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United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit ____________ FILED June 20, 2025 No. 24-30706 ____________ Lyle W. Cayce Clerk Darcy Roake, Reverend, on behalf themselves and on behalf of their minor children, real party in interest A.V., real party in interest S.V.; Adrian Van Young, on behalf of themselves and on behalf of their minor children, real party in interest A.V., real party in interest S.V.; Mamie Broadhurst, Reverend, on behalf of themselves and on behalf of their minor child, real party in interest N.W.; Richard Williams, Reverend, on behalf of themselves and on behalf of their minor child, real party in interest N.W.; Jeff Sims, Reverend, on behalf of himself and on behalf of his minor children, real party in interest A.S., real party in interest C.S. ^[1], real party in interest C.S. ^[2]; Jennifer Harding, on behalf of themselves and on behalf of their minor child, real party in interest A.O.; Benjamin Owens, on behalf of themselves and on behalf of their minor child, real party in interest A.O.; David Hawley, on behalf of themselves and on behalf of their minor children real party in interest A.H., real party in interest L.H.; Erin Hawley, on behalf of themselves and on behalf of their minor children, real party in interest A.H, real party in interest L.H.; Dustin McCrory, on behalf of themselves and on behalf of his minor children, real party in interest E.M.; real party in interest P.M., real party in interest L.M.; Gary Sernovitz, on behalf of themselves and on behalf of their minor child, real party in interest T.S.; Molly Pulda, on behalf of themselves and on behalf of their minor child. real party in interest T.S.; Christy Alkire, on behalf of herself and on hehalf of her minor child, real party in interest L.A.; Joshua Herlands, on behalf of himself and on behalf of his minor children, real party in interest E.H., real party in interest J.H., Plaintiffs—Appellees, Case: 24-30706 Document: 219-1 Page: 2 Date Filed: 06/20/2025 versus Cade Brumley, in his official capacity as the Louisiana State Superintendent of Education; Conrad Appel, in his official capacity as a member of the Louisiana State Board of Elementary and Secondary Education (LSBESE); Judy Armstrong, in her official capacity as a member of the LSBESE; Kevin Berken, in his official capacity as a member of the LSBESE; Preston Castille, in his official capacity as a member of LSBESE; Simone Champagne, in her official capacity as a member of the LSBESE; Sharon Latten-Clark, in her official capacity as a member of the LSBESE; Lance Harris, in his official capacity as a member of LSBESE; Paul Hollis, Louisiana State Board of Elementary and Secondary Education; Sandy Holloway, in her official capacity as a member of the LSBESE; Stacey Melerine, in her official capacity as a member of the LSBESE; Ronnie Morris, in his official capacity as a member of the LSBESE; East Baton Rouge Parish School Board; Livingston Parish School Board; Vernon Parish School Board; St. Tammany Parish School Board, Defendants—Appellants. ______________________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana USDC No. 3:24-CV-517 ______________________________ Before Dennis, Haynes, and Ramirez, Circuit Judges. Irma Carrillo Ramirez, Circuit Judge: Parents and students challenge a statute requiring public schools to permanently display the Ten Commandments in every classroom in Louisiana. The district court found the statute facially unconstitutional and preliminarily enjoined its enforcement. We AFFIRM.

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No. 24-30706 I A The Louisiana governor signed House Bill 71, Act. No. 676 (H.B. 71) into law in June 2024. In pertinent part, it provides: (1) No later than January 1, 2025, each public school governing authority shall display the Ten Commandments in each classroom in each school under its jurisdiction. The nature of the display shall be determined by each governing authority with a minimum requirement that the Ten Commandments shall be displayed on a poster or framed document that is at least eleven inches by fourteen inches. The text of the Ten Commandments shall be the central focus of the poster or framed document and shall be printed in a large, easily readable font. (2) The text shall read as follows: “The Ten Commandments I AM the LORD thy God. Thou shalt have no other gods before me. Thou shalt not make to thyself any graven images. Thou shalt not take the Name of the Lord thy God in vain. Remember the Sabbath day, to keep it holy. Honor thy father and thy mother, that thy days may be long upon the land which the Lord thy God giveth thee. Thou shalt not kill. Thou shalt not commit adultery. Thou shalt not steal. Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbor. Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor’s house. Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor’s wife, nor his manservant, nor his maidservant, nor his cattle, nor anything that is thy neighbor’s.” La. R.S. § 17:2124(B)(1)–(B)(2).

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No. 24-30706 The Ten Commandments 1 must be displayed with a “context statement” about the “History of the Ten Commandments in American Public Education,” 2 and “may” be displayed with “the Mayflower Compact, the Declaration of Independence, and the Northwest Ordinance.” Id. § 17:2124(B)(3)–(B)(4). Public school governing authorities are not required to pay for the displays. Instead, they can “accept donated funds to purchase the displays” or “accept donated displays.” Id. § 17:2124(B)(5). H.B. 71 tasks the Louisiana Board of Elementary and Secondary Education _____________________ Case: 24-30706 Document: 219-1 Page: 5 Date Filed: 06/20/2025

No. 24-30706 (BESE) with adopting rules and regulations to ensure the statute’s “proper implementation.” Id. § 17:2124(B)(6)(a). H.B. 71 also applies to postsecondary institutions. See id. § 17:2124(C)(1). H.B. 71 includes several legislative findings and a declaration of legislative intent, which, in relevant part, provide: (4) Recognizing the historical role of the Ten Commandments accords with our nation’s history and faithfully reflects the understanding of the founders of our nation with respect to the necessity of civic morality to a functional self-government. . . . (5) Including the Ten Commandments in the education of our children is part of our state and national history, culture, and tradition. (6) The text of the Ten Commandments set forth in Subsection B of this Section is identical to the text of the Ten Commandments monument that was upheld by the Supreme Court . . . in Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 688 (2005). .... (9) It is the Legislature’s intent to apply the decision set forth by the Supreme Court . . . in Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005), to continue the rich tradition and ensure that the students in our public schools may understand and appreciate the foundational documents of our state and national government. Id. § 17:2124(A)(4)–(A)(9). B On June 24, 2024, a group of multi-faith and non-religious Louisiana parents 3 brought suit on their own behalf (Parents) and on behalf of their _____________________ Case: 24-30706 Document: 219-1 Page: 6 Date Filed: 06/20/2025 Case: 24-30706 Document: 219-1 Page: 7 Date Filed: 06/20/2025

