Al Otro Lado v. Alejandro Mayorkas, 138 F.4th 1102 (9th Cir. 2024). · Go Syfert
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Al Otro Lado
v.
Alejandro Mayorkas
22-55988.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
Oct 23, 2024.
138 F.4th 1102
FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

AL OTRO LADO, a California Nos. 22-55988
corporation; ABIGAIL DOE; 22-56036
BEATRICE DOE; CAROLINA DOE;
DINORA DOE; INGRID DOE; D.C. No.
URSULA DOE; VICTORIA DOE; 3:17-cv-02366-
BIANCA DOE; JUAN DOE; BAS-KSC
ROBERTO DOE; CESAR DOE;
MARIA DOE; EMILIANA DOE,
individually and on behalf of all others OPINION
similarly situated,

Plaintiffs-Appellees /
Cross-Appellants,

v.

EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR
IMMIGRATION REVIEW,

Appellant / Cross-
Appellee,

and

ALEJANDRO N. MAYORKAS,
Secretary of Homeland Security;
CHRISTOPHER MAGNUS,
Commissioner of U.S. Customs and

2 AL OTRO LADO V. MAYORKAS

Border Protection (CBP); PETE
FLORES, Executive Assistant
Commissioner of CBP’s Office of
Field Operations, in their official
capacities,

Defendants-Appellants /
Cross-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of California
Cynthia A. Bashant, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted November 28, 2023
San Diego Carter & Keep U.S. Courthouse

Filed October 23, 2024

Before: John B. Owens, Michelle T. Friedland, and Ryan
D. Nelson, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Friedland;
Dissent by Judge R. Nelson

AL OTRO LADO V. MAYORKAS 3

SUMMARY *

Immigration

The panel affirmed in part and vacated in part the district
court’s permanent injunction relating to the application of the “Asylum Transit Rule”—which generally required persons traveling through a third country to apply for asylum there before seeking asylum in the United States—to noncitizens turned away at the border between Mexico and the United States under the policy of “metering.” Under the metering policy, whenever border officials deemed a port of entry to be at capacity, they turned away all people lacking valid travel documents. The district court entered a permanent injunction prohibiting application of the Asylum Transit Rule to members of a class of asylum seekers who were turned away under the metering policy before the Asylum Transit Rule took effect. The court also ordered the Government to unwind past denials of asylum to such individuals. The panel affirmed the district court’s conclusion that the metering policy violated section 706(1) of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), which provides that a court shall “compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed.” The Government contended that officials lack any duty to noncitizens who have not stepped across the border. Rejecting that argument, the panel held that a noncitizen

*
This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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stopped at the border is eligible to apply for asylum under 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1), which provides that a noncitizen may apply for asylum if she is “physically present in the United States” or “arrives in the United States.” The panel concluded that the latter encompasses those stopped at the border, whichever side they are standing on. The panel also held that such a noncitizen is an “applicant for admission” under 8 U.S.C. § 1225, which sets out the responsibilities of officials with respect to noncitizens at the border. Accordingly, border officials have a mandatory duty to inspect them. The panel explained that the presumption against extraterritorial application of statutes did not change its interpretation of § 1158 or § 1225. As to § 706(1) of the APA, the panel held that when an agency refuses to accept, in any form, a request that it take a required action, it has “withheld” that duty. Explaining that officials turned away noncitizens without taking any steps to keep track of them or otherwise allow them to open asylum applications, the panel concluded that the metering policy constituted withholding of action, not delay. The panel wrote that it need not reach Plaintiffs’ cross- appeal of the district court’s denial of their other claims. The panel also vacated the district court’s entry of judgment for Plaintiffs on their due process claim, explaining that when a constitutional holding is unnecessary, the court may simply vacate that portion of the judgment without discussing the merits. Next, the panel affirmed the district court’s entry of classwide declaratory relief. As the Government conceded, precedent foreclosed its argument that classwide declaratory relief is barred by 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1), which provides that “no court (other than the Supreme Court) shall have

AL OTRO LADO V. MAYORKAS 5

jurisdiction or authority to enjoin or restrain the operation” of specified immigration statutes on a classwide basis. The panel affirmed the grant of negative injunctive relief, which prohibits the Government from applying the Asylum Transit Rule to class members. The panel concluded that this relief was not barred by § 1252(f)(1) because it concerns § 1158, which is not covered by § 1252(f)(1). The panel concluded that § 1252(f)(1) does not bar the components of the district court’s affirmative relief requiring the Government to identify possible class members and notify them about their class membership and the significance of the injunction. However, the panel held that § 1252(f)(1) barred the portion requiring the Government, on its own initiative, to reopen or reconsider a prior decision. Dissenting, Judge R. Nelson concluded that an alien “arrives in the United States” only when she crosses the border into it and that the majority’s interpretation of that phrase twists the statutory language, ignores history, flips multiple presumptions, and ignores common-sense English usage. In doing so, the majority imposes on the federal government—for the first time—an obligation to interview asylum seekers who are still in Mexico. Judge R. Nelson also wrote that the majority erroneously concluded that the government “withheld” a statutory duty (rather than merely delaying it) by telling aliens to come back later. In his view, the panel should have rejected Plaintiffs’ claims, including those that the majority saved for another day.

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COUNSEL
Melissa E. Crow (argued), Center for Gender and Refugee
Studies, Washington, D.C.; Neela O. Chakravartula and
Anne Dutton, Center for Gender and Refugee Studies, San
Francisco, California; Robert Pauw, Center for Gender and
Refugee Studies, Seattle, Washington; Baher Azmy (argued)
and Angelo Guisado, Center For Constitutional Rights, New
York, New York; Rebecca M. Cassler, Southern Poverty
Law Center, Immigrant Justice Project, Washington, D.C.;
Sarah Rich, Southern Poverty Law Center, Decatur,
Georgia; Matthew Fenn, Mayer Brown LLP, Chicago,
Illinois; Matthew H. Marmolejo, Mayer Brown LLP, Los
Angeles, California; Michelle N. Webster and Ori Lev,
Mayer Brown LLP, Washington, D.C.; Stephen M.
Medlock, Evan Miller, and Rami Abdallah E. Rashmawi,
Vinson & Elkins LLP, Washington, D.C.; Katherine M.
Goettel, Gianna Borroto, and Suchita Mathur, American
Immigration Counsel, Washington, D.C.; for Plaintiffs-
Appellees.
Alexander J. Halaska (argued) and Katherine J. Shinners,
Senior Litigation Counsel; Jason Wisecup, Assistant United
States Attorney; Samuel P. Go, Assistant Director; Erez
Reuveni, Counsel; William C. Peachey, Director; Office of
Immigration Litigation; Brian M. Boynton, Principal Deputy
Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division; United States
Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.; for Appellant and
Defendants-Appellants.
Aileen M. McGrath, Morrison & Forester, San Francsico,
California, for Amicus Curiae Amnesty International.
Wendy Wylegala, Kids in Need of Defense, New York, New
York; Alexander J. Cooper, Kids in Need of Defense, Los
Angeles, California; Jane Liu, Young Center for Immigrant

AL OTRO LADO V. MAYORKAS 7

Children's Rights, Chicago, Illinois; Stephany Arzaga, Legal Services for Children, San Francisco, California; Mary T. Ross, Public Counsel, Los Angeles, California; for Amici Curiae Kids in Need of Defense, Legal Services for Children, Inc., Public Counsel, and The Young Center for Immigrant Children's Rights. Katrina Eiland, Stephen Kang, Spencer E. Wittmann Amdur, Cody Wofsy, and Oscar S. Roman, American Civil Liberties Union, San Francisco, California; Omar Jadwat, Lee Gelernt, and Anand Balakrishnan, American Civil Liberties Union, New York, New York; for Amici Curiae American Civil Liberties Union, ACLU of Southern California, ACLU of Northern California; and Northwest Immigrant Rights Project. Sabrineh Ardalan and Tiffany J. Lieu, Supervising Attorneys; Sarah Leadem and Simone Wallk, Supervised Law Students; Harvard Immigration and Refugee Clinical Program, Cambridge, Massachusetts; Sarah Sherman- Stokes, Supervising Attorney; Catherine Kannam, Supervised Law Student; Immigrants’ Rights and Human Trafficking Program, Boston University School of Law, Boston, Massachusetts; for Amici Curiae International Refugee Law Scholars. Anne Aufhauser, Sarah F. Warren, and Alison Goldman, Fried Frank Harris Shriver & Jacobson LLP, New York, New York, for Amici Curiae Haitian bridge Alliance, Ira Kurzban, and Irwin Stotzky. Raechel K. Kummer, Morgan Lewis & Bockius LLP, Washington, D.C.; Matthew C. McDonough and Andrew Savage, Morgan Lewis & Bockius LLP, Boston, Massachusetts; for Amici Curiae Immigration Law Professors.

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OPINION

FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judge:

In 2016, Customs and Border Protection adopted a policy of “metering” asylum seekers at ports of entry along the border between Mexico and the United States. Under that policy, whenever border officials deemed a port of entry to be at capacity, they turned away all people lacking valid travel documents. Many of those people intended to seek asylum in the United States but were not allowed to even apply. They could try to come back some other time, but there was no guarantee that they would ever be processed. The immigrant rights group Al Otro Lado and various individuals filed suit in federal district court challenging that metering policy on behalf of classes of asylum seekers. While the litigation was ongoing, the Government adopted a regulation, known as the “Asylum Transit Rule,” that generally required persons traveling through a third country to apply for asylum there before seeking asylum in the United States. For many asylum seekers who already had been turned away under the metering policy, the Asylum Transit Rule effectively barred them from qualifying for asylum if they were ever able to apply—even though they would not have been subject to the Rule if they had been processed when they first presented themselves at the border. The district court ultimately declared the metering policy to be unlawful. As part of the remedy, the district court enjoined the Government from applying the Asylum Transit Rule to noncitizens turned away under the metering policy before the Rule’s adoption. The court also ordered the

AL OTRO LADO V. MAYORKAS 9

Government to unwind past denials of asylum to such individuals. We must evaluate the lawfulness of the metering policy to decide whether to uphold the district court’s remedy, even though the Government rescinded the metering policy years ago. We largely affirm. I. Under federal law, asylum protects noncitizens who face persecution in their home countries because of their race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(1)(A), 1101(a)(42)(A). A noncitizen is eligible to apply for asylum if she is “physically present in the United States” or if she “arrives in the United States.” Id. § 1158(a)(1). People seeking to lawfully enter the United States via the southern border generally must present themselves for processing at a designated port of entry. 8 C.F.R. § 235.1(a). By statute, immigration officials are required to inspect all noncitizens “present in the United States who [have] not been admitted,” noncitizens who “arrive[] in the United States,” and noncitizens “otherwise seeking admission.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1), (3). If, during inspection at a port of entry, a noncitizen expresses an intent to apply for asylum or a fear of persecution, the inspecting border official must refer the noncitizen to an asylum officer for an interview to determine whether the noncitizen has a credible fear of persecution. Id. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii), (B). Otherwise, and if the noncitizen is inadmissible within the meaning of the statute, the official shall order her removed “without further hearing or review.” Id. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i).

