v.
Alejandro Mayorkas
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
AL OTRO LADO, a California Nos. 22-55988
corporation; ABIGAIL DOE; 22-56036
BEATRICE DOE; CAROLINA DOE;
DINORA DOE; INGRID DOE; D.C. No.
URSULA DOE; VICTORIA DOE; 3:17-cv-02366-
BIANCA DOE; JUAN DOE; BAS-KSC
ROBERTO DOE; CESAR DOE;
MARIA DOE; EMILIANA DOE,
individually and on behalf of all others OPINION
similarly situated,
Plaintiffs-Appellees /
Cross-Appellants,
v.
EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR
IMMIGRATION REVIEW,
Appellant / Cross-
Appellee,
and
ALEJANDRO N. MAYORKAS,
Secretary of Homeland Security;
CHRISTOPHER MAGNUS,
Commissioner of U.S. Customs and
2 AL OTRO LADO V. MAYORKAS
Border Protection (CBP); PETE
FLORES, Executive Assistant
Commissioner of CBP’s Office of
Field Operations, in their official
capacities,
Defendants-Appellants /
Cross-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of California
Cynthia A. Bashant, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted November 28, 2023
San Diego Carter & Keep U.S. Courthouse
Filed October 23, 2024
Before: John B. Owens, Michelle T. Friedland, and Ryan
D. Nelson, Circuit Judges.
Opinion by Judge Friedland;
Dissent by Judge R. Nelson
AL OTRO LADO V. MAYORKAS 3
SUMMARY *
Immigration
The panel affirmed in part and vacated in part the district
court’s permanent injunction relating to the application of the “Asylum Transit Rule”—which generally required persons traveling through a third country to apply for asylum there before seeking asylum in the United States—to noncitizens turned away at the border between Mexico and the United States under the policy of “metering.” Under the metering policy, whenever border officials deemed a port of entry to be at capacity, they turned away all people lacking valid travel documents. The district court entered a permanent injunction prohibiting application of the Asylum Transit Rule to members of a class of asylum seekers who were turned away under the metering policy before the Asylum Transit Rule took effect. The court also ordered the Government to unwind past denials of asylum to such individuals. The panel affirmed the district court’s conclusion that the metering policy violated section 706(1) of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), which provides that a court shall “compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed.” The Government contended that officials lack any duty to noncitizens who have not stepped across the border. Rejecting that argument, the panel held that a noncitizen
*
This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
4 AL OTRO LADO V. MAYORKAS
stopped at the border is eligible to apply for asylum under 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1), which provides that a noncitizen may apply for asylum if she is “physically present in the United States” or “arrives in the United States.” The panel concluded that the latter encompasses those stopped at the border, whichever side they are standing on. The panel also held that such a noncitizen is an “applicant for admission” under 8 U.S.C. § 1225, which sets out the responsibilities of officials with respect to noncitizens at the border. Accordingly, border officials have a mandatory duty to inspect them. The panel explained that the presumption against extraterritorial application of statutes did not change its interpretation of § 1158 or § 1225. As to § 706(1) of the APA, the panel held that when an agency refuses to accept, in any form, a request that it take a required action, it has “withheld” that duty. Explaining that officials turned away noncitizens without taking any steps to keep track of them or otherwise allow them to open asylum applications, the panel concluded that the metering policy constituted withholding of action, not delay. The panel wrote that it need not reach Plaintiffs’ cross- appeal of the district court’s denial of their other claims. The panel also vacated the district court’s entry of judgment for Plaintiffs on their due process claim, explaining that when a constitutional holding is unnecessary, the court may simply vacate that portion of the judgment without discussing the merits. Next, the panel affirmed the district court’s entry of classwide declaratory relief. As the Government conceded, precedent foreclosed its argument that classwide declaratory relief is barred by 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1), which provides that “no court (other than the Supreme Court) shall have
AL OTRO LADO V. MAYORKAS 5
jurisdiction or authority to enjoin or restrain the operation” of specified immigration statutes on a classwide basis. The panel affirmed the grant of negative injunctive relief, which prohibits the Government from applying the Asylum Transit Rule to class members. The panel concluded that this relief was not barred by § 1252(f)(1) because it concerns § 1158, which is not covered by § 1252(f)(1). The panel concluded that § 1252(f)(1) does not bar the components of the district court’s affirmative relief requiring the Government to identify possible class members and notify them about their class membership and the significance of the injunction. However, the panel held that § 1252(f)(1) barred the portion requiring the Government, on its own initiative, to reopen or reconsider a prior decision. Dissenting, Judge R. Nelson concluded that an alien “arrives in the United States” only when she crosses the border into it and that the majority’s interpretation of that phrase twists the statutory language, ignores history, flips multiple presumptions, and ignores common-sense English usage. In doing so, the majority imposes on the federal government—for the first time—an obligation to interview asylum seekers who are still in Mexico. Judge R. Nelson also wrote that the majority erroneously concluded that the government “withheld” a statutory duty (rather than merely delaying it) by telling aliens to come back later. In his view, the panel should have rejected Plaintiffs’ claims, including those that the majority saved for another day.
