Quinn v. Publix Supermarket, 119 F. App'x 517 (4th Cir. 2005). · Go Syfert
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Quinn v. Publix Supermarket, 119 F. App'x 517 (4th Cir. 2005). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“in instances where a complaint is timely filed and later dismissed, the timely filing of the complaint does not 'toll' or suspend the ninety-day limitations period.”
7 citation events (7 in the last 25 years) across 5 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Stump v. Wilkie (vawd, 2021-05-21)
Top citers, strongest first. 4 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (quoted) Stump v. Wilkie
W.D. Va. · 2021 · signal: see also · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence low
in instances where a complaint is timely filed and later dismissed, the timely filing of the complaint does not 'toll' or suspend the ninety-day limitations period.
discussed Cited "see" Paula Angles v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc.
4th Cir. · 2012 · signal: see · confidence high
See Quinn v. Watson, 119 Fed.Appx. 517 , 518 n. * (4th Cir.2005) ("In instances where a complaint is timely filed and later dismissed, the timely filing of the complaint does not ‘toll’ or suspend the ninety-day limitations period.”). .
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Brown v. County of Mecklenburg
W.D.N.C. · 2022 · signal: see also · confidence medium
The “general rule” is “that a Title VII complaint that has been filed but then dismissed without prejudice does not toll the 90-day limitations period.” Angles, 494 F. App’x at 329 ; see also Quinn v. Watson, 119 F. App'x 517, 518 (4th Cir. 2005) (same). “[T]he 90-day requirement is in the nature of a statute-of-limitations defense.” Quinn v. Copart of Connecticut, Inc., 791 F. App’x 393 , 395 (4th Cir. 2019).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." CHRISP v. UNC CHAPEL HILL
M.D.N.C. · 2021 · signal: see also · confidence low
(Doc. 1-1.) Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., 494 F. App’x 326, 329 (4th Cir. 2012); see also Quinn v. Watson, 119 F. App’x 517 , 518 n.* (4th Cir. 2005) (same); Khaliq v. Draper & Goldberg, P.L.L.C., 286 F. App’x 72, 73 (4th Cir. 2008) (applying the same principle in the context of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act in affirming the dismissal of a second complaint because it was filed outside the one-year limitations period where the first complaint was dismissed for failure to properly serve).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Jacqueline QUINN, Plaintiff—Appellant,
v.
Debbie WATSON, Deli Manager for Publix Supermarket; Publix Supermarket, Incorporated, Defendants—Appellees
04-2215.
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
Jan 14, 2005.
119 F. App'x 517
Jacqueline Quinn, Appellant pro se., Edmund Joseph McKenna, Ford & Harrison, Tampa, Florida, for Appellee Publix Supermarket, Inc.
Wilkinson, Gregory, Duncan.
Cited by 6 opinions  |  Unpublished
1 passage pin-cited by 1 case
Pinpoint authority: bottom 78%
Citer courts: W.D. Virginia (1)
PER CURIAM:

Jacqueline Quinn appeals the district court’s order denying relief on her 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2000) (“Title VII”) complaint. On August 26, 2004, the district court dismissed Quinn’s complaint on jurisdictional grounds. The court, adopting the reasoning set forth in Defendants’s motion to dismiss, determined that it did not have jurisdiction to hear the case pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3), Title VTI’s venue-laying provision. When a plaintiff files an action in the wrong venue, however, 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) (2000) directs courts to “dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice, transfer such case” to the proper venue. Because the record does not reflect such a determination, * we remand this case for a determination of whether a transfer to an appropriate jurisdiction would be in the interest of justice.

Accordingly, we vacate the order of the district court and remand the case for further consideration in light of this opinion. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

VACATED AND REMANDED

*

We note that Quinn would now be time-barred from initiating a new action. A Title VII action must be brought within 90 days of receipt of a right-to-sue letter issued by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. See § 2000e-5(f)(1). In instances where a complaint is timely filed and later dismissed, the timely filing of the complaint does not "toll” or suspend the ninety-day limitations period. See Minnette v. Time Warner, 997 F.2d 1023, 1026-27 (2d Cir.1993) (citing Berry v. CIGNA/RSI-CIGNA, 975 F.2d 1188, 1191 (5th Cir.1992); Brown v. Hartshorne Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 926 F.2d 959, 961 (10th Cir.1991) (holding that limitations period was not tolled during pendency of dismissed action)). Thus, even construing the district court’s order as a dismissal without prejudice will not benefit Quinn.