MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY v. Record No. 0375-24-4 CHIEF JUDGE MARLA GRAFF DECKER OCTOBER 7, 2025 COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAUQUIER COUNTY James E. Plowman, Judge1

Anna Cox, Senior Trial Attorney (Office of the Public Defender, on briefs), for appellant.

Israel-David J.J. Healy, Assistant Attorney General (Jason S. Miyares, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

Consistent with a plea agreement, Deshawn Jermel Martin entered a conditional guilty plea

to felony eluding under Code § 46.2-817(B). The agreement preserved Martin’s right to appeal the trial court’s denial of his pretrial motion to dismiss the charge under statutory and constitutional

speedy trial grounds and the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD). Martin also contends the court erred in overruling his evidentiary objections to two supporting exhibits submitted in the Commonwealth’s response to the motion to dismiss. Finding no error, the Court affirms the conviction.

* This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1-413(A).

Judge Plowman presided at the guilty plea and sentencing hearing. Judge Douglas L. Fleming, Jr., presided at the pretrial hearing on the motion to dismiss, and Judge James P. Fisher entered the agreed-to amended sentencing order.

BACKGROUND2

This case involves a request by Martin to be returned to Virginia for disposition of his charge for felony eluding. In 2016, he was indicted by the grand jury for felony eluding. During the pendency of his trial on that charge, Martin was serving a sentence in Maryland for attempted first-degree murder. He did not return to Virginia until 2023. The key date for purposes of this

appeal occurred in September 2023 when Martin filed his second request for disposition under the IAD. With this backdrop in mind, we relay the relevant facts in chronological order.

On July 14, 2016, the Maryland Capitol Park Police notified the Fauquier County Sheriff’s

Office that they were investigating Martin, who was believed to be involved in a shooting in Maryland and was en route to a cemetery in the county. Fauquier County deputies saw Martin’s car near the cemetery and attempted to stop him. Martin fled from the scene. His car struck a mailbox before he finally pulled into a convenience store where he was arrested for felony eluding.

At a preliminary hearing on August 10, 2016, the eluding charge was certified to the grand jury. Martin was given a $3,000 unsecured bond but was held without bail “on another charge.”

On September 16, 2016, Martin informed the Fauquier County Circuit Court that he had been

extradited to Maryland on August 24, 2016. Martin represented that he had a hearing set for September 26, 2016, on the eluding charge and wanted to appear in the Virginia court so he would

not be charged with failure to appear. Martin attached an “inmate request form” dated September 8, 2016, which showed that the Maryland correctional center where he was being held had informed him that he could “contact” the Virginia court “so that they [could] make arrangements.” The Fauquier County Circuit Court Clerk wrote Martin on September 30, 2016, advising him that the court could not consider his ex parte communication and would forward it to counsel of record.

On September 26, 2016, the grand jury returned an indictment on the eluding charge. At a hearing held on the same date in the Fauquier County Circuit Court, defense counsel told the court that Martin had been extradited and was being held in custody in Maryland. Accordingly, the court

directed that a capias be issued to “act as a hold on Mr. Martin over in Prince George’s County, Maryland.” The capias was issued on September 28, 2016, for failure to appear “according to the conditions of the recognizance” for the felony eluding charge.

Martin wrote the circuit court on March 17, 2023, asking for information to “close out” his case in Virginia. The clerk’s office filed the letter, but the Commonwealth’s Attorney never received a copy of it. Two months later, on May 17, 2023, Martin sent documents to the Fauquier

County General District Court requesting final disposition of his case pursuant to Article III of the IAD. That court forwarded the documents to the circuit court, which sent them to the Fauquier

County Commonwealth’s Attorney. The Commonwealth’s Attorney wrote Martin on August 7, 2023, informing him that his office received the IAD documents on July 17, 2023. In the letter, the prosecutor said that the Commonwealth could not act on his request because the submitted documents did not comply with the requirements of Article III. The letter advised Martin that his

request must be sent by registered or certified mail to the appropriate prosecutor and court (i.e., the Fauquier County Commonwealth’s Attorney and Circuit Court). Martin was told in the letter to include the correct case number for the crime of felony eluding (CR-16-457).3

On September 6, 2023, Martin submitted a second request for disposition under the IAD.

Even though the submission was still deficient because it was not received by registered or certified mail, the prosecutor accepted it and proceeded under the IAD to have Martin brought to Virginia.

