PER CURIAM

Federal prisoner Aleksey Sosonko appeals pro se from the District Court’s decision denying his habeas petition filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, as well as from the District

Court’s subsequent decision denying his related motion for reconsideration. The Govern- ment has moved to summarily affirm. We hereby grant that motion and will summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment.

I.

Sosonko is serving concurrent, 160-month prison terms, imposed in 2020, for kid- napping and conspiracy to affect commerce by robbery. In 2023, after exhausting his ad- ministrative remedies, he filed a pro se § 2241 petition in the District Court, claiming that

he was entitled to time credits to his sentence pursuant to the First Step Act (“FSA”). The Government opposed the petition, arguing that (1) his kidnapping conviction rendered him statutorily ineligible for FSA time credits, and (2) to the extent that he sought to challenge the validity of that conviction, he could not do so in a § 2241 action. The District Court agreed with the Government, denying Sosonko’s § 2241 petition in a memorandum order entered May 14, 2025. Shortly thereafter, Sosonko filed a “Response to Court’s

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent.

Memorandum Order.” The District Court construed that filing as a motion for reconsider- ation and denied that relief on June 2, 2025. This timely appeal followed.

II.

We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253(a).1

We review the District Court’s decision denying § 2241 relief de novo, except that we review the District Court’s factual findings for clear error. See Denny v. Schultz, 708 F.3d

140, 143 (3d Cir. 2013). And we review the District Court’s decision denying reconsider- ation for abuse of discretion, exercising de novo review over the District Court’s legal conclusions and reviewing its factual findings for clear error. See United States ex rel.

Schumann v. Astrazeneca Pharms. L.P., 769 F.3d 837, 848 (3d Cir. 2014). Reconsideration

is warranted only if the movant shows that (1) there has been “an intervening change in the controlling law,” (2) there is new evidence that bears on the district court’s underlying decision, or (3) there is a “need to correct a clear error of law or fact or to prevent manifest injustice.” Max’s Seafood Cafe ex rel. Lou-Ann, Inc. v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d

Cir. 1999).

For substantially the reasons provided by the District Court, we agree with its deci- sions to deny Sosonko’s § 2241 petition and deny his related motion for reconsideration.

As the District Court explained, his kidnapping conviction renders him statutorily ineligible for FSA time credits, see 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(D)(xxvi), and he cannot collat-

erally attack that conviction via a § 2241 petition, see Voneida v. Johnson, 88 F.4th 233, 236 (3d Cir. 2023) (“[A] federal prisoner seeking to collaterally attack his sentence gener-

ally must do so under [28 U.S.C.] § 2255 rather than § 2241.”); see also Jones v. Hendrix, 599 U.S. 465, 478 (2023) (identifying the two exceptions to this general rule, neither of which applies in Sosonko’s case). Because this appeal does not present a substantial ques- tion, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment. See 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6.