DILLARD, Presiding Judge.

Following trial, a jury convicted Nicole Guerra on one count of battery—family violence-first offense. Guerra now appeals this conviction and the denial of her motion for new trial, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence and arguing the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on her decision not to testify in her own defense and in denying her claim that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance. For the following reasons, we affirm.

Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict,1 the record shows that on May 14, 2019, a deputy with the Catoosa County Sheriff’s Office was dispatched verdict of acquittal on both charges. And finding the State presented no evidence that Guerra punched Carah, the trial court granted the motion as to the count alleging a battery against Carah but denied the motion as to the allegation involving Caleb.

Thereafter, Guerra presented her defense, in which her son Garrett testified as a witness to the incident. Neither Guerra nor Caleb testified; and after Guerra rested her case, the jury found her guilty on the charge of battery (family violence), alleging that she punched Caleb. Subsequently, Guerra obtained new counsel and filed a motion for new trial, arguing only general grounds. The trial court then held a hearing on the motion, during which Guerra also alleged that her trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to call Caleb as a witness. But at the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court denied Guerra’s motion. This appeal follows.

1. Guerra first contends the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction on the charge of battery (family violence) as to Caleb. Specifically, she argues the State failed to prove Caleb was a member of her household, a fatal variance existed between the accusation and the actual evidence at trial, and there was no evidence Caleb was injured. We disagree.

When a criminal conviction is appealed, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, and the appellant no longer enjoys a presumption of innocence.^[2] And in evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence, we do not “weigh the evidence or determine witness credibility, but only determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty of the charged offenses beyond a reasonable doubt.”3 The jury’s verdict will be upheld, then, so long as there is “some competent evidence, even though contradicted, to support each fact necessary to make out the State’s case.”4 Bearing these guiding principles in mind, we turn to Guerra’s specific challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting her conviction.

OCGA § 16-5-23.1 (a) provides that “[a] person commits the offense of battery when he or she intentionally causes substantial physical harm or visible bodily harm to another.” Subsection (b) further provides that, “[a]s used in this Code section, the term ‘visible bodily harm’ means bodily harm capable of being perceived by a person other than the victim and may include, but is not limited to, substantially blackened eyes, substantially swollen lips or other facial or body parts, or substantial bruises to body parts.”And relevant to this matter, under OCGA § 16-6-23.1 (f) (2), “[i]f the offense of battery is committed between household members, it shall constitute the offense of family violence battery . . . .” Finally, subsection (f) (1) explains that “‘household member’ means past or present spouses, persons who are parents of the same child, parents and children, stepparents and stepchildren, foster parents and foster children, or other persons living or formerly living in the same household.”

In this case, Count 2 of the accusation charged Guerra with battery (family violence) by alleging that she “did intentionally cause visible bodily harm to the person of Caleb Boyd, said person being the child of said accused, by punching said victim about the face. . . .” And as discussed supra, the State presented evidence that when Caleb attempted to intervene in Guerra’s confrontation with his twin sister, Guerra shoved him in the face, which resulted in his glasses scratching his face and leaving a mark near his right eye.

(a) Even so, Guerra argues the foregoing evidence was insufficient because the State failed to prove Caleb was a household member as required by OCGA § 16-6-23.1 (f) (2). But the deputy testified she was dispatched to respond to a dispute among family members and specifically recounted that Guerra’s “son had a mark over his right eye . . . .” Moreover, Guerra’s defense witness—her other son, Garrett—testified that the incident involved his sister, his brother, and his mom. Garrett also explained that he had recently moved out of Guerra’s home and was the last of his siblings to do so, with the implication being that all of them had lived there in the past. So, Guerra’s claim that the State failed to prove Caleb was a household member, as defined by the statute, is belied by the evidence.^[5]

(b) Guerra next argues her conviction should be reversed because a fatal variance existed between the charge in the accusation and the evidence actually presented during her trial. This argument likewise lacks merit.