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COUNSEL
Melissa E. Crow (argued), Center for Gender and Refugee
Studies, Washington, D.C.; Neela O. Chakravartula and
Anne Dutton, Center for Gender and Refugee Studies, San
Francisco, California; Robert Pauw, Center for Gender and
Refugee Studies, Seattle, Washington; Baher Azmy (argued)
and Angelo Guisado, Center For Constitutional Rights, New
York, New York; Rebecca M. Cassler, Southern Poverty
Law Center, Immigrant Justice Project, Washington, D.C.;
Sarah Rich, Southern Poverty Law Center, Decatur,
Georgia; Matthew Fenn, Mayer Brown LLP, Chicago,
Illinois; Matthew H. Marmolejo, Mayer Brown LLP, Los
Angeles, California; Michelle N. Webster and Ori Lev,
Mayer Brown LLP, Washington, D.C.; Stephen M.
Medlock, Evan Miller, and Rami Abdallah E. Rashmawi,
Vinson & Elkins LLP, Washington, D.C.; Katherine M.
Goettel, Gianna Borroto, and Suchita Mathur, American
Immigration Counsel, Washington, D.C.; for Plaintiffs-
Appellees.
Alexander J. Halaska (argued) and Katherine J. Shinners,
Senior Litigation Counsel; Jason Wisecup, Assistant United
States Attorney; Samuel P. Go, Assistant Director; Erez
Reuveni, Counsel; William C. Peachey, Director; Office of
Immigration Litigation; Brian M. Boynton, Principal Deputy
Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division; United States
Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.; for Appellant and
Defendants-Appellants.
Aileen M. McGrath, Morrison & Forester, San Francsico,
California, for Amicus Curiae Amnesty International.
Wendy Wylegala, Kids in Need of Defense, New York, New
York; Alexander J. Cooper, Kids in Need of Defense, Los
Angeles, California; Jane Liu, Young Center for Immigrant
AL OTRO LADO V. MAYORKAS 7
Children's Rights, Chicago, Illinois; Stephany Arzaga, Legal Services for Children, San Francisco, California; Mary T. Ross, Public Counsel, Los Angeles, California; for Amici Curiae Kids in Need of Defense, Legal Services for Children, Inc., Public Counsel, and The Young Center for Immigrant Children's Rights. Katrina Eiland, Stephen Kang, Spencer E. Wittmann Amdur, Cody Wofsy, and Oscar S. Roman, American Civil Liberties Union, San Francisco, California; Omar Jadwat, Lee Gelernt, and Anand Balakrishnan, American Civil Liberties Union, New York, New York; for Amici Curiae American Civil Liberties Union, ACLU of Southern California, ACLU of Northern California; and Northwest Immigrant Rights Project. Sabrineh Ardalan and Tiffany J. Lieu, Supervising Attorneys; Sarah Leadem and Simone Wallk, Supervised Law Students; Harvard Immigration and Refugee Clinical Program, Cambridge, Massachusetts; Sarah Sherman- Stokes, Supervising Attorney; Catherine Kannam, Supervised Law Student; Immigrants’ Rights and Human Trafficking Program, Boston University School of Law, Boston, Massachusetts; for Amici Curiae International Refugee Law Scholars. Anne Aufhauser, Sarah F. Warren, and Alison Goldman, Fried Frank Harris Shriver & Jacobson LLP, New York, New York, for Amici Curiae Haitian bridge Alliance, Ira Kurzban, and Irwin Stotzky. Raechel K. Kummer, Morgan Lewis & Bockius LLP, Washington, D.C.; Matthew C. McDonough and Andrew Savage, Morgan Lewis & Bockius LLP, Boston, Massachusetts; for Amici Curiae Immigration Law Professors.