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Until 2016, noncitizens seeking asylum at ports of entry on the U.S.-Mexico border would cross over onto U.S. soil and then wait in line to be inspected. In 2016, citing capacity constraints, Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”) officials began taking steps to prevent asylum seekers from entering port buildings or otherwise joining an inspection queue. In November 2016, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”), which includes CBP, approved “metering,” allowing border officials who deemed a port of entry to be at capacity to turn away all people lacking valid travel documents. CBP gave ports of entry flexibility to implement metering based on “what [worked] best operationally and whether it [was] required on any given day or [at] any specific location.” At some ports of entry, people were stepping onto U.S. soil before being turned back. CBP soon determined that it could not send such people back to Mexico without processing them, so it directed officials to implement metering at “the actual boundary line.” Officials standing on the U.S. side of the border therefore stopped people right before they crossed the border. The Government formalized its metering policy in the spring of 2018. In an April 2018 guidance memorandum, CBP authorized border officials to “meter the flow of travelers at the land border” based on “the port’s processing capacity.” The memorandum specifically permitted officials to “establish and operate physical access controls at the borderline.” It further stated that officers “may not provide tickets or appointments or otherwise schedule any person for entry” and that “[o]nce a traveler is in the United States, he or she must be fully processed.” The DHS Secretary publicly explained that the metering policy meant “that if we don’t have the resources to let them in on a particular day, they are going to have to come back.” A June 2018 guidance

AL OTRO LADO V. MAYORKAS 11

memorandum from the DHS Secretary stated that the agency was prioritizing other components of its mission, such as national security and trade, above “[p]rocessing persons without documents required by law for admission arriving at the Southwest Border.” Due to the metering policy, asylum seekers began to accumulate on the Mexico side of the border. Many camped near the bridges at ports of entry. In an attempt to impose some order, Mexican government officials and nonprofits made lists of people waiting to be processed. U.S. border officials sometimes coordinated informally with those keeping lists, but they did not keep lists of their own. Asylum seekers waited in Mexico for days, weeks, or months. Many were subject to persecution and crime, and they often lacked adequate food and shelter. Some were murdered in Mexico while waiting for an opportunity to be processed by U.S. officials. Some attempted to reach U.S. soil by other means, such as running down vehicle lanes at ports of entry, so that they could apply for asylum. Others, including young children, tried to swim across the Rio Grande River and drowned. The immigrant rights organization Al Otro Lado, Inc., and thirteen individual asylum seekers (collectively “Plaintiffs”) challenged the lawfulness of the metering policy in a putative class action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of California. They named as defendants the DHS Secretary, the CBP Commissioner, and the Executive Assistant Commissioner of CBP’s Office of Field Operations (collectively “the Government”). Plaintiffs asserted five claims, each presenting a different legal theory for why the metering policy was unlawful. One claim alleged that metering violated § 706(1) of the

12 AL OTRO LADO V. MAYORKAS

Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), which prohibits agencies from unlawfully withholding or unreasonably delaying action that they are required by law to take. Another claim alleged that the Government violated § 706(2) of the APA by acting “in excess of [its] statutorily prescribed authority.” Plaintiffs also alleged that metering violated the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), the Alien Tort Statute, and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Plaintiffs sought the same relief for each claim: classwide declaratory and injunctive relief ending the Government’s metering policy. [1] The Government moved to dismiss the Complaint, and the district court denied the motion in relevant part. Al Otro Lado, Inc. v. McAleenan, 394 F. Supp. 3d 1168 (S.D. Cal. 2019). At around the same time, DHS and the Department of Justice jointly adopted the Asylum Transit Rule as an interim final rule. That Rule rendered ineligible for asylum nearly any noncitizen “who enter[ed], attempt[ed] to enter, or arrive[d] in the United States across the southern land border on or after July 16, 2019, after transiting through at least one country” unless she first applied for protection in that other country and received a final denial. Asylum Eligibility and Procedural Modifications, 84 Fed. Reg. 33829, 33843 (July 16, 2019), codified at 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(c)(4) (2019).

[*1102]

Begin with the text. When, as here, “a statute does not define a term, we typically give the phrase its ordinary meaning.” FCC v. AT&T Inc., 562 U.S. 397, 403 (2011) (quotation omitted). The ordinary meaning is not merely a possible meaning. “[S]tatutes, no matter how impenetrable, do—in fact, must—have a single, best meaning.” Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 144 S. Ct. 2244, 2266 (2024). Our role as judges is to “use every tool at [our] disposal to determine th[at] best reading.” Id. “The starting point for statutory interpretation is the actual language of the statute”—what the words mean to an ordinary American. United States v. Yankowski, 184 F.3d 1071, 1072 (9th Cir. 1999). The majority skips this important and basic first step—which is dispositive here. [1] The statute’s context reinforces the unambiguous plain meaning. Another provision, § 1225, provides for the expedited removal of noncitizens “from the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) (emphasis added). As the Supreme Court has explained, § 1225 allows applicants for admission to “avoid expedited removal by claiming asylum.” DHS v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103, 109 (2020); see also United States v. Gambino-Ruiz, 91 F.4th 981, 985 (9th Cir. 2024). We have explained that the statute “ensures that all immigrants who have not been lawfully admitted,

[*1103]

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regardless of their physical presence in the country, are . . . ‘applicant[s] for admission.’” Torres v. Barr, 976 F.3d 918, 928 (9th Cir. 2020) (en banc) (quoting § 1225(a)(1)). The majority reads “regardless of their physical presence in the country” to mean that the expedited removal protections can be avoided even when an alien is outside the country. But that line is better understood to make asylum available to those subject to expedited removal regardless of whether they are in a port of entry or elsewhere within the country. After all, a person not yet in the United States cannot be “removed” from it. This conclusion further follows from the fact that Congress provided separate protections for immigrants who have not yet arrived in the United States. See 8 U.S.C. § 1157. The Supreme Court has explained that § 1157, and not § 1158, “governs the admission of refugees who seek admission from foreign countries.” INS v. Cardoza- Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 433 (1987). The majority’s reading places aliens on the Mexican side of the border in a penumbral zone where they can apply for refugee status under § 1157 or for asylum under § 1158. Thus, while the statutory scheme applies different protections to an alien based on her location—either in the United States or out of it—the majority’s reading creates a fiction where these aliens are entitled to both. In no other statute has Congress provided more asylum protection to aliens outside the United States than those inside. On the contrary, Congress consistently provides foreign aliens fewer protections, as § 1157 demonstrates. Thus, it makes sense that § 1158 applies only to those physically within the United States.

AL OTRO LADO V. MAYORKAS 59 History and precedent further support this conclusion. We have long treated aliens who arrive at a port of entry “as if stopped at the border” even if they are “on U.S. soil.” Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. at 139 (quotation omitted). This is called the “entry fiction.” Maj. at 22–23. For at least a century, our immigration laws have treated those at ports of entry as though they have not “entered the country.” Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. at 139. An alien who arrived at Ellis Island, for example, “was to be regarded as stopped at the boundary line and kept there unless and until her right to enter should be declared.” Kaplan v. Tod, 267 U.S. 228, 230 (1925). So it makes sense that in § 1158, Congress listed both those who “arrive in the United States” and those already “physically present.” By so doing, Congress clarified that, despite the entry fiction, those who just crossed the border can apply for asylum on the same terms as someone who is otherwise “physically present.” The majority resists this conclusion. It notes that the entry fiction is just that—a fiction. Whether or not aliens in ports of entry are legally deemed to be outside the country, they are nonetheless physically present. That is true. But that is hardly a reason to set aside the statute’s plain meaning. And, given the entry fiction’s long history, Congress can hardly be faulted for going out of its way to respond to it. Congress clarified that the two categories of aliens contemplated in § 1158 and § 1225—those physically present and those just arriving in the United States—can apply for asylum. This belt-and-suspenders approach makes sense, and it cleanly supports the statute’s plain meaning.

[*1104]

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Thus, text, history, and precedent all point in one direction. An alien “arrives in the United States” only when she crosses the border into it. B The majority ignores or diminishes this text, history, and precedent. It engages in “textual backflips to find some way[,] any way,” Fischer v. United States, 144 S. Ct. 2176, 2195 (2024) (Barrett, J., dissenting), to conclude that aliens in Mexico have arrived in the United States. Each attempt fails.

The majority begins with the rule against surplusage. Because the majority deems it “possible to give nonredundant meaning to those two categories,” it concludes it must give “arrives in the United States” a different meaning than “physically present in the United States.” Maj. at 20. But as I have already suggested, there is no surplusage. The phrase “arrives in” addresses the entry fiction, ensuring that those in ports of entry can apply for asylum just like those who are otherwise physically present in the United States. Thus, “arrives in” does not totally overlap with “physically present;” it plays a meaningful, independent role in the statute. Contra Maj. at 20 n.6. Even if the majority were right that “arrives in” and “physically present” totally overlap, id., that would not justify disregarding the statute’s plain meaning. True, courts often presume that ordinary speakers of English avoid surplusage. But the presumption is just that—a presumption. As anyone who has read a contract or deed knows, surplusage is common. Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S.

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103, 120 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“give, grant, bargain, sell, and convey” (quotation omitted)); Freeman v. Quicken Loans, Inc., 566 U.S. 624, 635 (2012). And, in any case, the presumption “should not be used to distort ordinary meaning.” Moskal, 498 U.S. at 120 (Scalia, J., dissenting). “Sometimes the better overall reading of the statute contains some redundancy.” Barton v. Barr, 590 U.S. 222, 239 (2020) (quotation omitted). Courts should “tolerate a degree of surplusage rather than adopt a textually dubious construction.” United States v. Atl. Rsch. Corp., 551 U.S. 128, 137 (2007); A. Scalia & B. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 177–78 (2012). After all, ordinary meaning—not nonduplicative meaning—is the lodestar in statutory interpretation. The statute’s ordinary meaning is clear, and the presumption against surplusage does not justify rewriting it.

The majority next turns to the 1980 version of the statue. The majority urges that its interpretation is not “breaking new ground” because that prior version allowed aliens “at a land border or port of entry” to apply for asylum. Maj. at 24 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1980)). Because this forty- five-year-old statute used language that—in the majority’s view—allowed aliens on the Mexican side of the border to apply for asylum, the majority argues that its interpretation of the current statute “does not radically expand” the asylum right. Id. No court, however, interpreted the 1980 statute like the majority does now. Al Otro Lado, 952 F.3d at 1029 (Bress, J., dissenting). That concern aside, the meaning of the 1980 statute cannot change the meaning of the 1996 statute now before us.

