister or magistrate” to be present at the ceremony where the marriage is solemnized); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 122.110 (West 2016) (“In every case, there shall be at least one witness present besides the person performing the [marriage] ceremony.”); N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 12 (McKinney 2016) (requiring “at least one witness beside the clergyman or magistrate” to be present at the ceremony where the marriage is solemnized); N.D. Cent. Code Ann. § 14-03-20 (West 2016) (“Every certificate of marriage must contain the full name of each party before and after the marriage and be signed by two witnesses to the marriage in addition to the signature of the person who solemnized the marriage.”); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 43, § 7 (West 2016) (“All marriages must be contracted by a formal ceremony performed or solemnized in the presence of at least two adult, competent persons as witnesses ***.”); 15 R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 15-3-8 (West 2016) (“The solemnization of marriage shall be in the presence of at least two (2) witnesses besides the minister, elder, justice, or warden officiating.”); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 765.16 (West 2016) (“Marriage may be validly solemnized and contracted in this state only after a marriage license has been issued therefor, and only by the mutual declarations of the 2 parties to be joined in marriage that they take each other as husband and wife, made before an authorized officiating person and in the presence of at least 2 competent adult witnesses other than the officiating - 23 - person.”); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-1-106(b) (West 2016) (“In the solemnization of marriage no particular form is required, except that the parties shall solemnly declare in the presence of the person performing the ceremony and at least two (2) attending witnesses that they take each other as husband and wife.”). ¶ 98 Nevertheless, citing Pike v. Pike, 112 Ill. App. 243 (1904), Shawn insists that “[p]roviding the names of two witnesses is the public policy in Illinois.” At the outset, we note that Pike is not controlling, as it was decided in 1904 and appellate decisions filed prior to 1935 have no binding authority. See Choate v. Indiana Harbor Belt R.R. Co., 2012 IL 112948, ¶ 32 n.4 (noting that appellate court decisions filed prior to 1935 have no binding authority and can be considered only persuasive). This technicality aside, we find Pike factually inapposite. Pike involved a common-law, “secret” marriage that was neither witnessed by anyone nor publicly acknowledged by the participants. At the time of the events in Pike, common-law marriages were recognized in Illinois. Pike, 112 Ill. App. at 260. However, one of the parties denied that he had married. Pike, 112 Ill. App. at 252. Under these circumstances, the reviewing court “regretted that a marriage, such as is claimed in this case, contracted secretly between the parties, no third person being present, is legally permissible.” Pike, 112 Ill. App. at 260. The present case does not involve the type of marriage at issue in Pike. Indeed, common-law marriages were eliminated by statute in Illinois in 1905. 750 ILCS 5/214 (West 2016); Hewitt v. Hewitt, 77 Ill. 2d 49, 62 (1979). Pike is simply not persuasive authority for the proposition that a valid marriage under Illinois law requires the presence of two witnesses at the ceremony. ¶ 99 Shawn notes that one of the forms issued by the Edgar County clerk includes a space to provide the names of witnesses to a marriage. Shawn therefore insists that, if the two-witness requirement did not remain the policy in Illinois, “the Edgar County Clerk’s instruction to marriage applicants to provide the names of such witnesses would be meaningless.” We find no such instruction in the documents submitted. And while the document referenced by Shawn does contain lines where the names of witnesses may be provided, there is no indication that this is a requirement to obtain a valid marriage license. Indeed, even though no witnesses are listed, the Edgar County clerk issued a marriage license to decedent and “Ellizzette Duvall Minnicelli,” thereby suggesting that witnesses are not required under Illinois law. Given the lack of authority substantiating a two-witness requirement for marriages in Illinois, the trial court erred when it ruled that Ellizzette was required to present some evidence that there were two witnesses to her officiated marriage to decedent. ¶ 100 4. Best-Interest Hearing ¶ 101 Fourth, the trial court indicated that, pursuant to the Probate Act, a best-interest hearing was required before decedent could marry. Although not directly cited in the trial court’s ruling, this was apparently a reference to section 11a-17(a-10) of the Probate Act (755 ILCS 5/11a-17(a-10) (West 2016)), which states in pertinent part as follows: “Upon petition by the guardian of the ward’s person or estate, the court may authorize and direct a guardian of the ward’s person or estate to consent, on behalf of the ward, to the ward’s marriage pursuant to Part II of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act if the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the