No. 24-30706 After a hearing, the district court denied Louisiana’s motions and issued a preliminary injunction. The preliminary injunction prohibited Louisiana from enforcing H.B. 71. 5 The court also ordered the Superintendent and the BESE-member defendants to provide notice of its ruling to all Louisiana public schools. Louisiana appeals the entry of a preliminary injunction and the denial of its motion to dismiss and motion to exclude '$)/$‚.Cexpert testimony. II This court has jurisdiction to review “final decisions” under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and interlocutory orders under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). A preliminary injunction is an appealable interlocutory order. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). Ordinarily, the denial of a motion to dismiss is not an appealable final decision under § 1291 as it is “neither a ruling on the merits nor an effective termination of all or any discrete part of the district court proceedings.” Save the Bay, Inc. v. U.S. Army, 639 F.2d 1100, 1103 (5th Cir. 1981) (per curiam). “But to the extent the underpinnings of [Louisiana’s] motion [to dismiss] are inextricably intertwined with the district court’s subsequent rulings challenged on appeal, . . . we have jurisdiction to address those issues.” Jiao v. Xu, 28 F.4th 591, 596 (5th Cir. 2022). Louisiana opposed the preliminary injunction on the same grounds asserted in its motion to dismiss, and the district court ruled on the motions simultaneously. Accordingly, we have jurisdiction over those rulings. _____________________ Case: 24-30706 Document: 219-1 Page: 8 Date Filed: 06/20/2025

No. 24-30706 III Louisiana challenges the denial of its motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, contending that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction based on ripeness, standing, and sovereign immunity. We review the denial of a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction de novo. Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001) (per curiam). Plaintiffs, as “the party asserting jurisdiction,” bear the burden of proof. Id. A Dʫ*0-/.#*0'$.($... !*-'&*!B-$+ ) ..C2# )/# . $. abstract or hypothetical.” Orix Credit All., Inc. v. Wolfe, 212 F.3d 891, 895 (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 833 F.2d 583, 586–87 (5th Cir. 1987)). To assess ripeness, courts evaluate “(1) Bthe fitness of the issues for judicial decision[,]’ and (2) Bthe hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration.’” Braidwood Mgmt., Inc. v. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n, 70 F.4th 914, 930 (5th Cir. 2023) (quoting Abbott Lab’ys v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149 (1967), abrogated on other grounds by Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977)).

On the first prong, “a '$($.B!$/!*-%0$$' $.$*)C$!$/+- . )/. pure question of law that needs no further factual development.” Braidwood Mgmt., 70 F.4th at 930 (citing New Orleans Pub. Serv., 833 F.2d at 586–87). This means that a claim is ripe so long as it is not “contingent [on] future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all.” Book People, Inc. v. Wong, 91 F.4th 318, 333 (5th Cir. 2024) (alteration in original) (quoting Braidwood Mgmt., 70 F.4th at 930).

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No. 24-30706 Louisiana is wrong that further factual development is needed in this case. Citing Staley v. Harris County, 485 F.3d 305 (5th Cir. 2007) (en banc), Louisiana argues that Plaintiffs’ claims are not fit for judicial decision because Plaintiffs have not yet encountered an H.B. 71 poster—they do not know what any given display will look like, what context may accompany the Ten Commandments, or where in any specific classroom a display may be placed. Staley provides no support. Staley concerned the constitutionality of a monument displaying a Christian Bible at a county courthouse in Texas. 485 F.3d at 307. A panel of this court held that displaying the monument violated the Establishment Clause, but days before the case would be reheard en banc, the courthouse placed the monument in storage. Id. Our en banc court held that “any dispute over a probable redisplay of the . . . monument [was] not ripe because there [were] no facts before [it] to determine whether such a redisplay might violate the Establishment Clause.” Id. at 309. “In the absence of this evidence,” the en banc court determined it was “unable to conduct the fact-intensive and context-specific analysis” required in Establishment Clause jurisprudence. Id. Plaintiffs’ lawsuit targets H.B. 71’s minimum requirements, which reflect “when, where, or under what circumstance[s]” the Ten Commandments are to be displayed. Id. at 307. ƒ What will be displayed? “The text of the Ten Commandments”—the exact Protestant version of which is provided by the statute, La. R.S. § 17:2124(B)(1)–(B)(2); ƒ How will it be displayed? As “the central focus” of a “poster or framed document that is at least eleven inches by fourteen inches,” and “printed in a large, easily readable font,” along with a “context Case: 24-30706 Document: 219-1 Page: 10 Date Filed: 06/20/2025

No. 24-30706 statement,” also provided by the statute, id. § 17:2124(B)(1), (B)(3) (emphases added); ƒ When will it be displayed? “No later than January 1, 2025,” and for the duration of the entire schoolyear, id. § 17:2124(B)(1); ƒ Where will it be displayed? In every Louisiana public school classroom, regardless of class subject matter, student age, or student grade, somewhere that it can be seen by students, 6 id; ƒ Why will it be displayed? Purportedly for historical reasons, see id. § 17:2124(A)(9). This case is not like Staley where “no decision ha[d] been made regarding any aspect of the future display of the [stored] monument.” 485 F.3d at 309 (emphases added). The text of H.B. 71 provides sufficient information for a fact-intensive and context-specific analysis. Plaintiffs’ claims are fit for judicial decision; the first ripeness prong is satisfied.

