DILLARD, Presiding Judge.

Rhonda White appeals a jury verdict in favor of Kelli Stanley1 and Jason Cartee in her negligence action against them arising from an automobile accident. Specifically, White argues the trial court’s jury instruction on the preponderance-of- the-evidence standard applicable in civil cases was an incorrect statement of law that requires a new trial of this case. For the following reasons, we affirm.^[2] Eventually, White filed a negligence action against Stanley and Cartee, alleging their actions either completely or partially caused the accident, which resulted in her injuries. The case then proceeded to trial, after which the jury entered a verdict in favor of Stanley and Cartee. This appeal by White follows.

White argues the trial court’s jury instruction regarding the preponderance-of- the-evidence standard was inaccurate and misleading; and as a result, she asks us to direct the trial court to grant her a new trial. And although we agree with White that the challenged instruction was erroneous, she is, nevertheless, not entitled to a new trial on this ground.

We review de novo an allegedly erroneous jury instruction, which is “a legal question.”4 And in assessing the assertion of an erroneous jury instruction, the instruction “must be evaluated in the context of the trial court’s jury instructions as a whole.”5 Indeed, the only requirement regarding jury charges is that they were, as given, “correct statements of the law and, as a whole, would not mislead a jury of ordinary intelligence.”6 Additionally, and importantly, an erroneous charge “does not warrant a reversal unless it was harmful and, in determining harm, the entirety of the jury instructions must be considered.”7 That said, we have held that “erroneous charges are presumed to be prejudicial and harmful, but this is not conclusive because the presumption of harm which arises from a charging error may be overcome by a review of the record as a whole.”8. 1. White contends the trial court’s jury instruction regarding the challenged preponderance-of-the-evidence standard was erroneous and misleading.

In civil cases, a plaintiff must “prove liability (i.e., duty, negligence, proximate cause) by a preponderance of the evidence”9—i.e., evidence showing that “something is more likely true than not.”10 And here, over White’s objection, the trial court gave

419, 421 (2) (699 SE2d 788) (2010).

an instruction almost identical to Georgia’s suggested pattern jury instruction on the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard applicable in civil cases:

The plaintiff has the burden of proof, which means the plaintiff must prove whatever it takes to make his case, except for any admissions in the pleadings by the defendant. The plaintiff must prove his case by what is known as preponderance of the evidence; that is, evidence upon the issues involved, while not enough to wholly free the mind from a reasonable doubt, is yet sufficient to incline a reasonable and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.11 Relevant here, about 12 years ago, the General Assembly adopted our current evidence code, which applies in cases tried on or after January 1, 2013.12 And under our prior evidence code (which is inapplicable in this case), “‘preponderance of the evidence’ [was] statutorily defined [under former OCGA § 24-1-1 (5)] as that superior weight of evidence upon the issues involved, which, while not enough to free the mind wholly from a reasonable doubt, is yet sufficient to incline a reasonable and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than to the other.”13 But when the current evidence code became effective in 2013, it no longer included a statutory definition of the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard.^[14] Needless to say, we must assume the General Assembly’s decision to repeal the former evidence code’s statutory definition of preponderance of the evidence was a matter of considered choice.^[15] Importantly, in the preamble to the legislative act adopting the current evidence code, the General Assembly explained that in doing it sought “to revise, modernize, and reenact the general laws of this state relating to evidence while adopting, in large measure, the Federal Rules of Evidence.”16 Indeed, the Supreme Court of Georgia has

