NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

24-P-279

COMMONWEALTH vs.

HAROLD NUNEZ REYES.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The defendant, Harold Nunez Reyes, appeals from a conviction, after a bench trial in the District Court, of malicious destruction of property, G. L. c. 266, § 127. The defendant's conviction was based on damage to the apartment he rented from the victim. Concluding that the testimony that the defendant and the victim had an acrimonious relationship and that the defendant's apartment was substantially damaged once the defendant was required to move out provided sufficient evidence to establish identity and malicious destruction of property, we affirm.

elements, along with the identity of the defendant, are at issue in this appeal.

animosity apparently towards one another," and that he was "at housing court many times with [the defendant]." The defendant "denied [the victim] access repeatedly" when he would attempt "to go through [the defendant's apartment] with a worker" to fix reported issues with the apartment. When the victim would "make a plan [with] 24-hour notice," which the defendant would confirm "multiple times," the defendant would still "come out and say, Nope, you can't come in."

Evidence of the ongoing dispute between the defendant and the victim was supported by testimony from other witnesses. An official from the Salem Board of Health (board) testified that the defendant would "continually complain about the same issues that [were] raised in the report" to the board. A police officer corroborated the health official's report and testified that "[t]here was some other type of civil court issue that they had where [the defendant] was having to remove himself from the apartment."

Our conclusion is bolstered by the defendant's repeated false statements that the damage had been there from before the tenancy. Although the health official had personally observed the apartment "in relatively good condition" between April and June 2019, the defendant stated to the official that the "damage had been there all along" and that "it was already there, it wasn't new." The trier of fact could infer from the defendant's false statements that he was trying to hide his own responsibility for the damage. See Commonwealth v. Vega, 54 Mass. App. Ct. 249, 253 (2002).

Although the evidence established that the defendant's girlfriend also had some issues with the defendant, there is little evidence of the girlfriend's involvement. ^[1] The board received the complaint from the defendant, not the girlfriend. The housing inspection report does not list the girlfriend, but only the defendant. The girlfriend was not present at the final inspection. "In order to convict on circumstantial evidence, it is not necessary to show that it was not in the power of any other person than the defendant to commit the crime." Commonwealth v. Winfield, 76 Mass. App. Ct. 716, 721 (2010), quoting Commonwealth v. Fancy, 349 Mass. 196, 200 (1965). The Commonwealth's evidence, "when taken together, 'formed a "mosaic" of evidence such that [a factfinder] could conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt'" that it was indeed the defendant who destroyed the victim's property. Commonwealth v. Pardee, 105 Mass. App. Ct. 496, 503 (2025), quoting Quinones, 95 Mass. App. Ct. at 162.

like it had been smashed." The defendant was not acting in a merely casual or reckless manner when he "deliberately destroyed a considerable amount of his landlord's property." Commonwealth v. Gordon, 82 Mass. App. Ct. 227, 233 (2012).

The trier of fact could reasonably find that the damage to the apartment was "gratuitous, excessive," and "hostile to the owner of the property." Commonwealth v. Doyle, 83 Mass. App. Ct. 384, 388 (2013), quoting Commonwealth v. Redmond, 53 Mass. App. Ct. at 5. This property damage, which occurred just prior to the defendant's eviction, was not a "deliberate condition precedent to effectuating" any goal of the defendant other than pure destruction. Commonwealth v. Wynn, 42 Mass App. Ct. 452, 456 (1997). Contrast Redmond, supra at 4 ("While the evidence was sufficient to support the conclusion that the defendant's principal goal was theft of the computers, it was insufficient to establish that the destruction of a door was more than a means to that end"). The trier of fact could reasonably conclude "that by design [the defendant] purposefully destroyed [much of the apartment] motivated by hostility, cruelty, or vengeance toward [the victim] as opposed to the resulting damage being occasioned by, or incidental to" any other desire. Gordon, 82 Mass. App. Ct. at 232. Accordingly, the judge properly denied the defendant's motions for a required finding of not guilty. ^[2]

Judgment affirmed.

By the Court (Ditkoff, D'Angelo & Wood, JJ. ^[3]),