On the second ripeness prong, Plaintiffs have shown hardship should we withhold court consideration. “The Supreme Court has found hardship to inhere in legal harms, such as the harmful creation of legal rights or obligations; practical harms on

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No. 24-30706 the interests advanced by the party seeking relief; and the harm of being B!*- NO . . . to modify [one’s] behavior in order to avoid future adverse consequences.’” Choice Inc. of Tex. v. Greenstein, 691 F.3d 710, 715 (5th Cir. 2012) (alterations in original) (quoting Texas v. United States, 497 F.3d 491, 499 (5th Cir. 2007)). Whether the challenged statute or regulation “inflicts significant practical harm upon the interests that [Plaintiffs] advance[]” is “an important consideration.” Ohio Forestry Ass’n v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726, 733–34 (1998). Here, Plaintiffs allege that the displays violate their rights under the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause. “The loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.” Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976). Absent judicial intervention, Louisiana will implement H.B. 71. As a result, Students will be subjected to displays that accord with the statute’s minimum display requirements, in every classroom during every school day. H.B. 71 therefore inflicts significant practical harm on Plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights. See id; Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, 591 U.S. 464, 486 (2020) (recognizing D/# -$"#/.*!+- )/./*$- /B/# - '$"$*0.0+-$)"$)"C*!/# $-#$'- )E (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213–14 (1972))). Plaintiffs have demonstrated that there is hardship in withholding consideration sufficient to “justify judicial intervention.” See Pearson v. Holder, 624 F.3d 683, 684 (5th Cir. 2010) (“[T]he ripeness inquiry focuses on whether an injury that has not yet occurred is sufficiently likely to happen to justify judicial intervention.” (alteration in original) (citation omitted)); Braidwood Mgmt., 70 F.4th at 931–32 (“[L]itigants - )/$/' /*- '$ !2# - /# 4BD- ($) under a constant threat” that government officials will use their power’ to enforce the law against them. Therefore, plaintiffs’ claims are ripe.” (footnote omitted)). Plaintiffs’ claims are ripe; the district court did not err.

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No. 24-30706 B Louisiana next challenges whether Plaintiffs have standing to press their Establishment Clause claim, focusing on the injury-in-fact element. To establish Article III standing, a plaintiff must show “an injury in fact” that is “fairly traceable to the challenged action” and “redress[able] by a favorable decision.” Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992) (citation modified). The injury-in-fact element “ensure[s] that the plaintiff #.B+ -.*)'./& $)/# *0/*( *!/# *)/-*1 -.47CESusan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149, 158 (2014) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975)). Accordingly, “an injury must be B*)- / 6+-/$0'-$5 6 and actual or imminent.’” Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 409 (2013) (citation omitted). 7 Louisiana’s argument that Plaintiffs lack standing to press their Establishment Clause claims is two-fold: First, it argues that in cases involving religious displays, allegations of future encounters are insufficient for purposes of establishing standing. Second, citing non-binding, minority- view Supreme Court opinions, it contends that the “offended observer

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No. 24-30706 standing” doctrine is “profoundly wrong” and urges that we overturn our “offended observer” precedent. We address each argument in turn. a i Parts of the Ten Commandments include basic principles regarding criminal conduct that are part of a civilized society, such as the prohibition against murder. However, they come from religious texts and include commandments that have clear religious import, such as requiring worship of one God and keeping the Sabbath holy. Their display in public school classrooms, as required by H.B. 71, qualifies as a religious display. Unwanted exposure to government-sponsored religious displays and exercises can, under certain circumstances, violate a plaintiff’s First Amendment rights. See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (examining the constitutionality of a Nativity scene displayed in a shopping center during the holiday season); County of Allegheny v. Am. C.L. Union Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 598–602 (1989) (permanently enjoining a county from displaying a Nativity scene in the county courthouse, but permitting a menorah to be displayed outside of a county building), abrogated on other grounds by Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565 (2014); Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000) (holding unconstitutional student-led and student-initiated prayer announced over the speaker system before football games). Because “government speech must comport with the Establishment Clause,” Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 468 (2009), “Establishment Clause injury can occur when a person encounters the Government’s endorsement of religion.” Moore v. Bryant, 853 F.3d 245, 250 (5th Cir. 2017); see e.g., Murray v. City of Austin, 947 F.2d 147, 151–52 (5th Cir. 1991) (finding standing to challenge religious insignia where plaintiff encountered insignia on utility bill); Freedom Case: 24-30706 Document: 219-1 Page: 14 Date Filed: 06/20/2025

No. 24-30706 From Religion Found., Inc. v. Mack, 49 F.4th 941, 949–50 (5th Cir. 2022) (finding standing where plaintiff had an “ongoing confrontation” with prayer ceremony in courtroom). Confrontation with a religious display or exercise satisfies the injury- in-fact requirement of standing only if the plaintiff can “identify [a] personal injury suffered by [the plaintiff] as a consequence of the alleged constitutional error.” Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 485 (1982); see Barber v. Bryant, 860 F.3d 345, 353 (5th Cir. 2017) (“A plaintiff has standing to challenge a religious display 2# - #$../$"(/$$)%0-4- .0'/.!-*(Bpersonal[] confront[ation]’ with the display.” (alterations in original) (citation omitted)). This means that alleging a confrontation, alone, is insufficient. Naked allegations that the Constitution has been violated are also insufficient. Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 485–86. Rather, in Establishment Clause cases, the injury is being “personally exposed” to a government’s religious message “with which [a plaintiff] disagrees, or . . . has had to assume a burden to avoid.” Carl H. Esbeck, Unwanted Exposure to Religious Expression by Government: Standing & the Establishment Clause, 7 Charleston L. Rev. 607, 633 (2013); id. at 637 (“A conflict between belief and message is the basis of adversity between plaintiff and her government where the basic problem is government taking sides on a religious question.”); see e.g., Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 211–12, 224 n.9 (1963) (atheist family and Unitarian family had standing to challenge statute requiring that the Holy Bible and Lord’s Prayer be read at the start of school day); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 599 (1992) (“The sole question presented is whether [under the Establishment Clause] a religious exercise may be conducted at a graduation ceremony in circumstances where . . . young graduates who object are induced to conform.”). And in the public school context, a government’s injurious religious message “carr[ies] a particular risk of indirect coercion.”