peace officer in order for the [statute] to apply, the statutory history shows that it knew how to do so. We must presume that its failure to do so was a matter of considered choice.” (citation and punctuation omitted)); Avila v. State, 333 Ga. App. 66, 69-70 (775 SE2d 552) (2015) (noting that the General Assembly’s use of the phrase “during the commission of the offense” in certain subsections of a criminal statute made clear that it knew how to specify that a disqualifying event must occur while the crime was in process, and that the subsection at issue did not include such a limitation); Inland Paperboard & Packaging, Inc. v. Ga. Dep’t. of Revenue, 274 Ga. App. 101, 104 (616 SE2d 873) (2005) (noting that, if the General Assembly meant to include a particular exemption in a tax statute, the statutory history showed it knew how to do so). Cf. Crum v. Jackson Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 315 Ga. 67, 77 (2) (c) (ii) (880 SE2d 205) (2022) (“Because the General Assembly repealed those statutes and chose not to reenact materially similar language, we cannot read the new statutes as having incorporated the body of decisional law that interpreted the old statutory language, at least not wholesale. . . . [When] the General Assembly, in a comprehensive effort, stitched together a new statutory scheme using only pieces of the extant body of decisional law on the subject—the most reasonable inference is that the legislature accepted the rules of decisional law that it codified and rejected those rules it did not.” (citations omitted and emphasis supplied)); see also ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts § 40, p. 256 (1st ed. 2012) (noting that statutory history, unlike legislative history, forms “part of the context of the statute . . . So, a change in the language of the prior statute presumably connotes a change in meaning . . . .”).

explained that “[m]any provisions of the new [e]vidence [c]ode were borrowed from the Federal Rules of Evidence, and when we consider the meaning of these provisions, we look to decisions of the federal appellate courts construing and applying the Federal Rules, especially the decisions of the United States Supreme Court and the Eleventh Circuit.”17 And because our General Assembly’s codified intent in enacting

Scott Carlson, CARLSON ON EVIDENCE 130 (8th ed. 2023) (“By enacting its new evidence code, Georgia follows a long list of states and other jurisdictions which have modernized evidence codes by adopting, in large measure, the Federal Rules of Evidence. The first section of the legislation enacting these rules explicitly states that it was the [codified] intent of the General Assembly to adopt the Federal Rules of Evidence, consistent with the Constitution of Georgia.”); ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 218 (1st ed. 2012) (noting that “[s]ome courts and commentators have said that the prologue [i.e., preamble to a statute] cannot be invoked when the text is clear. This limitation is reasonable if it means that the prologue cannot give words and phrases of the dispositive text itself a meaning that they cannot bear. But the limitation is unreasonable and erroneous if it means that the prologue cannot be considered in determining which of various permissible meanings the dispositive text bears. If the prologue is indeed an appropriate guide to meaning, it ought to be considered along with all other factors in determining whether the instrument is clear. The factors undermining its reliability affect its weight, not its relevance”).

the current evidence code was to, for the most part, model it after the Federal Rules of Evidence (which do not provide a definition of preponderance of the evidence), we agree with White that we must look to federal caselaw in determining Georgia’s legal definition of this evidentiary standard.

In this regard, many federal courts—including the Supreme Court of the United States and the Eleventh Circuit—have explained that “[t]he burden of showing something by a ‘preponderance of the evidence’ . . . simply requires the trier of fact to believe that the existence of a fact is more probable than its nonexistence . . . .”18 And after our prior evidence code’s statutory definition of preponderance of the evidence was repealed, the Supreme Court of Georgia provided a similar, straightforward, and brief definition of this evidentiary standard, holding that “[p]roof by a preponderance simply requires that the evidence show that something is more

of evidence that is enough to persuade you that [the plaintiff’s] claim is more likely true than not true.” Eleventh Circuit Pattern Jury Instruction 3.7.1. (emphasis omitted).

likely true than not.”19 With these guiding principles and statutory backdrop in mind, we turn to White’s claim of error.

White objects to the entire jury instruction at issue; and in doing so, primarily focuses on the trial court’s reference to the reasonable-doubt burden of proof applicable in criminal cases and its somewhat vague statement that the plaintiff “must do whatever it takes to make his case.” According to White, the court’s instruction on her burden of proof suggested to the jury that a much higher burden than the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard applied. We agree.