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“If anything, the [amendment] history suggests the opposite” of what the majority suggests. Trump v. Hawaii, 585 U.S. 667, 692 (2018). That Congress replaced “at a land border” with “arrives in the United States” suggests that it understood the terms to have different meanings. After all, when Congress amends a statute, “we presume it intends its amendment to have real and substantial effect.” Stone v. INS, 514 U.S. 386, 397 (1995). Thus, the better view is that Congress resolved whatever ambiguity existed in “at” by using “in” in the 1996 statute. See supra at 49–51. The majority suggests that the 1996 act did not substantively change the law. Maj. at 24–25 & n.9. But Congress used language in 1996 that differs in meaning from the 1980 statute. We cannot disregard a statute’s amendment history simply by declaring that the statute’s new terms— though quite different—mean the same thing as the old terms. Yet that is what the majority does. It claims the amendment had no practical impact. And it provides no textual analysis to support this ipse dixit. Moreover, we have already rejected the majority’s suggestion that the 1996 amendments were minor. As we have noted, those amendments made “large scale changes to the INA.” Gonzales v. DHS, 508 F.3d 1227, 1229 (9th Cir. 2007). Other circuits agree. Groccia v. Reno, 234 F.3d 758, 759 (1st Cir. 2000) (“In 1996, Congress made massive changes to the immigration laws.”); Acevedo v. Barr, 943 F.3d 619, 623 n.6 (2d Cir. 2019) (enacted “comprehensive immigration reform”); Prestol-Espinal v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 653 F.3d 213, 216, 222 n.9 (3d Cir. 2011) (“significant changes”); Renteria-Gonzalez v. INS, 322 F.3d 804, 809 (5th Cir. 2002) (“amend[ed] the [INA] in dozens of important but technical ways”). That overhaul went only one direction— the 1996 act was “widely regarded as placing important new

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limits on immigration.” Al Otro Lado, 952 F.3d at 1029 (Bress, J., dissenting). So even that major overhaul did not, as the majority concludes, collapse § 1158 into § 1157 and drastically expand asylum protections. In any case, the majority is of two minds with respect to the reach of the 1980 statute. When citing it as evidence of the 1996 statute’s meaning, it assures the public that the 1996 amendments were minor. Everything changes when the majority claims the 1996 amendments abrogated two binding cases. Maj. at 26–27. In INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 433, the Supreme Court explained that § 1158 sets out the process by which refugees “currently in the United States” can get asylum. We recognized the same in Yang v. INS, 79 F.3d 932, 938 (9th Cir. 1996). After waiving away those unambiguous statements as mere “general background summaries,” the majority says these cases are not helpful anyway because they reference the prior version of § 1158. Maj. at 26. But this just shows that the Supreme Court thought even the prior version of § 1158, which used the much broader “at a land border” applied only on our side of the border. Further, if the majority is correct that the 1996 changes were “minor,” then it is hard to say that those changes extended the statute’s protections to aliens in another country. In any event, the majority errs in waiving away the clear language of Cardoza-Fonseca and Yang. Those cases recognized that § 1158 applied only to people “in the United States” because the statute’s plain meaning compelled that conclusion. Never has our court—or any other court— concluded that § 1158 applies to aliens who seek admission from foreign countries. The reason is clear. As discussed above, such aliens—including Plaintiffs—can seek refugee

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status under § 1157. 9 Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 433. So if anything, the 1996 amendments confirm that aliens can apply for asylum only when they have entered the United States.

Even if the majority could show that “arrives in the United States” ordinarily references those just outside the United States, its analysis still falls short. For at most, the majority could show that “arrives in” is ambiguous. And the Supreme Court has instructed us to apply a presumption against extraterritoriality to ambiguous statutes. “Congress ordinarily legislates with respect to domestic, not foreign, matters.” Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010). Thus, “[w]hen a statute gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial application, it has none.” Id. True, Congress need not enact an “express statement of extraterritoriality” to overcome the presumption. RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. Eur. Cmty., 579 U.S. 325, 340 (2016). But it must provide “a clear indication of extraterritorial effect.” Id. Only the “rare statute” will meet this standard without “an express statement of extraterritoriality.” Id. The majority skirts this presumption. After laying out the rule, the majority rejects it in a single paragraph. In the

9 At least one of our sister circuits disagrees with the majority’s conclusion that Congress silently collapsed the differences between § 1157 and § 1158. See Cela v. Garland, 75 F.4th 355, 361 n.9 (4th Cir. 2023) (“Unlike aliens granted asylum—who are physically present in the United States or arrive in the United States when they seek asylum— aliens admitted as refugees seek admission to the United States from foreign countries.” (citing Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 433)).

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process, the panel so “eliminat[es] or water[s] down the presumption” that the “result[] i[s] purposivism.” Scalia & Bryan, supra, at 272. The majority suggests that Sections 1158 and 1225 contain an “indication of extraterritorial reach” because they do not expressly limit their reach to those inside the United States. Maj. at 30–31. But this flips the presumption on its head. Rather than presuming that these provisions lack extraterritorial effect, the majority presumes that they apply in Mexico because Congress did not say otherwise. Worse, perhaps recognizing the limitless reach of § 1158 and § 1225 in the presumption’s absence, the majority artificially limits its interpretation by saying that the statutes “do[] not . . . extend worldwide.” Id. The majority assures the public that the statutes reach only those noncitizens that are “on [the United States’] doorstep.” Id. This line drawing finds no harbor in any interpretive tool, let alone the statute’s text. The majority just makes it up. Next, the majority relies on our cases involving “conduct that almost always originates outside the United States.” United States v. Ubaldo, 859 F.3d 690, 700 (9th Cir. 2017). Immigration always originates outside the United States. So, applying Ubaldo, the majority eliminates the presumption against extraterritoriality from the entire immigration code. Ubaldo cannot bear this weight. If Ubaldo exempted all immigration law from the presumption, some case—any case—would have noted that remarkable result. None does. To the contrary, the Supreme Court has stated the opposite: statutes applying extraterritorially without an express statement are “rare.” RJR Nabisco, 579 U.S. at 340. The majority’s reliance on Ubaldo departs from how the Supreme Court has applied the presumption to other

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provisions of the INA—all of which, under the majority’s new Ubaldo reading, would have extraterritorial effect. For example, in Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 173–74 (1993), the Supreme Court decided that § 243(h)(1) of the INA lacked extraterritorial effect. At the time, that provision forbade the Attorney General from “deport[ing] or return[ing] any alien . . . to a country” if that alien qualified as a refugee. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(1) (1988). Despite that clear statutory mandate, the President “directed the Coast Guard to intercept vessels illegally transporting passengers from Haiti to the United States and to return those passengers to Haiti without first determining whether they may qualify as refugees.” Sale, 509 U.S. at 158. In holding that § 243(h)(1)’s statutory mandate did not apply on the high seas, the Court explained that the presumption against extraterritoriality applies with “special force when . . . construing . . . statutory provisions that may involve foreign and military affairs for which the President has unique responsibility.” Id. at 188. As Sale makes clear, the INA—which sets our Nation’s immigration’s policies—is one such statute. Later cases make this point more forcefully. In Trump v. Hawaii, the Supreme Court reversed our court after we failed to recognize that “the admission and exclusion of foreign nationals is a ‘fundamental sovereign attribute exercised by the Government’s political departments largely immune from judicial control.’” 585 U.S. at 702 (quoting Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977)). That fundamental sovereign attribute applies here with just as much “special force” as in Sale given the executive’s “unique responsibility” to govern immigration. The majority provides no reason to the contrary—it just says that there are “significant differences” between the high seas and

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the border. Maj. at 31 n.11. But the majority takes no pains to explain why those differences affect the presumption against extraterritoriality. Nor could it. Despite those differences, the Supreme Court “has generally treated the high seas the same as foreign soil for purposes of the presumption against extraterritorial application.” Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 569 U.S. 108, 121 (2013) (emphasis added) (citing Sale as an example). Thus, the Supreme Court has expressly rejected the majority’s attempt to distinguish Sale. Maj. at 31 n.11. Even if there were ambiguity in the statute (there is not), the majority cannot overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality. That presumption confirms that § 1158 applies only to aliens who have crossed the border.

[*1105]

The majority next argues that its interpretation is necessary to avoid a perverse incentive for aliens to enter the United States somewhere other than a designated port of entry. Maj. at 21–22 (quoting Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. at 140). 10 This argument is grounded in the presumption against ineffectiveness, which provides that interpretations that “further[] rather than obstruct[] the document’s purpose” are to be favored. See Scalia & Garner, supra, at 63. This presumption prevents interpretations that would “enable offenders to elude its provisions in the most easy