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No. 24-30706 Lee, 505 U.S. at 592; Sch. Dist. of City of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 383 (1985) (discussing “the sensitive relationship between government and religion in the education of our children” and noting that “[t]he government’s activities in this area can have a magnified impact on impressionable young minds”), overruled on other grounds by Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997). ii “An allegation of future injury may suffice [to satisfy Article III] if the threatened injury is certainly impending, or there is a substantial risk that the harm will occur.” Driehaus, 573 U.S. at 158 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); accord. Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat’l. Union, 442 77flm6fmlLemkmMLDʪ0/BN*O) * .)*/#1 /*2$//# *).0((/$*) of threatened injury to obtain preventive relief. If the injury is certainly impending, that is enough.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 593 (1923), aff’d, 263 U.S. 350 (1923))); Clapper, 568 U.S. at hdm LDNO #1 - + / '4 - $/ -/ /#/ B/#- / ) $)%0-4 must be certainly impending to constitute injury in fact . . . .’”); Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 588 U.S. 752, 767 (2019) (holding States had standing to bring action based on “primarily future injuries”); FDA v. All. for Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. 367, 381 (2024) (“Moreover, the injury must be actual or imminent . . . meaning that the injury must have already occurred or be likely to occur soon.” (emphasis added)). So, too, can allegations of future confrontations satisfy the injury-in-fact element of standing. This is particularly true when a plaintiff seeks prospective relief. See All. for Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. at 381. In School District of Abington Township v. Schempp, the Supreme Court invalidated two statutes requiring that Bible verses be read to students over the school’s intercommunications system at the start of every school day. 374 Case: 24-30706 Document: 219-1 Page: 16 Date Filed: 06/20/2025

No. 24-30706 U.S. 203. Students were “asked to stand and join in repeating the prayer in unison,” but could excuse themselves either by stepping out of the classroom or simply not participating upon a parent’s written request. Id. at 207. Finding that the plaintiffs had standing to challenge the statutes under the Establishment Clause, the Supreme Court said: It goes without saying that the laws and practices involved here can be challenged only by persons having standing to complain. . . . The parties here are school children and their parents, who are directly affected by the laws and practices against which their complaints are directed. These interests surely suffice to give the parties standing to complain. Id. at 224 n.9 (citations omitted). The Court explained that “[t]he plaintiffs in Schempp had standing, not [merely] because their complaint rested on the Establishment Clause . . . but because impressionable schoolchildren were subjected to unwelcome religious exercises or were forced to assume special burdens to avoid them.” Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 486 n.22; see also Lee, 505 U.S. at 584 (finding a “live and justiciable controversy” based on an alleged future injury where the plaintiff challenging a policy permitting clergy members to pray during middle and high school graduations was enrolled at a school where it was “likely, if not certain, that an invocation and benediction [would] be conducted at . . . graduation”). We have previously held that a plaintiff need not wait for “actual implementation of [a] statute” or an “actual violation[] of his rights” to seek relief. Ingebretsen v. Jackson Pub. Sch. Dist., 88 F.3d 274, 278 (5th Cir. 1996). Ingebretsen involved a pre-implementation challenge to a Mississippi statute permitting “student-initiated voluntary prayer” during school-related student events under the Establishment Clause. Id. at 277–78 (citation omitted). Rejecting Mississippi’s argument that the plaintiff lacked standing because the statute had not yet been implemented, we held that “[t]here Case: 24-30706 Document: 219-1 Page: 17 Date Filed: 06/20/2025

No. 24-30706 [was] no need for [the plaintiff] to wait for actual implementation of the statute and actual violations of his rights under the First Amendment where /# .//0/ B(& .$)++-*+-$/ "*1 -)( )/$)1*'1 ( )/$)- '$"$*0.!!$-. inevitable.’” Id. (citing Karen B. v. Treen, 653 F.2d 897, 902 (5th Cir. 1981), aff’d, 455 U.S. 913 (1982)); see also Barber, 860 F.3d at 357 (“Future injuries )+-*1$ /# .$.!*-./)$)"60//# 4B(0./ -/$)'4$(+ )$)"/* constitute injury in fact[.]’”). 8 Louisiana argues that Staley and Doe v. Tangipahoa Parish School Board, 494 F.3d 494 (5th Cir. 2007) (en banc), overturned Ingebretsen, so Plaintiffs must supply proof of an actual encounter with an H.B. 71 display to establish standing. At the outset, we note that Louisiana does not grapple with Schempp—a future injury case where the Supreme Court found standing to press an Establishment Clause claim. Nevertheless, Staley and Doe are both distinguishable and neither decision purported to overturn Ingebretsen, so Ingebretsen remains good law. Staley addressed mootness and ripeness—not standing. See 485 F.3d at 309. Doe involved a challenge to a school board’s practice of opening its meetings with a prayer. Doe v. Tangipahoa Par. Sch. Bd., 473 F.3d 188, 191 (5th Cir. 2006), rev’d en banc, 494 F.3d 494 (5th Cir. 2007). We held that the plaintiff, whose sons attended schools under the board’s jurisdiction, lacked _____________________ Case: 24-30706 Document: 219-1 Page: 18 Date Filed: 06/20/2025

No. 24-30706 standing to challenge the invocations because even after a trial on the merits, there was insufficient proof in the record that he or his sons had been exposed to the invocations. 494 F.3d at 497. Doe was not a pre-implementation facial challenge, and the issue was not whether the plaintiffs would be injured by the prayers if they were to occur in the future. Instead, the allegedly injurious invocations had occurred “since at least 1973,” 473 F.3d at 192, but the plaintiffs had not proven that they had ever witnessed them or would in the future. See 494 F.3d at 497–98. The precedents of the Supreme Court and this court establish that, in an Establishment Clause case, a plaintiff can generally satisfy the injury-in- fact element of standing when he experiences—or certainly will experience—unwanted exposure to government-sponsored religious displays or exercises in the course of his regular activities. See Schempp, 374 U.S. at 224 n.9; Lee, 505 U.S. at 584; Ingebretsen, 88 F.3d at 277–78. iii Here, H.B. 71 requires that the Ten Commandments be permanently displayed in every classroom of every public elementary, middle, and high school in Louisiana. Under Louisiana’s compulsory education laws, students must attend school for at least 177 days per year, La. R.S. § 17:154.1(A)(1), and legal guardians must “assure the attendance of the[ir] child[ren] in regularly assigned classes during regular school hours” or be fined or imprisoned, id. § 17:221(A)(1)(b)–(A)(1)(c). If H.B. 71 goes into effect, 9 impressionable Students will confront a display of the Ten Commandments for nearly every hour of every school day of their public school education in the course of their regular activities. Plaintiffs allege that H.B. 71’s version of _____________________ Case: 24-30706 Document: 219-1 Page: 19 Date Filed: 06/20/2025