Martin was returned on November 6, 2023, and served with the felony eluding indictment.^[4] The prosecutor told the court that the case had to be tried within the 180-day limit established under the IAD. The circuit court appointed counsel for Martin and ordered him to be held without bond pending a status hearing on November 27, 2023.

At the status hearing, the case was set for trial on January 30, 2024. On December 15, 2023, Martin moved to dismiss the eluding charge, contending the delay in trying him violated both his statutory and constitutional right to a speedy trial and also exceeded the time limits for trial under the IAD.

A hearing on the motion was held on January 3, 2024. Martin challenged Exhibits A and D, which the Commonwealth included in its response to the motion to dismiss. Exhibit A was

Martin’s 2016 commitment order from the general district court. The order granted Martin a $3,000

unsecured bond for the eluding charge but noted he was being held without bond on the Maryland charges. Exhibit D was a copy of the capias for failure to appear dated September 28, 2016, received by the Maryland facility where Martin was confined. Martin argued the documents lacked an adequate foundation. The trial court overruled the objection and admitted the exhibits.

Regarding his speedy trial claims, Martin attributed the seven-year delay in prosecuting his case to the Commonwealth. He contended that he was prejudiced by the delay because he could

have been moved from a maximum-security prison to a medium-security facility except for the detainer lodged by the Commonwealth in 2017. Martin acknowledged, however, that he learned of his eligibility to be moved to a less secure facility in 2021 but had not written the Virginia circuit court until March 2023 because he “was handling other court cases” he had in Maryland. In his March 17, 2023 letter to the Virginia court, Martin said that he needed to dispose of his detainer because he was “currently starting the process of applying for programs in the State of Maryland.”

After argument by counsel, the circuit court denied Martin’s motion to dismiss the indictment. The court held that the Commonwealth had complied with the time limit established in the IAD. It concluded that Martin’s statutory right to a speedy trial was not violated because his

incarceration in a Maryland facility between 2016 and his extradition to Virginia in 2023 tolled the statute. Finally, the court ruled that Martin’s constitutional speedy trial claim failed under the four- part test enunciated in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972).

On February 1, 2024, Martin entered a conditional guilty plea to felony eluding, preserving

his right to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss. The Commonwealth agreed to dismiss the capias on the failure to appear charge and to recommend a sentence at the low end of the sentencing guidelines. The court imposed an eight-month sentence.

ANALYSIS

Martin argues the trial court erred in admitting Exhibits A and D into evidence and in denying his motion to dismiss the charge for alleged violations of his statutory and constitutional rights to a speedy trial and the IAD.

I. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Exhibits A and D.

“A trial court must find any facts on which the admissibility of evidence depends by a preponderance of the evidence.” Davis v. Commonwealth, 79 Va. App. 123, 142 (2023). “In a non-

constitutional context [the appellate court] review[s] a trial court’s decision on whether to admit or exclude evidence under an abuse of discretion standard.” Commonwealth v. Swann, 290 Va. 194, 197 (2015). Unless the court’s factual findings “‘underlying the admissibility’” decisions are

“‘plainly wrong’” or lack supporting evidence, they are “binding on appeal.” Hicks v. Commonwealth, 71 Va. App. 255, 275 (2019) (first quoting Bloom v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 814, 821 (2001); and then quoting Campos v. Commonwealth, 67 Va. App. 690, 702 (2017)). And “[a] reviewing court can conclude that an abuse of discretion occurred only when reasonable jurists could not differ about the correct result.” Howard v. Commonwealth, 74 Va. App. 739, 753 (2022).

Martin argues that the Commonwealth did not establish a foundation for admission as evidence when offering Exhibits A (2016 commitment order) and D (copy of capias). He is correct

that a writing generally must be authenticated before it may be admitted into evidence.^[5] Snowden v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. App. 482, 485 (2013). However, “[a]uthentication is merely the process of showing that a document is genuine and that it is what its proponent claims it to be.” Id. (quoting

Owens v. Commonwealth, 10 Va. App. 309, 311 (1990), overruled in part by Waller v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 731, 736 (2009)). “The amount of evidence sufficient to establish authenticity will vary according to the type of writing, and the circumstances attending its admission, but generally proof of any circumstances which will support a finding that the writing is genuine will suffice.” Williams v. Commonwealth, 35 Va. App. 545, 556-57 (2001) (quoting

Walters v. Littleton, 223 Va. 446, 451 (1982)).

