UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA OCALA DIVISION

ANNI VILLARROEL, Petitioner, v. Case No: 5:24-cv-149-JSS-PRL

WARDEN OF FCI COLEMAN LOW, Respondent. ___________________________________/ ORDER Petitioner, a prisoner proceeding pro se, seeks a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Dkt. 1.) He claims that the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) wrongly “took back” his time credits under the First Step Act (FSA). (Id. at 6.) Respondent counters that Petitioner is ineligible to apply his FSA credits because he is subject to a final order of removal. (Dkt. 10 at 1–2.) An evidentiary hearing is unnecessary because Petitioner’s claim requires no further factual development. See Turner v. Crosby, 339 F.3d 1247, 1275 (11th Cir. 2003). For the reasons outlined below, the court dismisses the petition for writ of habeas corpus (Dkt. 1). Petitioner is serving a fifty-one-month sentence at Federal Correctional Institution (FCI) Coleman Low for possessing with intent to distribute cocaine while on board a vessel, in violation of 46 U.S.C. § 70503(a)(1), and for conspiring to possess with intent to distribute cocaine while on board a vessel, in violation of 46 U.S.C. § 70506(b). See Dkts. 43, 82, in Case No. 1:21-cr-20449-DMM-3 (S.D. Fla.). Petitioner asserts one ground for relief: that the BOP wrongfully revoked his contends that he is not subject to a final order of removal, and he requests an order instructing the BOP to reinstate his FSA credits. (Id. at 6–7.) He also asks for monetary compensation for the period he was “unfairly detained.” (Id. at 7.) Habeas corpus is the “exclusive remedy” for prisoners seeking “‘immediate or

speedier release’ from confinement.” Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 525 (2011) (quoting Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 82 (2005)). A section 2241 petition furnishes a basis to challenge the execution, as opposed to the validity, of a petitioner’s sentence. See McCarthan v. Dir. of Goodwill Indus.-Suncoast, Inc., 851 F.3d 1076, 1092–93 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (“A prisoner sentenced by a federal court . . . may file a petition

for a writ of habeas corpus to challenge the execution of his sentence, such as the deprivation of good-time credits . . . .)”). Petitioner claims entitlement to FSA credits that would result in a shortened sentence and his immediate release. (See Dkt. 1.) Therefore, his claim is properly brought under section 2241. Under the FSA, federal prisoners may earn and apply time credits to any

remaining time in custody or supervised release. 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(A), (C). However, a prisoner who is “the subject to a final order of removal under any provision of the immigration laws” is “ineligible to apply time credits.” 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(E)(i). In addition, BOP regulations provide that “[f]or any inmate eligible to earn FSA [t]ime [c]redits” who is “[s]ubject to a final order of removal under

immigration laws” of the United States, the BOP “may not apply FSA [t]ime [c]redits toward prerelease custody or early transfer to supervised release.” 28 C.F.R. § 523.44(a)(2). Petitioner is subject to a final order of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5). (See Dkt. 10-1 at 2; Dkt. 10-2 at 2.) The final order of removal renders Petitioner ineligible to apply FSA credits to his sentence. Although Petitioner states that he does not have a final order of deportation, (Dkt. 1 at 6), the court credits the order of removal filed by Respondent, (see Dkt. 10-1 at 2; Dkt. 10-2 at 2). Because Petitioner has not been unfairly detained, he is not entitled to the requested monetary compensation in this habeas action. Accordingly: 1. The petition for writ of habeas corpus (Dkt. 1) is DISMISSED. 2. The Clerk is DIRECTED to terminate any pending motions and deadlines and to close this case. ORDERED in Orlando, Florida, on March 13, 2025.

( fa _ a whesok JUVIE S. SNEED UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Copies furnished to: Unrepresented Parties Counsel of Record

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