8 AL OTRO LADO V. MAYORKAS
OPINION
FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judge:
In 2016, Customs and Border Protection adopted a policy of “metering” asylum seekers at ports of entry along the border between Mexico and the United States. Under that policy, whenever border officials deemed a port of entry to be at capacity, they turned away all people lacking valid travel documents. Many of those people intended to seek asylum in the United States but were not allowed to even apply. They could try to come back some other time, but there was no guarantee that they would ever be processed. The immigrant rights group Al Otro Lado and various individuals filed suit in federal district court challenging that metering policy on behalf of classes of asylum seekers. While the litigation was ongoing, the Government adopted a regulation, known as the “Asylum Transit Rule,” that generally required persons traveling through a third country to apply for asylum there before seeking asylum in the United States. For many asylum seekers who already had been turned away under the metering policy, the Asylum Transit Rule effectively barred them from qualifying for asylum if they were ever able to apply—even though they would not have been subject to the Rule if they had been processed when they first presented themselves at the border. The district court ultimately declared the metering policy to be unlawful. As part of the remedy, the district court enjoined the Government from applying the Asylum Transit Rule to noncitizens turned away under the metering policy before the Rule’s adoption. The court also ordered the
AL OTRO LADO V. MAYORKAS 9
Government to unwind past denials of asylum to such individuals. We must evaluate the lawfulness of the metering policy to decide whether to uphold the district court’s remedy, even though the Government rescinded the metering policy years ago. We largely affirm. I. Under federal law, asylum protects noncitizens who face persecution in their home countries because of their race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(1)(A), 1101(a)(42)(A). A noncitizen is eligible to apply for asylum if she is “physically present in the United States” or if she “arrives in the United States.” Id. § 1158(a)(1). People seeking to lawfully enter the United States via the southern border generally must present themselves for processing at a designated port of entry. 8 C.F.R. § 235.1(a). By statute, immigration officials are required to inspect all noncitizens “present in the United States who [have] not been admitted,” noncitizens who “arrive[] in the United States,” and noncitizens “otherwise seeking admission.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1), (3). If, during inspection at a port of entry, a noncitizen expresses an intent to apply for asylum or a fear of persecution, the inspecting border official must refer the noncitizen to an asylum officer for an interview to determine whether the noncitizen has a credible fear of persecution. Id. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii), (B). Otherwise, and if the noncitizen is inadmissible within the meaning of the statute, the official shall order her removed “without further hearing or review.” Id. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i).
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Until 2016, noncitizens seeking asylum at ports of entry on the U.S.-Mexico border would cross over onto U.S. soil and then wait in line to be inspected. In 2016, citing capacity constraints, Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”) officials began taking steps to prevent asylum seekers from entering port buildings or otherwise joining an inspection queue. In November 2016, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”), which includes CBP, approved “metering,” allowing border officials who deemed a port of entry to be at capacity to turn away all people lacking valid travel documents. CBP gave ports of entry flexibility to implement metering based on “what [worked] best operationally and whether it [was] required on any given day or [at] any specific location.” At some ports of entry, people were stepping onto U.S. soil before being turned back. CBP soon determined that it could not send such people back to Mexico without processing them, so it directed officials to implement metering at “the actual boundary line.” Officials standing on the U.S. side of the border therefore stopped people right before they crossed the border. The Government formalized its metering policy in the spring of 2018. In an April 2018 guidance memorandum, CBP authorized border officials to “meter the flow of travelers at the land border” based on “the port’s processing capacity.” The memorandum specifically permitted officials to “establish and operate physical access controls at the borderline.” It further stated that officers “may not provide tickets or appointments or otherwise schedule any person for entry” and that “[o]nce a traveler is in the United States, he or she must be fully processed.” The DHS Secretary publicly explained that the metering policy meant “that if we don’t have the resources to let them in on a particular day, they are going to have to come back.” A June 2018 guidance
AL OTRO LADO V. MAYORKAS 11