No. 24-30706 the Ten Commandments is contrary to the religious and non-religious beliefs they hold. H.B. 71 does not provide a means for students to avoid the displays or avoid unwanted exposure to a government-sponsored religious display. Students have shown standing. See Schempp, 374 U.S. at 211–12, 224 n.9; Lee, 505 U.S. at 599. Parents have likewise pleaded an injury-in-fact sufficient to confer standing to assert their Establishment Clause claims. Because of Students’ regular exposure with the H.B. 71 displays, Parents are “directly affected” by the challenged statute. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 224 n.9; see Fleischfresser v. Dirs. of Sch. Dist. 200, 15 F.3d 680, 684 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that parents have standing to allege an Establishment Clause claim where an “impermissible establishment of religion might inhibit their right to direct the religious training of their children”); Steele v. Van Buren Pub. Sch. Dist., 845 F.2d 1492, 1495 (8th Cir. 1988) (holding plaintiff’s claim remained in controversy because she had a “parental interest in having her children educated in a public school free of religious activities”). We find no error in the district court’s ruling that Plaintiffs demonstrated standing to assert their Establishment Clause claims. b Louisiana contends that Plaintiffs cannot establish “offended observer standing,” as characterized by non-binding, minority-view Supreme Court opinions. It nevertheless urges us to reconsider our “offended observer” precedents in light of Kennedy v. Bremerton School District, 597 U.S. 507 (2022), which overruled the test announced in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), for assessing Establishment Clause Case: 24-30706 Document: 219-1 Page: 20 Date Filed: 06/20/2025

No. 24-30706 claims,10 and because the doctrine is “profoundly wrong.” 11 Louisiana’s arguments fail at the threshold. i The Supreme Court has never expressly and formally recognized “offended observer standing” in a majority opinion; this term appears only in non-binding minority opinions. See City of Ocala v. Rojas, 143 S. Ct. 764 (2023) (Mem.) (Gorsuch, J., statement regarding denial of certiorari) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 588 U.S. 29, 79–89 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the judgment); Espinoza, 591 U.S. at 495 (Thomas, J., concurring). In a concurrence, one of the Supreme Court’s members has stated that under the “offended observer” standing theory, “offense alone ,0'$!$ ..B*)- / and particularized’ injury sufficient to confer standing” and it therefore has no basis in law. Am. Legion, 588 U.S. at 80 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the judgment) (emphasis added); 12 see also City of Ocala, 143 S. Ct. at 767 _____________________ Case: 24-30706 Document: 219-1 Page: 21 Date Filed: 06/20/2025 Case: 24-30706 Document: 219-1 Page: 22 Date Filed: 06/20/2025 Case: 24-30706 Document: 219-1 Page: 23 Date Filed: 06/20/2025

No. 24-30706 management circuit judges, we must follow binding precedent.” Consumers’ Rsch. v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n, 91 F.4th 342, 346 (5th Cir. 2024), cert. denied, 154 S. Ct. 414 (2024). 14 C Louisiana next argues that the Superintendent and the BESE- member defendants are entitled to sovereign immunity. It contends that the Ex parte Young 15 exception to sovereign immunity is inapplicable here because (1) there must be a direct threat of enforcement against the plaintiffs to find an ongoing violation of federal law in a pre-enforcement challenge like this one, and (2) these defendants lack the requisite enforcement authority over H.B. 71. “Generally, States are immune from suit under the terms of the Eleventh Amendment and the doctrine of sovereign immunity.” Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson, 595 U.S. 30, 39 (2021). “This bar also applies to .0$/.'$& /#$.*) B"$)./.// *!!$$'.*-" )$ ./#/- !! /$1 '4.0$/. against a state.’” Book People, 91 F.4th at 334 (quoting City of Austin v. Paxton, _____________________ Case: 24-30706 Document: 219-1 Page: 24 Date Filed: 06/20/2025

No. 24-30706 943 F.3d 993, 997 (5th Cir. 2019)). Under the Ex parte Young exception to sovereign immunity, “a litigant may sue a state official in his official capacity if the suit seeks prospective relief to redress an ongoing violation of federal law.” Williams ex rel. J.E. v. Reeves, 954 F.3d 729, 736 (5th Cir. 2020) (citing Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 167–68). The Supreme Court has warned that “a court need only conduct a Bstraightforward inquiry into whether [the] complaint alleges an ongoing violation of federal law and seeks relief properly characterized as prospective.’” Verizon Md., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 645 (2002) (alteration in original) (emphasis added). The ongoing and continuous violation of federal law requirement “merely distinguishes between cases where the relief sought is prospective in nature, . . . and cases where relief is retrospective.” Summit Med. Assocs., P.C. v. Pryor, 180 F.3d 1326, 1338 (11th Cir. 1999). It “does not mean that the enforcement of the allegedly unconstitutional state statute actually must be in progress against the particular plaintiffs initiating suit.” Id. Rather, “the Ex parte Young )'4.$. /0-). *) /# *(+'$)/C. *)/ 3/6E /#/ $.6 D2# /# - B/# .// officer, by virtue of his office, has some connection with the enforcement of the act.’” Air Evac EMS, Inc. v. Tex., Dep’t of Ins., Div. of Workers’ Comp., 851 F.3d 507, 519 (5th Cir. 2017) (citing Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 157); see id. (rejecting defendants’ argument that the Ex parte Young exception did not apply because the challenged action was not enforced against the plaintiff, noting the correct inquiry was “whether state defendants [had] the requisite connection to the enforcement of the [challenged action]”). “To satisfy the required enforcement connection, the state official (0./#1 0/4 4*)B/# " ) -'0/4/*. /#//# '2.*!/# .// are implemented.’” Book People, 91 F.4th at 335 (citation omitted). “We have !$) B )!*- ( )/C . B*(+0'.$*) *- *)./-$)/6CE .0# /#/ DN$O! /# official does not compel or constrain anyone to obey the challenged law, Case: 24-30706 Document: 219-1 Page: 25 Date Filed: 06/20/2025

