MCFADDEN, Presiding Judge.

Zakirullah Mamoorkhan appeals the order granting summary judgment to Auto- Owners Insurance Company in Auto-Owner’s declaratory judgment action. We vacate the order and remand the case for the trial court to consider a threshold issue: whether the statute upon which the trial court relied applies to this case.^[1]

Summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled Mamoorkhan was afforded no coverage for any claims arising out of the accident; and that it had no duty to pay, defend, or indemnify Mamoorkhan for any claims arising out of the accident.

Auto-Owners moved for summary judgment, relying on OCGA § 33-24-7 (b). Paragraph (b) provides in part:

Misrepresentations, omissions, concealment of facts, and incorrect statements shall not prevent a recovery under the policy or contract unless: . . . [m]aterial either to the acceptance of the risk or to the hazard assumed by the insurer; or [t]he insurer in good faith would either not have issued the policy or contract or would not have issued a policy or contract in as large an amount or at the premium rate as applied for or would not have provided coverage with respect to the hazard resulting in the loss if the true facts had been known to the insurer as required either by the application for the policy or contract or otherwise.

OCGA § 33-24-7 (b) (2), (3). Auto-Owners presented undisputed evidence that the failure to list the accident on the application was material to its decision to issue the policy at the premium rate applied for.

The trial court ruled in Auto-Owners’s favor, relying on OCGA § 33-24-7 (b) (2) and (3), and Mamoorkhan filed this appeal.

Although the parties have not raised it,3 this case presents an important threshold issue: whether OCGA § 33-24-7 (b) applies to this case at all. In Sentry Indem. Co. v. Sharif, 248 Ga. 395 (282 SE2d 907) (1981), our Supreme Court held that former Code Ann. § 56-2409, the predecessor to OCGA § 33-24-7, does not apply to insurance policies covered by former Code Ann. § 56-2430.1, the predecessor to OCGA § 33-24-45, which concerns the cancellation of automobile policies. Sentry, 248 Ga. at 397. The court held that “an insurer cannot, on the ground of fraud or misrepresentations relating to the inception of the policy, retrospectively avoid coverage under a compulsory or financial responsibility insurance law so as to escape liability to a third party.” Id. at 397 (citations and punctuation omitted). See OCGA § 33-34-4. See also Reynolds v. Infinity Gen. Ins. Co., 287 Ga. 86, 94 (694 SE2d 337) (2010) (Nahmias, J., concurring) (“the clear objective of the [s]tate’s mandatory automobile liability insurance system . . . is to ensure that all vehicles are insured at all times for the protection of the public as well as their drivers and passengers”); Patriot Gen. Ins. Co. v. Millis, 233 Ga. App. 867, 870-871 (1) (506 SE2d 145) (1998) (insurer’s right to rescind insurance contract ab initio for fraud cannot be reconciled with general statutory framework requiring compulsory insurance).

In Liberty Ins. Corp. v. Ferguson, 263 Ga. App. 714 (589 SE2d 290) (2003), we held that an insurer may not rely on OCGA § 33-24-7 to cancel an automobile insurance policy. Id. at 715 (1). We noted that OCGA § 33-24-45 “specifically regulates the cancellation of automobile insurance policies.” Id. at 715 (1). We concluded that, “[b]ecause [the insurer] cannot rely upon OCGA § 33-24-7 and cases construing that statute, [the insurer] cannot retrospectively void the liability portion of [the insured’s] policy even if [the insured] failed to fully disclose all information or made material misrepresentations when applying for the policy.” Id. at 716 (1).

Given the questions about the applicability of OCGA § 33-24-7, “a question that the trial court did not address and the parties have not adequately briefed[,]” Clayton County v. City of College Park, 301 Ga. 653, 656 (2) (803 SE2d 63) (2017), we cannot say that Auto-Owners has demonstrated that it is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law under that statute. “[I]t would be imprudent for this [c]ourt to reach out and decide that question ourselves in the first instance based on the briefing before us.” Guy v. Housing Auth. of Augusta, __ Ga. __, __ (__ SE2d __) (Case No. S24G1346, decided June 24, 2025). “It is a complex and important question, and one that we are reluctant to address in the first instance without affording the trial court an opportunity to consider the question and without complete briefing by the parties.” Clayton County, 301 Ga. at 656 (2). See Wilkes & McHugh v. LTC Consulting, 306 Ga. 252, 265 (4) (830 SE2d 119) (2019) (declining to decide issues in the first instance and remanding for trial court to consider whether statutes cited by plaintiff applied at all); Strength v. Lovett, 311 Ga. App. 35, 44 (714 SE2d 723) (2011) (we should not consider whether the trial court was wrong for any reason).

So we vacate the order granting summary judgment and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

Judgment vacated and case remanded. Hodges and Pipkin, JJ., concur.