memorandum from the DHS Secretary stated that the agency was prioritizing other components of its mission, such as national security and trade, above “[p]rocessing persons without documents required by law for admission arriving at the Southwest Border.” Due to the metering policy, asylum seekers began to accumulate on the Mexico side of the border. Many camped near the bridges at ports of entry. In an attempt to impose some order, Mexican government officials and nonprofits made lists of people waiting to be processed. U.S. border officials sometimes coordinated informally with those keeping lists, but they did not keep lists of their own. Asylum seekers waited in Mexico for days, weeks, or months. Many were subject to persecution and crime, and they often lacked adequate food and shelter. Some were murdered in Mexico while waiting for an opportunity to be processed by U.S. officials. Some attempted to reach U.S. soil by other means, such as running down vehicle lanes at ports of entry, so that they could apply for asylum. Others, including young children, tried to swim across the Rio Grande River and drowned. The immigrant rights organization Al Otro Lado, Inc., and thirteen individual asylum seekers (collectively “Plaintiffs”) challenged the lawfulness of the metering policy in a putative class action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of California. They named as defendants the DHS Secretary, the CBP Commissioner, and the Executive Assistant Commissioner of CBP’s Office of Field Operations (collectively “the Government”). Plaintiffs asserted five claims, each presenting a different legal theory for why the metering policy was unlawful. One claim alleged that metering violated § 706(1) of the
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Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), which prohibits agencies from unlawfully withholding or unreasonably delaying action that they are required by law to take. Another claim alleged that the Government violated § 706(2) of the APA by acting “in excess of [its] statutorily prescribed authority.” Plaintiffs also alleged that metering violated the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), the Alien Tort Statute, and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Plaintiffs sought the same relief for each claim: classwide declaratory and injunctive relief ending the Government’s metering policy. [1] The Government moved to dismiss the Complaint, and the district court denied the motion in relevant part. Al Otro Lado, Inc. v. McAleenan, 394 F. Supp. 3d 1168 (S.D. Cal. 2019). At around the same time, DHS and the Department of Justice jointly adopted the Asylum Transit Rule as an interim final rule. That Rule rendered ineligible for asylum nearly any noncitizen “who enter[ed], attempt[ed] to enter, or arrive[d] in the United States across the southern land border on or after July 16, 2019, after transiting through at least one country” unless she first applied for protection in that other country and received a final denial. Asylum Eligibility and Procedural Modifications, 84 Fed. Reg. 33829, 33843 (July 16, 2019), codified at 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(c)(4) (2019).
[*1102]Begin with the text. When, as here, “a statute does not define a term, we typically give the phrase its ordinary meaning.” FCC v. AT&T Inc., 562 U.S. 397, 403 (2011) (quotation omitted). The ordinary meaning is not merely a possible meaning. “[S]tatutes, no matter how impenetrable, do—in fact, must—have a single, best meaning.” Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 144 S. Ct. 2244, 2266 (2024). Our role as judges is to “use every tool at [our] disposal to determine th[at] best reading.” Id. “The starting point for statutory interpretation is the actual language of the statute”—what the words mean to an ordinary American. United States v. Yankowski, 184 F.3d 1071, 1072 (9th Cir. 1999). The majority skips this important and basic first step—which is dispositive here. [1] The statute’s context reinforces the unambiguous plain meaning. Another provision, § 1225, provides for the expedited removal of noncitizens “from the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) (emphasis added). As the Supreme Court has explained, § 1225 allows applicants for admission to “avoid expedited removal by claiming asylum.” DHS v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103, 109 (2020); see also United States v. Gambino-Ruiz, 91 F.4th 981, 985 (9th Cir. 2024). We have explained that the statute “ensures that all immigrants who have not been lawfully admitted,
[*1103]58 AL OTRO LADO V. MAYORKAS
regardless of their physical presence in the country, are . . . ‘applicant[s] for admission.’” Torres v. Barr, 976 F.3d 918, 928 (9th Cir. 2020) (en banc) (quoting § 1225(a)(1)). The majority reads “regardless of their physical presence in the country” to mean that the expedited removal protections can be avoided even when an alien is outside the country. But that line is better understood to make asylum available to those subject to expedited removal regardless of whether they are in a port of entry or elsewhere within the country. After all, a person not yet in the United States cannot be “removed” from it. This conclusion further follows from the fact that Congress provided separate protections for immigrants who have not yet arrived in the United States. See 8 U.S.C. § 1157. The Supreme Court has explained that § 1157, and not § 1158, “governs the admission of refugees who seek admission from foreign countries.” INS v. Cardoza- Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 433 (1987). The majority’s reading places aliens on the Mexican side of the border in a penumbral zone where they can apply for refugee status under § 1157 or for asylum under § 1158. Thus, while the statutory scheme applies different protections to an alien based on her location—either in the United States or out of it—the majority’s reading creates a fiction where these aliens are entitled to both. In no other statute has Congress provided more asylum protection to aliens outside the United States than those inside. On the contrary, Congress consistently provides foreign aliens fewer protections, as § 1157 demonstrates. Thus, it makes sense that § 1158 applies only to those physically within the United States.