1 The majority claims that it cannot interpret “arrives in” without looking to the whole statute. See Maj. at 18 n.4. True, words must be understood in context. Taniguchi v. Kan Pac. Saipan, Ltd., 566 U.S. 560, 569 (2012). But context is a tool to understand a law’s ordinary meaning, not a tool to replace it. See id. We cannot use context to impose a meaning that a term cannot bear. See id. (using context only after 50 AL OTRO LADO V. MAYORKAS The first term is the verb “arrive.” Since at least the 14th Century, the word “arrive” has meant to “reach[] a destination.” John Ayto, Dictionary of Word Origins 36 (2011). Its meaning remained the same in 1996, when the statute was enacted. Then, as now, “arrive” meant to “reach a destination” or “come to a particular place.” The American Heritage Illustrated Encyclopedic Dictionary 102 (1987). Other dictionaries confirm that a person “arrives” somewhere when she “come[s] to a certain point in the course of travel” or “reach[es] [her] destination.” Random House Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary 116 (2001). Thus, to “arrive at” a place means to reach it after traveling. Id.; see also Al Otro Lado, 952 F.3d at 1028 (Bress, J., dissenting) (collecting examples from other dictionaries). 2 Had Congress used the term “arrive at,” perhaps the majority’s ambiguity argument would have some plausible force. But Congress didn’t use “arrives at”— it used “arrives in.” Indeed, in 1996, Congress changed the statutory language from “at” to “in.” And that is the language we interpret. “Arrive in,” the term Congress used, has a clearer meaning—it is used “[w]hen the place of arrival is the object.” Webster’s Dictionary of English Usage 120 (1989). Consider the preposition “in.” “In has remained in use with verbs of motion” for hundreds of years. Id. at 533. It determining that a term “can encompass” two meanings); see also King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473, 500–01 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting). The majority’s proposed interpretation is not only unnatural, but unheard of. 2 For example, the term “at” is used with the “verb[] of motion” “arrive” to “indicat[e] attainment of a position.” 1 Oxford English Dictionary 739 (2d ed. 1989). So a person could “arrive at” the border on either side, depending on which direction they are coming from. AL OTRO LADO V. MAYORKAS 51 describes being “[w]ithin the limits or bounds of” a place with “material extension.” 7 Oxford English Dictionary 759 (2d ed. 1989). Accordingly, it is typically used “with the proper names of . . . countries.” Id. Putting those two terms together, a person “arrives in” a country when she has reached its inner limits or bounds. Real-life experience bears this out. Imagine, for example, that Apple says a new iPhone will “arrive in stores” on January 2. Hearing this, you would expect the phone to be on the shelves on January 2—not in an unloaded semitrailer behind the store. Or imagine that Amazon tells you a package will “arrive in your mailbox” on June 3. On June 3, you would expect the package to be inside your mailbox—not at the local post office, ready for delivery. As these common-sense examples show, to “arrive in” a location means to be physically within the premises. Not at the border, or in the process of arriving. Linguistic data confirms that these are not isolated examples. See Wilson v. Safelite Grp., 930 F.3d 429, 440 (6th Cir. 2019) (Thapar, J., concurring in part) (courts “ought to embrace” corpus linguistics as “another tool to ascertain the ordinary meaning”). The Corpus of Contemporary American English is a database of over one billion words spoken in everyday contexts between 1990 and 2010. Within that database, “arrives in” was used to describe a destination 161 times between 1990 and 1996 (when the statute was enacted). 3 Appendix 1. Of those, 160—the 3 This search can be replicated by searching “arrives in” on english- corpora.org/coca. Restrict results to those occurring before 1996. That yields 219 results. But 58 are irrelevant. The statute uses “arrives in” to describe where immigrants are located. By contrast, 58 results use 52 AL OTRO LADO V. MAYORKAS overwhelming majority—referenced someone or something physically within the destination. And not once was the phrase clearly used to mean standing at the destination’s border. A few examples are illustrative. One source describes a plane that “arrives in Newark but late,” forcing the passengers to rush through the airport to catch their connections. 4 Did the plane “arrive” when, circling miles above the city, the captain announced that the plane was cleared to begin its descent? Of course not. The plane “arrive[d] in Newark” when it touched Newark ground. After all, the passengers could not rush through the airport until the plane physically landed. Other sources describe dignitaries who “arrive[d] in” a city to attend a summit. To attend the summit, of course, the dignitaries must have been physically present. Nelson Mandela, for example, “arrives in New York” and is “greeted with a ticket-tape parade and crowds of thousands.” 5 Clearly, to parade through New York, Mandela was inside the Empire State—not standing just across the river in Jersey City. “arrives in” to describe either when something arrives (“arrives in two hours”) or how it arrives (“arrives in a bad mood”). Setting aside those 58, 161 results use “arrives in” to describe a location. See Appendix 1. 4 Valerie Lister, Road Trip: The Women’s Pro Basketball Way, USA Today (1996), relevant text available at Corpus of Contemporary American English, https://www.english-corpora.org/coca (last accessed Sep. 18, 2024). 5 Barbara Reynolds, Mandela’s Visit, USA Today (1990), relevant text available at Corpus of Contemporary American English, https://www.english-corpora.org/coca (last accessed Sep. 18, 2024). AL OTRO LADO V. MAYORKAS 53 Finally, consider an example from the great American sport: “As the pitch arrives in the catcher’s hands, the catcher digs in to take on [the runner].” 6 A pitch “arrives in” the catcher’s hands when it physically lands in the mitt. Not when leaving the pitcher’s hand, flying through the air, or even spinning inches from the catcher’s outstretched mitt. We could go on and discuss all 161 usages. But the underlying point is clear. English speakers use “arrives in” to mean standing within a destination, not outside. 7 The majority does not identity a counterexample. Nor does it deny what this linguistic data suggests: its interpretation of “arrives in” is not only unnatural, but unheard of. 8 See Maj. at 19 n.5.
6 Cobb (1994), relevant text available at Corpus of Contemporary American English, https://www.english-corpora.org/coca (last accessed Sep. 18, 2024). 7 Of the 161 examples, one usage is arguable. A TV script said, “the elevator arrives in the hall, bringing more people.” Metropolis (1995), relevant text available at Corpus of Contemporary American English, https://www.english-corpora.org/coca (last accessed Sep. 18, 2024). Perhaps one could argue that elevators are at a hall’s border, not physically inside. But even so, one ambiguous example out of 161 does not show that “arrives in” ordinarily means to stand at a destination’s border. If anything, the (arguable) exception proves the rule. To “arrive in” a location is unambiguous and means only one thing: to be physically inside. 8 The majority notes that neither party relied on corpus linguistics. Maj. at 19 n.5. But both parties extensively briefed the ordinary meaning of “arrives in.” And when interpreting a statute, we are not limited to the tools the parties cite, just as we are not limited to the caselaw cited by the parties when evaluating a legal proposition. See Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 129 (1998) (relying on corpus linguistics when neither party briefed the tool). 54 AL OTRO LADO V. MAYORKAS Instead, the majority emphasizes that statutory language must be understood in context. Id. at 19 n.5, 21 n.7. I agree. Statutory interpretation must determine how words are ordinarily understood, and ordinary English speakers leverage context to convey and interpret meaning. It’s because of context, after all, that we easily distinguish “drove the sheep into the pen” from “used the pen to sign a contract.” But context never justifies giving a term a meaning that it cannot bear. See Taniguchi, 566 U.S. at 569 (using context only after determining a term “can encompass” two meanings); see also King, 576 U.S. at 500– 01 (Scalia, J., dissenting). That is why the sentence “used the corral to sign the contract” leaves readers scratching their heads. Unlike “pen,” the term “corral” simply does not mean a writing instrument, even if all the context suggests it might. So too here. Dictionaries catalogue the possible uses of “arrives in,” and linguistic evidence indicates which of those uses are ordinary. Together, these tools confirm that “arrives in” simply cannot mean standing outside a destination’s border. No amount of context can change that linguistic fact. See Taniguchi, 566 U.S. at 569. Here, moreover, the context supports the plain meaning. I discuss other contextual clues below, see infra at 57–58, but two points are worth emphasis here. First, contrary to the majority’s suggestion, the fact that the statute covers an alien “who arrives in the United States (whether or not at a designated port of arrival)” does not alter the plain meaning of “arrives in.” Maj. at 20–21 & n.7. The parenthetical clarifies that the statute applies to immigrants who arrived through designated entry ports and those who crossed the border elsewhere. It does not mean that immigrants who have yet to enter an arrival port have somehow arrived in the United States. Contra id. Because entry ports are part of the AL OTRO LADO V. MAYORKAS 55 United States, an immigrant “arrives in the United States” whether she stands on Ellis Island or in rural Texas. But either way, the immigrant does not “arrive in” until she steps onto United States soil. Second, the majority suggests that because “arrives in” appears in the context of a statute, the only relevant linguistic evidence is other statutory language. Maj. at 19 n.5. Why would that be? Congress presumably uses words “in their natural sense.” Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 71 (1824). So evidence of how “arrives in” is used in everyday contexts is highly probative. See Muscarello, 524 U.S. at 129 (citing dictionaries and “searching computerized newspaper databases” to determine a word’s ordinary meaning); United States v. Costello, 666 F.3d 1040, 1044 (7th Cir. 2012) (Posner, J.) (relying on dictionaries and a Google search). Even so, other statutes use “arrives in” in its ordinary sense. See 22 U.S.C. § 2507a(c) (providing for training “[o]nce a volunteer has arrived in” a country). One provision, for example, states that aliens who arrive in the United States at undesignated times or locations are inadmissible. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). Are immigrants who approach border agents after hours therefore inadmissible? What about Mexican citizens who come within 20 feet of an undesignated portion of the border? Of course not. Congress, like ordinary English speakers, uses “arrives in” to mean those physically present, not those standing in Mexico—or as the majority calls it—“on the United States’ doorstep.” Maj. at 31 n.11. In sum, the linguistic data confirms what dictionaries and intuition suggest: for a person to “arrive in the United States,” she must arrive “in the United States”—“there is no in-between.” Al Otro Lado, 952 F.3d at 1028 (Bress, J., dissenting). 56 AL OTRO LADO V. MAYORKAS Today, the majority divines an “in-between.” Moving forward, a person who “encounter[s] officials at the border,” Maj. at 20, is “on the United States’ doorstep,” Maj. at 31 n.11, or is “in the process of arriving” in the United States, Maj. at 15, 46, may apply for asylum. The majority leaves each phrase ambiguously open- ended. At any rate, none of these phrases appears in the text. The statute does not say “encounter officials at the border.” It does not say “on the United States’ doorstep.” Nor does it say “in the process of arriving.” It says “arrives in.” No amount of context justifies the majority’s redlining of Congress’s statutory language. In a half-hearted attempt to change the statutory text, the majority cites a single dictionary definition for “arrive.” Maj. at 20–21. But, again, the statute says “arrives in,” not just “arrive.” And why credit that single definition over all the other evidence discussed above? The majority does not say. Nor does the majority explain how “arrives in” can mean “at the border,” “on the doorstep,” or “in the process of arriving” when each phrase has a historically different meaning. More than being wrong, the majority’s conclusion is harmful. Judicial redlining of statutes, as the majority does here, undercuts Congress’s authority, eliminates citizens’ ability to rely on the law, and erodes democracy, allowing unelected judges to revise the decisions of the People’s representatives. There is more. Borders define the very bounds of a nation’s sovereign power. Border, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024) (“The boundary between one country (or a political subdivision) and another.”). They also protect a country from those outside it and are, by their nature, AL OTRO LADO V. MAYORKAS 57 exclusionary. Thus, the Supreme Court has recognized a “longstanding concern for the protection of the integrity of the border.” United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 538 (1985). So strong is that interest that even constitutional rights yield when “[b]alanced against the sovereign’s interests at the border.” Id. at 539. The majority subverts these interests. It treats those in Mexico—but ambiguously close to the border—as if they were “in” the United States. And it assumes that Congress implicitly set aside constitutional principles that, for centuries, have uniformly been applied to protect our border. The statutory language forecloses the majority’s interpretation. A person at the border, but on the Mexican side, might be close to the United States. She might have arrived at the United States border. But until she crosses the border, she has not arrived in the United States. This is not just the best reading of the statute; it is the only reading. The majority has not pointed to any example in which “arrives in” means anything besides crossing the border into the destination. We would expect Congress to use clearer language to subvert long-established border protections.