It is well established that “[a]verments in an indictment as to the specific manner in which a crime was committed are not mere surplusage and must be proved as laid, or the failure to prove the same will amount to a fatal variance and a violation of the defendant’s right to due process of law.”6 But importantly,

the general rule that allegations and proof must correspond is based upon the obvious requirements (1) that the accused shall be definitely informed as to the charges against him, so that he may be enabled to present his defense and not be taken by surprise by the evidence offered at the trial; and (2) that he may be protected against another prosecution for the same offense.^[7]

Indeed, the courts of our state do not “employ an overly technical application of the fatal variance rule, focusing instead on materiality.”8

Here, Guerra claims a fatal variance existed between the accusation, which alleged that she “punched” Caleb in the face and the evidence presented at trial that she only “pushed” him in the face. But setting aside whether the red mark near Caleb’s eye constituted at least circumstantial evidence that Guerra punched rather than pushed him, we do not agree this variance was fatal because the accusation, nonetheless, “sufficiently apprised [Guerra] of the charge against [her], and that portion of the [accusation] specifying the means by which [she] committed this violent act was ‘mere surplusage.’”9

(c) Finally, Guerra argues the evidence she pushed Caleb amounted to nothing more than mere physical contact and did not result in a visible injury as required by the statute to support a conviction of family-violence battery. But this claim is also belied by the record and likewise lacking in merit. As discussed supra, the deputy who responded to the incident testified that Caleb had a red mark near his eye and what appeared to be dried blood. In fact, the deputy further testified that she had no doubt Caleb had suffered an injury to his face. Even Caleb’s brother, Garrett—who testified as a defense witness—conceded that Caleb had a red mark near his eye and surmised it was caused by Guerra pushing Caleb’s glasses into his face. Given these circumstances, the evidence was sufficient to support Guerra’s family-violence battery conviction.^[10]

2. Guerra next contends the trial court plainly erred by failing to instruct the jury that the defendant does not have to testify in her own defense, and if the defendant chooses not to testify, the jury should not consider that in any way in reaching a verdict. We disagree.

The record does not indicate that either Guerra or the State submitted written requests for jury instructions. But after swearing in the jury, the trial court provided some preliminary instructions, including an explanation of the burden of proof, in which it explained that: “Ms. Guerra could sit there the entire time and not say the first word because she has a presumption of innocence and that presumption remains with her throughout the trial until the State proves her guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” The trial then proceeded, and at the close of evidence, the parties apparently engaged in a brief charge conference, which was not transcribed. Following closing arguments, the trial court charged the jury on the applicable law, including again explaining the burden of proof. But the court did not instruct the jury that Guerra was not obligated to testify and that such a decision could not be considered in any way in reaching a verdict. When the trial court concluded its instructions, neither the State nor Guerra objected.

Given these circumstances, our review of this claim of error is significantly constrained. Indeed, under OCGA § 17-8-58, “[a]ny party who objects to any portion of the charge to the jury or the failure to charge the jury shall inform the court of the specific objection and the grounds for such objection before the jury retires to deliberate.”11 The failure to do so precludes “appellate review of such portion of the jury charge, unless such portion of the jury charge constitutes plain error which affects the substantial rights of the parties.”12 In such cases, the proper inquiry is whether the instruction was “erroneous, whether it was obviously so, and whether it likely affected the outcome of the proceedings.”13 And because Guerra failed to object to the trial court’s jury instructions, our review is limited to consideration in this regard.^[14] Suffice it to say, satisfying the plain-error standard is “difficult, as it should be,”15 and the burden of establishing plain error “falls squarely on the defendant.”16 Guerra has failed to satisfy that burden here.

Examining the relevant case authority, the Supreme Court of Georgia has held that “when a proper charge on a criminal defendant’s election not to testify is timely requested by the defendant, it is error for the trial judge to fail to give it.”17 And such an error “requires a new trial.”18 Similarly, the Supreme Court of the United States has held that a state trial judge has “‘the constitutional obligation, upon proper request, to minimize the danger that the jury will give evidentiary weight to a defendant’s failure to testify’ by instructing the jury to draw no adverse inference from the defendant’s election not to testify.”19 As that Court explained, “[n]o judge can prevent jurors from speculating about why a defendant stands mute in the face of a criminal accusation, but a judge can, and must, if requested to do so, use the unique power of the jury instruction to reduce that speculation to a minimum.”20 And echoing this case authority, as well as our statutory authority,21 the pattern jury instruction on this issue provides as follows:

The defendant in a criminal case may take the stand and testify and be examined and cross-examined as any other witness. You should evaluate such testimony as you would that of any other witness. However, the defendant does not have to present any evidence nor testify. If the defendant chooses not to testify, you may not consider that in any way in making your decision.^[22] Significantly, in further fidelity to the case authority related to this jury charge, § 1.32.10 of the pattern instructions also includes a footnote immediately following its title (“Defendant’s Choice Not to Testify”), which notes “Not required unless requested.”23

In this matter, it is undisputed that Guerra did not submit a written request for the trial court to provide a jury instruction on her right to eschew testifying and that such a decision should not factor in the jury’s decision. Additionally, Guerra does not claim she made an oral request for such an instruction during the charge conference or at any other point during the trial. And in the absence of such a request, the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on this issue did not constitute error, much less plain error.^[24] Accordingly, Guerra’s contention lacks merit.

