Castle v. Hayes Freight Lines, Inc., 348 U.S. 61 (1954). · Go Syfert
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Castle v. Hayes Freight Lines, Inc., 348 U.S. 61 (1954). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
294 citation events (145 in the last 25 years) across 52 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Bronco Wine Company v. Jolly (cal, 2004-10-13)
Treatment trajectory · 1954 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1954 1990 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 17 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Bronco Wine Company v. Jolly
Cal. · 2004 · confidence medium
(E.g., Gibbons v. Ogden (1824) 22 U.S. 1 [ 6 L.Ed. 23 ] [federal steamboat license preempted New York statute barring passage between New Jersey and New York]; Ray, supra, 435 U.S. 151, 164-165 [federal permit authorizing a vessel to carry cargo in United States waters prevails over the contrary state judgment]; Sperry v. Florida (1963) 373 U.S. 379, 385 [ 10 L.Ed.2d 428 , 83 S.Ct. 1322 ] [state statute barring unauthorized practice of law could not be applied to nonlawyers licensed under federal law to prosecute patents]; Leslie Miller, Inc. v. Arkansas (1956) 352 U.S. 187, 188-190 [ 1 L.Ed.2…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Manchaca v. Chater
E.D. Tex. · 1996 · confidence medium
"Title XVI [of the Social Security Act] ... provides [supplemental security income] benefits to financially needy individuals who are aged, blind, or disabled regardless of their insured status." Bowen v. Galbreath, 485 U.S. 74, 75 , 108 S.Ct. 892, 893 , 99 L.Ed.2d 68, 71 (1988) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1382 (a)). 5 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Allied Delivery System, Inc. (89-3383) Alvan Motor Freight, Inc. Tnt Holland Motor Express, Inc. And Parker Motor Freight, Inc., (89-3401) and State of Michigan and Michigan Public Service Commission, (89-3414) v. Interstate Commerce Commission and United States of America, Hover Trucking Company of Michigan, Respondent-Intervenor
6th Cir. · 1990 · confidence medium
Substantial evidence supports the Commission's conclusion, regardless of the accuracy of its subsequent dictum on the irrelevance of motivation. 29 The petitions for review are DENIED. 30 WELLFORD, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part. 31 I concur in the majority's conclusion concerning jurisdiction (Part II) but would augment the discussion by adding the following: 32 In Rock Island Motor Transit Co. v. Watson Wilson Transportation, 99 MCC 303, 306 (1965), aff'd, 256 F.Supp. 812 (S.D.Iowa 1966), 1 the Commission stated: 33 Since the Supreme Court's decision in Service Stor…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Bowker v. Bowen
D. Me. · 1989 · confidence medium
The Supreme Court has recently stated that this subsection “allows withholding of past-due benefits to pay attorney’s fees incurred in judicial proceedings under Title II.” Bowen v. Galbreath, 485 U.S. 74 , —, 108 S.Ct. 892, 893 , 99 L.Ed.2d 68, 71 (1988).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Frito-Lay, Inc. v. Wisconsin Labor & Industry Review Commission
Wis. Ct. App. · 1980 · confidence medium
The federal plan of control was so all-embracing that former power of states over interstate motor carriers was greatly reduced.” Castle v. Hayes Freight Lines, 348 U.S. 61, 63 (1954).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Service Storage & Transfer Co. v. Virginia
SCOTUS · 1959 · confidence medium
In Castle v. Hayes Freight Lines, 348 U. S. 61, 63-64 (1954), we observed that “Congress in the Motor Carrier Act adopted „a comprehensive plan for regulating the carriage of goods by motor truck in interstate commerce.” We pointed out that 49 U. S. C. § 312 provides “that all certificates, permits or licenses issued by the Commission ‘shall remain in effect until suspended of terminated as herein provided’....
cited Cited "see" Brenda Diedrich v. Nancy Berryhill
9th Cir. · 2017 · signal: see · confidence high
See id. § 401(b); see generally Bowen v. Galbreath, 485 U.S. 74, 75 , 108 S.Ct. 892 , 99 L.Ed.2d 68 (1988).
cited Cited "see" Moriarty v. Colvin
1st Cir. · 2015 · signal: see · confidence high