10 Thuraissigiam addresses perverse incentives in a single sentence and only after the Supreme Court had rejected all other textual arguments. 591 U.S. at 140. That case provides weak support for the majority’s reliance on the presumption against ineffectiveness, particularly because the majority uses the presumption to avoid the text’s plain meaning. 68 AL OTRO LADO V. MAYORKAS manner.” Garland v. Cargill, 602 U.S. 406, 428 (2024) (quoting The Emily, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 381, 389 (1824)). But like all presumptions, it is rebuttable. The majority’s reliance on this presumption is misplaced for at least two reasons. First, as with the other interpretive canons, the presumption only applies to textually permissible interpretations. Scalia & Garner, supra, at 63. As already explained, the majority’s interpretation is not textually permissible. Second, the presumption does not allow courts to supplant or “rewrite statutory text” just because a bad actor might evade the statute to avoid an interpretation that its plain text requires. Cargill, 602 U.S. at 428 (quotation omitted). Cargill illustrates this principle. There, the Supreme Court considered whether semiautomatic rifles equipped with a bump-stock device are machineguns as defined by statute. 26 U.S.C. § 5845(b) defines machineguns as weapons that can fire more than one shot “automatically . . . by a single function of the trigger.” Bump stocks allow a semiautomatic rifle to fire quickly, but they still require a shooter to “reset the trigger between every shot.” Cargill, 602 U.S. at 415. Faced with these facts, the Supreme Court concluded that, although bump-stock-equipped semiautomatic rifles can fire at rates that approach those of true machineguns, they were not machineguns as defined in the statute. In so concluding, the Court rejected arguments grounded in the presumption against ineffectiveness. Id. at 427–28. The Court applied the statute’s plain meaning— even if that meaning would undermine the statute’s overall purpose in some applications. AL OTRO LADO V. MAYORKAS 69 As in Cargill, adopting the statute’s plain meaning may well have perverse consequences. And those consequences may well undermine the very purpose of the INA—to regulate the border in an orderly fashion. But those consequences exist under any interpretation of the statute. The several hoops through which aliens must jump when seeking admission to the United States already encourage millions to enter the country at unlawful locations. And even though laws require those procedures, “it remains relatively easy for individuals to enter the United States,” and often “without detection.” United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 552 (1976). Our cases are full of examples of aliens doing just that. See United States v. Gambino-Ruiz, 91 F.4th 981, 983–84 (9th Cir. 2024) (discussing one alien who repeatedly illegally crossed the border at various points). This reality does not give the majority a blank check to cash any atextual interpretation. Nor may the majority adopt a textually impermissible interpretation just to avoid perverse incentives. In sum, the statute’s plain text precludes the majority’s interpretation. But even if the statute were ambiguous, the presumption against extraterritoriality, properly applied, supports the plain meaning. The majority’s attempts to find a workaround fail. All roads lead to the same conclusion: an alien “arrives in the United States” only when she crosses the border. II After erroneously holding that the government has a duty to process asylum seekers in Mexico, the majority narrowly defines what it means for the government to “withh[old]” that duty. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(1). The majority assures the government that it retains broad discretion to decide how to 70 AL OTRO LADO V. MAYORKAS process asylum seekers in Mexico. And it suggests that the government could comply with its duty simply by keeping a list of potential asylum seekers. Maj. at 36. The majority’s narrow interpretation of “withholding” limits the practical impact of its opinion. Indeed, because the government retains broad discretion to limit access to asylum, plaintiffs just across the border likely will still not get any relief—despite the majority’s expansive reading of “arrives in.” That is a salutary effect. But the way the majority gets there—narrowly interpreting “withholding”— is wrong. And two wrongs do not make a right. Section 706(1) of the APA requires us to compel agency action if it is either “withheld or unreasonably delayed.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(1). Under this section, “the only agency action that can be compelled under the APA is action legally required.” Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness All., 542 U.S. 55, 63 (2004) (emphasis in original). Even when an organic statute requires agency action, it may not require immediate agency action. Unless the statute imposes a deadline, agencies need only complete their statutory duties “within a reasonable time.” 5 U.S.C. § 555(b). We have held that agency action is “withheld” when “Congress has specifically provided a deadline for performance.” Biodiversity Legal Found. v. Badgley, 309 F.3d 1166, 1177 n.11 (9th Cir. 2002). We explained that the “failure to complete” the required agency action “within the mandated time frame compelled the court to grant injunctive relief.” 11 Id. at 1178.
11 Although we did not analyze the text of § 706(1) in Badgley, the Fourth Circuit correctly recognized that, by declining to apply the unreasonable- AL OTRO LADO V. MAYORKAS 71 Other circuits follow a similar approach. In the D.C. Circuit, agency action is withheld when “agency inaction violates a clear duty to take a particular action by a date certain.” Sierra Club v. Thomas, 828 F.2d 783, 794 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 12 The Fourth Circuit similarly recognizes that “an agency’s failure to meet a hard statutory deadline” is withholding. South Carolina, 907 F.3d at 760. So too the Tenth Circuit, which has concluded that agency action is withheld only if “Congress imposed a date-certain deadline on agency action” that the agency fails to meet. Forest Guardians v. Babbitt, 174 F.3d 1178, 1190 (10th Cir. 1999). The weight of authority—including our opinion in Badgley—thus provides that agency action is withheld only when an agency fails to act by a statutory deadline. Rather than create a circuit split, we should follow this clear consensus. Applying that standard here, the government did not withhold one of its duties. The statute does not impose any deadline on the government’s obligation to process asylum seekers (assuming an obligation exists). So not even the majority argues that the government “withheld” agency action under this standard. Instead, the majority concludes that we have already rejected this standard. It reaches this conclusion based on a delay factors, we necessarily concluded that the agency action was “unlawfully withheld.” South Carolina v. United States, 907 F.3d 742, 760 (4th Cir. 2018) (citing Badgley, 309 F.3d at 1176–77 & n.11). 12 The D.C. Circuit recognizes that “[a]n agency’s own timetable for performing its duties in the absence of a statutory deadline is due ‘considerable deference.’” Cobell v. Norton, 240 F.3d 1081, 1096 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (quoting Sierra Club v. Gorsuch, 715 F.2d 653, 658 (D.C. Cir. 1983)). This suggests that it is difficult, if not impossible, for an agency to withhold an action in the absence of a statutory deadline. 72 AL OTRO LADO V. MAYORKAS questionable reading of Vietnam Veterans of Am. v. CIA, 811 F.3d 1068, 1081 (9th Cir. 2016). There, we granted relief under the APA under a statute that did not impose a deadline. The majority concludes that, because we did not address whether agency action was unreasonably delayed, we must have decided that the government “withheld” its obligations. At the start, Vietnam Veterans was decided more than a decade after Badgley. To the extent there is any conflict, Badgley—which held that a missed deadline was withholding, not delay—controls. 13 In any event, the majority overreads Vietnam Veterans. It concedes that Vietnam Veterans did not analyze “whether the Army’s failure to comply with the regulation constituted withholding or delay under the APA.” Maj. at 33. Rather, we held that the Army had a mandatory obligation enforceable under § 706(1)—without deciding whether the Army withheld or delayed action. Thus, Vietnam Veterans cannot have defined what it means for agency action to be “withheld.” The majority concludes otherwise, arguing that the only possible conclusion in Vietnam Veterans was that the “failure to act constituted withholding.” Id. This cannot withstand scrutiny. First, for a century, the Supreme Court
13 To circumvent Badgley, the majority notes that Badgley held a statutory deadline was a sufficient (but not necessary) condition for withholding. Maj. at 34 n.13. But the majority fails to identify another case addressing the distinction between withholding and delay. Badgley is the closest we have. Even so, the relevant question is not whether a statutory deadline is necessary or sufficient for withholding. The relevant question is instead whether the government “withheld” an obligation (rather than “delayed” it) when it told aliens to come back later. AL OTRO LADO V. MAYORKAS 73 has cautioned that “[q]uestions which merely lurk in the record, neither brought to the attention of the court nor ruled upon, are not to be considered as having been so decided as to constitute precedents.” Cooper Indus. v. Aviall Servs., Inc., 543 U.S. 157, 170 (2004) (quoting Webster v. Fall, 266 U.S. 507, 511 (1925)). We have applied that rule to issues lurking in our own cases. See Schram v. Robertson, 111 F.2d 722, 725 (9th Cir. 1940). And it should govern with greater force here. The briefing in Vietnam Veterans suggests that the issue litigated was not whether a duty was withheld or delayed, but whether there was a duty at all. 14 In Badgley, by contrast, the government argued—and we rejected—that any deviation from the statutorily mandated deadline was reasonable delay. 309 F.3d at 1177 n.11. Thus Badgley, not Vietnam Veterans, governs whether agency inaction constitutes withholding. Second, Vietnam Veterans is distinguishable. Here, the government told Plaintiffs—like it told all other metered aliens—to come back to the overwhelmed port of entry for processing later. The Army in Vietnam Veterans, by contrast, gave no indication that it would ever take the actions the plaintiffs sought. See generally Vietnam Veterans, 811 F.3d at 1068. Unlike in Vietnam Veterans, the government has not “withheld” any duty to process asylum applications. At most, it has delayed that duty.
