v.
Springboard CDFI 23-2 LP
Court of Appeals
Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo
No. 07-25-00189-CV
JOSHUA JONES, APPELLANT
V.
SPRINGBOARD CDFI 23—2 LP, APPELLEE
On Appeal from the 84th District Court
Hutchinson County, Texas
Trial Court No. 46152, Honorable Curt Brancheau, Presiding
October 27, 2025
MEMORANDUM OPINION Before QUINN, C.J., and PARKER and YARBROUGH, JJ.
Appellant, Joshua Jones, proceeding pro se, appeals a no-evidence summary judgment granted in favor of Appellee, Springboard CDFI 23-2 LP (“Springboard”), in his suit to quiet title. He challenges the no-evidence summary judgment on the basis he submitted more than a scintilla of evidence in support of his claim.[1] We affirm.
[*2]judgment, the movant is required to identify the specific elements of each of the nonmovant’s causes of action for which there is no evidence. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i). Once the movant identifies the elements lacking evidence, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to produce more than a scintilla of evidence in support of each such cause of action to survive summary judgment. Id.; JLB Builders, L.L.C v. Hernandez, 622 S.W.3d 860, 864 (Tex. 2021) (citations omitted).
ANALYSIS
Springboard moved for a no-evidence summary judgment on Jones’s sole claim to quiet title. “The elements of a suit to quiet title are (1) plaintiff has an interest in a specific property, (2) title to the property is affected by a claim by the defendant, and (3) the defendant’s claim, though facially valid, is invalid or unenforceable.” Montenegro v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, 419 S.W.3d 561, 572 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2013, pet. denied). Springboard’s motion specified Jones had no evidence of the first and third elements—Jones could not demonstrate he had title to the property, nor could he show Springboard’s claim of title was invalid.
Jones’s written response to Springboard’s motion contained the following attached evidence:
• Contract for sale with Fernandez;
• Broker’s agreement;
• Emails with a VA home loans entity;
• Video evidence of a call with the brokers regarding the failure of the closing on the home; • Evidence presented at the justice of the peace eviction proceeding; and • Settlement offer sent to Springboard by Jones’s attorney at the time.
[*3]In addition, Jones attached the following evidence to a “reply” to Springboard’s original answer and counterclaim:
• Payment receipts for rent he paid to Fernandez;
• Receipts for repairs made to the home;
• Complaint made to the Texas Real Estate Commission regarding his broker, including emails with TREC;
• Text message and emails with an attorney at the Texas Legal Services Center;
• Messages to several attorneys who declined to represent Jones; and • Emails with the escrow officer for the closing.
Although the above evidence demonstrates Jones was potentially harmed by the actions of Fernandez—who apparently took Jones’s rent money and failed to pay the mortgage—it does not establish Jones received title to the home. None of the documents show Fernandez conveyed title to Jones. See TEX. PROP. CODE § 5.021 (conveyance of property “must be in writing and must be subscribed and delivered by the conveyor or by the conveyor’s agent authorized in writing.”); Jackson v. Wildflower Prod. Co., 505 S.W.3d 80, 90–91 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2016, pet. denied) (unrecorded conveyance of property generally not binding upon subsequent purchasers). At best, they demonstrate there was a contractual intent by Fernandez to convey the property to Jones. But Fernandez breached their sales agreement by failing to complete the closing and by pocketing the rent without paying the mortgage on the property. The default of the mortgage then triggered the foreclosure sale, and the sale extinguished all subsequent interests, including Jones’s equitable interest, if any. See Conseco Fin. Servicing Corp. v. J & J Mobile Homes, Inc., 120 S.W.3d 878, 883 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, pet. denied) (foreclosure merges legal and equitable title and extinguishes all subsequent claims and liens).
[*4]The evidence presented by Jones did not show he received title to the property from Fernandez, and thus Jones presented less than a scintilla of evidence to support his quiet title action.[2] Therefore, the trial court did not err by granting Springboard’s motion for a no-evidence summary judgment.
CONCLUSION
The trial court’s judgment is affirmed.
[*5]