AL OTRO LADO V. MAYORKAS 59 History and precedent further support this conclusion. We have long treated aliens who arrive at a port of entry “as if stopped at the border” even if they are “on U.S. soil.” Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. at 139 (quotation omitted). This is called the “entry fiction.” Maj. at 22–23. For at least a century, our immigration laws have treated those at ports of entry as though they have not “entered the country.” Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. at 139. An alien who arrived at Ellis Island, for example, “was to be regarded as stopped at the boundary line and kept there unless and until her right to enter should be declared.” Kaplan v. Tod, 267 U.S. 228, 230 (1925). So it makes sense that in § 1158, Congress listed both those who “arrive in the United States” and those already “physically present.” By so doing, Congress clarified that, despite the entry fiction, those who just crossed the border can apply for asylum on the same terms as someone who is otherwise “physically present.” The majority resists this conclusion. It notes that the entry fiction is just that—a fiction. Whether or not aliens in ports of entry are legally deemed to be outside the country, they are nonetheless physically present. That is true. But that is hardly a reason to set aside the statute’s plain meaning. And, given the entry fiction’s long history, Congress can hardly be faulted for going out of its way to respond to it. Congress clarified that the two categories of aliens contemplated in § 1158 and § 1225—those physically present and those just arriving in the United States—can apply for asylum. This belt-and-suspenders approach makes sense, and it cleanly supports the statute’s plain meaning.
[*1104]60 AL OTRO LADO V. MAYORKAS
Thus, text, history, and precedent all point in one direction. An alien “arrives in the United States” only when she crosses the border into it. B The majority ignores or diminishes this text, history, and precedent. It engages in “textual backflips to find some way[,] any way,” Fischer v. United States, 144 S. Ct. 2176, 2195 (2024) (Barrett, J., dissenting), to conclude that aliens in Mexico have arrived in the United States. Each attempt fails.
The majority begins with the rule against surplusage. Because the majority deems it “possible to give nonredundant meaning to those two categories,” it concludes it must give “arrives in the United States” a different meaning than “physically present in the United States.” Maj. at 20. But as I have already suggested, there is no surplusage. The phrase “arrives in” addresses the entry fiction, ensuring that those in ports of entry can apply for asylum just like those who are otherwise physically present in the United States. Thus, “arrives in” does not totally overlap with “physically present;” it plays a meaningful, independent role in the statute. Contra Maj. at 20 n.6. Even if the majority were right that “arrives in” and “physically present” totally overlap, id., that would not justify disregarding the statute’s plain meaning. True, courts often presume that ordinary speakers of English avoid surplusage. But the presumption is just that—a presumption. As anyone who has read a contract or deed knows, surplusage is common. Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S.
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103, 120 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“give, grant, bargain, sell, and convey” (quotation omitted)); Freeman v. Quicken Loans, Inc., 566 U.S. 624, 635 (2012). And, in any case, the presumption “should not be used to distort ordinary meaning.” Moskal, 498 U.S. at 120 (Scalia, J., dissenting). “Sometimes the better overall reading of the statute contains some redundancy.” Barton v. Barr, 590 U.S. 222, 239 (2020) (quotation omitted). Courts should “tolerate a degree of surplusage rather than adopt a textually dubious construction.” United States v. Atl. Rsch. Corp., 551 U.S. 128, 137 (2007); A. Scalia & B. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 177–78 (2012). After all, ordinary meaning—not nonduplicative meaning—is the lodestar in statutory interpretation. The statute’s ordinary meaning is clear, and the presumption against surplusage does not justify rewriting it.
The majority next turns to the 1980 version of the statue. The majority urges that its interpretation is not “breaking new ground” because that prior version allowed aliens “at a land border or port of entry” to apply for asylum. Maj. at 24 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1980)). Because this forty- five-year-old statute used language that—in the majority’s view—allowed aliens on the Mexican side of the border to apply for asylum, the majority argues that its interpretation of the current statute “does not radically expand” the asylum right. Id. No court, however, interpreted the 1980 statute like the majority does now. Al Otro Lado, 952 F.3d at 1029 (Bress, J., dissenting). That concern aside, the meaning of the 1980 statute cannot change the meaning of the 1996 statute now before us.