14 See generally Opening Brief of Appellants, Vietnam Veterans, 811 F.3d at 1068; Opening Brief for Defendants-Appellees/Cross- Appellants, Vietnam Veterans, 811 F.3d at 1068; Appellants’/Cross- Appellees’ Reply Brief and Opposition to Cross-Appeal, Vietnam Veterans, 811 F.3d at 1068; Reply Brief for Defendants- Appellees/Cross-Appellants, Vietnam Veterans, 811 F.3d at 1068. 74 AL OTRO LADO V. MAYORKAS Unmoored from precedent, the majority’s sweeping new rule—that the government withholds a duty whenever it “refuses to accept, in any form, a request that it take a required action” for any period is indefensible. Maj. at 34. The majority’s rule swallows the distinction between “withheld” and “delayed” agency action. After all, the government did not say it would never process Plaintiffs. It merely told those aliens who were turned away to come back when the Ports of Entry were not overwhelmed. That is a far cry from “refus[ing] to accept” a duty to interview those aliens. In any event, as even Vietnam Veterans recognizes, “the operation of § 706(1) is restricted to discrete actions that are unequivocally compelled by statute or regulation.” Vietnam Veterans, 811 F.3d at 1081. That obligation must be “so clearly set forth that it could traditionally have been enforced through a writ of mandamus.” Id. at 1076 (quoting Hells Canyon Pres. Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 593 F.3d 923, 932 (9th Cir. 2010)). The majority does not even try to explain how its withholding rule satisfies this standard. To the contrary, the majority suggests the government would not have “withheld” its duty to process aliens if it had kept a waitlist or immediately initiated the asylum process. Maj. at 36. But under Vietnam Veterans, we can grant § 706(1) relief only if the statute “unequivocally compels” those actions. The relevant statute says nothing about a waitlist or immediate processing. Thus, the majority imposes on agencies a requirement to do “that which [they are] not required to do.” In re A Cmty. Voice, 878 F.3d 779, 784 (9th Cir. 2017). Section 706(1) gives the majority no such authority. See Norton, 542 U.S. at 63. AL OTRO LADO V. MAYORKAS 75 The good news is the majority’s error is limited. If—as the majority concludes—“[e]ven minimal steps,” such as keeping a waitlist, would evade the majority’s rule and “shift the § 706(1) analysis . . . from the withholding category into the delay category,” then the majority’s rule is good for this case only. Maj. at 36. But the narrowness of the majority’s conclusion only limits its harm; it does not make it legally correct. We should reverse the grant of summary judgment to Plaintiffs on their § 706(1) claim and vacate the corresponding injunction. III Plaintiffs’ other claims also fail. A The majority properly vacates the injunction based on Plaintiffs’ Due Process claim. It does so, however, on constitutional avoidance grounds. Maj. at 37. I would reject the claim on the merits. “[M]ore than a century of precedent” establishes that aliens denied entry have no Due Process rights beyond “the procedure authorized by Congress.” Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. at 138–39 (quotation omitted). In other words, arriving noncitizens’ procedural rights “are purely statutory in nature and are not derived from, or protected by, the Constitution’s Due Process Clause.” Mendoza-Linares v. Garland, 51 F.4th 1146, 1167 (9th Cir. 2022). Plaintiffs thus warrant no relief on their Due Process claim. B Plaintiffs also raise a claim under § 706(2) of the APA. The district court did not reach this claim. But I would dismiss this claim as moot because the memoranda 76 AL OTRO LADO V. MAYORKAS promulgating the metering policy were rescinded years ago. See Akiachak Native Cmty. v. Dep’t of Interior, 827 F.3d 100, 113 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (“[W]hen an agency has rescinded and replaced a challenged regulation, litigation over the legality of the original regulation becomes moot.”). Even if the § 706(2) claim remained live, it fails on the merits. The metering policy was a lawful exercise of the government’s authority to “[s]ecur[e] the borders,” 6 U.S.C. § 202(2), (8), and the ability to admit aliens falls within the Executive’s inherent powers, United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 543 (1950). The government’s exercise of its inherent authority was reasonable given the pressures it faced at the border when it enacted the metering policy. C Finally, Plaintiffs raise a claim under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), arguing that the metering policy violated the international-law norm of non-refoulement. This claim also lacks merit. The ATS gives district courts “original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1350. This modest statute is an ordinary jurisdictional statute. It does not say when an action violates the law of nations or a federal treaty. Nor does it say which torts properly fall within its reach. In Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, the Supreme Court established a path for “recogni[zing] . . . new causes of action” under the ATS. Doe v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 73 F.4th 700, 714 (9th Cir. 2023) (citing Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 728 (2004)). Gratefully, that path is exceedingly AL OTRO LADO V. MAYORKAS 77 narrow. The bar for recognizing a new cause of action is “high.” Sosa, 542 U.S. at 727. The ATS creates a cause of action only for “violations of international law norms that are ‘specific, universal, and obligatory.’” Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 117 (citing Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732). 15 But even identifying such a norm is not enough—once identified, courts then apply a second, “extraordinarily strict” step of asking whether there is “even one” reason to think that Congress might “doubt the efficacy or necessity of the new remedy.” Nestle USA, Inc. v. Doe, 593 U.S. 628, 637 (2021) (plurality op.) (quotation omitted). If the answer to the second question is “yes,” then “courts must refrain from creating [a] remedy” for even a specific, universal, and obligatory norm. Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 584 U.S. 241, 264 (2018) (quotation omitted). Since both steps must be met, private rights of action under the ATS are available only “in very limited circumstances.” Nestle, 593 U.S. at 631 (plurality op.). Indeed, the Supreme Court has “yet to find [the two-part test] satisfied.” Id. at 637. The Court’s reluctance to expand the ATS beyond Sosa underscores its commitment to ending the “ancien regime” when the Court “ventur[ed] beyond Congress’s intent” to create rights of action that were—at best—only implied. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 287 (2001). A plurality of the Court has already suggested that it will not infer any rights of action beyond “the three historical torts identified in Sosa”: “violation of safe conducts, infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and
15 This test “bears a marked resemblance to the ‘clearly established law’ standard in qualified immunity analysis.” Gerald Weber, The Long Road Ahead: Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain and “Clearly Established” International Tort Law, 19 Emory Int’l L. Rev. 129, 132 (2005). 78 AL OTRO LADO V. MAYORKAS piracy.” Nestle, 593 U.S. at 635, 637 (plurality op.). Reading between the lines, we should never infer additional causes of action under the ATS. The three torts identified in Sosa, and no more. Finally, even if plaintiffs allege violations of one of the three torts identified in Sosa, they must go a step further and show that the violation took place in the United States. That is because the ATS lacks extraterritorial effect. Any claim alleging “violations of the law of nations occurring outside the United States is barred.” Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 124. Plaintiffs’ ATS claim founders on all these shoals. Extraterritoriality is a good place to start. Plaintiffs seek a remedy under the ATS for actions that occurred in Mexico. Because “the presumption against extraterritoriality applies to claims under the ATS,” id., their claim cannot succeed even if non-refoulement is a “specific, universal, and obligatory” norm. Besides seeking to give extraterritorial effect to the ATS, Plaintiffs also seek to elevate non-refoulement to a universal status it does not have. Assume Plaintiffs are right to define non-refoulement as they do: non-refoulement “encompass[es] any measure . . . which could have the effect of returning an asylum-seeker or refugee to the frontiers of territories where his or her life or freedom would be threatened[.]” UNHCR Exec. Comm., Note on International Protection, ¶ 16, U.N. Doc. A/AC.96/951 (Sept. 13, 2001). Even on that definition, the metering policy is not non- refoulement. The United States did not accept any metered aliens into the United States. So how could it have returned asylum-seekers or refugees anywhere? In any event, assuming that the metering policy was non- refoulement, Plaintiffs’ arguments remain unpersuasive. AL OTRO LADO V. MAYORKAS 79 Plaintiffs argue that non-refoulement has reached jus cogens status, meaning that it is binding on the United States regardless of whether it has consented to it. Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Arg., 965 F.2d 699, 714–17 (9th Cir. 1992). Because finding that a norm has jus cogens status is harsh medicine, only the rarest of norms will achieve that status. Jus cogens norms must be “so universally disapproved by other nations” that they are “automatically unlawful.” Sosa, 542 U.S. at 751 (Scalia, J., concurring in part). The list of such norms is so small that the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Laws of the United States enumerates them: only norms prohibiting “official torture,” “genocide, slavery, murder or causing disappearance of individuals, prolonged arbitrary detention, and systematic racial discrimination” have achieved that status. Siderman de Blake, 965 F.2d at 717. The refoulement of aliens who have never entered the United States is a far cry from that status. As the district court correctly recognized, many European countries and Australia have policies that belie any claim that the non-refoulement standard universally applies extraterritorially. Indeed, some countries have policies that mirror the metering policy here. That is unsurprising. Most countries, including the United States, respect and protect their borders. Only the Ninth Circuit—which is not a sovereign nation—seems to reject this nearly universal goal of national border security. Plaintiffs cannot identify the “general assent of civilized nations” necessary to create a cause of action under the ATS. See Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244, 254 (2d Cir. 2009). But even if non-refoulement were as universally disapproved as Plaintiffs suggest, a cause of action would 80 AL OTRO LADO V. MAYORKAS still not exist under the ATS. Under the second prong of the Court’s ATS test, there are countless sound reasons to think that Congress would doubt the efficacy or necessity of a remedy under the ATS. Jesner, 584 U.S. at 264. I offer just one—the ATS “has not been held to imply any waiver of sovereign immunity.” Tobar v. United States, 639 F.3d 1191, 1196 (9th Cir. 2011). “A waiver of sovereign immunity cannot be implied but must be unequivocally expressed.” Id. at 1195 (quoting United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538 (1980)). Thus, recognizing an ATS claim against the United States for violating a norm of non- refoulement would require us to find that Congress, which generally legislates against the backdrop of existing law, see Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 533 (1994), silently waived the Nation’s sovereign immunity in cases brought by any alien not immediately processed at the border. Nothing Plaintiffs identify would support such a drastic departure from precedent, particularly in a case that would open the federal coffers to aliens who have never stepped foot in the United States. In sum, for a host of reasons, Plaintiffs’ ATS claim, which would mark a drastic expansion of Sosa, fails. IV The majority’s interpretation of “arrives in the United States” is indefensible. It twists the statutory language, ignores history, flips multiple presumptions, and ignores common-sense English usage. The majority also erroneously concludes that the government “withheld” a statutory duty (rather than merely delaying it) by telling aliens to come back later. We should have rejected Plaintiffs’ claims, including those that the majority saves for another day. I dissent. AL OTRO LADO V. MAYORKAS 81 APPENDIX 1 Table 1: 161 Uses of “Arrives in” to Describe a Destination Year Source Context 1990 Christian Transplanted from her West Indian home, Science the 19-year-old arrives in a large East Monitor Coast city…to work as an au pair. 1990 Nelson Mandela, who arrives in New USA Today York today, is being greeted with a ticker- tape parade and crowds of thousands. 1990 Christian Mr. Gorbachev arrives in Washington [for Science a summit]. Monitor 1990 Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki, the diffident, sad-faced leader of Poland's Washington Solidarity-controlled government, Post arrives in Washington [to meet with President Bush]. 1990 When the new Washington Congress arrives in Washington in Post January, it will face a major piece of unfinished business. 1990 [She] used to think that money was got on J. of Am. the streets here, but if ever she arrives Ethnic in this country she will find it quite History different, as there is nothing got here by idleness. 1990 A vendor arrives in the market with a Ethnology small supply of capital and knowledge of market trade. 82 AL OTRO LADO V. MAYORKAS Year Source Context 1990 Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev World arrives in Beijing for the first Sino-Soviet Affairs summit in thirty years. 1990 When Roderick arrives in London, he Style must concoct a voice with which to advance his career. 1990 In “Squaring the Circle,” a mountain man American from Kentucky arrives in Manhattan and Heritage is made vertiginous by its pitiless rush forward. 1990 [Photo description:] Lajos Kossuth American arrives in America in 1851, with the Heritage Guardian Genius of Hungary in attendance. 1990 White You can leave if you want. I'm staying. Hunter: The company arrives in Entebbe the day Black Heart after tomorrow [to film a movie]. 1990 Ragged arrives in an era of declining rock' USA Today n' roll, a drift that hasn’t alarmed Young. 1990 [Photo description:] Ambassador to Newsweek Kuwait Nathaniel Howell arrives in Germany. 1990 Mikhail Gorbachev arrives in Washington ABC next Wednesday evening [for a summit]. 