3. Guerra further maintains the trial court erred in denying her claim that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to call Caleb as a defense witness. Yet again, we disagree.

In evaluating Guerra’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, we apply the two-pronged test established in Strickland v. Washington,25 which requires him to show that his trial counsel’s performance was “deficient and that the deficient performance so prejudiced [him] that there is a reasonable likelihood that, but for counsel’s errors, the outcome of the trial would have been different.”26 Importantly, should a defendant “fail to meet his burden on one prong of this two-prong test, we need not review the other prong.”27 As a result, this burden, though not impossible to meet, is “a heavy one.”28 In addition, there is a strong presumption that trial counsel’s conduct falls within the broad range of reasonable professional conduct, and a criminal defendant must overcome this presumption.^[29] Significantly, the reasonableness of counsel’s conduct is “examined from counsel’s perspective at the time of trial and under the particular circumstances of the case[.]”30 And decisions regarding trial tactics and strategy may form the basis for an ineffectiveness claim only if “they were so patently unreasonable that no competent attorney would have followed such a course.”31 Consequently, unless clearly erroneous, this Court will “uphold a trial court’s factual determinations with respect to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel; however, a trial court’s legal conclusions in this regard are reviewed de novo.”32 Although her motion for new trial only argued that the jury’s verdict should be vacated on general grounds,33 at the hearing on her motion for new trial, Guerra claimed her trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to call Caleb, the victim, as a defense witness. But as an initial matter (and quite importantly), Guerra’s trial counsel did not testify during the hearing. And as a result, trial counsel’s decisions are “presumed to be strategic, and [Guerra] must show that the presumed strategy was so unsound that no reasonable lawyer would have adopted it to show deficient performance.”34 Of course, this is “an unusually heavy burden to carry, and when trial counsel does not testify, it is extremely difficult to overcome the presumption of reasonable professional assistance.”35

That being said, in support of Guerra’s argument, Caleb testified during the hearing and asserted that his mother never struck him and the red mark near his eye was caused by a tree branch scratching him while he was trail-running earlier on the day of the incident. He further testified that, although he was stationed in Norfolk, Virginia while serving in the Navy around the time of the trial, he informed Guerra’s trial counsel that he wanted to testify in his mother’s defense and provided counsel with his contact information, but trial counsel never contacted him.

But on cross examination, the State asked Caleb if he recalled receiving a subpoena to appear at Guerra’s trial, and he responded that he did not. Caleb also acknowledged telling the State’s prosecutor shortly after the incident that he did not want to be involved in testifying and, later, testified that he did not put in a request for leave so he could attend the trial. Additionally, Caleb testified that he provided an affidavit to the State’s prosecutor a few weeks after the incident, in which he stated he did not want Guerra to be prosecuted and that she did not intentionally hurt him.

But in that same affidavit—in stark contrast to his testimony during the motion-for- new-trial hearing—Caleb averred that his “glasses cut his face when he was separating [his] mom and sister.” Given these circumstances, Guerra’s trial counsel may well have decided that Caleb’s testimony would not have been credible. And the appellate courts have “repeatedly deemed reasonable a trial attorney’s decision not to call witnesses based on credibility concerns.”36 Consequently, we cannot say trial counsel’s decision to not call Caleb as a witness fell outside the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.^[37] And accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying Guerra’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.^[38] For all these reasons, we affirm Guerra’s conviction and the denial of her motion for new trial.

Judgment affirmed. Brown and Padgett, JJ., concur.

1, 12 (4) (e) (890 SE2d 700) (2023) (“Ineffectiveness claims must be raised and pursued at the earliest practicable moment, which for a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel is at the motion for new trial stage if the defendant is no longer represented by the attorney who represented him at trial.” (punctuation omitted)).