Exhibit A was Martin’s 2016 commitment order from the general district court. In arguing for its admissibility, the prosecutor stated that the order “was in the Commonwealth’s file that we had from general district court and obviously became a circuit court file and we just had it in our file.” The circuit court clerk informed the court that “the bond was scanned in the court file and is currently in the paper file.” Citing Virginia Rule of Evidence 2:201, the trial court determined that it could take judicial notice of the document because it was part of the court’s own record.

Exhibit D was a copy of the capias for failure to appear that was received by the Maryland facility where Martin was confined. The document reflected that a circuit court clerk issued the capias on September 28, 2016, and the Fauquier Sheriff’s Department “received” it the next day.

The document was also date-stamped October 5, 2017, when it was faxed from the Sheriff’s

Office’s Communications fax machine. The prosecutor stated that her office had “reached out to

Maryland to get a copy of the detainer that was in [Martin’s] file.”6 Based on that conversation, the Commonwealth’s attorney proffered that their copy “mirrors directly the copy of the capias that was issued by [the Fauquier County Circuit Court] in 2016.” Martin argued that the document did not show when the Maryland prison authorities received the capias or if they in fact had received it at all. He contended that testimony from a Maryland Department of Corrections official was necessary. Noting that the Virginia trial date was approaching and the motion to dismiss had been filed recently, the prosecutor said that issuing a subpoena to a Maryland official would have taken

“a long period of time.” The court admitted Exhibit D based on the Commonwealth’s representation, finding that the documents came “from sources [i.e., officers of the court] whose accuracy could not reasonably be questioned.”

For these reasons, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding by a preponderance of the evidence that Exhibits A and D were properly authenticated and admitting them into evidence.

II. Martin’s statutory speedy trial right was not violated.

A statutory speedy trial claim “presents a mixed question of law and fact.” Ali v. Commonwealth, 75 Va. App. 16, 29 (2022) (quoting Young v. Commonwealth, 297 Va. 443, 450

(2019)). “The appellate court gives deference to the trial court’s factual findings but reviews legal issues de novo, including questions regarding the proper construction of [the] statute.” Id.

“Code § 19.2-243 provides specific time limits ‘within which an accused must be tried, absent tolling or other statutory exceptions.’” Osman v. Commonwealth, 76 Va. App. 613, 657

(2023) (quoting Brown v. Commonwealth, 75 Va. App. 388, 406 (2022)). If the defendant is held in continuous custody after the general district court has found probable cause, his trial must be held within five months. See Code § 19.2-243. In contrast, if he “is not held in custody but has been recognized for his appearance in the circuit court,” his trial must be held within nine months. Id.

Significantly, the statutory speedy trial period is subject to tolling. Code § 19.2-243(1)-(7) lists circumstances that toll the running of the statute, but the enumerated provisions are not exclusive.

See Jiron-Garcia v. Commonwealth, 48 Va. App. 638, 650 (2006) (holding that Code § 19.2-243 was “implicitly” tolled while the incarcerated defendant was unavailable for trial in state court due to being in federal custody). The Commonwealth must prove a delay was based on a tolling “or on

[the accused’s] waiver, actual or implied, of his right to be tried within the designated period.”

Wallace v. Commonwealth, 65 Va. App. 80, 89 (2015) (alteration in original) (quoting Powell v. Commonwealth, 29 Va. App. 745, 748 (1999)), aff’d, 292 Va. 1 (2016).

The record shows that Martin was arrested for felony eluding on July 14, 2016, and on the same date was served with a fugitive warrant for attempted first-degree murder in Maryland. The general district court held a preliminary hearing on August 10, 2016, and found probable cause to certify the eluding charge to the grand jury. As a result, the statutory speedy trial clock began to run on August 11, 2016. See Robinson v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 148, 152 (1998). Martin was granted an unsecured bond on the eluding charge and then was extradited to Maryland on August

24, 2016. Because Martin was not in continuous custody under § 19.2-243, the nine-month time limit applies here. See Ford v. Commonwealth, 33 Va. App. 682, 694 (2000) (holding that where the defendant was confined in the federal system on federal charges, his continuous custody under

§ 19.2-243 began only when he was delivered to Virginia authorities). Under the nine-month limit, the Commonwealth had “at least 273 days” to try Martin, subject to any tolling periods. McCray v. Commonwealth, 44 Va. App. 334, 342 (2004).