1990 [We have to design the equipment so that CNN it] is lighter and able to get there and then Specials do a different job when it arrives in the arena. 1990 And your view is that…let[ting] food CNN supplies go into Kuwait would be an Crossfire excellent idea?...The moment that food AL OTRO LADO V. MAYORKAS 83 Year Source Context arrives in Kuwait, it will be taken by the Iraqis. 1990 PBS Mandela arrives in New York on Newshour Wednesday for a 12-day visit to the U.S. 1990 Each day a new harvest of inmates arrives PBS in The Crosses [where they are detained Newshour for months, waiting for investigations to finish.] 1990 I think he is positioning himself also to PBS improve the chances for his foreign NewsHour minister, Teraq Aziz, when he arrives in Washington [for negotiations]. 1990 Furthermore, he said when Perez de ABC Cuellar arrives in Amman, they are not Nightline arriving with any proposals for the secretary general. 1990 As first light arrives in a beech and Atlantic hemlock forest, setting the birds sounding their chaotic vowels… 1990 Interior I am the one by whom my past arrives in Landscapes this world. 1990 A bedraggled Henry arrives in his brother, Good Fellas Michael’s, room. Michael is all dressed and sitting in his wheelchair, ready to go. 1990 Hence, productivity begins even before Newsweek the worker arrives in the office. 1990 This child…is the grandson of…a Russian Jew who arrives in Baltimore on the Newsweek Fourth of July, 1914, and declares it the most beautiful place he’s ever seen. 84 AL OTRO LADO V. MAYORKAS Year Source Context 1990 U.S. News & Until the supertanker arrives in the U.S., World no one knows the price its oil cargo will Report bring. 1990 [A cruise ship], for example, leaves Changing Miami on Saturdays and after two days at Times sea arrives in St. Martin/St. Maarten, which is half French and half Dutch. 1990 [T]he Count, disguised as a large, black dog, arrives in England. Fortunately for Weatherwise His Excellency, immigration and quarantine laws were much less strict then than now. 1990 If you think of the telephone purely as a TIME secular voice thrower, it arrives in the mind at its most irritating. 1991 On November 15th, a second ambassador arrives in the United States to help ABC Special Nomura, the current ambassador, who's been negotiating for almost a year. 1991 [T]he note is seen as an ultimatum. The ABC Special same day Hull’s note arrives in Japan, the Japanese fleet departs from Japan. 1991 Terry Anderson arrives in Germany [to PBS begin his first full day of freedom at an Newshour American military base] 1991 ABC James Baker arrives in Saudi Arabia Nightline tonight [to meet with Kuwait’s leader.] 1991 Once the food arrives in the port, yes, ABC there will have to be some work done on Nightline the roads. 1991 ABC He will likely tell the President which way Nightline it's going to go before he arrives in AL OTRO LADO V. MAYORKAS 85 Year Source Context Moscow for the summit with Mr. Gorbachev, July 30th, 31st. 1991 Six months after he arrives in Russia, JFK Francis Gary Powers’ U2 spy flight goes down in Russia. 1991 [I]f the wine is likely to cost at least 20%- Forbes 25% more when it arrives in the U.S. 18 to 24 months later. 1991 Her calculation is shown in one sequence in Truth or Dare when her tour arrives in Nat’l Rev. Toronto and she is told that the police are prepared to arrest her if [she performs a specific bit.] 1991 Saturday In New York City, only 32 cents of every Evening Post education dollar arrives in the classroom. 1991 The robot will sell for less than $1,000 Compute! when it arrives in stores and catalogs next February. 1991 When the shuttle arrives in space, the Compute! crew reconfigures the computers for orbital operations. 1991 [Photo description:] An ore carrier bearded with the frozen spray of the Great Weatherwise Lakes arrives in Superior, Wisconsin, in a -15 degrees F deep freeze. 1991 She gives one party each summer for NY Times about 400 Saratogians, even before the racing crowd arrives in town. 1991 Gorbachev decided to speed it up and Christian finish everything before the delegation Science arrives in Vilnius….Then the delegation Monitor will arrive to find ‘order’ restored. 86 AL OTRO LADO V. MAYORKAS Year Source Context 1991 First Egyptian contingent arrives in Saudi Associated Arabia. Iraqi President Saddam Hussein Press urges Arabs to sweep “emirs of oil” from power. 1991 The Giffords will be reunited temporarily USA Today Friday. Kathie Lee arrives in Tampa to tape Regis & Kathie Lee. 1991 John Major is expected to brief President Bush on the positions of Britain, Italy, USA Today France and Germany when he arrives in the United States Wednesday for a three- day visit. 1991 His new album, Dangerous, arrives in USA Today stores Tuesday. 1992 Uher said he would support a rules change Houston requiring the Calendars Committee to Chronicle schedule a bill for floor debate within 30 days after it arrives in Calendars. 1992 President Bush arrives in Japan on ABC Tuesday on a mission to open Japanese Business markets to American products. 1992 As Clinton arrives in Albuquerque, New ABC Special Mexico, it is very late at night and [local supporters are gathered to meet him.] 1992 NPR All The vice president arrives in Tokyo on Things Tuesday to take part in a ceremony. Considered 1992 One drawback to electing a governor President is that he arrives in the White CNN House with little foreign policy experience. AL OTRO LADO V. MAYORKAS 87 Year Source Context 1992 President Bush arrives in Japan with a ABC demand: Japanese markets must be Nightline opened to American-made goods. 1992 NPR Boris Yeltsin arrives in Washington, DC, Weekend on Tuesday [for a summit.] 1992 Descending the stone stairs, Alfred arrives Batman 2 in the Batcave. 1992 Frick arrives in the doorway [to speak to Batman 2 someone.] 1992 Jennifer [A man] spits gum at the sink as he arrives Eight in the kitchen. 1992 [She] hurr[ies] into her dressing gown Jennifer with a similar urgency to get out. Eight She arrives in the living room as the figure is clambering through the window. 1992 [Photo description:] A shipload of Somali Newsweek refugees arrives in Yemen 1992 The hero of And You, Too arrives in America France [to study] 1992 Christian A young senator, Jefferson Smith, arrives Science in the nation’s capital [to serve his term] Monitor 1992 Churchill arrives in Cairo, disturbed by a Associated telegram from Gen. Auchinlek saying Press Britain's 8th Army will not have the strength to make new attacks. 1992 Churchill arrives in Moscow to tell Stalin Associated no second front will be opened in Europe Press in 1942. 1992 The first installment of her $60 million, Washington multimedia deal with Time Warner arrives Post in stores today. 88 AL OTRO LADO V. MAYORKAS Year Source Context 1992 The Subway Finally Arrives in Washington Woodbridge and Waldorf[, expanding] the Post Metro into the outer counties. 1992 Hillary Clinton arrives in town today still Washington in the process of figuring out how to be an Post impeccable 1992 Joel Fleischman, a whiny New Yorker, Atlanta J.- arrives in Alaska to fulfill his obligation Const. under a state program that had paid his tuition 1992 His co-star, Susan Strasberg, portrays a San naive deaf woman who arrives in the Francisco Haight looking for her missing brother. Chronicle She's quickly befriended. 1992 World The first Mainland Chinese to visit Affairs Taiwan arrives in Taipei. 1993 Three days before Kennedy arrives in Dallas, [Lee Harvey Oswald is] given a ABC 20/20 gift on a silver platter. Jack Kennedy’s going to pass in front of the Depository. 1993 But Clinton arrives in Tokyo [for NPR All negotiations] with his stature as an Things international leader tarnished by his Considered performance over the last four months. 1993 Bosnia’s President Alija Izetbegovic NPR arrives in New York today. He'll address Morning the U.N. tomorrow. 1993 The President arrives in Tampa, Florida, a ABC medium-sized city where one out of five Nightline people has no health insurance. [The President is interviewed.] AL OTRO LADO V. MAYORKAS 89 Year Source Context 1993 A young English nurse, a new bride, arrives in Africa with a man that she met CNN while working as a nurse during the war…[and] sought out friends among the local Africans. 1993 A package arrives in the mail. You open CNN it… 1993 Mariana of Austria is not yet queen the Southern day that Mari Barbola arrives in Madrid: Review someone else fills that role, an Isabella. 1993 Charlie runs across the dance floor, So I Married fighting for an exit to the outside. an Axe He arrives in someone's arms on his way Murderer [and says,] ‘I need your help.’ 1993 William Nathaniel Showalter III arrives NY Times in Fort Lauderdale, Fla., for spring training today. 1993 When Mr. Clinton arrives in Des Moines, NY Times he will join Mr. Harkin for a helicopter tour. 1993 One-and-a-half hours northeast of the Salvadoran capital…, one arrives in Christian Ilobasco, marked by its red-tiled roofs. Science Here, the combination of fine-grained clay Monitor and local talent has produced a cottage industry of ceramic crafts. 1993 But when our renga arrives in the morning Christian mail, I find that the wind that climbs the Science pine hill behind David’s house is stirring Monitor the apple boughs behind me. 90 AL OTRO LADO V. MAYORKAS Year Source Context 1993 The flight from Miami arrives in Iquitos, Associated Peru, late at night and you get on the boat Press immediately…. 1993 The first, a nonstop from Ocean City to Washington Washington, departs Ocean City at 8 a.m. Post daily and arrives in Washington at 1:50 p.m. 1993 The second departs Ocean City at 11:20 Washington a.m., stops in Rehoboth Beach at 12:05 Post p.m. and arrives in Washington at 3:55. 1993 The last bus, also a nonstop, leaves Ocean Washington City at 5 p.m. and arrives in Washington Post at 10:45. 1993 [T]he Ladies Professional Golf Atlanta J.- Association arrives in Stockbridge this Const. week for the $ 600,000 Atlanta Women's Championship. 1993 He arrives in Atlanta via impressive stints Atlanta J.- as a staff conductor with the [several Const. symphonies.] 1993 Neeson…stars as Oskar Schindler, a Nazi Houston Party member who arrives in Krakow, Chronicle Poland, shortly after the Nazi army crushes Polish resistance in 1939. 1993 The brisk rhythm…builds up to this shot as an arresting point of confluence; the Raritan ship's entering frame as it arrives in the town harbor carries the accumulated charge of all that has been transpiring. 1993 [Photo description:] The phantom ship Raritan entering frame as it arrives in the town harbor. AL OTRO LADO V. MAYORKAS 91 Year Source Context 1993 By the time the caravan arrives in Geographical Amazonia, the forest is largely felled, the Review resources pillaged… 1993 Music A new magazine of practical music Educators teaching arrives in your mailbox this Journal summer. 1994 Constance Hopkins arrives in the New Social World aboard the Mayflower and relates Studies the early years of Plymouth Plantation from November 1620 to February 1626. 1994 Boris Yeltsin arrives in the U.S. tonight CBS 60 for a summit meeting with President Minutes Clinton. 1994 This delegation arrives in a situation in which, by and large, the Haitian people, as best anyone can determine, are saying to CBS Special themselves and anyone else who will listen, ‘We just hope this thing gets over with.’ 1994 Nearly every week, a Chinese freighter ABC Day arrives in the port of Long Beach, One California. 1994 Last week [a package] arrives in New CBS Eye to Jersey, where Jay Skidmore is a U.S. Eye postal inspector. 1994 When he arrives in the house, do you give Gerald him a kiss? MARGIE: No. (Audience- Rivera Show reaction). 1994 [A] convoy of U.N. peacekeepers arrives ABC in Gorazde after Bosnia's Serbs defy Saturday NATO's ultimatum and intensify their News shelling. 92 AL OTRO LADO V. MAYORKAS Year Source Context 1994 [I]t’s comforting to know that there is NPR poetry out there worse than my poetry. Morning And it arrives in the mail…. 1994 There is always a certain element of pomp ABC and ceremony when a U.S. president Nightline arrives in a foreign capital, but it's essentially fluff. 1994 [Mr. Swing] will be hosting the high- ABC powered delegation when it arrives in Nightline Haiti tomorrow. 1994 For instance, James Bond arrives in Literary Rev. Munich and knows where he can eat the best liverwurst in the city. 1994 [S]he sails around for several years…until she finally arrives in Britain, which has Critical recently been conquered by a non- Matrix Christian people…[S]he succeeds in spreading the word of God among the Britons. 1994 She believes she is escaping those dead- end streets, but instead arrives in North of California with the phone number of an Montana old high school boyfriend written out like a prescription. 1994 Here comes Cobb with a recklessness beyond reason. And as the pitch arrives in Cobb the Catcher's hands, the Catcher digs in to take on Cobb. 1994 A Mossad team arrives in London to The Fist of mount an operation against a Palestinian God undercover squad. AL OTRO LADO V. MAYORKAS 93 Year Source Context 1994 I have been avoiding the club where we Harpers had lunch. If a package arrives in the Magazine mail, I shake it slightly. 1994 [H]e arrives in Naples [for a summit] with NY Times the best economic performance of the participants. 1994 Prime Minister John Major arrives in NY Times Naples [for a summit] in a curious position: Britain’s economy is growing…. 