v.
Tennessee Department of Correction
AT NASHVILLE
Assigned on Briefs December 7, 2010
RONALD A. BARKER, A/K/A GEORGE N. BAILEY v. TENNESSEE
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION, ET AL.
Appeal from the Chancery Court for Davidson County
No. 09-181-I Claudia Bonnyman, Chancellor
No. M2010-00839-COA-R3-CV - Filed February 7, 2011
Inmate of the Tennessee Department of Corrections appeals the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the Department in inmate’s declaratory judgment action. Finding no error, we affirm.
Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed
R ICHARD H. D INKINS, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which F RANK G. C LEMENT, J R. and A NDY D. B ENNETT, JJ., joined.
Ronald A. Barker, Tiptonville, Tennessee, Pro Se.
Robert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney General and Reporter; Michael E. Moore, Solicitor General; and Kellena Baker, Assistant Attorney General, for the appellees, Tennessee Department of Correction.
MEMORANDUM OPINION 1
In December 2008, Ronald Barker, an inmate of the Tennessee Department of Corrections (“TDOC”), filed a petition for declaratory order with TDOC pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-223, seeking to have the sentence imposed as a result of his June 21, 2004 allow a case it knowingly had no authority over the subject matter in, to continue over some fifteen (15) months. By way of relief, Mr. Barker asks that this court:
[*2]. . . reverse the trial court order, if only in part, and suspend all cost occurred [sic] that have been assessed against him needlessly because the Court proceeded to allow all the unnecessary filings and costs to needlessly build up over a fifteen month period with absolutely no reason to entertain the petition containing issues the Court had no authority over.
It appears, therefore, that Mr. Barker is seeking a review of the trials court’s assessment of costs against him. In his brief and reply brief, Mr. Barker recites not only the history of this case but also that of the case which led to the February 2008 opinion of the Court of Criminal Appeals, and contends that the trial court should not have allowed his petition to proceed to hearing, thereby “unnecessarily” accumulating costs and filing fees.
While the record does not reflect that Mr. Barker moved the court for relief from the taxation of costs, the record does contain an order entered June 1, 2009 wherein the court granted Mr. Barker leave to file this action without paying an advance filing fee as required by Tenn. Code Ann. § 41-21-807. In the June 1 order the court cautioned that the finding that he did not owe a partial filing fee “does not relieve Mr. Barker from the possibility that he will owe court costs at the conclusion of this case. This ruling only delays payment of those costs. At the end of the case, the Court will assess court costs against the party that does not prevail.” The case proceeded and was disposed of on cross motions for summary judgment.
The assessment and recovery of costs in civil actions is governed by Chapter 12 of Title 20 of the Tennessee Code, Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-12-101 et seq., and administered in accordance with Tenn. R. Civ. P. Rule 54.04. We have been directed to nothing in either the governing statute or the rule implementing same from which to conclude that the trial court’s assessment of costs was improper. We have reviewed the record and determined that the trial court correctly held that neither the court nor TDOC had the authority to address the sentence imposed by the Sullivan County Circuit Court. Ms. Whisman’s explanation of the calculation of Mr. Barker’s sentence was unrebutted and we agree that TDOC’s calculation of Mr. Barker’s sentence was proper.[3] The trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to TDOC and dismissing this proceeding. The assessment of costs against Mr. Barker was in accordance with the law and facts.
[*3]For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Chancery Court is AFFIRMED.
___________________________________ RICHARD H. DINKINS, JUDGE
[*4]