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“If anything, the [amendment] history suggests the opposite” of what the majority suggests. Trump v. Hawaii, 585 U.S. 667, 692 (2018). That Congress replaced “at a land border” with “arrives in the United States” suggests that it understood the terms to have different meanings. After all, when Congress amends a statute, “we presume it intends its amendment to have real and substantial effect.” Stone v. INS, 514 U.S. 386, 397 (1995). Thus, the better view is that Congress resolved whatever ambiguity existed in “at” by using “in” in the 1996 statute. See supra at 49–51. The majority suggests that the 1996 act did not substantively change the law. Maj. at 24–25 & n.9. But Congress used language in 1996 that differs in meaning from the 1980 statute. We cannot disregard a statute’s amendment history simply by declaring that the statute’s new terms— though quite different—mean the same thing as the old terms. Yet that is what the majority does. It claims the amendment had no practical impact. And it provides no textual analysis to support this ipse dixit. Moreover, we have already rejected the majority’s suggestion that the 1996 amendments were minor. As we have noted, those amendments made “large scale changes to the INA.” Gonzales v. DHS, 508 F.3d 1227, 1229 (9th Cir. 2007). Other circuits agree. Groccia v. Reno, 234 F.3d 758, 759 (1st Cir. 2000) (“In 1996, Congress made massive changes to the immigration laws.”); Acevedo v. Barr, 943 F.3d 619, 623 n.6 (2d Cir. 2019) (enacted “comprehensive immigration reform”); Prestol-Espinal v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 653 F.3d 213, 216, 222 n.9 (3d Cir. 2011) (“significant changes”); Renteria-Gonzalez v. INS, 322 F.3d 804, 809 (5th Cir. 2002) (“amend[ed] the [INA] in dozens of important but technical ways”). That overhaul went only one direction— the 1996 act was “widely regarded as placing important new
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limits on immigration.” Al Otro Lado, 952 F.3d at 1029 (Bress, J., dissenting). So even that major overhaul did not, as the majority concludes, collapse § 1158 into § 1157 and drastically expand asylum protections. In any case, the majority is of two minds with respect to the reach of the 1980 statute. When citing it as evidence of the 1996 statute’s meaning, it assures the public that the 1996 amendments were minor. Everything changes when the majority claims the 1996 amendments abrogated two binding cases. Maj. at 26–27. In INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 433, the Supreme Court explained that § 1158 sets out the process by which refugees “currently in the United States” can get asylum. We recognized the same in Yang v. INS, 79 F.3d 932, 938 (9th Cir. 1996). After waiving away those unambiguous statements as mere “general background summaries,” the majority says these cases are not helpful anyway because they reference the prior version of § 1158. Maj. at 26. But this just shows that the Supreme Court thought even the prior version of § 1158, which used the much broader “at a land border” applied only on our side of the border. Further, if the majority is correct that the 1996 changes were “minor,” then it is hard to say that those changes extended the statute’s protections to aliens in another country. In any event, the majority errs in waiving away the clear language of Cardoza-Fonseca and Yang. Those cases recognized that § 1158 applied only to people “in the United States” because the statute’s plain meaning compelled that conclusion. Never has our court—or any other court— concluded that § 1158 applies to aliens who seek admission from foreign countries. The reason is clear. As discussed above, such aliens—including Plaintiffs—can seek refugee
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status under § 1157. 9 Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 433. So if anything, the 1996 amendments confirm that aliens can apply for asylum only when they have entered the United States.
Even if the majority could show that “arrives in the United States” ordinarily references those just outside the United States, its analysis still falls short. For at most, the majority could show that “arrives in” is ambiguous. And the Supreme Court has instructed us to apply a presumption against extraterritoriality to ambiguous statutes. “Congress ordinarily legislates with respect to domestic, not foreign, matters.” Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010). Thus, “[w]hen a statute gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial application, it has none.” Id. True, Congress need not enact an “express statement of extraterritoriality” to overcome the presumption. RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. Eur. Cmty., 579 U.S. 325, 340 (2016). But it must provide “a clear indication of extraterritorial effect.” Id. Only the “rare statute” will meet this standard without “an express statement of extraterritoriality.” Id. The majority skirts this presumption. After laying out the rule, the majority rejects it in a single paragraph. In the
9 At least one of our sister circuits disagrees with the majority’s conclusion that Congress silently collapsed the differences between § 1157 and § 1158. See Cela v. Garland, 75 F.4th 355, 361 n.9 (4th Cir. 2023) (“Unlike aliens granted asylum—who are physically present in the United States or arrive in the United States when they seek asylum— aliens admitted as refugees seek admission to the United States from foreign countries.” (citing Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 433)).