1994 [L]arge artificial marshes…will be used to Associated cleanse farm run-off before it arrives in Press the Everglades. 1994 The prevailing south winds are lashing Associated gnarled mesquite trees as a visitor arrives Press in Rule, population 783. 1994 British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd Associated arrives in Hanoi Wednesday to expand his Press country’s trade and investment links. 1994 In one scene, a group of children arrives Washington in England and is welcomed and hugged Post by people they don't know but with whom they will live temporarily. 1994 San Johnny…is 27 and arrives in London in a Francisco stolen car, penniless but full of dire Chronicle thoughts. 1994 California Governor Wilson will be the San latest visitor when he arrives in El Paso Francisco today to tour the border and see what Chronicle lessons the blockade may hold for his state. 94 AL OTRO LADO V. MAYORKAS Year Source Context 1994 She was in love with Lime, who is Chicago Sun- seemingly killed just as Cotton arrives in Times Vienna. 1994 A once-in-a-lifetime event arrives in Chicago Chicago and you might wind up with your nose pressed against the window. 1994 Armed This is how Amnon expresses what it Forces & means to be scared when one arrives in Soc. Gaza for the first time. 1994 When the exhibition arrives in London, Sirens the English will be convinced. 1994 Here’s a president who arrives in Moscow [for discussions] with no new money. The NPR only amounts of money that are going to Weekend be given to help Russia have all been stipulated before. 1995 As they head into the apartment, the elevator arrives in the hall, bringing more Metropolis people. Christoph ushers in this new group, then slips into the elevator. 1995 Shirley Harris arrives in the emergency CBS room at 2:00 PM with chest pain. She’s Morning immediately hooked up to a monitor. 1995 Private hospitals, by law, have to treat NPR anyone who arrives in the emergency Morning room. 1995 Meanwhile, I open a letter that arrives in Mass. Rev. the mail. 1995 Va. One week later, a letter to me arrives in Quarterly the office mail. The return address is The Rev. New York Herald Tribune Book. 1995 Outbreak [D]awn arrives in the Motaba Valley. AL OTRO LADO V. MAYORKAS 95 Year Source Context 1995 Within 48 hours a representative of the testing agency used by Major League Sports Baseball arrives in Binghamton, N.Y., Illustrated home of the Mets’ Double A affiliate, to collect a urine sample from Gooden. 1995 At certain separations, a light wave from Astronomy one star arrives in sync with a light wave from the other star and adds to it. 1995 Christianity U.S. Marines salute Pope John Paul II as Today he arrives in Queens. 1995 Pope John Paul II proclaims himself “a Associated pilgrim of peace” as he arrives in the Press United States for a five-day visit. 1995 Indeed, before he arrives in the United Washington States, Peres says he plans to develop a Post list of options…. 1995 Clayton County has become a multi- cultured and diverse community. When Atlanta J.- student-led prayer arrives in the Const. classroom, it will include Hindu, Muslim, Jewish and pagan chants. 1995 A tired young man arrives in Atlanta one Atlanta J.- evening. He has no relatives to support Const. him…. 1995 Atlanta J.- Stoichkov could play more than 60 Const. matches before he arrives in Atlanta. 1995 When the world arrives in our city next summer, challenging these barriers must Atlanta J.- be accomplished if Atlanta is to emerge as Const. the next great international city for people with disabilities. 96 AL OTRO LADO V. MAYORKAS Year Source Context 1995 Levada arrives in San Francisco following San several years of bitter protests over Francisco Quinn's decision to close more than a Chronicle dozen churches. 1995 As soon as she arrives in the village, a Symposium network that resembles a transparent web weaves itself around Samya. 1995 The first among this new old breed of NPR scary critters arrives in Species, a sci-fi Morning thriller that owes a lot to Alien. 1995 Mighty [The] world famous coach Gunthar Morphin Scmidt arrives in Angel Grove today [to Power scout for his gymnastics team.] Rangers 1996 [A man on a tour received increased media attention with] each successive stop. In fact, a few days from now, when Smithsonian he arrives in Buffalo, New York, for a Juneteenth Festival…he’ll be greeted by 60,000 festival goers.” 1996 Volkswagen's biggest car, the Passat, will Associated see slicker styling and improved safety Press features when it arrives in the United States next spring. 1996 Two people…are the keepers of the CBS 48 [Olympic] flame…until it arrives in Hours Atlanta [for the Olympics.] 1996 Runaway Jury, the story of a high-stakes People lawsuit against a tobacco company, which Weekly arrives in bookstores this week. AL OTRO LADO V. MAYORKAS 97 Year Source Context 1996 Marcie arrives in Baton Rouge at six Ark. Rev.: J. o’clock. When I open the door, she Delta Studies throws her arms around my neck. 1996 [She] goes right into a detailed description Ark. Rev.: J. of how she plans to breed iguanas once Delta Studies she arrives in Texas. 1996 It seems as if the 1992 elections just Fantasy & ended, and yet this magazine Sci. Fiction arrives in your mailbox at the beginning of primary season. 1996 House Later in the story, the children's letter Mouse, arrives in the House mail room. Senate Mouse 1996 She balls up the drawing and puts it in her pocket. Gina arrives in the doorway, Basquiat wearing a robe. The landlady’s trapped between them. 1996 What Mitsubishi’s 40-in. glass-plasma Popular display will actually look like and how it Mechanics will be configured when it arrives in stores in early 1997 are still mysteries. 1996 Dan “the Beast” Severn arrives in the Esquire Octagon [with people who announce him for a wrestling match.] 1996 [A] fish [changes] between the evening Field & when it is caught and the next morning Stream when the fisherman arrives in the local coffee shop to tell of his catch. 1996 If this were a video game, the screen Smithsonian might first show a stranger. He arrives in a rainy city [and founds a school]. 98 AL OTRO LADO V. MAYORKAS Year Source Context 1996 Associated [The] Cuban President arrives in Chile Press [for a summit.] 1996 The flight arrives in Newark but is late, and the team must go to the other end of USA Today the airport to catch its connecting flight to Hartford. 1996 Yet nothing is for sure now. San Moceanu arrives in Atlanta with a four- Francisco centimeter stress fracture in her tibia that Chronicle kept her out of the Olympic Trials 1996 Every month, Good Housekeeping The arrives in my mailbox bursting with Simpsons recipes. 1996 Chicago Sun- None of this rich thematic material arrives Times in the form of dry discourse in Arcadia. 1996 The imported Catera arrives in small Associated quantities this year in California, Oregon Press and Washington, then debuts in the Washington, D.C.-to-Boston area. AL OTRO LADO V. MAYORKAS 99 Table 2: 58 Uses of “Arrives in” to Describe When or How One Arrives Year Source Context 1990 The obliging taxi driver who has taken us Nat’l Rev. to a sung Latin Mass at St. Vitus's Gothic cathedral this morning arrives in time. 1990 Ninety percent of Hawaii's energy arrives Omni in the form of imported oil. 1991 Bert Blyleven, also disabled, arrives in Atlanta J.- time before each home game to take a 90- Const. minute bike ride around the stadium. 1990 Moments after Hackman and his crony find San Archer in a wilderness cabin, the mob Francisco arrives in a commando-style helicopter Chronicle raid. 1990 Animals are slaughtered and a meal arrives Ethnology in large brass trays. 1990 Rolling She arrives in a new red BMW, as well as Stone in a wide-brimmed hat. 1992 Passenger Stuart Ramsay arrives in mid-conversation 57 with a top executive. 1992 USA Today A [BMW] 325is coupe arrives in March. 1992 [The] [c]onvertible version of the 300ZX USA Today sports car arrives in April at about $39,000. 1992 USA Today A station wagon arrives in September. 1992 Mussels and clams are average; chicken is Atlanta J.- chunks of white meat resembling the stuff Const. that arrives in boxes, not on the bone; sliced chorizo sausage is so-so. 1992 Atlanta J.- [T]he daily stream of traffic arrives in Const. 1994. 100 AL OTRO LADO V. MAYORKAS Year Source Context 1992 Boston Coll. Perhaps the threat arrives in the form of a Env’t nearby sanitary landfill or a nuclear power Affairs L. plant. Rev. 1992 Since information arrives in time- J. Info. Sys. sequenced, discrete event' packets, this is essentially an optimal stopping problem. 1992 Since information arrives in discrete time- J. Info. Sys. sequenced packets…. 1992 [A]ssume that S is updated in clusters of J. Info. Sys. m=3 (e.g., it arrives in “bursts”). 1993 A young girl is chosen to be the Rangeley ABC Sun angel and arrives in snowland style to light News the tree. 1993 Babylon 5: [The four] governments have ambassadors The here. Almost. The fourth arrives in two Gathering days. 1993 The lamb, a tiny, pure white female, Kenyon arrives in a laundry basket. For Ariella it’s Rev. love at first sight. 1993 Being Hector’s girlfriend Anna arrives in her car. Human It is a bright pink station wagon. 1993 The Nobilem…is mechanically good and optically superb, comes with a leather neck Field & strap that is too long, and arrives in a Stream leather hard case that is an object of great beauty. 1993 Help arrives in the form of another Compute! undocumented feature. AL OTRO LADO V. MAYORKAS 101 Year Source Context 1993 [T]he date Nostradamus named for the end of the world can be figured in several Omni ways, depending on the chosen starting point, so that Armageddon arrives in the year 2000 or later, in 3797. 1993 [A m]id-size, extra-roomy Sonata sedan Chicago arrives in March as [a] thoroughly Sun-Times revamped but inexpensive early 1995 model. 1993 [This] Eclipse has [a] short production run Chicago because [the] redesigned 1995 model Sun-Times arrives in spring. 1994 Wagner takes the throw as Cobb arrives in Cobb a spikes-up slide. 1994 [I]t never occurs to him that he arrives in a Literary plaid suit and all others are wearing T- Rev. shirts. 1994 Then the Don, Death arrives in a big old Mass. Rev. Benz. 1994 Fantasy & The ship arrives in midafternoon. Why Sci. Fiction don't we just wait for it? 1994 San As is now usual with Stone films, this one Francisco arrives in a highly marketable cloud of Chronicle controversy. 1994 Chicago Callaway arrives in midmorning, having Sun-Times read late into the night before. 1994 Giorgino Professor Beaumont arrives in a moment. 1995 San The adulation arrives in torrents, gathering Francisco at Mike Tyson’s feet in three-foot drifts. Chronicle 102 AL OTRO LADO V. MAYORKAS Year Source Context 1995 It will take an outsider to revive this troubled lot, and she arrives in the form of TIME Bette Mack, a taciturn beauty in pink sneakers. 1995 Copycat Ruben arrives in a taxi. 1995 Braveheart The undertaker arrives in his hearse. 1995 The boss always arrives in a bad mood, but Feminist he never has a reason for being angry with Studies Mery Yagual. 1995 Chicago Not to be outdone, the tiramisu arrives in a Sun-Times wine glass. 1995 The great white buffalo heralded by Native Am. Studies prophesy arrives in the form of a white Int’l motor home. The medicine pipe is sold. 1995 Space: The miners are preparing to transfer ice ore Above and to a heavily armed convoy which arrives in Beyond two days. 1996 Amish-raised chicken arrives in a deep Chicago bowl, the pieces of chicken sharing space Sun-Times with chunks of roasted potatoes. 1996 Sally Field arrives in a square Volvo NY Times wagon for the wild children’s birthday party. 1996 When Harrison Ford is called to the White NY Times House in Clear and Present Danger, he arrives in his Taurus station wagon. AL OTRO LADO V. MAYORKAS 103 Year Source Context 1996 If these procedures or any of the team’s diagnostic tests indicate that an engine is malfunctioning, it’s removed entirely, Popular Sci. placed in a handsome aluminum shipping container, and replaced—straightaway— with another that arrives in a similar container. 1996 The Rock The President arrives in three hours. 1996 Kestrel, the first production, one-piece, Bicycling airfoil-designed carbon frame, arrives in ‘86. 1996 Beavis and We pan back to the hotel as Muddy arrives Butt-head in a cab. Do America 1996 Saturday Sometimes a rescue squad arrives in time Evening to revive the victim. Post 1996 The front-wheel-drive S70 sedan arrives USA Today in fall as the successor to the midrange 800-series. 1996 USA Today An all-new Accent arrives in fall. 1996 The sexy SLK roadster that’s been making USA Today the rounds of the international auto shows arrives in early ‘97, with two key features. 1996 Okay. Okay. The President arrives in three The Rock hours. 1996 A redesigned version of the midsize Regal USA Today arrives in spring. 1996 A successor to the compact Corsica sedan USA Today arrives in early 1997. 1996 In addition, a successor to the Ciera, USA Today rebadged a Cutlass, arrives in early 1997. 104 AL OTRO LADO V. MAYORKAS Year Source Context 1996 USA Today A redesigned Maxima sedan arrives in fall. 1996 And Auden’s version of the faithful Sarah Raritan Young arrives in time to see what he is up to. 1996 This [comment] arrives in the ponderous, thoughtful tones you would expect from ABA J. someone who has Higginbotham’s new life as an ombudsman for the American establishment.