No. 24-30706 enjoining that official could not stop any ongoing constitutional violation.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting City of Austin, 943 F.3d at 1002). “'$)/$!!.) *)'4.#*2B.$)/$''*! )!*- ( )/4/# - ' 1)/.// official.’” Id. (quoting Tex. Democratic Party v. Abbott, 978 F.3d 168, 179 (5th Cir. 2020)). H.B. 71 commands the BESE to “adopt rules and regulations . . . to ensure [its] proper implementation.” La. R.S. § 17:2124(B)(6)(a) (emphasis added). Louisiana argues that this obligation does not amount to enforcement power because the possibility that the BESE may someday promulgate rules and regulations is insufficient to invoke Ex parte Young. See Whole Woman’s Health, 595 U.S. at 44 (holding that the possibility that the Texas Medical Board “might in the future” promulgate a rule that the attorney general could enforce was insufficient to invoke Ex parte Young). But the BESE is not merely permitted to adopt rules and regulations implementing H.B. 71, it must do so. La. R.S. § 17:2124(B)(6)(a) (“The [BESE] shall adopt rules and regulations in accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act to ensure the proper implementation of this Section.” (emphasis added)). Louisiana also argues that the BESE’s exercise of its authority to implement H.B. 71 will not compel or constrain anyone to obey the challenged law. See Book People, 91 F.4th at 335. We disagree because the rules and regulations adopted by the BESE must “ensure [H.B. 71’s] proper implementation,” meaning the BESE-member defendants will necessarily compel “each public school governing authority [to] display the Ten Commandments in each classroom in each school under its jurisdiction.” La. R.S. § 17:2124(B)(6)(a), (B)(1). And under state law, the Superintendent must “implement the policies and programs of the [BESE] and the laws affecting schools under the jurisdiction of the [BESE].” Id. § 17:22(3)–(4). As the district court concluded: “[A]n injunction against the Case: 24-30706 Document: 219-1 Page: 26 Date Filed: 06/20/2025

No. 24-30706 Superintendent would prevent the implementation of any regulations related to H.B. 71, thus preventing constitutional violations.” All that our caselaw requires is a “scintilla of enforcement.” Book People, 91 F.4th at 335. The district court ruled that Plaintiffs met their burden; we find no error. IV Louisiana next challenges the denial of its Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Establishment Clause claims. ^[16] We review the denial of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim de novo. Ramming, 281 F.3d at 161. “To survive a motion to dismiss, a *(+'$)/(0./*)/$).0!!$$ )/!/0'(// -6 +/ ./-0 6/*B.// claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). 17 The parties agree that Plaintiffs have asserted a facial challenge to H.B. 71. “To successfully mount a facial challenge, the plaintiffs must show that there is no set of circumstances under which [H.B. 71] is constitutional.” Croft v. Perry, 624 F.3d 157, 164 (5th Cir. 2010). _____________________ Case: 24-30706 Document: 219-1 Page: 27 Date Filed: 06/20/2025

No. 24-30706 A # ./'$.#( )/ '0. D2. $)/ ) /* - / B 2'' *! separation between Church and State.’” Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing Twp., 330 U.S. ^[1], 16 (1947) (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878)). At a minimum, the Establishment Clause ordains that no federal or state government “can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another.” Id. at 15. The Supreme Court “has been particularly vigilant in monitoring compliance with the Establishment Clause in elementary and secondary schools.” Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 583–84 (1987). That vigilance must be exercised with prescribed “care and restraint” because public education is primarily in the hands of the States and local authorities. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968); see Yoder, 406 U.S. at 213 (“Providing public schools ranks at the very apex of the function of a State.”). This means “[c]ourts . . . cannot intervene in the resolution of conflicts which arise in the daily operation of school systems and which do not directly and sharply implicate basic constitutional values.” Epperson, 393 U.S. at 104. For still, “a State’s interest in universal education, however highly we rank it, is not totally free from a balancing process when it impinges on fundamental rights and interests, such as those specifically protected by . . . the First Amendment, and the traditional interest of parents with respect to the religious upbringing of their children.” Yoder, 406 U.S. at 214. The protections afforded to schoolchildren by the Establishment Clause unquestionably “implicate basic constitutional values.” Epperson, 393 U.S. at 104. As the Court has previously explained: Families entrust public schools with the education of their children, but condition their trust on the understanding that the classroom will not purposely be used to advance religious views that may conflict with the private beliefs of the student Case: 24-30706 Document: 219-1 Page: 28 Date Filed: 06/20/2025

No. 24-30706 and his or her family. Students in such institutions are impressionable and their attendance is involuntary. The State exerts great authority and coercive power through mandatory attendance requirements, and because of the students’ emulation of teachers as role models and the children’s susceptibility to peer pressure. Furthermore, “[t]he public school is at once the symbol of our democracy and the most pervasive means for promoting our common destiny. In no activity of the State is it more vital to keep out divisive forces than in its schools. . . .” Edwards, 482 U.S. at 584 (alterations in original) (citations omitted). That is why a religious practice may be deemed unconstitutional in the “special context of the public elementary and secondary school system,” but deemed constitutional elsewhere. Id. at 583. Perhaps no better case illustrates the nature of H.B. 71’s constitutional problem than Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (per curiam). In Stone, the Supreme Court struck down a Kentucky statute requiring that the Ten Commandments be displayed on the wall of every public classroom in the state because it had no “secular legislative purpose.” 18 449 U.S. at 41 (applying Lemon test). _____________________ Case: 24-30706 Document: 219-1 Page: 29 Date Filed: 06/20/2025 Case: 24-30706 Document: 219-1 Page: 30 Date Filed: 06/20/2025 Case: 24-30706 Document: 219-1 Page: 31 Date Filed: 06/20/2025 Case: 24-30706 Document: 219-1 Page: 32 Date Filed: 06/20/2025