Applying the definition of preponderance of the evidence provided by the Supreme Court of the United States (as well as the Supreme Court of Georgia’s similar definition in White), we conclude the trial court’s jury instruction was improper even though it tracked the language of former OCGA § 24-1-1 (5) and Georgia’s current suggested pattern jury instruction. Significantly, the definitions of preponderance of the evidence provided by federal courts, as well as our Supreme Court, make no mention of the inapplicable and much higher reasonable-doubt burden of proof.^[20] And at least one federal circuit’s jury instruction on the burden of proof applicable to civil cases expressly (and helpfully) explains the difference between the civil and criminal burdens of proof, emphasizing that the familiar criminal reasonable- doubt standard does not apply in civil cases.^[21] In stark contrast, the trial court’s instruction drew the jury’s attention to the reasonable-doubt standard without explaining the important differences between the civil and criminal standards of proof or making clear that the higher burden applied in criminal cases did not apply in this particular civil case.^[22] Indeed, the trial court’s lengthy explanation of the burden of proof applicable in civil cases bears almost no relation to the simple and straightforward definition of preponderance of the evidence provided by federal courts and our Supreme Court. Regardless, even if the trial court’s instruction on preponderance of the evidence could somehow be forgivingly construed as a correct statement of law, its reference to a much higher burden of proof and failure to expressly instruct the jury that it did not apply in this case posed a significant risk of confusing or misleading the jury as to the applicable (and much lower) burden of proof. Suffice it to say, a request to charge, “although it contains a correct abstract principle of law, is properly refused, where it may be misleading or confusing in its application to the facts of the particular case.”23

Nevertheless, Stanley and Cartee contend the Supreme Court of Georgia approved of the language in former OCGA § 24-1-1 (5) because when it provided the simple and precise definition of preponderance of the evidence in White v. State24 it cited Zwiren v. Thompson,25 which was decided before our current evidence code was in effect. But in Zwiren, our Supreme Court did not substantively rule on whether the then-statutory definition of preponderance of the evidence was erroneous. Instead, the Zwiren Court merely referenced Georgia’s pattern jury instruction on preponderance of the evidence in the context of considering whether any error in a different jury instruction constituted reversible error.^[26] Similarly, in White—which involved an appeal from the defendant’s sentence in a criminal case—our Supreme Court also did not interpret or rule upon the repealed language in former OCGA § 24-1-1 (5). Instead, the White Court merely explained that the State must prove “permanent incorrigibility” only by a preponderance of the evidence;27 and in doing so, held that “[p]roof by a preponderance [of the evidence] simply requires that the evidence show that something is more likely true than not,” with a general citation to Zwiren but no substantive discussion of that case or the language in OCGA § 24-1-1 (5).

Under the foregoing circumstances, we disagree with Stanley and Cartee’s contention that White’s general, passing citation to Zwiren—after providing its brief, easy-to-understand definition of preponderance of the evidence largely mirroring the definition given by federal courts—constituted a substantive ruling that the language contained in former OCGA § 24-1-1 (5) was still legally viable. Indeed, neither White nor Zwiren ruled upon that issue and the statute has since been repealed. In sum, given the unnecessary and confusing reference to the criminal (and much higher) reasonable-doubt standard of proof that bears no relation to the straightforward definitions of preponderance of the evidence provided by our Supreme Court and federal courts,28 we agree with White that the trial court’s instruction on preponderance-of-the-evidence standard was erroneous.

2. Next, White claims the trial court’s erroneous jury charge on her burden of proof warrants a new trial. On this point, we disagree.

In Georgia, to show reversible error, there “must be harm as well as error.”29 And relevant here, the mere fact that an accident happened and the plaintiff may have sustained injuries or damages “affords no basis for recovery against a particular defendant unless the plaintiff carries the burden of proof and shows that such accident and damages were caused by specific acts of negligence on the part of that defendant.”30 In other words, a plaintiff cannot rest on “generalized allegations, but must come forward with specific facts establishing negligence.”31

Importantly, when asked about the accident at trial, White expressly testified under oath that neither Stanley nor Cartee “did anything wrong.” And given White’s own admission to the jury that neither defendant committed any specific negligent act, it is highly unlikely the trial court’s erroneous jury instruction on her burden of proof contributed to its verdict. As a result, she cannot establish that the erroneous instruction given by the trial court was harmful such that it constituted reversible error.^[32] For all these reasons, we affirm the jury’s verdict in favor of Stanley and Cartee.

Judgment affirmed. Rickman and Pipkin, JJ., concur.