Thirteen days passed from August 11, 2016, to Martin’s extradition to Maryland on August

24, 2016. He then was convicted in Maryland of attempted first-degree murder and sentenced to fifty-five years in prison. He did not initiate procedures under the IAD to “close out” his Virginia case until 2023 and was not available for trial in Virginia until his return on November 6, 2023. See

Ford, 33 Va. App. at 694. Martin’s trial occurred eighty-seven days later on February 1, 2024, well within the nine-month limit of 273 days. Therefore, Martin’s statutory right to a speedy trial was not violated.

III. Martin’s constitutional speedy trial right was not violated.

The standard of review governing a Sixth Amendment speedy trial claim, like a statutory one, presents a mixed question of law and fact. Osman, 76 Va. App. at 657. We give deference to the trial court’s factual findings but review legal issues de novo. Id.

Constitutional speedy trial challenges are assessed under the Supreme Court’s test enunciated in Barker v. Wingo. The Court articulated a “balancing test [that] necessarily compels courts to approach speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis.” 407 U.S. at 530. The Court identified

four factors that reviewing courts must weigh: the “[l]ength of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant’s assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant.” Id.

The length of the delay is a “triggering mechanism.” Id. Whether a delay qualifies as presumptively prejudicial “necessarily depend[s] upon the peculiar circumstances of the case.” Id. at 530-31. A delay of one year or more is deemed “presumptively prejudicial” and warrants

consideration of the remaining three Barker factors. Osman, 76 Va. App. at 660; see Reedy v. Commonwealth, 77 Va. App. 81, 94-95 (2023). Accordingly, the more than seven years between

Martin’s arrest on July 14, 2016, and subsequent trial on February 1, 2024, warrants review under the additional Barker factors.

The second factor we must examine is the reason for the delay. “Although any delay not

attributable to the defendant is the responsibility of the Commonwealth for speedy trial purposes, ‘different weights should be assigned to different reasons’ for delay.” Reedy, 77 Va. App. at 96

(quoting Ali, 75 Va. App. at 42). Delay attributable to the Commonwealth may be “deliberately

improper, merely negligent, [or] valid and unavoidable.” Id. (quoting Ali, 75 Va. App. at 42). In Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 656 (1992), the Supreme Court held that “official bad faith in causing delay will be weighed heavily against the government.” At the other end of the spectrum is “diligent prosecution,” which nevertheless may entail “pretrial delay [that] is often both inevitable

and fully justifiable,” such as when the government may need time to obtain custody of the defendant. Id. The middle ground, “official negligence,” is “obviously to be weighed more lightly

than a deliberate intent to harm the accused’s defense.” Id. at 656-57. Yet “it still falls on the wrong side of the divide between acceptable and unacceptable reasons for delaying a criminal prosecution once it has begun.” Id. at 657; Reedy, 77 Va. App. at 96 (noting that negligent delay weighs against the Commonwealth because “the ultimate responsibility for such circumstances must rest with the government” (quoting Ali, 75 Va. App. at 42)). An appellate court “review[s] determinations of negligence with considerable deference.” Doggett, 505 U.S. at 652.

- 10 - Here, the record makes clear that almost immediately after Martin was charged with felony eluding in 2016, he was extradited to Maryland on a very serious charge, convicted of attempted first-degree murder, and sentenced to fifty-five years in prison. Martin testified at the hearing on the motion to dismiss that he concentrated on his Maryland cases until 2023. His attorney acknowledged that the Commonwealth was not obligated under Article IV of the IAD to request Martin’s transfer to Virginia.^[7] Despite this concession in the trial court, Martin now argues that the Commonwealth should be charged with the delay in his case because it could have sought his return to Virginia under Article IV of the IAD and did not do so. But nothing in the IAD required the Commonwealth to act or penalized it for choosing not to act. Given the serious criminal charge in Maryland and the heavy sentence he ultimately received, the Commonwealth certainly did not abuse its discretion in not seeking temporary custody of Martin to try him on the felony eluding charge. Further, the Commonwealth had “no right to . . . custody” of Martin, who was a Maryland prisoner. See Williamson v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 655, 660 (1992) (holding Virginia had no right to custody of a prisoner who was awaiting trial in North Carolina); see also Gaskins v. Clarke, 303 Va. 280, 284 (2024) (per curiam) (holding that Maryland officials were free to reject a Virginia court’s request to detain Gaskins because the request fell outside the bounds of the IAD and was “a matter of comity” between the two states). Martin contributed to the delay by not seeking transfer to Virginia under the IAD until May 2023. His initial request did not comply with the required IAD procedure. See Yiaadey v.