No. 24-30706 § 17:2124(B), with Stone, 449 U.S. at 39 n.1 (citing Ky. Rev. Stat. § 158.178 (1980)). Under H.B. 71, public schools “may” display the Ten Commandments alongside the Mayflower Compact, Declaration of Independence, and the Northwest Ordinance—they are not required do so. La. R.S. § 17:2124(B)(4)(a). Conversely, H.B. 71 includes an express “minimum requirement that the Ten Commandments shall be displayed on a poster or framed document that is at least eleven inches by fourteen inches,” that “[t]he text of the Ten Commandments shall be the central focus” of the display, “and shall be printed in a large, easily readable font.” Id. at § 17:2124(B)(1) (emphases added). An H.B. 71 display that meets the statute’s minimum requirements is materially identical to the displays challenged in Stone. ^[20] Stone’s reasoning is equally germane. In Stone, the Supreme Court deemed Kentucky’s proffered secular purpose insufficient to survive constitutional muster because Kentucky did not integrate the Ten Commandments, an inherently religious text, into an educational curriculum “where the Bible may constitutionally be used in an appropriate study of history, civilization, ethics, comparative religion, or the like.” 449 U.S. at 42 (citing Schempp, 374 U.S. at 225). Posting the Ten Commandments on classroom walls therefore “serve[d] no . . . educational function.” Id. The _____________________ Case: 24-30706 Document: 219-1 Page: 33 Date Filed: 06/20/2025

No. 24-30706 same is true of H.B. 71. The statute does not require that the Ten Commandments be integrated into a curriculum of study. On the contrary, under the statute’s minimum requirements, the posters must be indiscriminately displayed in every public school classroom in Louisiana regardless of class subject-matter. See La. R.S. § 17:2124(B)(1). Louisiana insists, however, that unlike Kentucky, its Legislature has a valid “secular historical and educational purpose” for displaying the Ten Commandments in classrooms, which is reflected in the statute. ^[21] “C*0-/. - B)*-(''4 ! - )/$' /* N' "$.'/$1 O -/$0'/$*) *! secular purpose.’” Croft, 624 F.3d at 166 (alteration in original) (quoting Edwards, 482 U.S. at 587). But an alleged secular purpose “must be Bsincere,’” and not “merely a Bsham.’” Id. (quoting Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 64 (1985) (Powell, J., concurring)). When “undertaking a B.#(C $),0$-46 2 *).$ - 2# /# - /# #'' )" /$*) !0-/# -. /# particular purposes articulated by the legislature or whether the challenged action contravenes those avowed purposes.” Id. (brackets omitted) (citing Freiler v. Tangipahoa Par. Bd. of Educ., 185 F.3d 337, 344 (5th Cir. 1999)). Louisiana’s purported legislative purpose states: It is the Legislature’s intent to apply the decision set forth by the Supreme Court of the United States in Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005), to continue the rich tradition [of including the Ten Commandments in the education of our children] and ensure that the students in our public schools may understand and appreciate the foundational documents of our state and national government. La. R.S. § 17:2124(A)(9). _____________________ Case: 24-30706 Document: 219-1 Page: 34 Date Filed: 06/20/2025

No. 24-30706 Plaintiffs allege H.B. 71’s legislative history reveals additional signs of a “sham” legislative purpose: ƒ H.B. 71’s primary author and sponsor stated during a legislative debate: “It is so important that our children learn what God says is right, and what he says is wrong, and to allow [the Ten Commandments] to be displayed in our classrooms as a visual aid, I believe, especially in this day and time is so important.” 22 ƒ In support of the bill, a co-author of the bill stated, “I really believe that we are lacking in direction. A lot of people, their children, are not attending churches . . . . We need to do something in the schools to bring people back to where they need to be.” Debate, at 15:17. ƒ H.B. 71’s primary author also stated, “You know, not all children . . . are taught right from wrong. . . . But I believe when I went to school, I learned . . . to know there was a God by reciting the Ten Commandments . . . . I knew what God said was right, and what he said was wrong, . . . not all of us were taught that.” Debate, at 15:55. ƒ When asked how a Buddhist or Muslim student would interpret one of the Commandments, the bill’s author responded, “Well I’m not Buddhist or Muslim so I’m not really worried about defining it for them. . . . [The Ten Commandments] [are] a model for what’s God— it’s God’s law, and it’s universal law.” Debate, at 19:42. ƒ Another co-author and co-sponsor of H.B. 71 expressed his support for the law during debate by claiming that those who oppose it are waging an “attack on Christianity” and suggesting that it would _____________________ Case: 24-30706 Document: 219-1 Page: 35 Date Filed: 06/20/2025

No. 24-30706 provide a religious counterbalance to students’ secular education: “My wife is a Christian and if she was a teacher she would be asked to teach evolution which is in complete contradiction with the theory of creation that we believe out of the Bible. . . . I am a parent and am asking for this [bill].” Citing these statements, the district court found that Louisiana’s avowed secular purposes were “implausible [and] inadequate.” See Croft, 624 F.3d at 167 (citation modified). These statements indeed “support a commonsense conclusion that a religious objective permeated the government’s action.” Id; see Edwards, 482 U.S. at 591–92 (concluding that the “preeminent purpose of the [state legislature] was clearly to advance [a] religious viewpoint” based on statements by legislators and testimony presented during legislative hearings). It is also unclear how H.B. 71 ensures that students in Louisiana public schools “understand and appreciate the foundational documents of [its] state and national government” when it makes displaying those “foundational” documents optional, and does not require that they also be printed in a large, easily readable font. La. R.S. § 17:2124(A)(9). When the Ten Commandments must be posted prominently and legibly, while the other “contextual” materials need not be visible at all, the disparity lays bare the pretext. To the extent that Louisiana relies on Van Orden to justify displaying the Ten Commandments in classrooms, we have already explained that the public school classroom implicates certain protections that other contexts, like the Texas State Capital grounds, does not. See supra Section IV(A). The Supreme Court said as much in Van Orden. See 454 U.S. at 690–91 (“There are, of course, limits to the display of religious messages or symbols. . . . Stone . . . 2.*). ,0 ) *!/# B+-/$0'-*) -)./#/-$. $)/# *)/ 3/*! Case: 24-30706 Document: 219-1 Page: 36 Date Filed: 06/20/2025