See Bowen v. Galbreath, 485 U.S. 74, 79 , 108 S.Ct. 892 , 99 L.Ed.2d 68 (1988).
discussed Cited "see" Moriarty v. Colvin
D. Mass. · 2014 · signal: see · confidence high
See Bowen v. Galbreath, 485 U.S. 74, 79 , 108 S.Ct. 892 , 99 L.Ed.2d 68 (1988); H.R. 92-231 (1971) (withholding fees from past-due benefits due claimants “would be contrary to the purpose of the program”).
discussed Cited "see" Sam MAZZA, Appellant, v. SECRETARY OF DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES of the United States, Appellee
3rd Cir. · 1990 · signal: see · confidence high
See Bowen v. Galbreath, 485 U.S. 74, 75 , 108 S.Ct. 892, 893 , 99 L.Ed.2d 68 (1988). > Public assistance paid to a claimant by a state may be deducted from retroactive SSI payments by the Secretary and paid directly to the state. 42 U.S.C. §§ 407 , 1383(g).
cited Cited "see" Peterson v. Bowen
N.D. Ga. · 1988 · signal: see · confidence high
See Bowen v. Galbreath, — U.S. —, 108 S.Ct. 892 , 99 L.Ed.2d 68 (1988).
examined Cited "see" Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc. v. City of Burbank (3×)
C.D. Cal. · 1970 · signal: see · confidence high
See Castle v. Hayes Freight Lines, 348 U.S. 61, 63-64 , 75 S.Ct. 191 , 99 L.Ed. 68 (1954), where the Court held the State of Illinois was *928 without authority to revoke or suspend operations in that state of an interstate motor carrier for violation of a law regulating the weight of loads to be carried on the state’s highways.
cited Cited "see, e.g." Frazier v. Sullivan
M.D. Ala. · 1991 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Bowen v. Galbreath, 485 U.S. 74, 76 , 108 S.Ct. 892, 894 , 99 L.Ed.2d 68 (1988).
cited Cited "see, e.g." Goff v. Sullivan
D.S.D. · 1990 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Bowen v. Galbreath, 485 U.S. 74 , 108 S.Ct. 892 , 99 L.Ed.2d 68 (1988).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Wells v. Bowen
2d Cir. · 1988 · signal: see also · confidence low
The Relationship of the Two Statutes An attorney who has represented a successful claimant before the district court in a matter arising under Title II of the SSA may apply to the court for “a reasonable fee ..., not in excess of 25 percent of the total of the past-due benefits to which the claimant is entitled by reason of [the court’s] judgment.” See 42 U.S.C. § 406 (b); see also Bowen v. Galbreath, — U.S. -, -, 108 S.Ct. 892, 893-95 , 99 L.Ed.2d 68 (1988).
cited Cited "see, e.g." Dale Wells v. Otis R. Bowen, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Appeal of John S. Hogg (Four Cases). William Oliver v. Otis R. Bowen, Secretary of Health and Human Services, William Hlywa v. Otis R. Bowen, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Joseph J. Gemelli v. Otis R. Bowen, Secretary of Health and Human Services
2d Cir. · 1988 · signal: see also · confidence low
Sec. 406 (b); see also Bowen v. Galbreath, --- U.S. ----, ----, 108 S.Ct. 892, 893-95 , 99 L.Ed.2d 68 (1988).
examined Cited "see, e.g." Hagood v. Heckers (3×)
Colo. · 1973 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Castle v. Hayes Freight Lines, Inc., 348 U.S. 61 , 75 S.Ct. 191 , 99 L.Ed. 68 ; Franklin National Bank v. New York, 347 U.S. 373 , 74 S.Ct. 550 , 98 L.Ed. 767 .
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
CASTLE, ATTORNEY GENERAL, Et Al.
v.
HAYES FREIGHT LINES, INC.
44.
Supreme Court of the United States.
Dec 6, 1954.
348 U.S. 61
John L. Davidson, Jr., First Assistant Attorney General of Illinois, argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the brief were Latham Castle, Attorney General, Mark O. Roberts, Special Assistant Attorney General, and William C. Wines and Lee D. Martin, Assistant Attorneys General., David Axelrod argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Jack Goodman and Carl L. Steiner., Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by Edwin K. Steers, Attorney General, and J. D. Wright and Arthur H. Gemmer, Deputy Attorneys General, for the State of Indiana; and Charles C. Collins and Ode L. Rankin for the American Automobile Association, Inc., Peter T. Beardsley filed a brief for the American Trucking Associations, Inc., as amicus curiae, urging affirmance.
Black.
Cited by 61 opinions  |  Published
Mr. Justice Black

delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case raises important questions concerning the power of states to bar interstate motor carriers from use of state roads as punishment for repeated violations of state highway regulations. The respondent Hayes Freight Lines, Inc. is such a carrier transporting goods to and from many points in Illinois and seven other states. [1] This extensive interstate business is done under a certificate of convenience and necessity issued by the Interstate Commerce Commission under authority of the Federal Motor Carrier Act. [2] Hayes also does an intrastate carrier business in Illinois under a certificate issued by state authorities. Illinois has a statute which limits the weight of freight that can be carried in commercial trucks over Illinois highways; the same statute also provides for a balanced distribution of freight loads in relation to the truck's axles. [3] Repeated violations of these provisions by trucks of a carrier are made punishable by total suspension of the carrier’s right to use Illinois state highways for periods of ninety days and one year. [4] This action was brought in a state court to restrain[*63] Illinois officials from prosecuting Hayes as a repeated violator. The State Supreme Court held that the punishment of suspension provided by the state statute could not be imposed on the interstate operations of the respondent Hayes. Such a state suspension- of interstate transportation, it was decided, would conflict with the Federal Motor Carrier Act which is the supreme law of the iand. [5] We granted the State’s petition for certiorari. 347 U. S. 1009.

Congress in the Motor Carrier Act adopted a comprehensive plan for regulating the carriage of goods by motor truck in interstate commerce. The federal plan of control was so all-embracing that former power of states over interstate motor carriers was greatly reduced. No power at all was left in states to determine what carriers could or could not operate in interstate commerce. Exclusive power of the Federal Government to make this determination is shown by § 306 of 49 U. S. C. which describes the conditions under which the Interstate Commerce Commission can issue certificates of convenience and necessity. And § 312 of the same title provides that all certificates, permits or licenses issued by the Commission “shall remain in effect until suspended or terminated as herein provided.” But in order to provide stability for operating rights of carriers, Congress placed within very narrow limits the Commission’s power to suspend or revoke an outstanding certificate. No certificate is to be revoked, suspended or changed until after a hearing and a finding that a carrier has willfully failed to comply with the provisions of the Motor Carrier Act[*64] or with regulations properly promulgated under it. [6] Under these circumstances, it would be odd if a state could take action amounting to a suspension or revocation of an interstate carrier’s commission-granted right to operate. Cf. Hill v. Florida, 325 U. S. 538. It cannot be doubted that suspension of this common carrier’s right to use Illinois highways is the equivalent of a partial suspension of its federally granted certificate. The highways of Illinois are not only used by Hayes to transport interstate goods to and from that State but are also used as connecting links to points in other states which the Commission has authorized Hayes to serve. Consequently if the ninety-day or the one-year suspension should become effective, the carriage of interstate goods into Illinois and other states would be seriously disrupted.

That Illinois seeks to punish Hayes for violations of its road regulations does not justify this disruption of federally authorized activities. A state’s regulation of weight and distribution of loads carried in interstate trucks does not itself conflict with the Federal Act. The reason for this as pointed out in Maurer v. Hamilton, 309 U. S. 598, is that the Federal Act has a provision designed to leave states free to regulate the sizes and weights of motor vehicles. But it would stretch this statutory provision too much to say that it also allowed states to revoke or suspend the right of interstate motor carriers for violation of state highway regulations.

It is urged that without power to impose punishment by suspension states will be without appropriate remedies to enforce their laws against recalcitrant motor carriers. We are not persuaded, however, that the conventional forms of punishment are inadequate to protect states from overweighted or improperly loaded motor trucks. More[*65] over, a Commission regulation requires motor carriers to abide by valid state highway regulations. [7] And as previously pointed out, the Commission can revoke in whole or in part certificates of motor carriers which willfully refuse to comply with any lawful regulation of the Commission. [8] If, therefore, motor carriers persistently and repeatedly violate the laws of a state, we know of no reason why the Commission may not protect the state’s interest, either on the Commission’s own initiative or on complaint of the state. [9]

We agree with the Supreme Court of Illinois that the right of this carrier to use Illinois highways for interstate transportation of goods cannot be suspended by Illinois.

Affirmed.

1

Indiana, Missouri, Michigan, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Kentucky, and Tennessee.

2

49 Stat. 543. Now Part II of the Interstate Commerce Act, 54 Stat. 919, 49 U. S. C. § 301 et seq.

3

Ill. Rev. Stat., 1953, c. 9514, § 228.

4

Ill. Rev. Stat., 1953, c. 95½, § 229b. This section provides for a 90-day suspension upon a finding of 10 or more violations. If thereafter the same carrier is found to have been guilty of 10 or more later violations the suspension is for one year.

5

2 Ill. 2d 58, 117 N. E. 2d 106. But the State Supreme Court held that Hayes’ intrastate operations could be suspended. Hayes appealed to this Court. We dismissed for want of a substantial federal question. 347 U. S. 994.

6

Smith Bros., Revocation of Certificate, 33 M. C. C. 465, 472. See United States v. Seatrain Lines, 329 U. S. 424.

7

49 CFR, 1954 Cum. Supp., § 192.3. “Every motor vehicle shall be driven in accordance with the laws, ordinances, and regulations of the jurisdiction in which it is being operated, unless such laws, ordinances and regulations are at variance with specific regulations of this Commission which impose a greater affirmative obligation or restraint.”

8

49 Stat. 555, 49 U. S. C. § 312.

9

49 Stat. 555, 49 U. S. C. § 312. For eases in which the Commission has considered violations of state law in passing on the fitness and ability of applicants to operate as carriers in interstate commerce see Southwest Freight Lines, Inc., Extension — Glass Products, 54 M. C. C. 205, 219; Hayes Freight Lines, Inc., Extension — Alternate Routes, 54 M. C. C. 643, 659.