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process, the panel so “eliminat[es] or water[s] down the presumption” that the “result[] i[s] purposivism.” Scalia & Bryan, supra, at 272. The majority suggests that Sections 1158 and 1225 contain an “indication of extraterritorial reach” because they do not expressly limit their reach to those inside the United States. Maj. at 30–31. But this flips the presumption on its head. Rather than presuming that these provisions lack extraterritorial effect, the majority presumes that they apply in Mexico because Congress did not say otherwise. Worse, perhaps recognizing the limitless reach of § 1158 and § 1225 in the presumption’s absence, the majority artificially limits its interpretation by saying that the statutes “do[] not . . . extend worldwide.” Id. The majority assures the public that the statutes reach only those noncitizens that are “on [the United States’] doorstep.” Id. This line drawing finds no harbor in any interpretive tool, let alone the statute’s text. The majority just makes it up. Next, the majority relies on our cases involving “conduct that almost always originates outside the United States.” United States v. Ubaldo, 859 F.3d 690, 700 (9th Cir. 2017). Immigration always originates outside the United States. So, applying Ubaldo, the majority eliminates the presumption against extraterritoriality from the entire immigration code. Ubaldo cannot bear this weight. If Ubaldo exempted all immigration law from the presumption, some case—any case—would have noted that remarkable result. None does. To the contrary, the Supreme Court has stated the opposite: statutes applying extraterritorially without an express statement are “rare.” RJR Nabisco, 579 U.S. at 340. The majority’s reliance on Ubaldo departs from how the Supreme Court has applied the presumption to other
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provisions of the INA—all of which, under the majority’s new Ubaldo reading, would have extraterritorial effect. For example, in Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 173–74 (1993), the Supreme Court decided that § 243(h)(1) of the INA lacked extraterritorial effect. At the time, that provision forbade the Attorney General from “deport[ing] or return[ing] any alien . . . to a country” if that alien qualified as a refugee. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(1) (1988). Despite that clear statutory mandate, the President “directed the Coast Guard to intercept vessels illegally transporting passengers from Haiti to the United States and to return those passengers to Haiti without first determining whether they may qualify as refugees.” Sale, 509 U.S. at 158. In holding that § 243(h)(1)’s statutory mandate did not apply on the high seas, the Court explained that the presumption against extraterritoriality applies with “special force when . . . construing . . . statutory provisions that may involve foreign and military affairs for which the President has unique responsibility.” Id. at 188. As Sale makes clear, the INA—which sets our Nation’s immigration’s policies—is one such statute. Later cases make this point more forcefully. In Trump v. Hawaii, the Supreme Court reversed our court after we failed to recognize that “the admission and exclusion of foreign nationals is a ‘fundamental sovereign attribute exercised by the Government’s political departments largely immune from judicial control.’” 585 U.S. at 702 (quoting Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977)). That fundamental sovereign attribute applies here with just as much “special force” as in Sale given the executive’s “unique responsibility” to govern immigration. The majority provides no reason to the contrary—it just says that there are “significant differences” between the high seas and
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the border. Maj. at 31 n.11. But the majority takes no pains to explain why those differences affect the presumption against extraterritoriality. Nor could it. Despite those differences, the Supreme Court “has generally treated the high seas the same as foreign soil for purposes of the presumption against extraterritorial application.” Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 569 U.S. 108, 121 (2013) (emphasis added) (citing Sale as an example). Thus, the Supreme Court has expressly rejected the majority’s attempt to distinguish Sale. Maj. at 31 n.11. Even if there were ambiguity in the statute (there is not), the majority cannot overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality. That presumption confirms that § 1158 applies only to aliens who have crossed the border.
[*1105]The majority next argues that its interpretation is necessary to avoid a perverse incentive for aliens to enter the United States somewhere other than a designated port of entry. Maj. at 21–22 (quoting Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. at 140). 10 This argument is grounded in the presumption against ineffectiveness, which provides that interpretations that “further[] rather than obstruct[] the document’s purpose” are to be favored. See Scalia & Garner, supra, at 63. This presumption prevents interpretations that would “enable offenders to elude its provisions in the most easy