marriage is in the ward’s best interests.” The primary objective of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. State Bank of Cherry, 2013 IL 113836, ¶ 56. The most reliable indicator of - 24 - legislative intent is the language of the statute itself, given its plain and ordinary meaning. State Bank of Cherry, 2013 IL 113836, ¶ 56. If the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, it must be applied as written, without resorting to further aids of statutory construction. State Bank of Cherry, 2013 IL 113836, ¶ 56. Moreover, a court may not depart from the plain language of the statute and read into it exceptions, limitations, or conditions that are not consistent with the express legislative intent. State Bank of Cherry, 2013 IL 113836, ¶ 56. ¶ 102 The plain language of this provision simply does not require prior approval by the court before a ward can marry of his or her own accord. Instead, it provides a procedure to allow a guardian to petition the court for authorization to consent, on behalf of the ward, to the ward’s marriage. The fact that a guardian may seek from the court an order authorizing consent, however, does not mean that the ward may not marry unless and until the guardian first obtains the court’s consent. We read nothing in the language of section 11a-17(a-10) of the Probate Act that expressly declares that a marriage entered into by a ward is void in the absence of a best-interest hearing. ¶ 103 Indeed, this is consistent with Pape, 145 Ill. 2d 13, in which the supreme court held that the appointment under the Probate Act of a guardian of a person is not sufficient, in and of itself, to show that the person was incompetent to consent to marriage. In reaching this result the court explained: “In this regard, we note that section 11a-3 of the Probate Act of 1975 provides, inter alia, that a court may adjudge a person disabled and may appoint a guardian of his person if, because of his disability, he lacks sufficient understanding or capacity to make or communicate responsible decisions concerning the care of his person. In contrast, section 301 of the Marriage Act provides that a declaration of invalidity of a marriage may be obtained where a party, inter alia, lacked the capacity to consent to the marriage because of, inter alia, mental incapacity or infirmity. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 40, par. 301.) Moreover, a person lacks capacity to consent to a marriage where he is unable to understand the nature, effect, duties and obligations of marriage.” Pape, 145 Ill. 2d at 21-22. Based on the foregoing, the court concluded that the test of incapacity under the above- referenced provisions of the Probate Act and the Marriage Act “is limited and does not speak to the incapacity required for purposes of the other provision.” Pape, 145 Ill. 2d at 22. In this case, decedent was adjudged a ward of the court pursuant to section 11a-3 of the Probate Act (755 ILCS 5/11a-3 (West 2016)). Pursuant to Pape, however, this fact is insufficient, in and of itself, to require a best-interest hearing prior to decedent marrying. As such, we conclude that the trial court erred in ruling that the lack of a best-interest hearing provided a basis to grant Shawn’s motion for a directed finding at the close of Ellizzette’s case. ¶ 104 Shawn suggests that, to the extent that Pape constituted persuasive authority, it no longer does because the legislature added the language in section 11a-17(a-10) to the Probate Act after the supreme court decided Pape. We disagree. Shawn’s argument overlooks the plain language of section 11a-17(a-10), which does not prohibit a ward from marrying on his or her own accord in the absence of a best-interest hearing. Moreover, nothing in section 11a-17(a- 10) expressly declares a marriage entered into by a ward, without his or her guardian’s consent or a best-interest hearing, to be a nullity. Shawn also maintains that such a holding ignores a recent case decided by the supreme court, Karbin v. Karbin, 2012 IL 112815. In Karbin, the supreme court held that a guardian has standing to institute marital dissolution proceedings on - 25 - behalf of a ward. Karbin, 2012 IL 112815, ¶ 52. We read nothing in Karbin that prohibits a ward from getting married in the absence of a best-interest hearing. Accordingly, we find Shawn’s reliance on Karbin misplaced. ¶ 105 IV. CONCLUSION ¶ 106 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s rulings denying Ellizzette’s motion to vacate the order appointing Shawn as the administrator of decedent’s estate and the order of heirship. We also affirm the trial court’s decision to deny Ellizzette’s motion for a continuance of trial and her motion for judgment on the pleadings. We find, however, that the trial court erred in barring Ellizzette from testifying regarding her marriage and heirship. Further, the trial court erred in granting Shawn’s motion for a directed finding on the four grounds set forth in its oral ruling. The judgment of the circuit court of Kane County is therefore affirmed in part and reversed in part. We remand for further proceedings consistent with this disposition. ¶ 107 Affirmed in part and reversed in part. ¶ 108 Cause remanded with directions. - 26 -