No. 24-30706 public elementary and secondary schools.’ . . . The placement of the Ten Commandments monument on the Texas State Capitol grounds is a far more passive use of those texts than was the case in Stone, where the text confronted elementary school students every day.” (citations omitted)). As in Stone, “[i]f the posted copies of the Ten Commandments are to have any effect at all, it will be to induce the schoolchildren to read, meditate upon, perhaps to venerate and obey, the Commandments.” 449 U.S. at 42. This “is not a permissible state objective under the Establishment Clause.” Id. Stone v. Graham is controlling. Under Stone, H.B. 71 is plainly unconstitutional. The district court did not err. C We also agree with the district court that, even if Stone were overturned tomorrow, H.B. 71 violates the Establishment Clause under Kennedy. Louisiana counters that the district court misapplied Kennedy because, under Kennedy, the threshold question in an Establishment Clause analysis is whether the challenged practice implicates historical hallmarks of religious establishments. We disagree. As noted, Kennedy shed light on the proper standard for interpreting Establishment Clause claims, holding that “the Establishment Clause must $)/ -+- / 4B- ! - ) /*#$./*-$'+-/$ .)0) -./)$)".7CE597 U.S. at 535 (quotation marks omitted). “The line that courts and governments must draw between the permissible and the impermissible has to accord with history and faithfully reflect the understanding of the Founding Fathers.” Id. at 536–37 (citation modified) (citing Galloway, 572 U.S. at 577; Schempp, 374 U.S. at 294).

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No. 24-30706 The Supreme Court then addressed the district’s alternative argument—that the district’s actions were justified because it “would have been guilty of coercing students to pray” if it allowed the coach to continue publicly praying on school property. Id. at 536. Acknowledging that “coercion . . . was among the foremost hallmarks of religious establishments the framers sought to prohibit when they adopted the First Amendment,” the Court concluded there was insufficient evidence of coercion by the coach. Id. at 537 & n.5 (citing Shurtleff v. City of Boston, 596 U.S. 243, 285–88 (2022) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (examining the historical hallmarks of an established religion)). But Kennedy did not adopt these “hallmarks” 23 as the exclusive Establishment Clause test and the Shurtleff concurrence is non- binding. See Kennedy, 597 U.S. at 536–37 & n.5. Louisiana conceded as much before the district court. We applied Kennedy and Galloway in Freedom From Religion Foundation, Inc. v. Mack. There, plaintiffs challenged a Texas Justice of the Peace’s practice of opening his court with a prayer. Mack, 49 F.4th at 944. We looked to Galloway, in which the Supreme Court upheld a town’s practice of commencing its board meetings with a prayer, and we formulated the following standard to evaluate historical record evidence: Whether the challenged practice “fits within” or is “consistent with a broader tradition” at the time of the Founding or incorporation. Id. at 951. This analysis _____________________ Case: 24-30706 Document: 219-1 Page: 38 Date Filed: 06/20/2025

No. 24-30706 “ + ).*)B*-$"$)'( )$)")#$./*-46C2$/#+-/$0'-// )/$*)+$/* B#$./*-$'+-/$ .7CEId. (citing Kennedy, 597 U.S. at 535); see Galloway, 572 U.S. at 577 (“The Court’s inquiry, then, must be to determine whether the prayer practice in the town of Greece fits within the tradition long followed in Congress and the state legislatures.”). Applying Kennedy and Mack here, the district court framed the “broader tradition” as the use of the Ten Commandments in public education, and the challenged practice as “the permanent posting of the Ten Commandments in public[] school classrooms.” No one challenges that framing. Therefore, the question before us is whether the permanent posting of the Ten Commandments in public school classrooms fits within, or is consistent with, a broader tradition of using the Ten Commandments in public education. Plaintiffs allege that “[t]here is no longstanding tradition of permanently displaying the Ten Commandments in public[] school classrooms in Louisiana or the United States more generally.” They also allege that “[H.B. 71] includes false statements relating to a purported history and connection between the Ten Commandments and government and public education in the United States,” including a “fabricated” quote by James Madison regarding this country’s “capacity . . . to govern ourselves according to the moral principles of the Ten Commandments.” Accepting these allegations as true, the district court found that Plaintiffs adequately pleaded an Establishment Clause violation under Kennedy. We find no error. ^[24] _____________________ Case: 24-30706 Document: 219-1 Page: 39 Date Filed: 06/20/2025 Case: 24-30706 Document: 219-1 Page: 40 Date Filed: 06/20/2025 Case: 24-30706 Document: 219-1 Page: 41 Date Filed: 06/20/2025 Case: 24-30706 Document: 219-1 Page: 42 Date Filed: 06/20/2025 Case: 24-30706 Document: 219-1 Page: 43 Date Filed: 06/20/2025 Case: 24-30706 Document: 219-1 Page: 44 Date Filed: 06/20/2025 Case: 24-30706 Document: 219-1 Page: 45 Date Filed: 06/20/2025 Case: 24-30706 Document: 219-1 Page: 46 Date Filed: 06/20/2025 Case: 24-30706 Document: 219-1 Page: 47 Date Filed: 06/20/2025 Case: 24-30706 Document: 219-1 Page: 48 Date Filed: 06/20/2025 Case: 24-30706 Document: 219-1 Page: 49 Date Filed: 06/20/2025 Case: 24-30706 Document: 219-1 Page: 50 Date Filed: 06/20/2025